TELOS

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

ANDREW FRASER teaches law in McQuarie University in Australia. DAN DINER lives and teaches sociology in Frankfurt, West Germany. ALBRECHT WELLMER teaches sociology at the University of Konstanz in West Germany. MICHAEL McKEON teaches English in Boston University. ARSHI PIPA teaches Italian and Albanian at the University of Minnesota. Originally from New Zealand, DAVID BUXTON now lives and works in Paris. MARTHA HERBERT resides in New York City. A *Telos* editor, RUSSELL BERMAN teaches German at Stanford University. FERENC FEHER and AGNES HELLER have recently come out with a new book, *Dictatorship over Needs.* Both live in Melbourne, Australia. IVAN SVITAK teaches philosophy at Chico State University in California. MANFRED FRANK teaches philosophy at the University of Koblenz, West Germany. ROBERT ANTONIO teaches sociology at the University of Kansas. MAURIZIO D'ENTRÈVES is a philosophy graduate student at Boston University. MOISHE GONZALES is a construction worker in New York City. JOHANNES BERGER is a regular *Telos* reviewer. FRANK HEARN teaches sociology at the State University of New York at Cortland. ROBERT EHRLICH teaches sociology at the University of California at Berkeley. SANG-KI KIM teaches philosophy at Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville. JOHN CLARK teaches philosophy at Loyala University in New Orleans. Finally, JOHN WALLACH is a graduate student in political science at Yale University.

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THE CORPORATION AS A BODY POLITIC

by Andrew Fraser

For most radical social theorists, it goes almost without saying that the business corporation is and always has been, by its very nature, an essentially economic entity. As such, one would expect the corporation to measure its performance according to the standard of profit maximization. However, the validity of that assumption has been under constant challenge ever since the appearance, in 1932, of Berle and Means' classic work, *The Modern Corporation and Private Property.*[1] In that book, Berle and Means set out to demonstrate that the modern corporation had effectively undermined what they called "the traditional logic of property," thereby calling into question the continued efficacy and relevance of the profit motive to the modern business enterprise.

According to Berle and Means, the common law doctrines governing the structure and objects of the early nineteenth century business corporation had united the basic attributes of property — ownership and control — in the stockholders who together constituted the body corporate. In the modern business corporation, however, control was fast slipping away from the legal owners of the corporation, the stockholders, into the hands of a managerial class possessed of inside knowledge, business skills, and a technical and operational mastery of the corporate enterprise that a widely dispersed body of stockholders with a limited commitment to the enterprise could not hope to match. The consequence has been a splitting off of the control function from formal legal ownership. That separation of ownership and control has been seen as the prelude to a shift in the orientation of corporate activity, away from a narrow preoccupation with the maximization of profits towards other, more socially responsible, goals. Berle and Means themselves suggested that the separation of ownership and control could provide both the foundation and the need for the effective legitimation of corporate enterprise. In their view "it is conceivable — indeed it seems almost inevitable if the corporate system is to survive — that the "control" of the great corporations should develop into a purely neutral technocracy, balancing a variety of claims by various groups in the community and assigning to each a portion of the income stream on the basis of public policy rather than private cupidity."[2]

In response, Leftists have devoted a great deal of intellectual energy to the task of refuting the managerialist thesis that "the old-fashioned hunt for profits" has been subordinated "to a variety of other, quantitatively less precise but qualitatively more worthy, objectives." Baran and Sweezy, for example,

1. Adolph A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, *The Modern Corporation and Private Property* (New York, 1932).
2. *Ibid*, pp. 293-313.

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sought to demonstrate that, in fact, "the economy of large corporations is more, not less, dominatd by the logic of profit-making than the economy of small entrepreneurs ever was." In adopting that tactic, Baran, Sweezy and others have accepted, quite uncritically, the orthodox Marxist claim that only a sweeping program of socialization or nationalization could ever successfully legitimate corporate enterprise by cleansing it of the stigma of "private cupidity." Curiously, that conclusion can be made tenable only if one accepts, equally uncritically, the further assumption that "the traditional logic of property," as embodied in the early nineteenth century business corporation, represented an ideal vehicle for the unrestrained expression of the profit motive.[3]

This article will argue that an examination of the legal history of the corporation in the early American republic provides clear evidence that the traditional logic of property expressed something other than the stern and single-minded logic of profit maximization. Most Leftist critiques of the managerialist thesis have failed to perceive that the fusion of ownership and control endowed the traditional logic of property with a decidedly *political* significance. It will be shown below that the common law doctrines governing the corporation assumed that even the private business corporation should be treated as a body politic, or, in other words, as an association of persons imbued with the civic ethos appropriate to a genuine republican comunity.

Once we grasp the political meaning attached to the traditional common law understanding of property it will become apparent that the emergence of the corporation as a private, economic engine of capital accumulation was contingent upon the same separation of ownership and control that Berle and Means, Galbraith[4] and others cite as evidence of the post-capitalist nature of the modern corporate system. Understood as a phase in the evolution of the capitalist system, the separation of ownership and control was a necessary step

3. Paul A. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy, *Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economic and Social Order*, (New York 1968), pp. 20-28. According to Baran and Sweezy, "The contradiction between the increasing rationality of society's methods of production and the organizations which embody them on the one hand and the undiminished elementality and irrationality in the functioning and perception of the whole creates that ideological wasteland which is the hallmark of monopoly capitalism." The problem of legitimacy can therefore be overcome only by creating a rational social order within which private appropriation will no longer stand in contradiction to the socialization of production. The degree to which the Left discussion of managerialism simply takes for granted the historical assumptions embodied in Berle and Mean's description of the "traditional topic of property" is evident in the debate between Robert Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer, on the one hand, and James O'Connor and Paul Sweezy, on the other. See, Robert Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer, "Who Rules the Corporation? Part I,: *Socialist Revolution* 4 (July-August 1970); Robert Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer, "Who Rules the Corproations? Part II," *Socialist Revolution* 5 (September-October 1970); Robert Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer, "Who Rules the Corproations? Part III," *Socialist Revolution* 6 (November-December 1970); James O'Connor, "Question: Who Rules the Corporations? Answer: The Ruling Class," *Socialist Revolution* 7 (January-February 1971); Robert Fitch "Reply to O'Connor," *Ibid.*; Paul M. Sweezy, "The Resurgence of Financial Control: Fact or Fantasy?," *Socialist Revolution* 8 (March-April 1972). See also, John Scott, *Corporations, Classes and Captialism* (London, 1979).

4. *John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State* (Toronto, 1968).

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in the growth of the capital market. By factoring out an "irrelevant" political dimension which had been imported into the investment relation by the common law, the splitting off of ownership from control made it possible for stockholders to relate to the body corporate as simple investors rather than as members of what amounted to a political association. The corporate device then came to be valued in terms of its economic utility.

The corporation, in short, was shorn of its identity as a body politic. That loss of political identity did not occur simply because the propertied classes were single-mindedly devoted to the pursuit of the private gains which could be reaped through use of the corporate device. On the contrary, the emergence of the corporation as an essentially economic entity owed as much, if not more, to a tradition of American radicalism burning with the anti-institutional spirit of evangelical Christianity. So long as the corporation stood as a "little republic," endowed with an identity and purpose of its own through a special act of a state legislature, it remained open to radical attack as a bastion of monopoly and special privilege. In the end, only general incorporation laws, which placed the corporate instrument at the disposal of everyone who could employ it to their own private economic advantage, would dampen that radical hostility. The emergence of the modern corporate system thus owes much to the radical assault on the corporation as a body politic.

It should be made clear that the foregoing argument is not one that can be supported by the weight of historiographical opinion. Most work on the legal history of the American corporation has been deeply influenced by Berle and Means. The realist or Progressive interpretation of the place of the corporation in early American history, as found in the work of Louis Hartz, Oscar and Mary Handlin, and James Willard Hurst,[5] portrays it as an arm of the newly-established democratic state governments seeking to promote economic growth and development (an argument which provided a convenient historical legitimation of the early New Deal). Originally conceived as an instrument of state economic policy, the corporate form very early took on a life of its own. In this view, precisely because the corporate instrument was so well adapted to the needs and circumstances of a dynamic economy in the early phase of what would prove to be a virtually limitless expansion, the corporation soon became in law what it had always been in fact — a private, profit-seeking institution.

According to the Hartz-Handlin-Hurst thesis, the business corporation has always been an essentially *economic* organization. As a consequence, the fundamental policy question facing Americans in the early nineteenth century —a question which remains as vital today — was whether the acknowledged economic utility of the corporate device would be deployed to

5. Louis Hartz, *Economic Policy and Democratic Thought: Pennsylvania, 1776-1860* (Cambridge, Mass., 1948), Oscar Handlin and Mary Flug Handlin, *Commonwealth: A Study of the Role of Government in the American Economy: Massachusetts, 1774-1861* (Cambridge, Mass., rev. ed. 1969); James Willard Hurst, *The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in the Law of the United States, 1780-1970* (Charlottesville, 1970).

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secure public or private ends.

The relative ease with which the corporation was captured by businessmen as a vehicle for their own private interests reflected, according to Hurst, the primitive and clumsy nature of the techniques of legal and administrative regulation available to state policy makers in the early republic. More specifically, the inherited assumptions of an English common law tradition which had little experience of the corporation as a business enterprise served only to confuse the real issues by imposing anachronistic and unrealistic limitations on the use of the corporate device.[6] The fact, for example, that corporate charters could be obtained only by special act of the state legislatures tended to generate "recurrent political controversy over the social acceptability of such corporate status." To Hurst, the efforts of Democratic politicians to equate the grant of corporate charters with aristocratic privilege obscured the real economic issues at stake in such a procedure. "This confused combat" over corporate privileges "offers instructive lessons on the waste which the development of public policy may involve when legal processes produce unreal issues, wrong issues, or deflected attention."[7]

The Private Corporation and Aristocratic Privilege

One must, however, ask: To what extent was the charge that corporate characters served as bastions of aristocratic privilege "unreal?" Were corporations in the early nineteenth century viewed by businessmen simply "as a socially useful instrument of economic growth?"[8] Can we assume that the property entrusted to corporate ownership and control was not thus given over to the service of a predominantly Federalist property-owning elite seeking to secure the material foundation for its continued political and ideological hegemony within post-revolutionary American society? Can we safely ignore the political objectives secured by the traditional logic of property?

In post-revolutionary America property remained charged with an essentially political significance. By the time of the American Revolution, a political culture had developed in the mainland colonies which had been deeply influenced by the Atlantic republican tradition. That tradition of civic humanism was based, according to Pocock, on "a civic and patriotic ideal in which the personality was founded in property, perfected in citizenship and perpetually threatened by corruption; government figuring paradoxically as the principal source of corruption and operating through such means as patronage, faction, standing armies (opposed to the ideal of the militia), established churches...and the promotion of a monied interest..."[9] Even after the revolution, property ownership was closely linked to formal civil status.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 1-9; see also, Shaw Livermore, *Early American Land Companies: Their Influence on Corporate Development*, (New York, 1939), pp. 5-6.

7. Hurst, *op. cit.*, pp. 28, 30.

8. Hurst, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-61, 70.

9. J.G.A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton, 1975), p. 507.

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Property or freehold qualifications for the suffrage were by no means uncommon and persisted until well into the nineteenth century in many areas.[10] While the concept of an hereditary aristocracy had been decisively rejected, it was still widely assumed by the Founding Fathers and their generation "that the alternative to a hereditary, entrenched, or artificial aristocracy was a natural aristocracy — an elite of persons distinguished by natural superiority of talent, but also by contingent material advantages such as property, leisure and learning, as possessing the qualities of mind required by the classical Few."[11]

To those patrician elites, distinguished by their visible property and culture, and standing ready to play the role of natural aristocracy, the ideas of popular sovereignty, thrown up by the revolution and embodied in the Federal Constitution of 1787, threatened the foundations of civic virtue in the new republic. If sovereignty rested in the undifferentiated mass of the people-at-large who had withdrawn from government, leaving its conduct to their elected representatives in the functionally distinct legislative, executive and judicial branches, how could rule by the virtuous Few be guaranteed? Everywhere, "spokesmen for 'the poor and middling orders' were directly challenging the eighteenth century assumption that social authority was a necessary prerequisite to the wielding of political power." The "Federalists could not ignore George Mason's warning that the genius of the American people was in favor of democracy, ' and that the genius of the people must be consulted.' " The Antifederalist assault on the proposed Constitution of 1787 took on, for the defenders of natural aristocracy, the aspect of "war...levied on the virtue, property and distinctions in the community."[12]

The Federalists were not opposed to the governmental power of the states as such. A strong government was regarded as a vital necessity if the licentious propensities of the Many were to be held in check. They were, however, appalled by the character of the men who had come to dominate the state governments. Vulgar, upstart state politicians riding on the crest of the wave of democratic enthusiasm were distinguished, in Federalist eyes, mainly by the narrowness of interest and vision they displayed. It was their hope, spelled out in the *Federalist Papers*, that the very size of the new republic and the "great height of the new national government...would prevent unprincipled and vicious men, the obscure and local-minded men who had gained power in the state legislatures, from scaling its walls." The federal government would filter out "from the mass of the society the purest and noblest characters which it contains." The cream of society would naturally rise to the top if election by the people took place within electoral districts large enough to render the crass electioneering and demagoguery of merely local factions ineffectual. John Jay, for one, was convinced that while local influence might give almost

10. Chilton Williamson, *American Suffrage: From Property to Democracy, 1760-1860* (Princeton, 1860).

11. Pocock, *op. cit.*, p. 515.

12. Gordon S. Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787* (New York 1972), pp. 471-518, 5-3.

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anyone access to power at the state level, a "yet more general and extensive reputation for talents and other qualifications will be necessary to recommend men to offices under the national government." By means of "the artificial contrivance of the Constitution overlying an expanded society, the Federalists meant to restore and to prolong the traditional kind of elitist influence in politics that social developments, especially since the Revolution, were undermining."[13] If that strategy was to succeed, it was absolutely imperative that "the best men in the country" take steps to reassert and secure their political and cultural hegemony on the terrain of civil society itself. Recognizing that necessity, important elements within the old propertied elite developed a program of political and social activism which amounted to a "revolution of American conservatism."[14] The success of that program required the creation of a battery of instituional instruments capable of conquering and colonizing American civil society in the name of the classical Few.

The device of incorporation was ideally suited to serve the needs of that conservative strategy. The widespread use of the corporate form by the commercial and professional gentry of the early republic represented a means of reasserting the civil status of the "natural aristocracy" that was no less effective and much more direct, than the new Federalist party and its electioneering press which were similarly deployed against the levelling influences of Jeffersonian democracy. By granting corporate charters to various forms of business activity, the state legislatures formally acknowledged the civil status of property devoted to the pursuit of corporate ends. Possession of a corporate charter allowed bankers, turnpike, canal and railroad operators — and even a few manufacturers — to claim that their business enterprises were infused with a substantial public interest.[15] Any enterprise endowed with a charter was lifted above the crass pursuit of a merely private interest by the common law conception of the corporation as an association of persons vested by policy of the law with certain powers deemed necessary to the successful promotion of some design of general utility and public benefit.

The definition of the public interests at stake in the life of the early nineteenth century business corporation was not the exclusive province of the state legislatures. Precisely because the corporation was recognized as a creature of the common law, the courts — staffed and controlled largely by judges and lawyers whose Federalist sympathies were rarely in doubt — very early came to play the major role in defining the meaning and scope of the rights, duties and privileges conferred by the grant of a corporate charter. By 1807 the Supreme Judicial Court in Massachusetts had established that no one could be required to become a member of "private" corporation against his

13. Alexander Hamilton, *et al. The Federalist* (New York, 1937); Wood, *op. cit.*, pp. 512-513.

14. David Hackett Fischer, *The Revolution of American Conservatism: the Federalist Party in the Era of Jeffersonian Democracy* (New York, 1965).

15. See, e.g., James B. Hedges, *The Browns of Providence Plantation: The Nineteenth Century* (Providence, 1968) esp. Chapter IX, "Private Enterprise in the Public Interest."

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will. That decision, in *Ellis v. Marshall*, represents the first judicial recognition in Anglo-American law of the distinction between "public" and "private" corporations. Public corporations were those established with a view to the "general good." Private corporations were created instead for the "private emolument" of their owners. The clear implication of the judgment was that the private corporation should be conceived, not as an arm of the state, but as a free association of private property owners pursuing their own autonomously defined goals.[16]

Once it had been established that the grant of a corporate charter was a privilege that could be refused, it remained only to confirm, first of all, that a corporate charter, once granted, could not be revoked, and second, that the concept of a "private corporation" extended beyond and included many corporations other than those established for the purpose of "private emolument." That dual task was performed brilliantly by the "crypto-Federalist" Justice Joseph Story in the *Dartmouth College* case decided by the United States Supreme Court.[17]

The issue in that case was whether the New Hampshire legislature could alter or repeal the original charter granted to Dartmouth College without the consent of the college trustees. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire had been prepared to permit such an alteration on the ground that, because the college had been established to serve a public purpose, it was a public corporation. In striking down that decision, Story denied that the distinguishing feature of the private corporation was the pursuit of private profit. Private property could be applied to public purposes without forfeiting its right to security: "...who ever thought before, that the munificent gifts of private donors for general charity became instantaneously the property of the government; and that the trustees appointed by the donors, whether corporate or unincorporated, might be compelled to yield up their rights to whomsoever the government might appoint to administer them."[18]

Story's Federalist instincts gave him a powerful understanding of the relationship between private property and the political, moral and cultural hegemony of the classical Few. He recognized that to limit the concept of the private corporation to "those which are created for the immediate benefit and advantage of individuals" would amount to an abandonment by the natural aristocracy of its claim to possess a special sort of civic virtue grounded in the experience of property ownership. Property carried with it both civic responsibilities and the burden of charity. For Story, it was axiomatic that the moral authority of the propertied classes could be preserved only so long as the right of private control over charitable and educational corporations was recognized and secured as a fundamental constitutional principle. The distinction between public and private corporations therefore related, not to

16. *Ellis v. Marshall* (1807) 2 Tyng 168.

17. *Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward* (1814) 17 U.S. 518; *Gerald T. Dunne, Justice Joseph Story and the Rise of the Supreme Court* (New York, 1970), p. 49.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 672; The New Hampshire court's decision is reported in *Dartmouth College v. Woodward* (1817) 1 N.H. Rep. III.

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their objects or purposes, but rather to the interests at stake in each. Public corporations included only those corporations "founded by the government for public purposes, where the whole interests belong also to the government." If, on the other hand, "the foundation be private, though under the charter of the government, the corporation is private, however extensive the uses may be to which it is devoted, either by the bounty of the founder or the nature and objects of the institution."[19]

The Corporate Public Sphere

Story's judgment in *Dartmouth College* made it clear that the public purposes served by the private corporation were very largely defined and administered by the corporation itself. Those purposes were necessarily therefore a matter of political discussion and negotiation within the corporation itself. Accordingly, the common law rules relating to the internal governance of the corporation recognized and constituted a public sphere internal to the body corporate. Those rules applied with equal force to all private corporations, whether they were engaged in business, educational or eleemosynary activity. Precisely because the private corporation was constituted as a body politic, not even private decision-makers could escape a confrontation with the civic values which corporate enterprise was expected to serve.

A public realm internal to the corporation was established first of all by applying to private corporations the "rule applicable to municipal corporations — viz., that all corporate affairs must be transacted at an assembly convened upon due notice, at a proper time and place, consisting of the proper number of persons, the proper officers, classes, etc...."[20] Some judges also

19. *Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward* (1819) 17 U.S. 508 at pp. 663-672. In *The Organization of American Culture, 1700-1900: Private Institutions, Elites and the Origins of American Nationality* (New York, 1982), Peter Dobkin Hall discusses the importance of private control over educational and charitable corporations to the post-revolutionary propertied elites attempting to reconstitute their moral, cultural and political hegemony within American civil society. Unfortunately, Hall fails to recognize that the common law conception of the corporation required that even the proprietors of private business corporations pay at least formal heed to the "public interest" in the conduct of their enterprises. Nor does Hall consider how that circumstance shaped the traditional logic of private property. In the ante-bellum private corporation, the separation of social prestige and political authority enjoined by the theory of liberal constitutionalism was at least partially reversed. With the subsequent collapse of the traditional logic of property, the authority which once attached to the private ownership of property has been effectively socialized. The right of property no longer denotes an exclusive dominion over a specific thing. Instead, the concept of property has expanded to include any enforceable claim to some portion of the income stream generated by the process of social wealth. Similarly, authority has become progressively detached from natural persons and lodged instead in "agents of the community." To the modern liberal mind, the authority vested in a specific natural person is bound to be both subjective and arbitrary. For that reason, the authority wieled by elite groups in the age of total administration comes to be conceived, by the managers of the system itself, not as a form of the private power once exercised by natural persons, but rather as a constituent element of "the social." This analysis is pursued further in Andrew Fraser, "The Spirit of the Laws: Capitalism and the Decline of the Republican Tradition in American Legal Thought," (forthcoming somewhere). On the relationship between liberalism and the socialization of authority, see Sheldon Wolin, *Politics and Vision* (Boston, 1960).

20. Joseph K. Angell and Samuel Ames, *A Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations Aggregate* (New York, 1972, original ed., 1832), p. 275.

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recognized that the identity of the corporation as a body politic implied that the body corporate should be treated as an association of formally equal natural persons. Such a recognition flew in the face of strong pressures to treat the corporation instead as a private, profit-seeking unit of capital accumulation. The most obvious way of bending to that pressure would be to allow the members of private business corporations to vote by *share* rather than by *voice*.

As a matter of political practice, state legislatures often included just such an arrangement in the charters they printed. But, as a matter of law, Chief Justice Hornblower of the New Jersey Supreme Court was one judge who was in no doubt that the role of the stockholder in a body corporate was homologous with that played by the citizen in a republican polity. For that reason, voting by *share* or by *proxy* was "at variance with the spirit, and with the fundmental principles of our civil and political institutions." In the absence of some special legislative authorization, "every corporator, every individual member of a body politic, whether public or private, is *prima facie*, entitled to equal rights...In joint stock companies the owner of one share or action of the capital stock, is, in general, a member of the company; a corporator; and, as such, entitled to, and cannot be denied, the entire rights and privileges of a member...Those rights and privileges, are definite and certain, they cannot be greater or different in one member than they are in another."[21]

The survial of the corporate public sphere was possible therefore only so long as it retained the form of an Aristotelian polity, that is to say, "an association of persons formed with a view to some good purpose."[22] The specific objects or purposes for which the corporation had been created were central to its political identity. The courts consistently refused to sanction actions taken by a corporation or its agents which exceeded the powers granted by the corporate charter. Such actions were branded *ultra vires*. If corporate directors or a majority of shareholders (or, *a fortiori*, of shares) were free to pursue whatever objectives seemed most likely to enhance their particular interests, even over the objections of a minority, the integrity of the corporate public realm would be destroyed. In the words of the New York court which decided *Abbot v. American Hard Rubber Company*, "boards of directors are agents of the corporation to manage its affairs, and carry out the purpose and object of its formation, and not to inflict upon it political death." By selling those corporate assets, including patent rights, without which the business of manufac-

21. *Taylor v. Griswold* (1834) 2 Green Rep. (N.J.) 223 at p. 229, 237. Membership in a body corporate was expected to be accompanied by a sense of civic responsibility. Hornblower noted that voting by proxy might suit the personal convenience of members, but it could not "be for the good of the corporation": "The interest of the company, the good of the public, would be better promoted and more effectually secured by the personal attendance of, and mutual interchange of opinions among the members, than by the action of proxies, at least this is the fair and legal presumption. If one member may appear and vote by proxy at elections, and on other matters of vital importance to the institution they all may, and so the welfare and interest of the company and of the public, be utterly neglected." Cf. *contra., State ex rel. Kilbourn vs. Tudor* (1812) 5 Day's Rep. (Conn.) 329.

22. Aristotle, *The Politics*, trans. T.A. Sinclair (Harmondsworth, 1962), p. 25.

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turing Indian rubber could not be carried on over the objections of the plaintiff shareholder, the directors in *Abbot* had "effectually" destroyed the company "for all the purposes for which it was formed. It [was] no longer the same corporation."[23] That doctrine of *ultra vires* operated as a brake on the emergence of the modern business corporation which, according to Hurst, has served as "an instrument to provide firm central direction for the enterprising use of pooled assets" in multi-unit enterprises whose only necessary common denominator and object is the pursuit of profit.[24]

Political Utility of the Corporation

The existence of a corporate public sphere constituted by special act of the state legislature meant that the private corporation of the early nineteenth century was "a political institution merely, and it [had], therefore, no other capacities than such as [were] necessary to effect the purpose of its creation."[25] The political nature of the private corporation — an analytical category which embraced a wide range of ecclesiastical, eleemosynary and business corporations — was clearly and explicitly recognized by lawyers, judges and treatise writers throughout the new republic. It does not seem far-fetched, therefore, to suppose that the propertied classes of the early republic were attracted to the corproate form as much by its *political* as by its *economic* utility. One finds, for example, that the importance of the corporate form to the maintenance of a stable and well ordered polity was clearly recognized in the ecclesastical law of post-revolutionary Massachusetts. Article III of the Declaration of Rights appended to the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 declared that, "the good order and preservation of civil government, essentially depend upon piety, religion and morality." The existence and survival of those virtues was seen to depend, in turn, upon the public worship of God, conceived, not as a matter of individual conscience, but as a public duty. The legislature was directed, therefore, to "authorize and require the several towns, parishes, precincts, and other bodies politic, or religious societies, to make suitable provisions, at their own expense, for the institution of the public worship of God, and for the support and maintenance of public Protes-

23. *Abbot v. American Hard Rubber Company* 1861) 33 Barb, 578 at pp. 578 at pp. 583, 591-592. In *The Human Condition* (Chicago, 1968), Hannah Arendt points out that the term "public" refers to "the world itself," insofar as it is common to all of us and distinguished from our privately own place in it." That the doctrine of *ultra vires* was necessary to distinguish the "common world" of the corporation from the privately owned place within it of the individual shareholder was recognized by Angell and Ames *op. cit.*, when they quoted the standard common law definition of the corporation: "A corporation, or body politic, or body incorporate is a collection of many individuals united in one body...and vested by the policy of the law with a capacity...of enjoying privileges and immunities *in common*, and of exercising a variety of political rights, more or less extensive, according to the design of its institution, or the powers of conferred upon it, either at the time of its creation, or at any subsequent period of its existence." (p. 1).

24. Hurst, *op. cit.*, p. 26; The distinction between the single-unit "traditional business enterprise," governed by the doctrine of *ultra vires*, and the "modern multi-unit business enterprise is derived from Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., *The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business* (Cambridge, Mass., 1977), p. 3.

25. Angell and Ames, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

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tant teachers of piety, religion and morality, in all cases where such provision shall not be made voluntarily."[26]

The Masschusetts courts lent their full weight to that religious establishment. Judges and lawyers alike clearly perceived the compulsory, tax-supported, public worship of God as an essential bulwark of the established social order. When a Massachusetts corporation sought to escape the parish tax levy on the grounds that, because a corporation had no soul, it could derive no benefit from publicly supported religious instruction, the court was quick to point out "that the interests of corporations are promoted...equally with those of individuals." After all, as counsel for the parish had observed, "So far as the community is interested in the support of public, religious and moral instruction, it regards only the prevention of crimes, not the salvation of souls." The court took it as self-evident that property, including corporate property, "is made more secure, both by the education of children, and the religious and moral instruction of adults."[27]

The judiciary was convinced further that the capacity of religious teaching to secure property and good order required that the public tax monies gathered to support "public Protestant teachers" of religion and morality be directed only to those churches and religious societies whose links to the established structure of civil authority had been formally acknowleged through a grant of incorporation. Prior to 1811, the Massachusetts courts consistently denied that any religious teacher at all was authorized to recover the religious taxes paid by members of his congregation. In *Washburn v. West Springfield*,[28] the court rejected the claim of an itinerant Methodist preacher on the ground that he "had never been ordained over a certain specified place of parish." If such a claim were allowed, the court declared, "it would have the most direct tendency to subvert all the regular religious societies in the community." Only ministers ordained to preach within religious societies which had been formally recognized as "bodies corporate and politic" were entitled to public support. In *Barnes v. Falmouth*, Chief Justice Parsons claimed that the words "religious societies" in the third article of the 1780 Declaration of Rights "must, from the nature of the duty imposed on them, necessarily mean societies having corporate power; beause without those powers, the duty cannot be legally performed, a voluntary association having no legal authority to assess money on all the members or to compel payment, or to elect a teacher by the vote of the greater part."

If the constitution had made the public worship of God a formal civic right and duty, it followed, for Parsons, that religious teaching was a *public* function to be performed only by *public* teachers. "But a public teacher must be a

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26. The text of the Declaration of Rights can be found in Jacob C. Meyer, *Church and State in Masschusetts, From 1740 to 1833: A Chapter in the History of the Development of Individual Freedom.* (Cleveland, 1930); See also Edward Buck, *Massachusetts Ecclesiastical Law* (Boston, 1866).

27. *Amesbury Nail Factory Company v. Weed* (1820) 17 Mass. Rep. 42.

28. *Washburn v. West Springfield* (1804) 1 Mass. Rep. 32.

29. *Barnes v. Falmouth* (1810) 6 Mass. Rep. 400 at p. 412.

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teacher of some public, and not of any private religious society." The difference between the two was clear: "A public society is a society known in law, formed by the public authority of the state; and a private society is formed by the voluntary association of private persons, the powers of which are derived from the individual assent of each member,"[30] The effect of those decisions was to require members of dissenting sects whose churches lacked corporate status to contribute through their taxes to the support of the established Congregationalist churches in each parish. Both congregations and clergy in the Congregationalist churches were notoriously Federalist in their outlook and political sympathies.[31]

The political significance of the corporate form as it was employed in religious affairs did not escape the attention of Massachusetts Republicans. Once they had gained control of the state legislature in 1810, the Republicans moved to overturn Parson's decision in *Barnes v. Falmouth* by passing the *Religious Freedom Act* of 1811. That law made it possible to avoid paying taxes for the support of the established church by providing a certificate showing that one belonged to a religious society, corporate or unincorporated, other than the regularly established society of the town or parish. Dissenters, other than Quakers, were still required to pay taxes but their taxes could be directed to the support of their own ministers.[32] Federalist judges saw the act as a fundamental threat to "the decency and regularity of public worship." By permitting dissenters to "withdraw themselves from the regular and established religious societies in towns and parishes" which remained obliged, by law, to support a public religious teacher, the law could only tend to weaken the influence of the established churches by increasing the burdens on those who remained within them.[33] Federalist hostility to the law was so strong that at least one historian has concluded that, if a serious split had not developed within the established Congregational churches, it probably would have been repealed.[34]

The Church v. The Corporate Parish

The schism that separated Unitarians and Orthodox Calvinists within the Congregational churches forced the courts to deal with a sharp, but hitherto latent, contradiction between the conception of the church as a body politic and another view emphasizing its identity as a community of confirmed Christian believers. That issue came to a head in 1820 when the Orthodox majority of the First Parish church in Dedham seceded in protest against the election of a Unitarian minister by the parish. The potential for conflict between "church" and "parish" had existed ever since Article III of the 1780 Declaration of Rights had provided "that the several towns, parishes, pre-

30. *Ibid.*, at p. 413. In *Terret v. Taylor* (1815) 9 Cranch. 43, Justice Story would make it clear that what Parsons described as a "public religious society" should be classified as a private corporation.

31. Meyer, *op. cit.*, Chapter 5.

32. Buck, *op. cit.*, pp. 44-45.

33. *Adams v. Howe* (1817) 14 Mass. Rep. 344 at pp. 344-345, 348.

34. *Meyer, op. cit.*, p. 157.

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cincts and other bodies politic, or religious societies, shall, at all times, have the exclusive right of electing their public teachers and of contracting with them for their support and maintenance."[35]

In the Dedham case, the Orthodox majority of the church (i.e., the body of communicants) insisted that the name, records, and property of the first church in Dedham "belonged to the church as an ecclesiastical body, without any connection with the parish." That argument was flatly rejected by Chief Justice Parker who declared that, "A church cannot subsist but in connection with some corporate parish or religious society." While conceding that a church might exist as a purely *ecclesiastical* body independently of some regularly constituted parish or religious society, Parker was adamant that, for all civil purposes, "it is certain that it has no legal qualities, and more especially that it cannot exercise any control over property which it may have held in trust for the society with which it had been formerly connected." The conclusion was inescapable: by withdrawing from the regularly constituted religious society of the parish, the Orthodox majority ceased to be members of that particular church leaving the minority constituted as the first church of Dedham and in sole legal possession of the rights and property belonging to it.[36]

Chief Justice Parker's judgment in *Baker v. Fales* has been subjected to sharp and bitter criticism, not only by Orthodox Congregationalists, but also by legal historians. Both groups have asserted that Parker's decision flew in the face of the "ancient usages of pious ancestors," who had recognized the church itself, as distinct from the parish, as a corporate body in its own right. According to Goebel, for example, clear evidence "of the admitted corporate capacity" of the Congregationalist church can be found in the fact that, until the mid-eighteenth century, "no question appears to have been raised as to its capacity to deal with its property as a juristic entity." In his view "the absence of acts incorporating churches necessarily drives us to the conclusion that as far as ecclesiastical bodies were concerned, the Separatist doctrine that association alone was sufficient to make a corporation became for at least a century the accepted legal doctrine in the New England colonies not questioned judicially until the courts of a later generation invented a theory which placated their outraged common law consciences."[37]

Goebel suggests that Parker's judgment was, therefore, an "extreme position" marked by "a great confusion of ideas and a complete disregard for earlier history."[38] Only a complete insensitivity to the political significance of the corporate form in post-revolutionary Massachusetts could make such a charge credible. The issues in the Dedham case extended far beyond the factional control of church property. Parker's judgment cannot be explained simply as the cynical product of his Unitarian allegiance. Rather, Parker

35. *Ibid.*, p. 235.
36. *Baker v. Fales* (1820) 16 Mass. Rep. 487 at pp. 503-504.
37. Julius Goebel, Jr., "Editor's Introduction" in Livermore, *op. cit.*, pp. xvii-xix.
38. *Ibid.*, p. xix, note 31.

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recognized that the survival of the religious establishment, and the security it provided to the existing social order, could only be guaranteed by preserving the identity of the publicly supported churches as bodies politic. Goebel fails to understand that the revolution had forced fundamental changes in the role of the established church in Massachusetts society. Association alone could constitute the colonial Congregationalist church as a corporate body only because, as Parker pointed out in *Baker v. Fales,* after 1631 "no inhabitant should have the political rights of a free man, unless he were a member of some orthodox church." In a theocratic state the church was the foundation of the polity itself. Under those circumstances it would make little sense to create churches through an act of incorporation — to do so would be an exercise in infinite regression. Parker observed that the colonial system allowed a minority composed of church members to exercise the right of governance over the majority of the inhabitants of a town or parish. He also realized that such a system could not be revived. It was simply not consistent with the "spirit of the times" to permit "the male members of the churches" who "form but a small part of the corporation which makes the contract, and is obliged to perform it" to subject the "great majority" of the parish to its own will in matters such as ministerial appointments. "Indeed, we apprehend those are mistaken, who imagine that the aim of religion would be served, public worship promoted, or instruction in piety, religion and morality more extensively encouraged, by restoring to the churches the power they once enjoyed, of electing the minister without concurrence of the people or concurrence of the people or congregation, or by the aid of a council which they might select to sanction their choice. Nothing would tend more directly to break up the whole system of religious instruction; for the people never would consent to be taxed for the support of men in whose election they had no voice."[39]

In acknowledging the power of democratic ideology Parker was by no means suggesting that the respectable and well-born should abdicate their traditional role of dominance and responsibility for the fate of society. Rather, he urged members of the natural aristocracy to recognize that "the authority of the church should be of that invisible, but powerful nature, which results from superior gravity, piety and devout example. It will then have its proper effect upon the congregation, who will cheerfully yield to the wishes of those who are best qualified to select the candidate. But as soon as it is challenged as a right, it will be lost."[40]

Unlike Goebel, Parker understood the political realities imposed upon the "better sort of men" by recent history. The "invisible" authority of the traditional ruling class could remain effective, in religious and secular affairs alike, only so long as the towns and parishes remained under a legal obligation to support a "public Protestant teacher of religion, piety and morality." The goal of religious instruction was to maintain all the objects of civil administra-

39. *Baker v. Fales, supra,* at pp. 498, 520.
40. *Ibid.*

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tion in their proper and rightful place. In determining whether a particular form of religious activity should be licensed and protected by law, the test employed by the Federalist and Congregationalist elite was one of benefit to the polity. Federalist politicians, lawyers, merchants and clergymen dreamed of recreating, or, at the very least, preserving some elements of a polity characterized by the "habit of subordination." As the "party of order," the old Federalist propertied and professional classes were gravely concerned by the rapid erosion of that habitual respect and deference among people emboldened by the twin experiences of revolution and independence. The effort to clothe its religious, educational and business activities in corporate form was one response made by the propertied elite to that crisis of authority.

"Polity" and "Economy" in the Early Republic

The political nature of the private corporation was central to its role in the ecclesiastical affairs of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. That fact combined with the absence of any sharp distinction in law between ecclesiastical, educational or charitable corporations, on the one hand, and buiness corporations, on the other, should lead us to view with skepticism the realist claim that the business corporation was an "essentially" economic entity struggling to free itself of the anachronistic cocoon of English common law doctrine. Indeed, one might even question the very existence of *economic* discourse, properly so called, in the early republican period.

An economic discourse is one which seeks to develop a theory of production and distribution among economic agents. A form of discourse which speaks of profit, capital, production and labor is not, *ipso facto*, an economic discourse. Much of what Hartz, the Handlins, Hurst and Dorfman[41] characterize as "economic thought" or "economic policy" in the early republican period was articulated within the discursive forms of traditional political oeconomy. Public policy in that period, like political oeconomy itself, was concerned not so much with state management of a national *economy* as with the constitution of a polity.

As Keith Tribe has demonstrated, the crucial figure within the discursive formation of political economy was the statesman-legislator. In his *Inquiry into the Principles of Political Oeconomy*, published in 1767, Sir James Steuart projected the model of the patriarchal household onto the polity. The term "oeconomy" was not simply an archaic form of the word economy. For Steuart, it signified "the wise administration of the household and the maintenance of the objects of administration in their rightful place." If "distribution" refers to "the maintenance of all objects of administration in their rightful place," it becomes "quite distinct from the modern economic sense of the term which concerns the allocation of the product to economic agents who are placed not by some prior social role but by their contribution to the process of production." In that discursive context the conception of par-

41. Joseph Dorfman, *The Economic Mind in American Civilization*, Vol. 1 (New York, 1946).

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ticular forms of activity was governed by their respective contribution to the constitution of a polity. In determining whether a particular economic activity should be licensed and protected by the law, the test emphasized by political oeconomy was one of benefit to the polity.[42]

According to Steuart, "What oeconomy is in a family, political oeconomy is in a state." The task of the *statesman*, then, was to adapt the different operations of the political oeconomy "to the spirit, manners, habits, and customs of the people; and afterwards to model these circumstances so as to be able to introduce a set of new and more useful institutions." Only the presence of the statesman's guiding hand made unity possible within a polity divided "by sector (trade, manufacture, agriculture) or by consumption (productive versus unproductive populations)." Tribe notes that "much of the literature" of political oeconomy "occupies itself with the consideration of the relative merits of such elements from the point of view of their *incorporation* into the polity and as objects of administration for the statesman."[43]

The advice tendered to the statesman by writers on political oeconomy was particularly concerned with taxation and money: "The first is the means by which the statesman intervenes to both support and order the economy, and the second is the means by which comparisons of the different elements in the polity can be effected via a common standard.[44] Such advice was eagerly sought (and tendered) by the first generation of Federalist leaders, who saw commercial prosperity as the foundation of national power. Money and taxation could be employed as instruments to augment the circulation of goods within the polity, thereby contributing to that prosperity. Hamilton and his associates accordingly sought to strengthen the foundations of the republic by using the sovereign authority of the national government to promote useful manufacturers and establish a National Bank. Indeed, Hamilton himself was so committed to the idea that the guiding hand of the statesman was the key element in national prosperity that he had been "disgusted" when the federal constitution failed to "abolish the individual states outright and consolidate them at once into a new national sovereignty."[45]

42. Keith Tribe, *Land, Labour and Economic Discourse* (London, 1978), Chapter 5.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 85 (emphasis added). Tribe, *op. cit.*, p. 85. In *This Sheba, Self* (Baltimore, 1974) J.E. Crowley discusses the response of colonial Americans to the clash between the self-interested rationality of economic life and a communally-oriented rationality of moral responsibility. He contends that, while the colonists saw commercialization as productive of luxury and vice, they also came to identify commerce as a sign of civilization. That "benign" attitude towards a market society" led many Americans "to identify the public interest, at least partially and often equivocally, with commercial prosperity." (pp. 116-124, 149). Crowley identifies "commercialization" with the appearance of an autonomous field of economic activity and self-interested behavior with economic motivation. But commercial activity could become emancipated from the constraints imposed by a communal morality (or "moral economy") while remaining subordinate to the welfare of the polity. In terms of Tribe's analysis, commercial activity — "a system of circulation of goods and money" — was but one element in an "aggregate polity" unified through the activity of the statesman-legislator (p. 35). The importance of commercial activity lay in its contribution to the well-being of the state.

45. See, e.g., Alexander Hamilton, *Report on the Subject of Manufactures* (Philadelphia, 1827); Bray Hammond, *Banks and Politics in America: From the Revolution to the Civil War* (Princeton, 1957) p. 120.

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The role of the statesman was to fuse the "polity" and the "economy" — understood as "a system of circulation of goods and money" — into a single national "household" according to the model prescribed by political oeconomy. The image of the national household was a commonplace one within the "economic" thought of the early republic. In his *Thoughts on the Study of Political Economy*, published in 1809, Loammi Baldwin argued that the "study and application of political economy deserves the encouragement, patronage, and assistance of government, which like "the faithful steward of a great household should carefully investigate the character of the inmates, watch them in their employments, ascertain to what purpose they are employed, and scrupulously attend to the collection, application and management of its finance...But what should be done by statute and what should be left to good sense is always difficult."[46]

The fundamental difficulty was that the early republic was a house divided. Hamilton's proposed National Bank was not received as the disinterested project of an enlightened statesman. On the contrary, the Bank became, at once, the subject of a prolonged and bitter political battle which "outstripped its economic importance." Hamilton's scheme for "a federal Bank was a plain defiance of agrarian interests and of the view that the powers of the federal government were definitely limited." According to Hammond, "The people who were most eager for a strong central government and who wished to apply the Constitution constructively were the people who also wanted banks. They were the commercial and moneyed class." Those who opposed the Bank "were principally agrarians who had been mistrustful of the Constitution and were now mistrustful of the central government created by it. They were mistrustful of all business interests."[47] That and related conflicts soon crystallized into the open party warfare that led, finally, to the "Revolution of 1800" which deprived the first generation of Federalist leaders of their control over the national government.

That defeat was a heavy blow to the "gentlemen of property and standing" who provided the backbone of Federalist strength. The vision of a great national household governed by a generation of wise and benevolent patriarchs crumbled into ashes, leaving many of them consumed by fury and bitterness. Many felt themselves to be the victims of a form of political patricide. Noah Webster, for example, suggested that "It would be better for the people, they would be more free and more happy — if all were deprived of the right of suffrage until they are 45 years of age, and if no man was eligible to an important office until he is fifty, that is, if all powers of government were vested in our old men who have lost their ambition chiefly and have learned wisdom by experience; but to tell this to the people would be treason. We have grown so wise of late years as to reject the maxims of Moses, Lycurgus and the patriarchs; we have, by the constitutions of government and the preposterous use made of doctrines of *equality*, stripped *old* men of their dignity and *wise* men of

46. Quoted in Dorfman, *op. cit.*, pp. 339-40.
47. Hammond, *op. cit.*, pp. 118, 119.

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their influence, and long, long are we to feel the mischievous effects of our modern policy."[48]

While Federalist gentlemen of Webster's generation had been accustomed to look upon public office as a right and a duty, even a special kind of property, their sons, of necessity, developed a significantly different attitude to politics and public life. That younger generation was no less committed to the idea that property ownership made for a special sort of civic virtue. But within a free and popular republican polity, property ownership no loner carried with it an automatic right to govern. In recognition of that fact, people "of the better sort" began to shift their attention away from politics. C. Wright Mills has shown that 71 percent of the members of the American business elite born between 1730 and 1759 held some sort of political office. For the generation born in the period 1760-1789 the comparable figure was 46 percent.[49] For respectable and wellborn men of that generation, politics in a democratic state had become a low and dirty business to be avoided whenever possible. Propriety (in Harrington's double sense) sought other means to advance its claims and interests, recognizing that the struggle would now have to be waged on the terrain of civil society itself. After the Republican victory of 1800 the propertied classes could no longer depend upon the firm and guiding hand of the statesman-legislator to maintain all the objects of administration in their proper and rightful place. The spirit of Jeffersonian democracy was leading to the rapid erosion of the "habit of subordination." Many Federalists genuinely hated the people for their newfound spirit of independence. "They are vicious," wrote one gentleman of the old school, "and love vicious men for their leaders." The entire natural order of hierarchy and authority was threatened with destruction now that "the herd have begun to walk on their hind legs."[50] Faced with such an unprecedented collapse of traditional norms, it was no wonder that the propertied and professional classes of the early republic seized enthusiastically upon the corporate form as one possible solution to the crisis of authority confronting them.

Forces of Expansion

That conservative strategy did not go unchallenged. In Massachusetts, the split in the Congregationalist churches prepared the way for disestablishment. By 1833 a coalition of disgruntled Orthodox Congregationalists, dissenting sects, and Republicans had secured not only the passage of a constitutional amendment enforcing the separation of church and state but also the final destruction of the Federalist party itself.[51] That and similar coalitions in other parts of the country were united by an abiding evangelical distrust of "legal" schemes for the regulation of religion or other spheres of private activity. Evangelical preachers insisted "that spiritual authority lay not

48. Quoted in Fischer, *op. cit.*, p. 24.
49. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 30.
50. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 23.
51. Meyer, *op. cit.*, Chapter 5; see also, Leonard W. Levy, *The Law of the Commonwealth and Chief Justice Show* (New York, 1957), Chapter 3.

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in the church but in the individual's heart and conscience." Their hostility to "legal" forms of Christianity naturally influenced the evangelical attitude toward the legal system itself. "The law, they believed, was too rational, too complex, and too much under the control of designing intellectuals," lawyers and judges.[52] That combination of attitudes was bound to produce a hostile response to any legal device, such as the common law corporation, which could be seen as a vehicle for the political ambitions of a Federalist elite.

Throughout the country hostility to "monopolistic" corporations was a staple item in Democratic political rhetoric. Democratic politicians routinely charged that corporate charters were a device employed by the propertied classes to entrench "aristocratic" power and influence. In New Jersey, for example, Cadman reports that "during the first decade of the nineteenth century, some Democrats were loud in denouncing the turnpike movement as subversive of the liberties of the people, closing old roads and making the proprietors rich at the expense of the people's rights, and in general a direct tendency to subvert our Republican institutions."[53]

Those concerns were well founded. As Kasson has observed, conservative Federalists were making determined efforts to counter the intense anti-institutionalism spawned by evangelical radicalism by erecting "*new* institutions capable of dealing with an increasingly complex urban and industrial society and to restore social cohesion and public virtue."[54] The business corporation was one such institution. The experience of the Boston Manufacturing Company, which established the textile industry in Lowell, Massachusetts, provides a particularly relevant illustration of the way in which the use of the corporate form was associated as much with political and moral concerns as with more narrowly economic, profit-oriented considerations. Indeed, the company seemed designed as much to instill in its employees regularity, sobriety and a decent respect for their superiors as to produce cotton cloth.

The Federalist founders of the Lowell enterprise sought to protect the working population of their mill from the corruption, vice and degeneration they associated with the English factory system. They hoped to avoid the creation of a permanent under-class by attracting instead "a temporary group of able and intelligent girls from the country farms." To that end, the corporation took on the role of a benevolent but firm patriarchal figure providing a cluster of boarding houses "supervised by competent matrons, where the girls lived under regulations strict enough to satisfy even the puritan Yankee farmers." In Lowell, at least, the corporation was founded upon the conviction that each element of the new social order spawned by the factory system would remain in its assigned and rightful place. Given "the proper institutional environ-

52. Richard E. Ellis, *The Jeffersonian Crisis: Courts and Politics in the Young Republic* (New York, 1974), pp. 253-254.

53. John W. Cadman, Jr., *The Corporation in New Jersey: Business and Politics, 1791-1875,* (Cambridge, Mass., 1949), p. 46.

54. John F. Kasson, *Civilizing the Machine: Technology and Republican Values in America, 1776-1900.* (Harmondsworth, 1977), p. 63.

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ment, a factory town need not be a byword for vice and poverty, but might stand as a model of enlightened republican community in a restless and dynamic nation."[55]

Banks and insurance companies were political in a more obvious, partisan sense. Most of the early chartered banks belonged to Federalists who used them, in the words of a Jeffersonian contemporary, "to check the growth of Republicanism and thus indirectly to weaken the constituted authorities of the nation."[56] In New England, the bitter political rivalries between Federalists and Republicans transformed the State Street insurance offices in Boston into "informal political clubs, at which leading Federalists would drop in during the morning to discuss the latest French outrage or Jacobin delusion. 'The office of the Suffolk Insurance Company,' writes Lucius Manlius Sargent, 'was more noted for its daily political harangues, than for its semi-annual dividends...The voice of Mr. Parsons, then Chief Justice of the Commonwealth, was often heard in those conventicles; not in his official capacity, of course, but as the Magnus Appollo of the assembly."[57]

Naturally enough, Republicans as well as entrepreneurs with no partisan political axe to grind were bound to resent Federalist efforts to monopolize use of the corporate form. And so, despite the anti-charter rhetoric of Democratic politicians and the dark fears of Federalist reactionaries, the number of incorporations began to swell into a flood. In 1821 the New York Constitutional Convention inserted a provision into the state constitution requiring the approval of the two-thirds of the members of each branch of the legislature for passage of any bill "creating, continuing, altering, or renewing any body politic or corporate."[58] Even that measure proved insufficient to stem the tide. The forces of expansion — economic, demographic, political and even religious — were simply too powerful to be contained.

In eyes of lawyers such as Chancellor Kent and Justice Joseph Story, the unchecked growth in the number of corporations showed a clear and direct tendency to subvert the doctrine of vested interests upon which the traditional logic of property ultimately rested. The political significance of property within early nineteenth century Anglo-American society was captured metaphorically by Blackstone who defined the right of property as "that sole

55. Caroline F. Ware, *The Early New England Cotton Manufacture: A Study in Industrial Beginnings.* (New York, 1966) pp. 60-61, 64-65, 146, 200; Kasson, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

56. Hammond, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

57. Samuel Eliot Morison, *The Life and Letters of Harrson Gray Otis, Federalist: 1761-1848,* Vol. 1, (Boston, 1913), pp. 247-298. A similar situation prevailed for some time in New York until Republicans were provoked to seek remedial action through a scheme to establish the Manhattan Company (the forerunner of the Chase Manhattan Bank) as a water supply company. As one Republican declared in 1804, " it is well known that previous to the incorporation of the Manhattan Company, the Branch Bank and the New York Bank, governed by *federal* gentlemen, were employed in a great measure as political engines. A close system of exclusion against those who differed from them on political subjects was adopted and pursued. There were but few active and useful Republicans that could obtain from those banks discount accommodation." Hammond, *op. cit.*, pp. 157-158.

58. See, Nathaniel H. Carter and William Z. Stone, *Reports of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention of 1821* (Albany, 1821), pp. 284, 446.

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and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe."[59] In line with that understanding of property, Story and Kent insisted that charter granted to a corporation performing an important public service, such as a bridge or a turnpike, should be construed so as to imply an exclusive franchise.[60]

That position was rejected by the majority on the Supreme Court in the *Charles River Bridge* case[61] decided in 1837. In dissent, Story insisted that the charter of the Charles River Bridge Company gave it the exclusive right to erect a bridge to carry traffic across the Charles River between Boston and Charlestown and that, therefore, the state legislature lacked the authority to charter a rival enterprise seeking to build another bridge for the same purpose. Story argued that, if the government expected a public service corporation to perform its role faithfully and well, it must provide security for the capital invested in such enterprises: "there must be some pledge, that the property will be safe; that the enjoyment will be coextensive with the grant; and that success will not be the signal for a general combination to overthrow its rights, and to take away its profits." Such corporations were not merely private, economic entities; they enjoyed a special civil status. They were, in fact "little republics" to use Blackstone's phrase, enjoying an exclusive dominion, almost akin to a form of territorial sovereignty, which barred potential competitors within the boundaries of a zone of "injurious rivalship."[62]

The majority judgment delivered by Chief Justice Taney, rejected the claim that the original charter should be construed so as to confer an exclusive dominion over a particular line of travel upon the proprietors of the Charles River Bridge. The argument of the majority insisted that the traditional doctrine of vested and exclusive interests would have to bow to the forces of science and technical improvement. Turnpike or bridge corporations deserved no special protection. Their property was simply a form of economic capital which would shrink or expand according to their competitive success in the marketplace and their contribution to general economic development. Taney declared that technological progress itself would be threatened if the court were to adopt Story's analysis[63]

59. William Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England,* Book II, (Chicago, 1979), p. 2.

60. For a description of Kent's approach to the doctrine of vested interests as it related to corporate privileges, see, John Theodore Horton, *James Kent: A Study in Conservatism* (New York, 1939).

61. *Charles River Bridge Company v. Warren Bridge Company* (1837) 11 Peter's Rep.

62. *Ibid.*, pp. 607-608 *per* Story J. That zone of "injurious rivalship" was not confined to the sructure and immediate approaches of the bridge itself. It extended over a line of travel: "The franchise is therefore construed to extend beyond the local limits, and to be exlusive within a reasonable distance; for the plain reason that it is indispensable to the fair enjoyment of that franchise and right of toll."

63. "The millions of property which have been invested in rail roads and canals, upon lines of travel which had been before occupied by turnpike corporations will be put in jeopardy. We shall be thrown back to the improvements of the last century, and obliged to stand still, until the claims of the old turnpike corporations shall be satisfied; and they shall consent to permit these states to avail themselves of the lights of modern science, and to partake of the benefits of those

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To historians such as James Willard Hurst, the lyric of plenty and prosperity sung by Taney reflected a clear-headed and pragmatic recognition that the business corporation must be justified by its works. The destruction of the corporation as a body politic, therefore, followed rationally and self-evidently from a developed awareness of the economic utility of the corporate instrument. The resulting changes in the law of corporations served to release an enormous burst of energy which was channeled into "the economy, which was the main area in which we pursued utility."[64] Against that view it might be argued that neither the transformation of corporation law nor the dynamic expansion of American capitalism beginning in the Jacksonian era drew their inspiration from a narrowly "economic" impulse. As we have seen, neither those who attacked, nor those who defended the identity of the corporation as a body politic were concerned solely with the business corporation. Indeed, in Massachusetts, where use of the corporate form was most widespread during the early nineteenth century, ecclesiastical corporations provided both an established model of the corporation as a body politic and the focal point for an often bitter political and social struggle.

Evangelical v. Legal Christianity

That struggle had roots extending deep into the colonial past. The Great Awakening of the 1740's spawned by the work of Jonathan Edwards was an early "evangelical" uprising against the "legal" scheme of religion upheld by the established Congregationalist churches of New England. The evangelical preachers who sparked the Awakening sought to liberate their flocks from the constraints imposed by the coldblooded and rationalistic "Arminianism" of the established clergy. The faith which inspired that Calvinist assault on the citadel of "legal" religion rested upon the existential reality of the emotional conversion experience. That "enthusiastic" approach to religion aroused the intense distrust and disapproval of the respectable and wellborn. The clerical opponents of evangelical revivalism insisted "that God had formed men as rational beings so they might learn from his works, what is good, and what is required of them." That rationalist creed gave pride of place to those men of high learning and culture best fitted to become the teachers of morality, piety and religion. Those men of learning and culture took to themselves the name of Liberals in opposition to the "oppressive" doctrines of their Calvinist opponents. According to Heimert, "Liberalism was a profoundly elitist and conservative ideology, while evangelical religion embodied a radical and even democratic challenge to the standing order of colonial America."[65]

That challenge was encapsulated in Jonathan Edward's remark that, "Our people do not so much need to have their heads stored, as to have their hearts touched." The essence of the evangelical faith was a belief in the "inward

improvements which are now adding to the wealth and prosperity, and the convenience and comfort, of every other part of the civilized world. *Ibid.*, p. 552, *per* C.J. Taney.

64. Hurst, *op. cit.*, pp. 47, 4-5, 59.

65. Alan Heimert, *Religion and the American Mind: From the Great Awakening to the Revolution*. (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), pp. 1-15.

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operation of the holy spirit in regeneration." Evangelical preachers emphasized "the role of the affections in religion and in making virtue dependent on the reception of a vital indwelling principle from the Holy Spirit." That principle was expressed in all its perfection through the experience of Divine love. It was the experience of God as love that held together the constituent elements of the holy communion. The partisans of evangelical religion flatly rejected the Liberal claim that men could gain access to the experience of "True Virtue" through a worldly political community or by relying on the coercive bonds of a stale institutional religion.[66] For Edwards, "civil union, or a harmonious agreement among men in the management of their secular concerns, is amiable; but much more a pious union, and sweet agreement in the great business for which man was created, even the business of religion; the life and soul of which is Love."[67] It was the direct emotional intuition of Divine love which held the "atoms of creation" together: "The whole material universe is preserved by gravity or attraction, or the mutual tendency of all bodies to each other. One part of the universe is hereby made beneficial to another; the beauty, harmony, and order, regular progress, life and motion, and in short all the well-being of the whole frame depends upon it. This is a type of love or charity in the spiritual world[68]

Those who sought to cement all men together in the bonds of mutual affection were seen as a real and serious threat to the vested interests of the established clergy. Defenders of the existing order saw evangelical revivalism as "subversive, of peace, *discipline* and *government*." Alan Heimert suggests that, "The evangelical goal of evangelical liberty was stated in its simplest terms when Jonathan Parsons argued for the abolition of parish lines. Complete religious liberty — including freedom from inherited relationships — was essential if men were to sit down with their brethren 'in good order and pleasure.' " Liberal opponents of the revival in New England looked upon itinerant evangelical preachers "as an intrusion on the covenant relationship of minister and people."[69] They refused to acknowledge that members of an established congregation had the right to separate.[70]

Itinerant preachers were denied entrance into parishes by the consociations of Massachusetts which were also used eventually "to impose unpopular ministers on congregations and intolerable tax burdens on dissenters." The evangelical quest for freedom from such burdens and restriction did much to shape the tradition of democratic radicalism in America which gave birth to the Republican revival of 1801 and the Jacksonian crusade against corporate privilege in the 1830's and 1840's.[71]

66. *Ibid.*, pp. 108, 106.
67. *Ibid.*, p. 115.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 107.
69. *Ibid.*, pp. 119-121
70. "You have no liberty, no right, to forsake the communion of the churches...you cannot do it without breaking the covenant...and incurring the awful guilt of schism. *Ibid.*, p. 119.
71. *Ibid.*, pp. 120, 15, 545.

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The Struggle Against Corporate Privilege

The deep-rooted and continuing contest between "evangelical" and "legal" Christianity had its exact parallel in the struggle, reaching its crescendo during the Jacksonian era, between the radical advocates of free and general incorporation and the conservative proponents of incorporation by special act of the state legislatures. In both cases, the radical objective was to deprive ecclesiastical and business corporations, alike, of their identity as "bodies politic." Evangelical reformers could never rest satisfied with a religious establishment which had its reason for being in the prevention of crime and other threats to property and social order. Evangelical religion burned with a passionate desire to save souls. That same evangelical passion can also be seen at work in the assault on the "aristocratic influences" and "special privileges" which attached to corporate charters.

Both struggles generated an enormous wave of millenarian enthusiasm and boundless faith in America's future as a "redeemer nation."[72] That faith gave birth to what amounted to a cult of revolution. The passionate intensity of American millenarianism could not be contained within the framework of institutionalized religion or confined to the usual pattern of theological debate. Such enthusiasm was bound to spill over into other areas. The conviction that it was America's unique role to realize the Kingdom of God on earth led radical millenialists to seek to "overturn" the obstacles on the road to the Kingdom wherever they appeared, in every area of American life. The somnolent acceptance of things as they are was seen as "the principal device by which Satan now hopes to frustrate the divine plan." Ante-bellum movements for social reform amounted to uprisings "directed against spiritual evil, not simple political wrongs, however little religion itself may seem at the time to be involved." The anti-charter movement was clearly infused with the same spirit which moved the author of the following extract from the *Presbyterian Quarterly Review* in 1853: "Whenever and wherever the rights secured by everlasting charter and sealed by the blood of the covenant, alike to every human bieng, are withheld and monopolized; whenever institutions, obviously distrusting general happiness, are sustained by force and appeals to passions and interests; revolutions will occur as light increases marked with more or less violence, in proportion to the resistance offered, or the wisdom employed, till human rights are all properly guaranteed and wrong principles and institutions are swept away."[73]

Clearly, the millenial spirit underlying the dynamic expansion of American capitalism in the Jacksonian era should not be lightly ascribed to any narrowly "economic" impulse. Economic activity was not, as Hurst would have us believe, an end in itself. Prosperity and individual worldly success came to be sought after as the visible sign of divine grace. At the same time, the evangelical conviction that the spirit of divine love could not be captured and frozen in

72. Ernest Lee Tuveson, *Redeemer Nation: The Idea of America's Millenial Role.* (Chicago, 1968). 1968).

73. *Ibid.*, p. 76.

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a stable set of institutional arrangements drove Americans to dissolve their worldly ties with other men. The spirit of evangelical Christianity was profoundly hostile to the civic humanist ideals which found expression, *inter alia* in the conception of the corporation as a body politic. "True Virtue" could not emerge from the experience of citizenship in a secular political community. In place of civic virtue, evangelical preachers offered the faithful access to a direct and unmediated relation with God. The voice of the Holy Spirit, they claimed, could be heard only by a listener attentive to the passionate striving of his own heart. Those who heeded the evangelical call to turn inward could only hasten the progressive dissolution of the worldly political community around them. Having forsaken community for the hope of personal salvation, Americans could hardly avoid the temptation to find in worldly success the tangible evidence of their individual and collective redemption. It was hardly surprising, then, that the author of a *Practical Treatise on Business* should insist that it was a "religious duty...to get money."[74] As a consequence, "the theory of natural aristocracy was overshadowed by a philosophy of individual success and the concept of the republican community gave way to the the image of a loose association of individuals each making his own way in the world."[75]

The disintegration of the corporation as a body politic reflected in microcosm the transformation which occurred within the political life of the American republic as a whole. The emergence of the business corporation as an essentially economic entity was not the product of a simple, homespun American pragmatism which finally managed to throw off the confusions engendered by the common law conception of the corporation. Only a burning evangelical faith in the redemptive role of the American nation could justify the radical assault on the institutional structure of the body politic that one finds in American millenialist thought and practice. Their enthusiasm knew no bounds and their message was simple: "Overturn, and overturn, and overturn, till he come, whose right it is, is the great annunciation."[76]

That anti-institutional fervor, and not a calm, hard-headed pragmatism, was responsible for the complete separation of property and civil status that was implicit in the destruction of the corporation as a body politic. Property ceased to be conceived as a form of dominion or the foundation of a political community and was treated instead as economic capital, the utility and worth of which depended upon its efficient allocation within an organized system of production and distribution. The corporation, similarly, ceased to be conceived as a "little republic." No longer an association of formally equal shareholders, the legal regulation of the corporation came to rest upon the assumption that it was nothing more than a private, profit-seeking unit of capital accumultion. By the turn of the twentieth century legal treatise writers had come to reject the theory that the corporation was an "artificial entity"

74. Quoted in Hartz, *op. cit.*, p. 20.
75. John G. Cawelti, *Apostles of the Self-Made Man.* (Chicago, 1965), p. 43.
76. Quoted in Tuveson, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

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created by the state. Instead, a sustained effort was made to establish that the corporation was a "private," "real," or "natural" entity whose existence was prior to and separate from the state. That "natural entity" theory was carried even further by some writers who emphasized that the corporation had an existence independent of its shareholders as well.[77]

It has been suggested that the "main effect of the natural entity theory of the business corporation was to legitimate large scale enterprise and to destroy any special basis for state regulation of the corporation that derived from its creation by the state."[78] That approach shares the assumption made by Hurst that the role of legal doctrine is to legitimate the objects of its concern, in this case the business corporation. Hurst claims that the American business corporation could be fully legitimated through a legal regime which guaranteed that corporate activity would be both "socially useful and socially responsible." His interpretation of the historical development of American corporation law treats it as a more or less coherent response to needs and demands generated by those considerations of utility and responsibility. While superficially plausible, that approach actually begs the most important questions. The most fundamental question in the history of American corporation law is not how did (or could) the corporation become legitimized? Rather, we need to ask why that need for legitimation has become so acute in the first place. A serious attempt to answer the latter question might throw into doubt the easy assumption that doctrinal practice is actually capable of "legitimating" the corporation (or anything else, for that matter). It might also become clear that the legitimation needs of the corporation reflect a deeper and more general crisis of legitimacy affecting the entire structure of late capitalist society. Finally, it may turn out that the crisis of legitimation is directly linked to the collapse of the public sphere attendant upon the maturation of what Marx described as "bourgeois-Christian society."

It is a grave historical error to treat the business corporation as an autonomous institutional force which came to dominate American economic and social life by virtue of its proven instrumental and organizational efficacy. Such an interpretation implies that the corporation lost its "capitalist" character once the "separation of ownership and control" left a New Class of corporate managers in a position of virtual independence from shareholders.[79] The problem then becomes, not "the overthrow of capitalism," which has already been effectively accomplished, but rather the development of a public policy capable of imposing standards of social responsibility on corporate managers. But the historical phenomenon of capitalism cannot be identified with the interests of a class of propertied individuals and top-hatted coupon-clippers. The development of capitalism has involved a continuing process of *socialization* which has incorporated each individual unit of capital into the total movement of social capital.

77. Morton J. Horowitz, *Corporations*. Unpublished paper (on file at Harvard Law School Library), p. 67.
78. *Ibid.*, p. 72.
79. Berle and Means, *op. cit.*,

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Once property takes on the form of economic capital — once it is treated by its owner as a mere commodity — it loses its political character and becomes a *social* relation. The individual capitalist then becomes "the personification of this relation: he is a function of his own capital, and direct expression of his private property." Marx pointed out long ago that with the rise of social capital, "capital comes to represent all capitalists, and the individual capitalist is reduced to an individual personification of this totality."[80] The socialization of capital makes it impossible for the corporation to function as a body politic. As each shareholder becomes merely the "personification" of his individual capital, the notion that every shareholder should have one vote without regard to the size of his capital investment becomes an "obvious" absurdity. Nor does it make sense any longer to assume that all shareholders must stand in the same relation to the enterprise. New and different classes of shares and shareholders, some of which may not even carry voting rights, make their appearance. The common quality of the world shared by the members of the corporation as a body politic loses its concrete character. The objects and purposes of the corporate association are subjected to a process of abstraction. The goal of the enterprise becomes profit *per se*, rather than the conduct of a particular form of business activity. That being so, minority shareholders can hardly complain if, for example, a railroad corporation discovers that its surplus capital can be employed more profitably in the purchase of a hotel chain. The doctrine of *ultra vires* loses its meaning and *raison d'etre* once the corporation's only constant aim is to obtain a higher-than-average yield on its capital stock in whatever line of business it chooses to pursue.

The capital stock managed by the corporation then comes to appear as a part of the total social wealth. The corporation itself takes on the role of the "private proprietor" of that particular portion of social wealth.[81] That last change meant that shareholders ceased, practically, to be regarded in law as "members" or "owners" of the corporation and became mere "investors" instead. In American corporation law that transformation in the status of the shareholder was registered in the demise of the so-called "trust fund doctrine." That doctrine had its origin in Justice Story's judgment in *Wood v. Dummer*, decided in 1824, which declared that the capital stock of the corporation is a trust fund for the benefit of corporate creditors. If that capital stock was divided among the shareholders, each would take his share subject to all the equities attached to it in favor of creditors. The shareholders "have no right to anything but the residuum of the capital stock, after payment of all the debts..."[82] It followed that the shareholders of an insolvent corporation would be liable "for their failure to pay the full or par value of any stock to which they subscribed from a corporation."[83] The liability imposed by the trust fund doctrine clearly rested upon the assumption that the shareholders

80. Mario Tronti, "Social Capital," *Telos*, No. 17 (Fall 1973) p. 105.
81. *Ibid.*
82. *Wood v. Dummer* (1824) 3 Mason 308, 30 Fed. Cas. 435 at p. 439.
83. Horowitz, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

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were, after all, the "owners" of the enterprise and should therefore bear responsibility for its debts (at least up to the par value of their shares).

By the end of the nineteenth century the legitimacy of that assumption was increasingly open to question. The rise of a national market in the shares of large industrial companies began to replace the traditional pattern of "private" subscriptions. Shares were routinely purchased in the market for less than their par value thereby raising the issue of shareholder liability for "watered stock" — stock which was issued by companies desperate for cash at less than its par value. For a time the courts sought to establish a distinction between original and subsequent issues of stock, holding original but not subsequent shareholders liable. That shaky distinction began to collapse with the development of investment banking after 1900 when "even the marketing of original shares of corporate stock no longer entailed a formal relationship between the corporation and a subscriber." Once it became possible to market stock without any established par value at all, the trust fund doctrine was rendered entirely devoid of meaning. The shareholder could no longer be credibly regarded as a "member" of the corporation who was bound, in conscience, "to be the guardian of the rights of the company's ceditors, and bound to protect them."[84]

Marxist theory has long recognized that as the shareholder's role was reduced to that of a mere "investor," corporate management came to play the role of the "collective capitalist." As such, management, "on the one hand is the supreme mediation and composition of all particular bourgeois interests, while on the other it is the direct representative of the general interest for capital." The socialization of capital necessarily destroys the capacity of the shareholders to act as the ultimate controlling power within the corporation. The appearance of social capital, in other words, amounts to "the abolition of capital as private property within the framework of capitalist production itself." Capital, having taken on the corporate form, appears as a social force of production and "raises itself to the level of a general social power, while the capitalist is reduced to the level of a simple agent, functionary or emissary of this power."[85] That shift was reflected in judicial decisions which came to identify corporate boards of directors as "the primary possessors of all the powers which the charter confers." By 1931 a treatise writer acknowledged that "the enlargement of facilities for the purchase and sale of corporate securities, the tendency toward combinations of corporations, and the consequent desirability of diversification of individual investments have joined to create a class of stockholders who regard themselves as investors rather than co-entrepreneurs...Accordingly, modern decisions tend toward an emphasis of the director's absolutism in the management of the affairs of large corporations; the board of directors has achieved a super-control of corporate management and of the corporation's legal relations..."[86]

84. *Ibid.*, pp. 49-59.
85. Tronti, *op. cit.*, pp. 107-108.
86. Quoted in Horwitz, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

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The development of capitalism cannot, therefore, be identified with the interests of a class of individual property-owners and their power within particular business enterprises. Capitalism is a process of generalized abstraction which involves the ever deepening alienation of human beings from their own social being which comes to stand over against them as an alien, uncontrollable force. Capitalism becomes a process of generalized social wealth that liquidates both private property and the public realm, thereby undermining the necessary foundations of a genuine political community. Without such a political community, it may become impossible for late capitalist societies to replenish the stock of accumulated cultural traditions and meanings which provided the historic motivational force underpinning capitalist development itself. The fate of the Protestant ethic and other related motivational syndromes cannot be disentangled from the general fate of bourgeois-Christian society. Can such a society avoid a prolonged, and perhaps insoluble crisis of legitimation? How might such a crisis of legitimation be related to the destruction of the corporation as a body politic?

Bourgeois-Christian Society

The kinship between Christianity and capitalism is close and undeniable, not least of all because they have both exerted a profoundly corrosive influence on the bonds uniting human beings, in particular local political and cultural communities. By transforming property into an infinitely exchangeable economic asset, the generalization of capitalist social relations has deprived all of us, to a greater or lesser degree, of any secure location in the world. Under the impact of money and commerce the realm of the political, as a distinct sphere of human experience, dissolves: "the individuals which were enclosed therein are cast forth like free atoms; the localistic barriers fall away together with differences in blood and lineage."[87] As Marx observed "in the money relation, in the developed system of exchange...the ties of personal dependence, of distinctions of blood, education, etc., are in fact exploded, ripped up (at least personal ties all appear as *personal* relations); and individuals *seem independent*...free to collide with one another and to engage in exchange within this freedom; *but they appear thus only for someone* who abstracts from the conditions, the conditions of exchange within which these individuals enter into contract...individuals are now ruled by *abstractions*, whereas earlier they depended on one another."[88]

That process of capitalist abstraction owes much to its historical association with evangelical Protestant Christianity. Nowhwere is this more true than in America. The enormous explosion of energy released by the fusion of American capitalism and evangelical Christianity, whatever its creative potential may have been, has shattered the institutional foundation for the experience of genuine political community. There is nothing surprising

87. Lucio Colletti, *Marxism and Hegel.* (London, 1979) p. 259; Arendt, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-67.

88. Karl Marx, *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy.* (Harmondsworth, 1973), pp. 163-164.

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about that result. Hostility to the worldliness of the polity has always been a hallmark of Christian thought. From the beginning, Christianity sought to replace worldly political bonds between men by the ideal of charity. That Christian ideal was essentially worldless and "incapable of founding a public realm of its own." The Christian community was to be "modeled on the relationships between the members of a family because these were known to be non-political and even antipolitical."[89] The concept of a universal brotherhood of man stood diametrically opposed to the ancient Greek assumption that the individual was bound utterly and completely by the ethic of the particular group to which he belonged. "Man as man was not then recognized to be of infinite worth and to have infinite rights." The recognition of the equality and universality of human nature is a consequence of the advent of Christianity "when men recognized that they were all equally sons of God, in other words, when they grasped the divinity (and therefore their own principle and essence) no longer as this or that 'particular' force but as Spirit, in all its unconditional infinitude and universality."[90]

Writers in the classical republican tradition such as Rousseau have emphasized that not only was the individual in ancient Greece "integrated organically into the *particular* community of his city," but also, and for that very reason, "he is excluded from that broader and *general society* which is the community of the entire human species." For Rousseau, the rise of Christianity meant the subversion of the particular but real bonds uniting men in the *polis* and their replacement by a spiritual vision which linked men, one to another, through a transcendent God, "elevated and projected outside the world." Within the Christian revelation each individual "taken in his isolation and separation from others and therefore before and independent of any relationship with society...stands in an unmediated and direct relationship with God as Spirit."[91]

Christianity and classical republican thought were therefore profoundly at odds with one another. Rousseau declared that one could not speak sensibly of a "Christian republic." For him, the terms were mutually exclusive.[92] In its essence Christianity short-circuits the possibility of any genuinely political vision. As we have seen, evengelical revivalism denied that the source of "True Virtue" could be located in a worldly political community. Rather virtue had its roots in the spirit of Christian love which acted as a kind of "gravity inherent in the atoms of creation" which alone could "hold the beings of the spiritual world together." To the evangelical mind, the entire history and significance of Christianity could be summed up in the single message of the gospel that men should love God with all their hearts and love one another as brethren. Such a message led directly to the profound alienation of men from the political dimension of their being as creatures for whom freedom becomes a real

89. Arendt, *op. cit.*, pp. 53-54.
90. Colletti, *op. cit.*, p. 250.
91. *Ibid.*, pp. 257-259.
92. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, trans. Maurice Cranston (Harmondsworth, 1968), p. 184.

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possibility in the world through collective action within a particular political community. The worldly bond created within the ancient *polis*, "with Christianity presents itself not only as an *other-worldly bond*, situated above and beyond men, but also as a cohensive bond in heaven that has its basis in the atomistic disintegration of the individuals on earth." That which men, through Christianity, came to represent as God "is nothing more than man's own alienated essence."[93]

It is the Christian cult of the abstract human being that explains why evangelical Christianity has become the special religion of American capitalism. As Marx suggested: "Capitalist production...is as truly cosmopolitan as Christianity...In both it is only man in the abstract who counts...In the one case, all depends on whether or not he has faith, in the other, on whether or not he has credit." In bourgeois-Christian society, as it has developed in America, a persistent confusion between money and divine grace has been inevitable, "In money itself the totality exists as the whole, in representational form, of the commodities. It is in gold and silver that for the first time wealth (exchange-value both as totality and as abstraction) exists in its own distinct form to the exclusion of other commodities, as an individual palpable object. Money is therefore the God of commodities. As an isolated object that can be grasped in the hand, money can therefore be solicited, found, stolen, and discovered, and the general wealth can be tangibly possessed by a single individual. From the lowly status which money appears to have as a mere means of circulation, it suddenly becomes the Lord and God of the world of commodities. It represents the heavenly existence of the commodities."[94]

The Divine Economy

If money becomes the God of commodities, those who devote their lives to the production, exchange and consumption of commodities will soon come to worship at the same shrine. It would be no exaggeration, therefore, to assert that the American republic has been crucified on a cross of gold. The "little republics" embodied within the conception of the corporation as a body politic suffered a similar fate. That outcome was not inevitable. Precisely because it had been conceived in law as an association of natural persons and therefore as an essentially *political* entity, the corporation in the early republic was capable of sustaining a "communicatively-structured life-world (with private and public spheres)" common to all the members of the corporation. The patterns of communicative interaction made possible by the existence of a public sphere internal to the corporation enabled the corporation to generate a meaningful ethical vision of the corporation and of its place in the world. But from the beginning there was always the danger that the corporation would come to be understood simply as a system of instrumental action oriented to merely economic ends. Should that conception of the corporation

93. Colletti, *op. cit.*, p. 265.
94. *Ibid.*, p. 271.

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become dominant, the process of communicative interaction among members of a body politic would be displaced by a process of bureaucratic rationalization which would constitute the corporation as a "monetar-administrative complex" within which shareholders would become reified, appearing as the mere personification of their individual capital investment. That danger was clearly recognized by Chief Justice Hornblower, in *Taylor vs. Griswold* when he struck down a corporation by-law which permitted voting by *share* rather than by *voice*. He insisted that the corporation had been chartered to serve the public good, but "instead of promoting and serving these legitimate designs, the tendency, at least, the *apparent* tendency of the by-law in question, is to encourage speculation and monopoly, to lessen the rights of the smaller stockholders, depreciate the value of their shares, and throw the whole property and government of the company into the hands of a few capitalists; and it may be, to the utter neglect and disregard of the public convenience and interests."[95]

Unfortunately for those who shared that view, the legitimacy of the corporation as a body politic was inherently unstable in a bourgeois-Christian society which had developed a tradition of democratic radicalism which placed the locus of legitimate sovereign authority, not in the body politic, but in the people-at-large, standing outside and apart from the institutions of government.[96] The corporation as a body politic made an easy target for Democratic politicians casting about eagerly for opportunities to kick the "aristocratic" can. The fact that the private corporations of the early nineteenth century were so often and so obviously vehicles for the aims and ambitions of a Federalist propertied elite, equally eager to re-assert its traditional hegemony within American society, made the charges of "monopoly" and "aristocratic influence" all the more credible. But the disintegration of the corporation as a body politic did not represent a victory for "the people." Nor was it a triumph of homespun American programatism over the muddled illogic of the English common law. The emergence of the business corporation as a private, profit-seeking engine of capital accumulation marked the final and crushing defeat of the classical republican tradition of civic humanism. Their attachment to republican values led conservative judges and lawyers to utilize the common law conception of the corporation as a body politic in an ultimately futile effort to stem the tide of capitalist rationalization. That republican legal tradition collapsed under the impact of evangelical revivalism and the millenarian spirit which infused the demands of a rising entrepreneurial class for free and general incorporation with an unmatchable ideological force and energy. Politics in the classical sense disappeared from American civil society, as it became reduced to a matter of who gets what, when and how. The concept of civic virtue declined, to be replaced with a heightened concern, even obsession, with issues of private morality. By

95. *Taylor v. Griswold, supra*, at p. 24; Cf. Jürgen Habermas, "Dialectics of Rationalization: An Interview," *Telos*, No. 49 (Fall, 1981), p. 5.
96. Wood, *op. cit.*, pp. 344-390.

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the early twentieth century Americans had reached the point where they could find a meaningful national identity only in the inscrutable movements of the Divine Economy.

As the business corporation successfully colonized virtually every facet of American life, meaning became an ever-scarcer resource. Meyer has described the bind in which corporate America now finds itself. "To the economist and presidential adviser Walt Whitman Rostow we owe the concept of 'take-off' in the historical development of an economy. The man of the Protestant ethic supplied power on the runway. Once in flight the economy moved ahead not on character but on technique. Hence if at the center of nineteenth century social imagination there had stood a man, in the twentieth he was replaced by the vision of a system."[97] Americans sought desperately to find ways to spiritualize that system, most of which seemed doomed to failure. "But there was one more alternative for sanctifying the system without doing anything about it, another way of thinking to make everything come out right. This was to regard the economy in a traditional religious fashion, as an object of worship rather than for imitation, an occasion for dependency rather than for belonging. Men know the hidden God, the God of Will, only in His works, not in His nature. In a downward spiral, men could return by way of dialectic to the position of early Protestants, between whom and God there opened an abyss, to be bridged not by insight, by knowledge, by intelligence, by courage, by politics, by tradition, but by faith alone. Awesome, inscrutable, self-impelling, the system invited adoration."[98]

The emergence of that self-propelled capitalist economy, steered and managed by the private business corporation, therefore entailed a long-term, persistent and cumulative crisis of legitimacy. Evangelical fervor and messianic hopes could not prevent the cannibalization by the system of the very traditions of Christian thought which alone had made the pursuit of individual and collective success *meaningful*. In the face of an increasingly rationalized and impersonal one-dimensional society, evangelical Christianity declined into a form of mind-cure extolling the power of positive thinking. Managerial technique, no matter how sophisticated, humane, or socially responsible it strives to become, has been no more successful in its attempts to provide the foundation for a legitimating world-view. As Habermas has observed: "There is no administrative production of meaning."[99] The most that managerial technique can do is to broadcast the "lyric of plenty" incessantly in the hope that the desires of the perfect, passive consumer will become more or less automated. The aim of managerial technique is to eliminate the very need for meaning. In Meyer's words, "the wish for plenty was the wish not to have to wish wishes of one's own at all."[100]

97. Donald Meyer, *The Positive Thinkers: A Study of the American Quest for Health, Wealth and Personal Power from Mary Baker Eddy to Norman Vincent Peale.* (New York, 1965), p. 194.
98. *Ibid.*, p. 195.
99. Jürgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis* (Boston, 1975), p. 70.
100. Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 207.

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It follows that the ideal of corporate management, acting as "a purely neutral technocracy"[101] bound to adhere to legally prescribed standards of social responsibility, can serve to legitimize neither the corporation nor the society which it dominates. The crisis of legitimacy which besets the contemporary corporate welfare state has not developed merely because the modern corporation has been captured by a New Class of corporate managers. The rise of the corporation to its position of dominance within American society should not be understood as another variation on the theme of "the people" versus "the interests" so beloved of Progressive and neo-Progressive historians. Nevertheless, that is precisely the story recounted in one way or another by the standard histories of American corporation law. The Handlins, for example, have claimed that the effort of the courts, in the *Dartmouth College* case and elsewhere, to preserve the property interests of private corporations from state interference was the crucial element in the transformation of the corporation into "primarily a profit-seeking institution, a business vehicle serving the interests of investors rather than a public agency utilizing private capital." Because it fell away from the control of the state, the "forces inherent in the society," above all the desire for private economic aggrandizement, "pressed for multiplication." The resulting dispersal of the corporate form "brought new attributes, and a private character replaced the public."[102] In fact, as we have seen, there was no contradiction between the public dimension of the corporation's identity as a body politic and its property element. Private property could be dedicated to public purposes. The whole point of securing a corporate charter was to confer a civil status on privately-held property. The corporate form allowed the propertied classes to maintain a legally sanctioned form of dominion on the terrain of civil society. It is in that light that one should read Story's opinion in the *Dartmouth College* case. In that judgment, Story was not engaging in a covert defense of the property rights of the emergent business corporation. It mattered to him that the case involved a college rather than just another business corporation. If the Supreme Court had been primarily concerned to safeguard the rights of private business corporations against state interference, it could have done no more than uphold the decision of the New Hampshire Supreme Court which clearly distinguished between "public" corporations such as Dartmouth College and private business enterprises clothed in corporate form. "By holding that ownership of lands and buildings constituted a college a private corporation," Story was not simply broadening "the meaning of private property to the point of meaninglessness."[103] This analysis represented instead an implicit acknowledgment that the use of the corporate form to serve the political and cultural hegemony of the propertied classes could not possibly be confined to business enterprises oriented towards private profit. It was perhaps even more important to secure the autonomy of colleges and

101. Berle and Means *op. cit.*, p. 356.
102. Handlin, *op. cit.*, pp. 159-160.
103. *Ibid.*, p. 156.

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churches[104] against possible interference from state legislatures prey to demagogic influences which might easily escape the control of the "natural aristocracy" of the propertied and well-born.

The effort by conservative judges and lawyers to preserve the identity of the corporation as a body politic was not simply a manifestation of illogical thought. Rather it represented a significant point of resistance to the emergent logic of capitalist economic development. That logic was by no means autonomous. It drew much of its dynamic force instead from a tradition of millenarian radicalism hostile to the "legal" domination and privileges of the conservative propertied classes. That radical tradition stymied conservative efforts to defeat or contain it. The problem conservatives faced, and finally failed to solve, was that they were continually being forced to hedge their bet on the capacity of a natural aristocracy to maintain its civil hegemony in a free and popular state. Unable to rely any longer upon an habitual respect and deference, the Federalist elite sought to rally mass support for their aims through the same electioneering techniques employed by their Republican opponents. They also became enthusiastic advocates of religion and education as useful means of inculcating habits of decency, modernation and virtue among the common people.[105] Grants of corporate privilege were yet another means of hedging their political gamble, an effort which subsequently proved fruitless. Just as they failed to turn the Jeffersonian's own instrument — the political party — against the Republicans with any lasting success, they were forced to watch helplessly as the privilege of incorporation was made available for the asking with scant regard to the civil prerogatives of vested property interests. By 1837, with Taney's judgment in the *Charles River Bridge* case, the corporation as a body politic was on the road to extinction. It was the old propertied elite, for whom the ownership of property signified a form of civil dominion, and not the democratic state, which lost control of the corporate instrument. The result was a far-reaching transformation in the nature of domination within American society. Property ownership lost its last vestige of *civil* status. Once it took on the form of capital, property gave its owner access only to the sort of *social* status which has come to be measured according to sociological indices of prestige and income. The old propertied classes were as much the victims as the engineers of the capitalist revolution in American life. It is part of the continuing tragedy of American radicalism that the vital force underlying that revolution was radical ideology of popular sovereignty fused with the limitless ambitions of an evangelical Christianity forever prone to a persistent confusion between the experience of worldly success and divine grace. Given that confusion, it is hardly surprising that American radicalism has hardly ever seemed capable of producing a program that moves beyond the demand for a new economic and social deal for those denied access to the fruits of the affluent society. Those who seek such a new

104. See, *Terret v. Taylor* (1815) 13 US 43.
105. Fischer, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-49.

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deal typically seek to overcome what they see as a failure of social responsibility on the part of corporate and other private interests wedded to the ideology of the free market. But the crisis of legitimacy which permeates American society will not be resolved in another climactic struggle between "the people" and "the interests." The crisis exists on a much deeper, cultural level and involves the disappearance of any genuinely political ethic from both state and civil society in the American republic. By refusing to take seriously the identity of the corporation as a body politic, we can only postpone the time when a recovery of that political dimension of our being becomes genuinely possible. The attempt to portray the early American business corporation as an agency of state economic management — a kind of prototype New Deal — involves just that kind of refusal. So, too, does the claim that the business corporation can only be legitimized through some program of socialization or state ownership which would eliminate the last vestiges of private ownership. Such a program would succeed only in dissolving altogether the boundary separating state and civil society and with it any hope that the private corporation might serve as a useful model of "an association of persons formed with a view to some good purpose."

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ISRAEL AND THE TRAUMA OF THE MASS EXTERMINATION*

by Dan Diner

The Palestine Conflict is characterized by the fact that in its perception by Jewish Israelis, experiences play a role which did not emerge from the conflict itself. Instead there is prior consciousness which is saturated with images from Western history, especially the recent German-European past. This peculiarity cannot be explained solely with reference to the fact that a significant number of Israeli Jews are of European origin whose biographical experiences with the old Europe have been accumulated in the state of Israel. Certainly the Jews, as a traditionally extraterritorial people, carry around more world history in their collective consciousness than other peoples. They also tend to place their own current history into a transhistorical continuity and thus to overlook specific characteristics. But not even these aspects explain why the Palestine conflict, and above all its recent expansion into Lebanon, became blended together with traces of the European past into a surrealistic scenario of simultanity. This was exemplified by Begin, who, with his back to reality, thought only to glimpse the past. Yet, the conflation of history with the present did not remain limited to those responsible for Israeli policy. In West Germany, in Europe, and in the West in general, Israeli policy was measured against precisely this past. The substance of this questionable morality drew on comparisons and analogies with the historical high-point of barbarism, the Nazis' mass extermination of the Jews. The real Palestine Question was never debated. The actual confrontations were completely overlaid by historical metaphors.

The century-long conflict over Palestine between Jews who either immigrated with the intention of establishing a national state or fled there in the face of persecution, and the displaced Arab population, is a conflict of a demographic character. For the nationally oriented Jews it was a question of founding a national state, to be guaranteed by a Jewish majority which would provide a democratic legitimation. This implied, however, transforming the Arab population into a minority, which in the final analysis amounts to its political and national expropriation. Its individual and civil expropriation necessarily follows. This is the basic constant of the Palestine conflict. The territorial and military forms only extend the demographic conflict over the establishment of a Jewish-national state or the preservation of the Arab character of the region. The Zionist colonisation is perceived by the Arab population as an attack on its existence, even if the means originally applied were not directly violent and took legal and economic forms.

*Translated by John McCole

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The Arab population instinctively tried to defend itself against this "peaceful" displacement. And although the Palestinian Arabs were merely reacting, they were soon cast in the role of attackers. This historical reversal is, on the level of consciousness, a fundamental motif in the Palestine conflict. As a result, a particular perception could spread among Israeli Jews — following centuries of European experience — that they repeatedly became objects of hate and targets of attack by others.

In addition, this inversion makes it possible to deny the guilt resulting from the displacement and expulsion of Palestinians in the course of the Zionist colonisation. Hence, the vehement struggle over mere facts relating to empirical events. The issue seems not to be the interpretation of events but rather whether something took place at all. The fundamental pattern in the perception of the conflict by the majority of Israeli Jews includes a denial of events and of the means and measures of the colonisation process, pushed through against the Arab-Palestinian population in order to establish a Jewish-national state — ultimately the denial of the existence of Palestinians as such. This denied Palestinian reality is replaced by interpretations connected with the Jews' terrible and real experiences from persecutions in the Diaspora to the attempted total annihilation. These interpretations function with respect to the perception of reality like a seal which hardens and closes out other realities. Thus, Israeli Jews, and Jews in general, shift the conflict with the Palestinians and with the Arab environment into interpretive models based on antisemitism and the Holocaust. This process is not merely a subjective carry-over of a collective trauma. An *objective* ground is also needed to give material support and a living framework to memories which live on in individual and collective history.

A great deal can be traced back to the conflict itself. Simply the fact that it can be characterized as "colonial" makes it clear that its ramifications include a moment of mutual extermination. That is, as a colonial conflict it is not subject to compromise; at least not in the sense of a territorial dispute as, for example, in the past between Germany and France; for in this case what is at stake is not just more or less disputed territory, but the very collective existence of Israeli-Jews and of Palestinian Arabs. That is why the conflict is carried out with such historical stubborness. In this case a distinction between civilians and military is hardly thinkable: the collectives themselves are in conflict, and not just socially determinable regimes. The colonial and thereby total character of the conflict over Palestine is the *actual* gate of entry through which images and metaphors from the extermination of the Jews in Europe flow. There the possibility of a military defeat of Israel is necessarily taken to imply the extinction of the collective. To prevent such a defeat demands that the conflict be conducted with all available means — as a preventive exercise of anticipated Arab violence. And if this conflict implies the potential extinction of one group by the other while the colonial origins and forms of development of this violence are nevertheless stubbornly denied by Jews and Israelis,

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then events in and about Palestine can only be interpreted as a continuation of previous history *outside* of Palestine. The significance of the actual conflict over Palestine quickly becomes unimportant. It merely supplies the material for an interpretation whose coordinates lie in the history of Europe and not in the Near East, the locus of the actual events. If so, then an outlook determined by the experience of the holocaust is oriented towards certain disasters in the concrete conflict over Palestine. In the final analysis, the constant effort to prevent it increases its likelihood. The Jewish-Israeli interpretation transpassing by metaphors the horrifying European past makes it more difficult to consider historical solutions — even those with risks — which have been suggested in the Palestine conflict.

Another aspect of the Palestine conflict which heightens the relevence of the Jewish-European experience is tied to the fact that the maintenance of a Jewish state in Palestine requires the use of force against native Palestinian Arabs to exclude them from that power reserved for the Jewish nation. If one, however, wishes to end the discrimination against Arabs in Israel within the "Zionist structure", then the national identity of Israel as a *Jewish* nation-state comes into question. That is, a structural change which ends by recognizing the individual and collective rights of the Palestinians implicitly places the Jewish national character of the Israeli state in doubt. Such a possible change would not amount to a question of social and political order in the narrow sense, but, rather, to one of national identity which, as such, would thereby be put in question and would arouse corresponding fears: The Jews would ask themselves abstractly, ignoring the local conditions of the conflict why precisely they should be denied a national state.

The demand to defuse the Palestine conflict by abolishing the Zionist state ignites existential fears based on the denial of collective identity which Jews encountered in the course of their European history where their particular existence and form of life were not accepted. The French Revolution emancipated the Jew as a private person, who was to be granted all individual rights, but no rights protected a collective Jewish identity. Collective rights would include not only the exercise of cultural particularity but also a positive recognition of that *difference* for which Jews have had to pay so much in the course of their history. Differences become politically insignificant and culturally fruitful when they are generally accepted. But when they are denied, their importance spreads to every aspect of existence. Consequently, the denial of difference appears as a threat to be opposed with one's entire being.

After the holocaust, which qualitatively transformed Jewish self-understanding, the overhelming majority of Jews delegated their partularity to the state of Israel. This delegation essentially resulted from the guilt felt for having failed to prevent the Holocaust — especially for American Jews who believe they did not adequately use their influence during the forties. Thus Israel became a constituitive element of Jewish self-consciousness after the Holocaust. Only after WWII and the Nazis' eradication of the European Jews,

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did the surviving Jews decisively consider a Jewish national home in Palestine. As the only remaining form of Jewish self-understanding, Zionism appeared as a theory of the horror that had been experienced. The Jewish people witnessed how the overhelming majority of non-Jews had allowed Jews to suffer an almost complete extermination. Nothing seemed to contradict this experience, and a collective retreat towards a Jewish particularity ensued.

Zionism arose during the 19th century as a theory of impending catastrophe. Building on centuries of Jewish suffering in Europe, its historical pessimism foresaw an increasing antisemitism and a total crisis of the bourgeois nation/state in which Jews would become the principal victims. Once the mass extermination took place and all other varieties of Jewish self-understanding came to be seen as the all too-optimistic children of enlightenment and emancipation, the program of a Jewish state could lay claim to historical confirmation.

Yet, the conclusion which seems to follow — that the Zionist interpretation of history is now irrefutable and has been verified in the most horrible possible way — is not tenable. The Zionist argument amalgamates the experience of the Holocaust with its interpretation of Jewish history and with practical Zionist policy from the time before the WWII. It thereby neglects a decisive element which is important for any political solution of the Palestine conflict.

The Zionist argument suggests that a sovereign Jewish state is an absolute necessity if Jews are to be guaranteed a refuge in case of persecution. Had such a possibility existed before the mass extermination, then more Jews would have been able to save themselves. In fact, European Jews who immigrated to Palestine were able to escape persecution by the Nazis. But those Jews able to flee to other lands in which the Nazis could not reach them also escaped persecution. In this respect, Palestine cannot be distinguished from other places where the persecuted found refuge. Palestine was even a place where the endangerment of the Jews by the Nazis lay within the realm of the possible — quite apart from the independently existing conflict with the Arabs. In the course of the war the German army stood at the gates of Egypt, but the plan to push northwards through the Nile and Palestine in order to deal a blow to British interests in the Near East and turn towards the Soviet Union's south flank failed due to Rommel's defeat at El-Alamein.

The Palestinian Jews had prepared themselves for a battle to the end with the German army — a battle whose prospects were horrifying given the Nazis' declared intention of exterminating Jews *everywhere*. Thus, Palestinian Jews could expect no other fate than that of the fighting Jews of the Warsaw Ghetto. That it fortunately did not come to that, was due to the British military advantage. It is trivial — but the Jews in Palestine were not rescued any differently than those who, for example, resided in England or who were evacuated into the interior of the Soviet Union — that is, by virtue of the fact that they remained beyond the Nazis' military reach because of the military efforts of the allies.

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This analysis in no way confirms the Zionist conception of history. Nevertheless, Zionism transforms the Palestinian Jews' accidental survival — accidental in comparison to Zionist historiosophical determinism — into an ideological confirmation. The insistence on a national homeland and an independent state is surrounded by an all-encompassing aura: The Jewish communal entity in Palestine appears as an effective refuge offering escape. A Jewish state would have admitted even more people, and because the horror of the past could repeat itself, one should never again renounce the security of the Jewish state.

The direct, causal linkage of Palestine, the Holocaust and salvation leads to a theoretical interpretation which results in a paradigm of practical action in the Palestine conflict. It also decisively contributes to the Jewish comprehension of world developments after the mass extermination. The interpretation of the Holocaust as a further link in the chain of persecutions and antisemitism, obscures its incomparable uniqueness. The result is that the Holocaust, as the last and irrefutable confirmation of the Zionist interpretation of Jewish history, is twisted into proving that past events could have been avoided through a national Jewish state in Palestine. The enmity towards Jews is thus based monocausally on the loss of territory in antiquity, so as to suggest that a "return" would put an end to Jewish historical misery. Thus, no distinction is made between the antisemitism of *persecution* in the 19th and the first decades of the 20th century, and the qualitative intensification represented by the national-socialists' *extermination* of the Jews. The inability to recognize the difference between antisemitic persecution and the Nazi extermination of Jews means to ignore the particularity of the Holocaust. As with the Nazi measures in the 1930's, traditional antisemitism was an essential historical forerunner of the Holocaust. But the Holocaust loses its qualitative new character when it is misinterpreted as the *historically necessary* consequence and fulfillment of traditional-religious and modern antisemitism. Yet, this misinterpretation blocked the correct political and military reactions regarding the European Jews, for whom the Western world carries the main burden of responsibility. For it closed its doors to the harrassed Jews so that the Nazis settled on the decision to exterminate them.

The misunderstanding of the consequences which National Socialism was to have for the Jews took on a traumatic meaning for classical political Zionism because it saw itself as a direct response to antisemitism. Its answer to the Jewish question was based on historical antisemitism and envisioned a national Jewish state as a secure refuge. It also reacted with a negative acceptance of the antisemitic image of Jews. In this way Zionism adopted purportedly progressive theories of integrating the Jew into production as well as the alternate image of Jews as parasitical do-nothings in order to deprive the antisemites of their allegedly good arguments. Not only were the irrational and projective aspects of antisemitism misunderstood. Such an attitude assumes that the causes of antisemitism are to be found among the Jews themselves and thinks it possible to eliminate antisemitism through a 'civiliz-

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ing" transformation or even a territorial concentration of the Jews in their own communal entity. Apart from the intentions of such a "transformation,' the notion of concentrating the threatened Jews in one country appears sensible only in response to the kind of antisemitism which traditionally takes the form of the persecution of the Jews, i.e., an expulsion from a given country. Yet it was a policy of total extermination of Jews everywhere that the Nazis pursued after 1941, and even the Zionists had never dared to consider such a possibility.

Consequently, the Zionist organization and its institutions did not recognize the significance of the news about mass extermination in Nazi occupied Eastern Europe. First of all, this news lacked credibility due to its unimaginable content. In this sense, the reaction of organized Zionism did not differ from that of others — Jews as well as non-Jews. Secondly, there was another perceptual barrier with leading Zionists. For the Zionist concept of establishing a national state, the intention and execution of a total extermination must have appeared as a refutation of the program which had been developed in response to traditional antisemitism. The news of the total extermination, the "final solution," fundamentally called the Zionist answer to antisemitism into question. Such news simply had no right to be true.

Zionists and non-Zionists, Jews and non-Jews discredited the factuality of news and witnesses' reports about the Holocaust in the same way for the news ran counter to a Western consciousness trained on goal-oriented rationality. The Nazi strategy of keeping the genocide secret was based on the assumption that their activities were so unbelievable that possible reports about the mass extermination would be rejected as imaginary and lacking credibility. That the incredible indeed lacked credibility has been completely confirmed. Reports about the Holocaust were dismissed by the allies as exaggerations. Due to this mental barrier, all practical responses were limited or not even carried out. The bombing of the death factories of Auschwitz, which could have been carried out, never took place, which still remains incomprehensible. At the same time, the Zionist organization spared no effort to mobilize its energy for a quantitatively relatively unimportant illegal immigration to and *only* to Palestine. Before the mass extermination, in 1938, when the National-Socialist policy with regard to Jews still appeared as traditional antisemitism and neither the Jews in Germany, nor those in annexed Austria had yet been in direct physical danger, the Jewish Agency tried to undermine even halfhearted political efforts to open other places of refuge for Jews, arguing that the admission of Jews to other countries would have weakened Zionist pressure to open up Palestine for Jewish immigration. Jewish suffering in Central Europe was seen by the leaders of the Jewish Agency as a lever of its policy concerning Palestine.

During the war, the formation of Jewish-Palestinian armed forces within the British army was carried out by analogy with the experiences of WWI: one must belong to the victorious coalition in order to acquire Palestine as a Jewish state in the post-war redistribution of spheres of interest. In view of the

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events in Europe, such efforts, directed towards Palestine as a Jewish state of the *post-war period* were a senseless venture — particularly when measured by the core of the Zionist claim, which was to save Jews from the Holocaust.

As the others, the Zionist organizations and their leaders were victims of the diabolical logic of the Nazis. The Nazis knew how to make both their enemies and their victims into accomplices of their crimes. What nevertheless distinguishes organized Zionism from all others was *its* passivity when confronted with the Holocaust. For those who identify with Zionism, this is a particular psychological burden. In Jewish mass consciousness, Zionism represented the claim to save the persecuted. Politically, Zionists had managed to get their way internationally as representatives of the Jewish people. It would have been their task to take appropriate measures. The concentration on Palestine, however, was not an alternative to Nazi genocide. In order to pursue the notion of a Jewish state in Palestine, the political Zionists' perception of the real monstrosity of the Nazi policy towards Jews had to remain distorted, despite their catastrophic world view. For the recognition of the qualitative difference from traditional antisemitism, would have implied the refutation of the project for a Jewish state. After the mass extermination became a dreadful certainty, terrible doubts had to follow. The possibility of realizing that the price for Israel was even higher than assumed increased its symbolic importance, and the historical accident that the Jews in Palestine escaped extermination was necessarily eclipsed by the new Zionist historiography.

The notion of having been saved from extermination accidentally and not by Zionism can lead to a deep shock to Jewish self-understanding after the Holocaust. The historical capability to act as a collective and the ability to determine one's own fate is called into question. The Jewish people would thus be thrown back into a dreadful complex of feelings from which they believed themselves saved thanks to Israel and the mental relief connected with it. The Jewish people in Israel and elsewhere would be confronted anew with the old horror of having been subjected to an inconceivably ingenious death machinery. Any other behavior toward this machinery than that adopted would hardly have been possible. The psychological aid to survival which Israel provided for victims of the Holocaust would be removed in the most tormenting fashion.

The human inability to envisage a total industrial killing outside of all goal-oriented rationality corresponds to the inability to relive such a phenomenon. The victims displace its memory in time and space. The Nazi genocide is thus experienced in a compensatory manner in the Palestine conflict. Because the murderers did not appear as persons, the understandable emotional reactions of the victims, their hatred and anger, were displaced from the Germans onto those who corresponded more clearly to the traditional forms of antisemitism and who stood nearer to the historical experience of discrimination and persecution, e.g., the Poles, whose antisemitic traditions belonged to the immediate everyday experience of Jews in Eastern Europe before the

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mass extermination, or the hatred for the British in the mid-forties, which mixed together the reproach of a passive acceptance of the mass extermination with a reaction to the English colonial, Western arrogance towards Jews in Palestine. But it is impossible to mobilize feelings about an abstraction, i.e., the form of the National-Socialist mass extermination. Thus, there were more direct victims of the Holocaust in the extremist Zionist military organizations, which fought the British as well as the Arabs in the forties, than in mainstream Zionism. In these organizations the battle for Palestine was justifed through images, metaphors and the projective perception of recent European experience. The antagonist was directly perceived as enemy of the Jews and the real conflict was occluded by its justifications.

Ben Gurion, who carried the chief responsibility for the Zionist colonization of Palestine, warned about confusing Arab behavior towards the Jews in Palestine with antisemitism. He could still clearly differentiate between the real conflict in the Near East and European antisemitism, and recognized the danger that people like Begin, who ignored the necessity of such distinctions and with it the local origins of the conflict, might take over political leadership in Israel. His fundamental attitude was based on the principle that any partners for the government coalition in Israel were acceptable with the exception of Begin's Herut Party on the one hand and, for different reasons, the non-Zionist communists on the other. Begin's criteria of political evaluation and distinction are those between Jews and non-Jews. Non-Jews are basically perceived as antisemitic. In this way, it becomes practically impossible to perceive the important difference between those Palestinians or Arabs who oppose the Jewish state in a concrete conflict and real antisemitism. Thus, the Palestine conflict becomes trans-historical and therefore part of an insoluble world opposition between Jews and non-Jews. Potential solutions to the very real Palestine conflict are considered useless from the start. Moreover, the assumption of a world opposition between Jews and non-Jews turns every attempt at compromise in the Palestinian conflict into a treacherous attack upon the very existence of Israeli Jews.

That Begin's perception presents the Palestine conflict and the Arab-Israeli controversy in terms of WW II could also be caused by the fact that for the Jews the events of WWII are fundamentally different from the Holocaust carried out *during* the war. The participants in the organized, military war actions, and above all the participating nations as collectives, were able to see themselves as fighting subjects and were perceived as such, although in the beginning they were inferior to the German military machinery. The Jews were not considered a military opponent. They were subject to industrial eradication. The collective humiliation of having been chosen for extermination leads to the need to relive those events as subjects — this time as a full member of the coalition which won the war. The exaggerated and disportional force exercised in Palestine, together with the corresponding mental disposition can be traced back to the feeling of helpless subjugation experienced as the objects of extermination. Furthermore, Begin must be particularly overwhelmed by the

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feeling of not having participated in the struggle against Nazi Germany in a way which would satisfy his self-image. Begin escaped the grasp of Nazism in Soviet deportation and later in Palestine.

The destruction of the nuclear reactor in Iraq in June 1981 by an Israeli air raid exemplifies this phenomenon. This event has all the features of the realization of the bombing of Auschwitz, which the Allies never carried out. The identification of the nuclear reactor in Iraq with means of mass murder, as they were applied in the extermination camps, brought with it precisely *this* form of demonstrative destruction. This is not to say that this kind of consciousness determines Israeli politics in general. It is rather a question of a surplus which can only be explained in terms of the traumatic experience of the Holocaust and which results in an Israeli escalation of the level of violence in the Palestine conflict and its extension throughout the Near East, because the opponents are identical with Nazi persecutors. This surplus can be recognized in the fact that the Israeli intentions to destroy the Iraqi reactor, in order to maintain a nuclear monopoly, could have been realized through other, less spectacular means — as carried out in the past by governments of the Zionist Labor Party. A demonstrative and humiliating air raid goes far beyond the rationale of immediate political effectiveness.

The complusive repetition dangerously blocks insight into the origins, the real course and the forseeable possibilities of a conclusion to the Palestine conflict. As long as the concrete victims of the Zionist colonization — the Palestinians — are equated with criminals or even Nazi criminals, while the real aggressors, the Zionist Israelis, perceive themselves as transhistorical victims, then every possibility of overcoming the real controversy is bound to remain blocked. The political consciousness remains blinded by the European experience. The confusion of the constitutive Holocaust in Europe with the real conflict in Palestine can never heal the wound caused by having missed the decisive battle at the right time. For the life and surivial of Israelis and Palestinians such a consciousness represents a collective danger.

It is not probable that such a perception will be modified by a generational change in Israel. The collective trauma of the Holocaust was less effective in Israel in the forties and fifties than in later decades. The older generation which suffered the shock directly distanced itself from the past in order to protect its own psychological survival. The time lapse, however, has made it possible to come closer to the events. Therefore, the psychological effects of the mass extermination will persist. This is not only valid for Jews in Israel. The presence of the Holocaust has increased with temporal distance in the diaspora as well. With it comes the positive perception of Israel as a substitute for the experienced loss. This identification takes very concrete forms. The overwhelming majority of Jews in the world has transferred its consciousness and its subjective perception of the State of Israel. Certain actions of the Israeli Army — as in Entebbe — appear as real confirmations and feed far-reaching illusions. But this protection, desired by the majority of Jews in the world, has actually a contrary effect and endangers them fatally. Israel's claim to be the

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state of all Jews, and last but not least to represent them as well, along with the readiness of the Jews themselves to delegate the essential contents of consciousness to that very state paradoxically makes them into the most exposed victims of its politics.

This takes place above all when the political interests of Israel come into conflict with the interests of those states in which the majority of Jews live. This is equally valid both for Israeli policy in the Palestine question and for the support of repressive regimes, especially in Latin America — its arms supplies and military training in order to repress social-revolutionary movements, not to mention the already proverbial cooperation between Israel and South Africa. A combination of latent anti-semitism and the effects of Israeli policies sharpens the problem of Jewish existence even in those countries where explicit antisemitism was hitherto unknown. As opposed to traditional antisemitism, whose local outbursts still enabled Jews to find refuge in some other place, the Israeli claim upon world Jewry for the politics of the Jewish state spreads the danger throughout the world.

A separation of Jews throughtout the world from Israel or from the Israeli policies which threaten them will therefore become essential if their existence is to be secured. A mere separation, however, remains a purely abstract demand when one considers how irrevocably the identity of the Jews has been interwoven with Israel since the Holocaust. For the Jews in the world, the solution of this dilemma lies in an effort to solve the conflict in the Near-East by recognizing the rights of Palestinians. This may seem a paradoxical solution because it involves *intervention* in Israeli policy, and far-fetched considering that the majority of Jews in the world supports the state of Israel protozionistically. However, when confronted with the increasingly threatening Israeli policy, it seems advisable to behave towards Israel in such a way that this hererto *abstract* refuge ceases to increase the threat to the Jews' *real* existence in various countries. For Jews outside Israel this means a post-Zionist Jewish-Israeli existence; such a notion can include positive identification, for instance as an expression of *cultural* relations to Eretz Israel, but no *national-sovereign* claims to Palestine.

The conflict between the endangerment of Jews' existence in the world due to Israeli policy on the one hand and the striving for security on the other is not generally perceived, above all because Israel is seen as the last resort of reliable protection and refuge due to the consciousness of the Holocaust. But in fact, Jews are nowhere as endangered as in Israel, although Jewish collective consciousness has failed to recognize this contradiction. The trauma of mass extermination has led to a qualitatively new perception. Had the National-Socialist extermination policy never existed and animosity towards the Jews had remained limited to traditional antisemitism (which one could escape by emigration), then the empirical contradiction between the real violence in the Palestine conflict and the Zionist premise of Jewish security would have become evident. But against the background of a historical mass extermination, the violence in Palestine is perceived as relatively less threatening. The

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Jewish victims of the Palestine conflict appear as a confirmation of a *meaningful* existence when compared to the absolute *senselessness* of the victims of the National-Socialist genocide. As long as the consciousness of the Holocaust remains interwoven with the real conflict in Palestine, the terror and the extent of mass extermination by the Nazis will function as a relevant measure of the present killing.

Against this mental and historical background, certain explanatory patterns develop in Jewish consciousness which help to deny the real determinants of the conflict. These patterns, which always involve a moment of truth, become central paradigms of the Zionist denial of guilt in the Palestine conflict. The flight and expulsion of Palestinians become linked to European events. Thus, the moral validity of criticism of Israel is questioned. Those who consider themselves part of the victorious alliance of WW II and, correctly, the main victims of the Nazis, ask why it was legimitate for Poland and the Soviet Union to move their Western borders and to expel millions of Germans. Such comparisons build a mental bridge between two worlds, the present and the past. The displaced perception of history becomes a seemingly real historical continuity filled with absolutely real material, for example, the ideological closeness of German and Arab nationalism, particularly in the forties, which so imprinted themselves on popular consciousness. It was then that Arab nationalism moved closer to National-Socialist Germany in search of an ally against British colonialism. Based on the archaic but no less effective principle that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend," Arab nationalists, along with Indian nationalists, looked toward Berlin. Opposing England, German policy regarded the animosity of the colonial nations in the east towards their oppressors as a tactical pawn in its own imperialist policy. The Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini became a symbol of this rapprochement in Jewish consciousness and accelerated the connection between the Jewish experience in Palestine and European antisemitism. The Mufti's activities in Berlin and the establishment of a Muslim SS-division in Yugoslavia which he inspected — photo-material confirms it — confirmed the Jewish reception that the Nazis unfinished business was being carried out in Palestine. Chauvinistic Arab rhetoric made use of this mixture and reaffirmed Jewish fears. It was expressed in the slogans of Ahmed Shukeiry and other Arab propaganda on the eve of the June 1967 War and consequently the pattern of Israeli Jewish perception were confirmed. Similarly, the welcome which many Nazis found in Arab countries after 1945 contributed to the consolidation of this consciousness.

Given this experiential background, the denial of the real causes of the Palestine conflict becomes complete, especially when it becomes apparent that a Jewish collective in form of a national state cannot be maintained in the long run as the state of Jews in the world. For present Jewish consciousness this appears as an attack on the rememberance of Jewish suffering which thrives on the European experience. In reaction to this attack, a question arises based on the subjective experiences of the victim appealing to the

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world's sense of justice: why, for example, did the existence of Germany and the German collective remain unquestioned after WW II — while Israeli Jews are denied a national existence despite the European experience? Stalin's dictum from the last phase of WW II that "Hitlers come and Hitlers go, but the German people remains" treats the criminal actions of Germany correctly as a question of the regime. Yet, in the case of Israel's existence and the Palestine conflict it is not a question of the regime but rather of the conditions of existence for a Jewish state in a country in which it is forced to apply colonial means in order to maintain itself. However, Israeli consciousness overlooks the objective limitation, the really existing barriers to collective or national-statist Jewish existence in Palestine. The claimed right to a national Jewish state by the European victims relies on a comparison with the recognized collective existence of the culprits, who compelled the Jews to flee into their own state. Therefore, the criticism of Israel by Germans who refuse to reflect on their own history which forced Jews to Palestine appears to Jews as an additional insult to the victims of genocide. For Germany, the historically guilty collective, history is supposed to be over; biology has simply blocked the extension of the past into the present. For the Jews, however, Germany continues in the Palestine conflict for which no end is in sight.

Jews regard the *manner* of the German treatment of the Palestine conflict more insulting than any real participation, i.e., solidarity with the actual victims, the Palestinians. It is rather a matter of the participation which is only superficially interested in the suffering of the Palestinians but in reality is only concerned with it to the extent that it represents an extension of the German past. This became clear in the terrible war which Israel unleashed against the Palestinians in Lebanon: finally, the Jews could be ascribed a role which could balance out the debt between German and Jews. The victims of German and European history — the Jews — were presented in the guise of their former persecutors. German critics' use of terms such as "final solution," "holocaust," and "extermination," magically turned the Israeli action *vis-à-vis* the Palestinians into a completion of the German project for the Jews. This sort of solidarity with the Palestinians uses them only in order to carry out a psycho-historical eradication of German guilt. The Palestinians become fodder for a grandiose exculpation. Its historical space has little to do with the real conflict in Palestine — and all the more with German history. Thus Germany continues to participate in the conflict; not as if it contributes to the development of a new perspective for Jews and Arabs but by strengthening the Jewish consciousness that past history continues. False criticism from Germany thereby ensures that the Jewish perception of the real conflict remains distorted.

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ART AND INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION*

By Albrecht Wellmer

From its start in 1907, the German Arts and Craft Society (*Deutscher Werkbund)*attempted to set itself at the forefront of industrial progress.[1] Its leaders believed that technological and esthetic modernism would eventually converge and they hoped that art and industry, separated since the end of the artisan era of production, would be reconciled. Similarly, the functions of the artist, technician and merchant — previously united in the person of the laborer — were to be joined again in a harmonious whole at a higher stage of differentiation. The result would be the liberation and development of a genuinely modern, esthetic-moral culture.

If one can speak of a central, underlying illusion in the original platforms of the Arts and Craft Society, it is this: that the interests in a humanization of the work environment, an expansion of capitalistic markets, and the development of a new attitude towards form and material could operate in ultimate conformity with one another. The great accomplishments of the Arts and Craft Society through the end of the 1920s never approached the cultural revival anticipated by its founders. Instead, they involved the appropriate use of new materials and construction techniques within certain limited problems; examples include the trail-blazing factories of Behrens and Gropius, the Weissenhof development in Stuttgart, and the design of modern forms for objects of daily usage. On the other hand, both world wars and the dynamics of industrial development itself have proven that the cultural renewal dreamed of by the artists, architects and social politicians of the Arts and Craft Society in no way fit into the logic of this development. Unlike most of the cultural avant-garde at the start of this century and again in the 1920s, the contemporary cultural avant-garde regards technical modernization as a symbol of the destruction of the environment and tradition. As the process of modernization has attacked the deepest levels of traditional urban and rural social forms, while threatening the ecological balance and thereby the natural basis of human life, the destructive consequences of industrial progress have become readily apparent. Today an alliance between art and ecology is more probable than one between art and industry.

The history of the Arts and Craft Society is tied to the functionalist and constructivist impulses of modern architecture and modern industrial design. At the same time, the Arts and Craft Society can also be understood as a protest

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1. On the history of the German Arts and Craft Society, see the recent works by Joan Campbell, *Der Deutsche Werkbund: 1907-1934* (Stuttgart: Klett Cotta, 1981), and Kurt Junghans, *Der Deutsche Werkbund. Sein erstes Jahrzehnt* (Berlin DDR: Henschel Verlag Kunst und Gesellschaft, 1982). For a good collection of documents concerning the history of the Society, see the catalog of the Arts and Craft Society exhibition at the City Museum of Applied Art, Munich 1975: *Zwischen Kunst und Industrie, Der Deutsche Werkbund.*

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against the barbarity inherent in unleashed capitalistic mass production. These two central motives both complement and confront one another. Early on, even the "modern" representatives of the Arts and Craft Society recognized that functionalist postulates were insufficient to effect an esthetic-moral revival of culture against the logic of capitalist modernization. This was the meaning of the "spirituality" of form invoked by Muthesius and others, which, in contrast to the merely instrumental and materially necessary, first made beauty possible in a world of industrial production. "Spirituality" also designated the role of the artist in a combination of art and industry. Yet, in 1908, Albert Loos protested against just such a separation of roles between art and industry: "the amalgamation of art with the commodity" meant "the strongest abasement which could be inflicted." If one thinks of the history of *industrial design,* then in retrospect Loos does not seem wrong, but if one considers the real social problems which gave the Arts and Craft Society its founding impetus and which ensured its continuance, then it becomes clear that even Loos' functionalist slogans do not hold the solution. But what are the actual boundaries of functionalism to which that formula of the "spirituality" of form point?

I use the concept of "functionalism" in a broad sense, so that it will encompass the problems of material construction as well as the postulate that "form follows function." Above all, functionalism had an ideologically critical meaning: compared with the industrial kitsch, the eclecticism and historicism of architecture at the turn of the century, the functionalist postulates implied a moral-esthetic purification, comparable to the criticism of Karl Kraus or the early Wittgenstein. Just as Wittgenstein demanded, "If one cannot speak about a topic, one should remain silent," one can also summarize the functionalist position in the demand, "What has no significance (no function) should not appear (specifically, as if it had a significance." And just as the rhetorical ascehcism of the early Wittgenstein led to an extreme concentration of the esthetic quality of his prose, one can also maintain that in the best works of the new architecture, the clarity of the functionalist language has led to an extreme esthetic concentration, due to the fusion of construction, purpose and expression. But as in logical positivism, Wittgenstein's call for language purity culminates in the hypostatization of scientific-technical rationality, the critique of ornaments in vulgar functionalism became the hypostatization of technological development. This meant a radical reduction of the perception of the basic issues themselves: light, air, hygienic facilities, the requirements of transportation — no one can dispute the importance of these needs, especially when they were largely unsatisfied. Yet they hardly exhaust the contents of traditional European urban culture or an understanding of what a modern city could be in which the human potential of technology prevailed over its destructive force. In analogy to Marx's criticism of mechanical materialism, one might speak of a "mechanical functionalism," to which a "historical functionalism," i.e., an historically reflective and self-preserving functionalism, could be contrasted.

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Elements of a mechanical functionalism, a technocratic simplification, are present even in the works of great modern architects or even in the designs of Le Corbusier. But in his best buildings, Corbusier represents the *other* side of modern architecture as well: its esthetic potential. Corbusier's own "human joys" — *air, son, lumière* — hardly allow themselves, as Julius Posener stressed, to be grasped as physiological needs in the sense of vulgar functionalism. It appears more to mean joys, as once, perhaps, the buildings of Greek antiquity extracted from a still mythical landscape. In this great architect, the radical modern and the archaic converge. Liberated architecture appears as the liberation of impulses and experiences, buried in the course of the disenchantment of the world: the successful interlacing of origin and utopia. The best of Corbusier's buildings seem to be eloquent objects transcending any vulgarizing functionalism, as if in them, the dead material opened its eyes — thereby showing the rich potentials of constructivism.

In contrast, the version of functionalism which has historically predominated is afflicted with the formal and mechanical simplifications of the technocratic spirit. It suffers especially from a lack of reflection on the functional and objective relationships *in reference to which* a functionalist production ought to be carried out. Thus, a vulgarized functionalism could participate in a process of modernization, which depended on capitalist accumulation and the imperatives of bureaucratic planning. Not until the 1960s, when the last — or next-to-last — ornamental facades of the Wilhelmine era threatened to fall victim to the modernization movement in postwar Germany, did there arise a broad understanding that these functionally awkward, ornamented facades preserved more of the urbanity and humanity of European city culture than did the functionalist wilderness of the modernized city districts. Certainly, the overburdened and eclectic facades of the 1880s and 1890s may have, as Wolf Jobst Siedler pointed out in *Die Gemordete Stadt* (1964), concealed bad and disproportionate architecture, but with the removal of the facades not only would the bad dimensions of the underlying architecture become visible, but the characteristic dialectic of the functionalist movement would be apparent as well. For a functionalism that accepts uncritically the definition of the fundamental functions and their priority relations can only acquiesce to a complete devastation of the cities by capitalist profit-taking, traffic planning, and administrative logic. Even if the ornate facades of the turn of the century were untruthful and ideological, they still carried a memory of urbane lifestyles and a promise of their continuation. The simple destruction of ornament only brings to light the wretchedness of the previously hidden "basis," and thereby threatens to extinguish the vestiges of memory that alone could spark the impulse to change. The functional modernization of postwar West German cities displays inclinations to self-mutilation — as if the metamorphosis of humanity into a simply functioning and faceless being should be additionally accelerated. This exodus from the city — in the traditional sense — and into the facelessness of the modern nomadic settlements culminated in the sun-filled, suburban bedroom communities of

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the postwar period. Of course, no one can dispute the tremendous advances in the general comfort of life which the modernization of the cities *also* implied; there is no reason to romanticize working class tenements. But what was lost with this modernization was the city as a public space, as the pervasion of a diversity of functions and forms of communications — in short, the city both as a place of freedom for the average citizen in European history as well as a cultural center.

In a speech to the Arts and Craft Society in 1965, Adorno defended the functionalist and constructivist impulses of modern architecture against their vulgar functionalist realization. "Architecture," he said, "is of higher quality, the more intensely it combines the two extremes of form construction and function."[2]. Adorno conceives of a reciprocal permeation of materials, forms and goals, in the sense that none of these impulses would be absolutely declared the last, or the "original phenomena." The materials and forms are not ahistorical givens; history is contained within them, and spirit is "stored up." "Artistic fantasy awakens the sedimented spirit, by becoming aware of the problem. Its steps, always minimal, answer the speechless question which the materials and forms ask in their mute object language. In this fashion the separated moments, and also the goal and immanent law of form, converge." For Adorno, the deeper legitimacy of functional impulses lies only in this reconciled coherence of materials, forms and goals. Here functionalism goes beyond any simple relations of expediency. "The feeling for space," he says, "has grown together with the goals; when it surpasses function in architecture, it is also immanent to the functions. Whether such a synthesis succeeds is probably a criterion of great architecture, which asks how a specific goal can become space, in which form and materials, all moments, bear reciprocally upon each other. Accordingly, architectural fantasy would articulate space through functions and let the functions become space; it would construct forms via functions." In the language of functionalism, Adorno attempts to arrive at something beyond merely functionalist cohesion: expression, meaning, the linguistic character of architectural constructions — that for which Muthesius or Le Corbusier would have used the cipher "spirit." Adorno attempts to locate this immediately within the postulates of functionality and construction materials. For Adorno a truly functional architecture implies an arrangement of concrete spaces in which humanity could rediscover its subjectivity objectified and which at the same time allows subjective impulses to resist and develop against a spatial structure replete with significance. These animating and inhabitable spaces act as spatial objectifications of communicative relations and potentialities of significance.

As with Le Corbusier buildings, Adorno's interpretation pushes functionalism immanently beyond itself to another linguistic-esthetic dimension of architecture, to which — in contrast to the simple formal or functional-esthetic — the representatives of the so-called postmodern architecture have

2. Theodor W. Adorno, "Funktionalismus heute," in *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 10 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1977), p. 389.

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first drawn attention. Charles Jencks[3] in particular has celebrated the rediscovery of the *Language* of architecture as the key discovery of postmodern architecture. Indeed, Jencks saw the metaphor of "articulateness" as the key to a *criticism* of functionalism and constructivism. Because the advocates of postmodernism, in opposition to Adorno, regard functionalism in terms of what it historically became —the vulgar functionalism of the "international style" — the rediscovery of the language of architecture is understood as a *turning away* from the "rationalism" of modernity.

From the standpoint of articulateness, much of modern architecture appears in fact as an extremely impoverished representation of technological logic. Jencks criticizes the "univalency," the one-dimensionality, ineptness and rationality of the reference system of modern architecture in opposition to which he sets the polyvalency, the semiotic complexity, the contextuality, the stylistic pluralism and eclecticism of postmodern architecture. Jencks bases the rehabilitation of eclecticism on a simple consideration: the stylistic homogeneity of an architecture embodying 'meanings' can only exist in societies with a common system of signification, i.e., in traditional societies. Since such a system no longer exists in industrial societies, architecture today, conscious of the historical distance or in an ironical break, can only draw *ad hoc* from the semantic potential of the past, while, on the other hand, this semantic potential lies readily accessible in its complete expansion, including both exotic and archaic modes of expression.

If this were all, then the plan of modern architecture would account to an open admission that it is no longer capable of arriving at its own language; the necessity of its own speechlessness becomes the virtue of an arbitrary or frivolous game with the language forms of the past. This is in fact the only truly postmodernist feature of postmodernist architecture. In contrast, its other, productive side amounts to an *immanent* surpassing of modern architecture, in the sense of a liberation from the simplifications and restrictions of a technocratic rationalism. The most interesting aspect of Jencks' reflections lies in his suggestion of a connection between the development of the articulate dimension of architecture on the one hand, and a new, participatory form of city planning on the other hand. What had only been intimated with Adorno becomes specifically clear here; the metaphor of the "articulateness" of architecture refers to the real speech ability of those affected by architecture. In contrast to musical composition, which always concerned Adorno, in architecture the changing interfusion of materials, forms and goals must be actually interlaced with a communicative clarification of the goals, if "meaning" or "expression" are not to become arbitrary: buildings are not hermetic works of art. Jencks' reflections are, therefore, thoroughly helpful in explaining the concept of an architecture which is neither bound up in functionalist relations nor loses itself in self-glorifying gestures. It would be the concept of an architecture which went beyond a merely technical, economic and

3. Charles Jencks, *Die Sprache der postmodernen Architektur (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1978).*

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bureaucratic rationality, as well as beyond the simple arbitrariness of esthetic gestures and entered instead — in an expression of Habermas — into a "communicative rationality." Participatory forms of city planning and city "repair" would be *one* aspect of such an architecture, another would be what the Dutch have named "polyvalented space," i.e., the conception of a space open to individual variation and interpretation of a collective basic plan, therefore the conception of individually *interpretable* (Hertzberger) space. In this connection Van Eyck coined the beautiful expression "labyrinthine clarity." The concept of a labyrinth stands for everything which, from the perspective of a technocratic plan, appears to be dysfunctional, unforeseeable, unplanned, and superfluous; it simultaneously represents the indirectness, ambiguity and complexity of structures and relations, which arise from the unregimented experiences and self-initiated action of a *great number* of subjects. From *this* perspective something can appear to be clear and lucid which the carriers of technocratic ideals will regard as confused, disarranged. Once again a parallel to the philosophy of language presents itself: Wittgenstein's criticism of "prejudice of crystal purity" in the philosophy of language corresponds to the criticism of post-modernist architects to the ideal of geometrical clarity and functionalist unambiguity. Wittgenstein's demand that "the views must be turned, but about our own need as the pivot," is the demand that structures of daily speech must be observed from the standpoint of their *user*; then, what appears to be confused from the standpoint of a constructivist semantic could appear as clear and ordered. The concept of "labyrinthine clarity" would thus be linked to "communicative rationality:" measured against the conceptions of rationality of a technocratic consciousness, both are indebted to a "turnabout" in the view around a pivot defined by the needs of concrete, historical subjects.

In the concept of communicative rationality, both communication and rationality are considered together. The concept does not stand only for the complex structures of ordinary spoken communication, but just as much for the normative core of an emancipated consciousness. It implies the idea of an "open society" in the modern sense, meaning a post-traditional, universally understood democracy. The concept of communicative rationality therefore indicates conditions under which common, binding systems of signification — as understood by Jencks — can *legitimately* no longer exist except on the metalevel of universal values; against the false uniformity of the technical, impoverished systems of signs, we can no longer offer a system of objective meanings — unless we were to accept the price of a powerful reduction in communication — but rather only a *pluralism* of values, meanings and life forms resulting from the liberation of communicative potentials. This pluralism implies the recourse to traditions and the semantic potentials of the past. This is probably what Jencks had in mind when he spoke of the possibility of a new authentic eclecticism in the architecture of the post-modern period. He envisions a productive use of the new degree of freedom which modern consciousness has won for itself in relation to tradition, the

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possibility of striking sparks from the petrified texts of the past, while adapting their signs into new configurations of an altered legibility. If this is eclecticism, then it is an eclecticism of *contemporizing,* a selective power to provoke traces of the past to life, not, however, eclecticism as a contrary play with forms of style which, incapable of facing the present, vainly searches for a footing in the past. Jencks' idea of an "authentic" eclecticism is consequently understood in relation to his demand, that "the entire system of architectural production" must be altered, a demand which aims for the reconquest of the use values of architecture by the affected subjects.

The rejection of a one-sided technocratic modernism by postmodernist architecture *must*, obviously, not be understood as a turning away from modernity and the enlightenment; it can also be understood as an immanent criticism of a concept of the modern which has fallen behind its own goals: the rediscovery of the articulate dimension of architecture, the contextuality, participatory planning models, the emphasis of the city "fabric" in place of contextless structural monuments, historicism and eclecticism themselves, understand them in the sense of a rediscovery of the historical-social dimensions of architecture as well as the cultural tradition as a reservoir of semantic potentials — in short, much of that which distinguishes the so-called postmodernist architecture from the technocratic — utopian biases of the modern can be understood as progress in architectural awareness and as a corrective *within* the modernist tradition. But against this, eclecticism and historicism also have the potential meaning of a *renunciation* of the constitutive features of modernity: from enlightenment, universality, and rationality. In this respect, postmodernist architecture participates in an ambiguity characteristic of many trends which are today included under the title of postmodern: be it a matter of alternative social movements or "postmodern" scientific and cultural theories — from the epistemological anarchy of Paul Feyerabend to French poststructuralism. It is the ambiguity of movements, political and theoretical impulses, which on the one side are aligned against a technocratically perverted modernity in the defense of communicative structures, semantic potentials, ecological balances, or the possibilities of an unregimented self-expression of the subject, i.e., the defense of conditions without which modernity would have to relinquish its peculiar potential for humanity, and which on the other hand frequently enough proclaim that the retreat from technocratic modernity means the retreat from modernity in general. In the latter case, the criticism of technical rationality becomes irrationalism, contextualism becomes particularism, nativism becomes a mere fashion — or worse — regression, and the rediscovery of the symbolic function or architecture becomes an ideological or authoritarian gesture. Jencks seems to belong to the representatives of a postmodernity architecture and city planning, who in the meaning used here are radically modern; the clearest indication of this is his emphasis on the connection between urban lifestyle and democracy. In a certain sense, Jencks constructs his "postmodern" criticism of modern architecture from the perspective of a demo-

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cratically understood city plan. To this extent his criticism of modern architecture — despite his intentions — is not a criticism of enlightenment but rather part of a "critique of instrumental reason."

This example of developments in architecture permits no direct conclusions regarding the mediation of art and industrial production in other areas. Individuality and "articulateness" are particular characteristics for the forms of architecture; architecture is open to fine art. In addition to individuality, industrial mass products also lack an important condition of articulateness: they cannot individualize the goals which they embody, and this limits the *expression* of a possible mediation of materials, form constructions and function. Signs are, to industrial products, frequently just signs of a function, or else they are status symbols — symbols of technical progress or the projected symbols of an infantile world of images. Where industrial mass products are not externally ornamentally or symbolically burdened, they cannot give expression, by virtue of their own totality, to a coherence of *meanings*; they *embody* a coherence of *functions*, but they cannot express them.

Industrial products need not, therefore, be expressionless. Expression is an inferential phenomenon, as Adorno said, and scarcely separated from beauty. Industrial products can certainly be beautiful, if an accomplished construction and an evident function are *visible*. The difference between visible and invisible constructions is in many respects more important than that between houses and machines: that the iron constructions of the 19th century now often appear beautiful is not simply nostalgia, not just the romantic glorification of the "ruined" remains of a bygone industrial age, but also a consequence of the visibility of their construction; with steam locomotives and even bicycles the moment of expression depends upon the visibility of the construction. Where the perfection of construction with visible functions results in expression — even if it is only the successful correspondence to the body's gesture-motor space of movement — the objects attain a specific significance and become beautiful; they are more than mere means, a bit of purposefulness without purpose. To be sure, this form of beauty is in the process of disappearing in the age of electronic technologies; its products are insignificant or monstrous, visible only as smooth surfaces which cover something sensually incomprehensible, just as ordinary things conceal the operation of the atomic nucleus. Today those use objects which are still close to the human body, i.e., the eyes and hands, such as tools, furniture, lamps, can, if well-constructed still be beautiful. But this beauty of perfected construction is still different from the "eloquent" beauty of perfected buildings, and all the more so, the more technically precise — meaning more general — the functions of objects allow themselves to be described. In this respect, Loos is still correct.

The lessons which may be gleaned from the example of architecture lie on a different level. They involve the goals and *life forms* which are embodied in the products of industry. The products of industry are linked together in configurations and networks of functions whch *determine* the patterns of life and

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work, reproduce social hierarchies or forms of communication, and embody social priorities. These configurations are comparable to the forms of architecture in that they broaden or constrict expressions of life, stimulate or deaden sensibility, block or provoke independence. They construct boundaries, openings, passages, utensils or else the prison walls of the human environment in general. Referring to Ivan Illich's concept of "tools for conviviality," one could distinguish between a technology oriented to human needs, human independence and communicative rationality, and a technology designed for capital accumulation, bureaucratic control or political manipulation. *This* distinction, and not that between industrial Kitsch and functional design, today denotes the boundary between esthetic-moral culture, on the one side, and barbarism on the other.

In comparison with the start of the 20th century, when the Arts and Craft Society was founded, a radical dislocation has become evident, if not in the objective nature of the problem than at least in social consciousness; it finds its expression in the retreat from the "productions-esthetic" problems, to those of "usage-esthetics." Behind the functionalist and constructivist impulses of modern design and modern architecture stood the conviction that, given certain functions, one must be able to find technically impeccable, materially appropriate and esthetically binding solutions. Even when one understands this problem in Adorno's manner of a reciprocal permeation of materials, functions and form constructions, there still remains — and Adorno would have been the last to contest this — the question of an appropriate explanation of the goals themselves. In the unified coherence of materials, forms and goals, the latter can, indeed, be concretized and materialized, but cannot actually be clarified. On the other hand, the interdependence between the beauty and expedience of utilitarian objects is only real and comprehensible where the goals are themselves understood and shared by affected subjects. Consequently, if the clarification of goals and their purposes is omitted, a world of utilitarian objects themselves cannot be "beautiful" in the functionalist sense of the word. This is one of the reasons why so much in modern architecture, even when it appears to have succeeded according to immanent criteria, approaches the sterile beauty of a "decorative formalism" (Alexander Schwab), becomes "*light Kitsch*," as Bloch calls it, or a "polished death" which "glares as the morning light." "Between the overstuffed and the steel chair," says Bloch, "between post offices in renaissance style and egg crates, there is no longer a *third alternative* exciting the fantasy." This third alternative could only arise from a change of the "life style," i.e., from a clarification and change in the goals *from which* and *for which* production occurs. An "esthetic of use" emerges where the esthetic quality of the life world is concerned, in dependence on the sensibleness of the goals embodied in objects of usage. Today the problems of "contemporary form" are above all those of the esthetics of usage, for whose solution the model of an interaction of art and industry is no longer sufficient.

In the conception that the inherent dynamic of industrial progress would

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allow itself to become humanized and domesticized by the weak powers of an esthetic enlightenment, there was probably always a good deal of naiveté, even if one posited the material- and productions-esthetic enlightenment of a broad public as a desideratum. But since the middle 1960's it has become increasingly recognized that in the world of industrial products goals have been realized which scarcely conform to those which living subjects recognize as their own. Wherever questions about the fashioning of utilitarian objects are of more than private or ephemeral interest, where it concerns more than questions of a new "style" or a new fashion, it is the question of goals which enters public consciousness. This is true for questions of city planning, urban renewal, and city maintenance in the same way that it is for questions of drainage water regulation, conservation, the construction of hospitals, streets or nuclear power plants, or finally for questions of an alternative technology. In all of this, questions of design have acquired, in addition to their technical-esthetic component, an *unmistakeable* social, political or ecological component. In the old Arts and Craft Society formula of the separation of the traditional manual laborer into the functions of technician, merchant and artist, not only are worker and capitalist absent; the *social* component of design is missing, i.e., the role of the laborer as the representative of a collective model of life, articulated in his products. But where the collective models of life have dissolved and been problematized in their substance, and subordinated to democratic processes of clarification, it becomes *evident* that the question of the interdependencies of goals and functions extends into the esthetic problems of designs.

A new challenge for esthetic fantasy arises. As materials and forms, goals are, in Adorno's words, not "original phenomena," i.e., in situations where, as in architecture, the concern is not simply with technically precise, circumscribed goals, the articulation of the goals themselves is again linked to possibilities, concretizations and verbalizations. In the traditional relationship between the architect and the client, it is the former who first provides the goals with precise form and articulation. Accordingly, today the constructive and esthetic fantasy of the artist could engage in the process of communicative clarification of goals, as has already been documented from examples of city constructions. Without this contribution of the esthetic fantasy to the *clarification* of goals — and not just for their *realization* — human relations would have to forfeit a decisive dimension of their articulateness, and their goals themselves would become *in*articulate.

The double transition from the cult of utility and the religion of art will not be realized in the core area of industrial production through a renewed direction, rapprochement of art and industry, as the founders of the Arts and Craft Society had in mind. But it is conceivable that industrial production could be linked back to the determination of goals, and that art and esthetic fantasy could participate in this communicative clarification of common goals. Perhaps, through the mediation of an enlightened democratic practice, art and industry could then return as moments of an industrial culture.

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THE ORIGINS OF AESTHETIC VALUE

by Michael McKeon

The Problem of Unequal Development

The initial concern of Marx's "Introduction to a Critique of Political Economy" (1857) is to ask: Where do we begin our effort to understand a complex human activity like political economy? His response to this problem of beginnings consists in the development of a dialectical method which analyzes it into the component questions: What is the relation between material and mental activity, between (for example) economy and the idea of economy? What is the relation of abstract to concrete mental categories? What is the relation between past activity — material or mental — and the present moment of understanding? In two distinct ways, the movement of this meditation on dialectics encourages us to consider seriously the analogy between "political economy" and what we might call "literary" or "cultural economy." First, Marx's subtle manipulation of economic categories like "production" and "consumption" as interdependent activities conditioned by particular material circumstance tacitly suggests how we might profit from viewing our familiar literary terms — author, audience, influence, response — in a similar light. Second, at a certain point the argument of the "Introduction" turns explicitly to the relation of literary to economic production so as to pose a problem, raised by the preceding discussion, that would appear to subvert the very grounds of Marxist materialism and its view of the interdependence of mental and material activity. In Marxist scholarship these fragmentary remarks have become a notorious crux known as "the problem of unequal development." Generally in agreement that Marx's "solution" of the problem is unsatisfactory, scholars have variously attempted to repair this collapse of dialectical method in literary theory which seems to occur at the very moment of its potential triumph.[1]

The following essay is one more such attempt. I believe that the problem has been misconstrued, that it is more precisely the problem of "aesthetic value" under which all modern critical theory labors to some degree, and that

1. For some representatively diverse views on the nature of the problem and the avenues to its solution, see Mikhail Lifshitz, *The Philosophy of Art of Karl Marx*, trans. Ralph B. Winn (London: Pluto Press, Ltd., [1933] 1973), pp. 107-11; Max Raphael, *The Demands of Art*, trans. Norbert Guterman (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 185-87, reprinted in Maynard Solomon, ed., *Marxism and Art* (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), pp. 450-53; Hans Robert Jauss, "The Idealist Embarrassment: Observations on Marxist Aesthetics," *New Literary History*, 7, No. 1 (Autumn, 1975), 191-209.

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its solution may be found in the dialectical method that is itself the major subject of the "Introduction." My procedure in this essay will be, first, to disclose the problem of aesthetic value within the terms of what customarily is known as the problem of unequal development; and then to historicize it by asking the following questions: What are the material — the socioeconomic and cultural — conditions under which the mental category of aesthetic value "began?" What are the alternatives to it that may be discovered by investigating those precedent material conditions under which it must have carried neither conviction nor meaning? How is Marx's failure adequately to engage the problem of unequal development related to the hegemony of "aesthetic value" in modern thought?

As Marx poses it in the "Introduction," the problem of unequal development appears to consist in the fact that in any given historical period, social being and consciousness, material and mental activity, frequently may be seen to be out of step with one another. The problem is specified as an incongruity in the development of "material production and e.g. that of art."[2] The central example is Greek antiquity, and the discrepancy emerges in comparing the high achievements of Greek art, particularly literature, with the primitive state of ancient economic forms. On the face of it, this discrepancy might seem to deny the correspondence of mental and material activity, of superstructure and substructure: "As regards art, it is well known that some of its peaks by no means correspond to the general development of society; nor do they therefore to the material substructure, the skeleton as it were of its organization" (p. 149). Yet it requires no more than a few paragraphs for Marx to "solve" the problem he has created, by unfolding the contradictory nature of the relation between super- and substructure. This solution may be paraphrased briefly as follows.

The correspondence of consciousness and social being is dialectical, not absolute. It is in an evaluative sense that we assess the *difference* between Greek literary and economic production, and in this assessment we employ normative standards — of literary and economic "development" — that are not in the least congruent with each other. Thus in the realm of art, "the concept of progress is on the whole not to be understood in the usual abstract form" (p. 149). The *unity* of literary and economic production, on the other hand, lies in their structural similarity, in the general congruence of literary and economic forms in classical antiquity. This is no more than to specify one way in which the relation between super- and substructure is dialectical: a relation of similarity and difference, a unity of opposed parts. When we momentarily isolate the similarities of super- and substructure apart from their differences, we are able to see how literary production, so far from being incompatible with economic production, has incorporated its principles on the level of form.

2. Marx, "Introduction to a Critique of Political Economy" (1857), p. 149; printed as an appendix to Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology*, ed. C. J. Arthur (New York: International Publishers, 1970), pp. 124-51. All subsequent citations will be to this edition and will be made parenthetically in the text.

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Marx suggests this structural congruence through a seminal discussion which emphasizes the fact of literary *production* — the status of literary making as part of a productive mode — by focusing on what he treats as the essential mediator between literary and economic forms, Greek mythology: "We know that Greek mythology is not only the arsenal of Greek art, but also its basis. Is the conception of nature and of social relations which underlies Greek imagination and therefore Greek [art] possible when there are self-acting mules, railways, locomotives and electric telegraphs? What is a Vulcan compared with Roberts and Co., Jupiter compared with the lightning conductor, and Hermes compared with the *Crédit mobilier*?...Is Achilles possible when powder and shot have been invented? And is the Iliad possible at all when the printing press and even printing machines exist? Is it not inevitable that with the emergence of the press, the singing and the telling and the muse cease, that is the conditions necessary for epic poetry disappear?" (p. 150). Mythology, in other words, signifies the forms of a particular stage in the production of human artifacts, and epic poetry bears the indelible mark of early Greek economy not only in a general sense but in the special sense of disclosing, in its formal assumptions and conventions, the conditions of a pre-typographical mode of literary production.

And this would seem to lay to rest the problem of unequal development. For the discrepancy between the *value* of ancient art and that of ancient economy is not problematic, whereas the *structural* relationship between them — and more generally, between super- and substructure — is one not of inequality but of correspondence. But Marx remains uneasy, and the source of his discomfort lies in the fact that the acknowledgment of this distinction between the standards of evaluation applicable to different kinds of human products seems to empower the stubborn persistence of literary or "aesthetic" value quite apart from all questions of material, substructural conditions. For if literary achievement is judged by its "own" evaluative standards, its own "concept of progress," and these appear to assert their validity under the most diverse social and historical conditions, must we not attribute to "literature" (if not to literary production) a fundamental autonomy that strikes at the heart of Marxist theory? "The difficulty we are confronted with is not...that of understanding how Greek art and epic poetry are associated with certain forms of social development. The difficulty is that they still give us aesthetic pleasure and are in certain respects regarded as a standard and unattainable ideal" (p. 150). Several questions are raised by Marx's formulation of this difficulty. Why should the conceptual discrimination of evaluative standards imply that one of those standards is free of material determinacy? Do we still value epic poetry as Homer's contemporaries did? What do we mean by — what is the content of — our categories of "aesthetic pleasure" and "aesthetic value?" When did Western culture begin to conceive them? But rather than asking questions such as these, Marx turns instead to a characteristically nineteenth-century parallel between individual and historical nostalgia that only muddies the earlier sections of the "Introduction" and leaves the

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troubling suggestion of an autonomous standard of aesthetic value intact: "Why should not the historical childhood of humanity, where it attained its most beautiful form, exert an eternal charm because it is a stage that will never recur?" (p. 151).

The problem we are left with, then, is not so much that of "unequal development" as that of "aesthetic value." Buried at the heart of Marx's unsatisfactory conclusion is the historicizing insight that the suprahistorical standard of aesthetic value itself owes its origin to the conditions of classical antiquity. Yet through a sudden relapse into the dominant mentality of the age against which his own revolutionary philosophy was defining itself, Marx then employs this insight not to historicize, but to naturalize, aesthetic value as a persistent and universal standard. In the following pages I will undertake the historical analysis of aesthetic value that Marx has begun and abandoned here by developing his suggestive comments concerning the material conditions of literary production in classical antiquity. Although these comments direct our attention to the typographical revolution of the Renaissance, the more pertinent technological change must be the revolution which transformed the oral, "archaic" culture of Homeric antiquity into the literate culture of the Greek Enlightenment. My argument will be that it is to this great historical transformation that we owe not only the first and most powerful subversion of "the singing and the telling and the muse," but also the invention of that mental category of aesthetic value under which Marx himself occasionally, as here, may be seen to labor.

The Oral Mode of Cultural Production

"If we observe the general behavior of archaic man," says Mircea Eliade, "we are struck by the following fact: neither the objects of the external world nor human acts, properly speaking, have any autonomous intrinsic value. Objects or acts acquire a value, and in so doing become real, because they participate, after one fashion or another, in a reality that transcends them."[3] The modern understanding has come to view archaic ritual and myth as social activities that undertake to mediate human partiality to cosmic wholeness by imitating and repeating divine models or "archetypes." What is achieved by these undertakings may be described in many ways, for they are the primary means, in ceremony and speech, by which experience is rendered meaningful, valuable — in a word, real. Common to all such descriptions, however, must be an emphasis on the effect of ritual and mythic repetition with respect to the primitive experience of time. The regeneration of the archetype, in Eliade's words, suspends or abolishes time, duration, and history, for "he who reproduces the exemplary gesture...finds himself transported into the mythical epoch in which its revelation took place."[4] Through the periodic annullment of time, primitive experience takes on the transcendent and sac-

3. Mircea Eliade, *The Myth of the Eternal Return; or, Cosmos and History*, trans. Willard R. Trask, Bollingen Series XLVI (Princeton: Princeton University Press, [1949] 1974), pp. 3-4.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

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red value of a primordial past, which, in that act of recreation, loses its pastness. Primitive humanity thus "escapes" the disvalued temporality and ongoingness of history, and "lives in a continual present" which is coextensive with the presentness of the great, founding acts of cosmic Creation and human origins.[5]

In recent years, this perspective on the thought of archaic humanity has become very familiar, and it would seem to imply predictable attitudes about the truth value of archaic myth. A myth is a sacred tale, according to the traditional anthropological definition: its truth lies in its transcendent sacredness. The criterion of historicity, the ascertaining of truth through the question "Did it really happen?," would seem to play no part in this epistemology, for which the fact of historical occurrence carries no value whatsoever. And yet the evidence of field work among North American, Australian, and African tribes, for example, argues that the standard of historicity has an undeniable status in the primitive classification of the truth value of different sorts of stories. Myths are, indeed, sacred tales that concern sacred beginnings in the first age of the world, but the truth of these tales also is designated by the insistence that what they relate did in fact happen. Thus the Pawnee distinguish three kinds of stories of diminishing numinousness — concerning sacred creation by divine beings, the marvelous adventures of national heroes, and the power of medicine men — all of which are historically true, unlike the "false" stories of the exploits of Coyote. Myths appear to be true, in other words, both as they regenerate the *transcendent* reality of cosmic and human origins, and as they recount the *antecedent* and precedent-giving reality of the past made present.[6] Myth fixes on the primordial instant of wholeness, the moment when the phenomenal, social, and temporal divisions of this world were generated. In the very act of regenerating this instant before time and division, myths acknowledge the serious claim of "history" on their attention if only as the necessary mediator to its own negation. In the same way, oral lineages become formulaic repetitions, ladders to carry the reciter back to a realm that needs no ladders. The archaic Homeric narratives also must be understood as acts not simply of "poetic creation" but of memorial preservation, stories that recollect the truth of divine happenings.[7] For the periodic "escape" from history, then, archaic humanity is dependent upon the ongoing temporality that it inevitably lives. And the integral notion of truth on which this strategy depends makes reference to criteria — of contingence and transcendence, of the historical and the sacred — which we are accustomed to seeing as incompatible. Mythic historicity is inseparable from, part of the same system as, mythic sacredness — and as such it is alien to our own, rigorously autonomous and "divided," notion of "historical truth."

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5. *Ibid.*, p. 86.
6. See Raffaele Pettazzoni, *Essays on the History of Religions*, trans. H.J. Rose (Leiden: E.J. Brill. 1954), pp. 11-13, 15.
7. See Eric Havelock, *Preface to Plato* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 91.

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What are the conditions that led to the conceptualization of this autonomous category of historicity? In a literate culture, written documents fix and preserve the productions of subjective human consciousness as objective knowledge. When the objects containing knowledge are not immediately present — a familiar state entailed for us by the lost index card or the returned library book — we have recourse to mnemonic devices that mediate our minds back to what we both have and temporarily have lost. In nonliterate cultures this recourse is the normal and habitual state of affairs. Oral knowledge is formulaic, rhythmic, repetitive, proverbial — sedimented in "echoic" layers so as to achieve aurally that effect of reification which written symbols and their physical media achieve in fact. This is, of course, to some degree still the language of poetry. And the repetitive features that we commonly associate with "poetic" form may be seen to reflect, as it were vestigially, the conditions of literary production of a culture very different from our own. From the perspective of modern culture, archetypalist thought might be described as an imaginative superstructure erected to rationalize the distinctive mental processes involved in the oral production, preservation, and transmission of knowledge. The archetypes explain first of all the haunting experience of memory itself, the way in which subjectivity comes to know what it knows it once knew but had forgotten. They are hypostatized by the archaic mind into that objective realm beyond subjectivity, which alone is powerful enough to have created the flux of temporal experience, hence also to stabilize it periodically through the medium of ritual recreations that first rationalize, then evoke, the actual repetition that is the experience of memory.

This profane, "modern" view of archetypalist thought as an epistemological mechanism for achieving ontological stability is quite compatible with discoveries that it also works as a mechanism of social stability that extends beyond the obvious, situational significance of oral recitation and group ritual. Lineages, myths, and oral narratives look to us as though they confer a "historical" and precedent-establishing authority, but when they are transmitted by memory alone they admit of none of the independent tests of verification upon which our notions of historical authority depend. In fact the genealogies in use among the Tiv of Nigeria were found to change over time, validating present social relations rather than faithfully recording times past: "The social element in remembering results in the genealogies being transmuted in the course of being transmitted...Myth and history merge into one: the elements in the cultural heritage which cease to have a contemporary relevance tend to be soon forgotten or transformed..."[8]

In the absence of physical objects that may be preserved and transmitted, then, oral culture objectifies its knowledge through a process of mnemonic stabilization that achieves, indistinguishably, an ontological and a social wholeness. It is through ritual behavior of the group that the archetypes are

8. Jack Goody and Ian Watt, "The Consequences of Literacy," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 5 (1963), 310, 311. On the "poets" of the Homeric era see also Havelock, *op. cit.*, pp. 121, 123.

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regenerated and collective memory readjusted, behavior that perpetually attributes a division to past and present and a truth value to historicity as one stage in a more general process of unification whereby historicity and division are obliterated. The very language of archaic cultures is suffused with these striking consequences of archetypalist thought. The language of the Trobriand Islanders, for example, permits scarcely any acknowledgement of temporal movement or difference. There are no tenses, no "becoming" of temporal connection between objects, no distinction between past and present, no causation or teleology, no metaphorical or substantive "lineality" in their linguistic cognition. What is valued among the Trobriand Islanders is not lineality but archetypal pattern, activity arranged in or recalling clusters whose patterning is preordained rather than empirically derived. Activity which cannot be valued, which cannot be subsumed socially and ontologically and therefore must appear despicable, is purposive activity, labor whose rewards and satisfactions are not dictated by the overarching pattern and purposiveness implicit in the act itself.[9]

The Analogy of Cultural and Economic Production in Antiquity

Recalling now Marx's account of the dialectical relation between super- and substructure, how might we understand the structural similarity or formal unity of cultural and economic production in archaic societies? What are the general conditions of archaic economy to which we might expect the oral mode of cultural production to correspond? In the first volume of *Capital*, Marx provides a celebrated model of a major distinction in modes of economic production and consumption that emphasizes some of its consequences for a corresponding distinction in forms of consciousness.[10] Money is first transformed into capital, according to Marx, through a transformation of the way that commodities circulate. The simplest form of circulation Marx represents symbolically by the circuit C-M-C: commodities are sold for money in order to buy other commodities. The aim or end of this circuit, Marx says, is use-value; that is, its end is the satisfaction of wants through the consumption of the final commodity obtained. All circulation is motivated by a sense of some difference between the beginning and the end of the circuit, and in C-M-C this clearly lies in the difference in nature or quality between the second commodity and the first one for which it is exchanged. In contrast to this simple form of circulation, Marx describes the circuit M-C-M′, according to which commodities are bought for money only to be sold again in order to obtain more money. If the end of C-M-C is use-value, the end of M-C-M′ is exchange-value, for the sense of difference that motivates the capitalist circuit is not a qualitative distinction between two commodities, but an appreciation the quantitative differences between M and M′. The incre-

9. See Dorothy D. Lee, "Codifications of Reality: Lineal and Nonlineal," in *Freedom and Culture* (Prentice-Hall, Inc.: Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1959), pp. 109-10, 118.

10. Trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling (New York: International Publishers, 1967), I, II, iv, pp. 146-55.

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ment represented by M′ is the surplus-value the expectation of which initially leads the capitalist to enter his money into circulation. Capital is, for Marx, identical with this quantitatively expanded value, the sum of value and surplus-value, and the capitalist enters the process of circulation not to consume its product, but to send it back once more into the process of circulation and the expansion of profit.

This model of the transition from simple commodity production to capitalism sheds light on the differences between oral and literate cultures. Just as archetypalist thought makes use of the flux of historical division to the end of abolishing it, so the circulation of commodities which is involved in simple commodity production amounts to a means of carrying out an end quite unconnected with the flux of circulation — that is, the end of consumption. The consumer of commodities enters the circuit C-M-C, as the consumer of culture enters the serial recitation of ancestral lineage or cosmogonic myth, only so that he may use it to remove himself from lineality as soon as possible. The circuit C-M-C finds its meaning outside itself, at the point of its own dissolution, and the circuit is therefore repeatable but not extendable. To move beyond the transaction C-M-C is necessarily to repeat it *in toto*, by selling another commodity for the purpose of a consumption that, once again, transcends or subsumes the circuit itself. With each repetition of the pattern, circulation comes to an end.

The circuit M-C-M′, however, provides a very different model of purposiveness. When we buy in order to sell, Marx says, we "begin and end with the same thing, money, exchange-value; and thereby the movement becomes interminable. ...the final result of every separate circuit, in which a purchase and consequent sale are completed, forms of itself the starting-point of a new circuit." For the perpetually regenerated sacred Beginning, lineality substitutes what might be seen as the narrative version of exchange-value, a series of desacralized beginnings that derive their genetic meaning from the ongoing movement of historical change itself. The same must hold for ends. Whereas the simple circulation of commodities is a means to an end that lies elsewhere, the circulation of money as capital — i.e., the process of exchange — is an end in itself, "for the expansion of value takes place only within this constantly renewed movement." It is because the circuit C-M-C, like the sacred ritual or myth, has an ending coextensive with its transcendent end that it can be replicated as an integral unit. The circuit M-C-M′, like lineal chronology, has internalized is purposive principle of repetition, and it thereby becomes an endless series: M-M′ -M″ -M‴ -M⁗, etc. [11]

11. This is not to say, Marx continues, that the capitalist is not also, necessarily, a consumer. "As the conscious representative of this movement, the possessor of money becomes a capitalist. ...The expansion of value, which is the objective basis or main-spring of the circulation M-C-M, becomes his subjective aim, and it is only in so far as the appropriation of ever more and more wealth in the abstract becomes the sole motive of his operations, that he functions as a capitalist, that is, as capital personified and endowed with consciousness and a will. Use-values must therefore never be looked upon as the real aim of the capitalist; neither must the profit on any single transaction. The restless never-ending process of profit-making alone is what he aims at" (*Ibid.*, pp. 152-53).

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Although this analogy of economic production, cultural production, and certain forms of consciousness is suggestive in several ways, I will confine my present remarks to the subject at hand. It is clear that "capitalism" is likely to be antithetical — as a mentality and as a mode of behavior — to what I have been calling the archaic mind. Consider the following account of a profane tale told by the Wichita Indians about the rogue figure Coyote, a self-reflexive story that seeks to explain just what is profane about such tales:" It tells of a contest between Coyote and an opponent as to which knew most, i.e., which knew more stories. The contest takes place at night, and the two opponents, sitting beside the fire, tell each a story in turn. At a certain point, Coyote's opponent begins to show signs of fatigue, and is slower and slower at finding a new tale to match that told by Coyote, while the latter goes on without stopping or hestitating, as if his repertory were limitless. At last the opponent owns himself beaten, and is killed. Why does Coyote win? Because, says the tale, his stories are "false," i.e., invented and therefore indefinitely many, while those of his opponent, who, we should note, is a falling star, are "true," that is, they tell of things which have really happened, and consequently are as many as they are, no more."[12]

In spinning out the lineal circuit M-C-M′, Coyote supplants the unit of the divine cosmogony by his own profane creations, which he tirelessly and endlessly heaps up as if he were a capitalist accumulator freed of all constraints upon industriousness. The archaic production of myths, like the archaic production of commodities, may be said to depend upon a principle of "use-value," a discretionary sense of the necessary limits that are imposed upon what otherwise might appear to be no more than a profanely indeterminate, lineal exercise in endless exchange. In the Wichita tale of the story contest, this principle of use-value is expressed through the limitation of having to "tell of things which have really happened," a mode of truth-telling which is not (as we have seen) to be confused with the linealist claim to historicity, precisely because its "happenings" finally are archetypal, primordial ones whose regeneration through narration is tantamount to a negation of merely profane history.

When we focus our attention upon the period in Western history that witnessed the major transformation from oral to literate modes of cultural production, the formal analogy between economic and cultural production becomes both deeper and more problematic. As Marx tells us in a footnote to his discussion of the transition from simple commodity production to capitalism,[13] Aristotle also knew this distinction; his version of the circuit M-C-M′ is "chrematistic," the art of making money. The "economic" art concerns the efficient acquistion of "such things necessary to life, and useful for the community of the family or state, as can be stored. They are the elements of true riches; for the amount of property which is needed for a good life is not

12 Pettazzoni, *op. cit.*, p. 12.
13. *Capital*, I, II, iv, p. 152, n. I.

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unlimited...there is a boundary fixed, just as there is in the other arts..." Economics, then, is the "natural art of acquisition," the limits of which are set naturally by the needs and uses of the household. Value in exchange is, as it were, the "secondary use" of a possession, and "the art of exchange...arises at first from what is natural, from the circumstance that some have too little, others too much." Chrematistic begins when exchange persists after natural needs and uses have been satisfied. "And there is no bound to the riches which spring from this art of wealth-getting. ...in this art...there is no limit of the end..."[14] The economy of the household, once again, is comparable to the economy of story-telling. Crucial to both is a discretionary principle of limits and purposes, the capacity to recognize the circulation of commodities and the spinning of tales as means to an end rather than (as in chrematistic) ends in themselves. In both cases, the source of value lies in the greater uses which these transactions temporarily subserve.

Thus Aristotle's *Politics* discriminates economic production into economic and chrematistic, the "natural" and "simple" stage of barter and the more "complex" form of exchange which developed from it,[15] and this would appear both to strengthen our analogy between economic and cultural production, and to specify more sharply the nature of the historical transformation undergone by both during classical antiquity. What terms might correspond to economic and chrematistic in the realm of cultural production? In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle makes a pertinent distinction between styles of discourse:" ...the compact [style] is that which is in periods. By a period I mean a portion of speech that has in itself a beginning and an end, being at the same time not too big to be taken in at a glance. Language of this kind is satisfying and easy to follow. ...the hearer always feels that he is grasping something and has reached some definite conclusion...It is easy to follow, because it can easily be remembered...By free-running style I mean the kind that has no natural stopping places, and comes to a stop only because there is no more to say of that subject. This style is unsatisfying just because it goes on indefinitely — one always likes to sight a stopping place in front of one...[16]

As we might expect in a treatise on an "oral" (that is, a presentational) art like rhetoric, Aristotle is concerned to compare the mnemonic comprehensibility of the compact and the free-running styles (following critical tradition I will designate these the "hypotactic" and the "paratactic" styles, respectively). On the basis of our understanding of economic and chrematistic, we might further suppose that if a chronological discrimination between these styles were at all possible, the earlier one, being further in time from the newly-literate conditions under which Aristotle himself is writing, might

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14. Aristotle, *Politics*, trans. Benjamin Jowett, in *Introduction to Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Modern Library, 1947), 1256b-1257b.

15. On the fact of a historical development from economic to chrematistic see *Ibid.*, 1257a-1257b.

16 *Rhetoric*, trans. W. Rhys Roberts, in *The Rhetoric and the Poetics of Aristotle*, ed. Friedrich Solmsen (New York: Modern Library, 1954), 1409a-b.

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appear simpler, more "natural," more sensitive to the limits imposed by its social ends and uses, hence more immediately susceptible to memory. It comes as some surprise, then, to learn that just the reverse is true. The paratactic style, Artistotle says, "is the ancient one...Every one used this method formerly; not many do so now."[17] The outlines of the puzzle are clear enough. Aristotle's discussion has seemed to confirm the fact of the analogy between economic and cultural production, but to reverse its terms: whereas chrematistic is the "advanced" form of the "natural" economic, the "natural" hypotaxis is the advanced form of parataxis. There is, moreover, a certain irony in our discovery of the puzzle in this fashion. For it is precisely after reformulating the traditional "problem of unequal development," and in pursuit instead of the hypothetical origins of the "problem of aesthetic value" in classical antiquity, that we now stumble upon what would appear to be nothing other than an instance of unequal development — that is, a genuinely formal or structural incongruity between contemporaneous economic and cultural forms of production. The appearance is an illusion. But it is a highly instructive one, since in attempting to account for this apparent incongruity we will find, in the normative notion of a hypotactic style, the germ of that category of aesthetic value which we have been seeking. The central text in this investigation will be not the *Rhetoric* but the *Poetics*.

The Aristotelian Revolution

That Aristotle represents the consciousness of a newly-literate culture is immediately evident in his capacity to distinguish sharply between the functions of the historian and the poet to describe, respectively, what "has been" and what "might be."[18] Aristotle's characterization of poetry in general and of tragedy in particular requires that this fundamental distinction be unshakable, but from the perspective of the archaic mind, "what has been" and "what might be," the contingent and the transcendent, are inseparable parts of the dialectical whole that is perpetually re-established through archetypal regeneration and its use of lineality to escape lineality. Through the unconditional separation of what archaic thought treats as the indivisible components of myth, Aristotle postulates the discrete categories of "poetry" and "history." This is perhaps more immediately clear in the case of history than in that of poetry. History, Aristotle observes, is obliged "to deal not with one action, but with one period and all that happened in that to one or more persons, however disconnected the several events may have been" (1459a). Here we may recognize that characteristic lineality which expresses the new sense of truth-as-historicity that is the product of literate culture. But Aristotle, interestingly enough, is willing to conflate the lineality of history with what he perceives as the disunity of works like epic that are composed within the older, oral tradition (1459a-b, 1451a-b). It is, of course, from the dominant

17. *Ibid.*

18. *Poetics,* trans. Ingram Bywater, in *Ibid.*, 1451a-b (hereafter cited parenthetically in the text).

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perspective of poetic standards of unity that Aristotle may appear justified in conflating two cultural forms that we have been at pains to distinguish. For him the crucial antithesis is between *propter hoc* and *post hoc*, causality and seriality, the well-ordered plot on the one hand, and the paratactic or episodic progression — whether "history" or "myth" — on the other (1452a). Among the old, oral poets, only Homer had the discretion to limit the length and structure of his imitation to a single action "so as to enable the work," like a good tragedy, "to produce its own proper pleasure with all the organic unity of a living creature" (1459a).

Thus Aristotle, like Marx, is attuned to the aesthetic "pleasure" Homer gives us — although he would distinguish the pleasure "proper" to epic from that proper to other poetic forms. Are Marx and Aristotle experiencing the same sort of pleasure? Is it the same pleasure as that felt by the oral consumers of Homeric recitation in archaic culture? In what sense would they find Aristotle's discrimination of "proper" pleasures a meaningful one? I will approach a response to these questions by trying to clarify, within the present context, the idea that not only "history" but "poetry" emerges, in Aristotle's hands, as an autonomous category. The categories "poetry" and "history," the conceptualization of what might be and what has been, both are presupposed in archaic myth, but in a dialectical relation which prohibits each from being experienced or described autonomously, apart from the other — as "history as such" or "poetry as such." What Aristotle performs in the *Poetics* might be seen as an anatomy of archaic myth aimed at extracting the abstract universality of "poetry as such" — an account that is fair enough so long as we remember that a large part of the work already was done for him by the tragedians themselves. For even "oral" art (in the presentational sense of the term) that is produced in a newly-literate culture must bear the marks of the new mode of production, and Aristotle's achievement lies not in imposing new assumptions upon an alien form, but in abstracting the assumptions that he shares with the tragedians into self-conscious theory. What is central to this theory, the idea of poetic wholeness, has become so familiar to us as to seem a transparent opening out onto the nature of things. When we historicize it, we permit it to regain some of the revolutionary power it must have had at its conception. "Poetry as such" is describable in these terms because it has become autotelic, like a natural organism. Where myth has the imitative capacity to regenerate the all-powerful archetypes of Creation, poetic imitation has assumed the power of the archetypes themselves. The discretionary limits imposed by the divine models have been internalized as the "natural" laws of organic unity. What controls tragedy and gives to it its purpose is not a principle of unity in either the ontological or the social sense of archaic wholeness, but the immanent unity of the plot itself, the purpose, end, "final" cause, and generative "soul" of tragedy (1450b).

It is only by considering that the alternative to Aristotelian unity may be not only disunity, but an entirely different conception of wholeness, that we can begin to reconstruct the significance of the Aristotelian revolution from an

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archaic perspective. A well-constructed tragic plot is a whole, Aristotle argues, and "a whole is that which has beginning, middle, and end. A beginning is that which is not itself necessarily after anything else, and which has naturally something else after it; an end is that which is naturally after something itself, either as its necessary or usual consequent, and with nothing else after it; and a middle, that which is by nature after one thing and has also another after it" (1450b). This passage appears tautologically self-evident to the modern reader precisely because we share Aristotle's belief that wholeness may aptly be described in terms of a lineal sequence whose stages, like those of an Aristotelian syllogism, are causally related according to principles of necessity and probability. As Eric Havelock observes, the "Homeric" or "oral" state of mind "constituted the chief obstacle to scientific rationalism, to the use of analysis, to the clarification or experience, to its rearrangement in sequence of cause and effect."[19] For Aristotle, story-telling is an immanent activity that does not seek its meaning and value outside itself, and so its significant models have been reduced to two contrasting modes of lineality: poetic hypotaxis is opposed to the indistinguishably episodic parataxis of history and myth. For the archaic mind, on the contrary, mythic wholeness must be opposed to the purposeless lineality of both "history" and "poetry," which, in being divided from one another, are divided as well from the very source of their use-value. Rather than a means to an end that transcends and dissolves it, story-telling has become, with the Aristotelian abstraction, an end in itself. From the perspective of the Aristotelian plot, archaic myth is an imitation of a series of actions whose end and principle of movement are external to it. The value of the series must lie in the interconnections of its actions, but since these depend on invisible intrusions from another (transcendent or social) realm, myth can be little more than an endless repetition or accidental juxtaposition of actions. From the perspective of archaic myth, on the other hand, the Aristotelian plot is a random accumulation of events that have no pattern. Existing for itself rather than for the great purpose of archetypal imitation and preservation, the lineal plot — whether "hypotactic" or "paratactic" — repeats the accidental events of profane time in a nightmare progression which can have no end because it has no value, no connection to sacred truths.

What has become, in the *Poetics*, of those features of archaic story-telling that connect myth to its social and ontological ends? The formulaic and repetitive devices of oral mnemonics (rhythm, meter, and harmony), having lost much of their function in the objectification and preservation of knowledge, are classified as one of the "means" of poetic imitation (1447a) and treated as a "material" cause of poetry. This is one of the causes by which Aristotelian method differentiates modes of imitation from one another, and Aristotle makes it clear that meter, for example, is itself incapable of distinguishing poetry from some other thing (1447b, 1451a-b). The socially functional, persuasive features of tragedy are treated rather less uniformly in the *Poetics*. On

19. *Op. cit.*, p. 47.

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the one hand, they may be comprised within the "thought" of the dramatic personages, one aspect of the "objects" of poetic imitation (1448a), which are treated as a "formal" cause of poetry. As such, persuasive speech would appear to have greater importance, as a mode of differentiation, than does meter. Yet for a full discussion of "thought" Aristotle nonetheless refers us to other treatises altogether — the *Rhetoric* and the *Politics* — suggesting perhaps that the persuasive effects of poetic story-telling are not central to its ends properly understood (1450b, 1456a-b). This is generally in accord with our view of the Aristotelian revolution as consisting in the abstraction of lineal wholeness from the status of a means to rhetorical and metaphysical ends to that of an end in itself, but Aristotle also evinces a more central and insistent concern with persuasive effects.

This is, of course, the doctrine of *catharsis*, whose first mention, in the summary definition of tragedy (1449b), appears to attribute to it the dominant significance of the "final" cause of tragedy, that essential end which all other tragic elements subserve. We discover soon enough that it is the immanent plot itself, and not the cathartic effect it will have upon its audience, that is to be understood as the true end of tragedy. But the achievement of *catharsis* remains important throughout the treatise as a persistently convenient test by which the poet may know that he has succeeded in his purpose.[20] For Aristotle, *catharsis* serves to define the "proper pleasure" of tragic poetry, the emotional reaction — the "aesthetic response" — of the individual viewer to a well-constructed plot. It is a "social" function that has become estranged from the full, ritual context of social interaction and stabilization, the response of an audience abstracted from that audience and posited as autonomous affect: the uniform and generalizable emotional correlate of the well-constructed plot; what anyone will feel when they read a good tragedy; in short, "aesthetic pleasure." Yet even so, if the "poetry" of the *Poetics* is our most crucial register of the origins of aesthetic value, the correlative doctrine of *catharsis* bears, more hauntingly than any other aspect of the treatise, the vestigial traces of poetry's archaic pre-existence.

In fact the narration of such a pre-history is a task that Aristotle also undertakes, early in the *Poetics*, in a fashion that underscores his pivotal importance in this cultural transformation. Shortly he will prove the priority of plot to the other tragic elements by reference to (among other things) its difficulty: "nearly all the early dramatists" mastered "diction" and "characters" more easily or successfully than they did the construction of the plot (1450a). With the aid of the archaic perspective on cultural production we may wonder if the early dramatists, more fully exposed as they were to the premises of oral culture, slighted the well-constructed plot not because of its difficulty but because of its relative unimportance in furthering the great ends they had in mind. Here Aristotle seems willing, in other words, to take as "natural" what the archaic perspective suggests is "cultural." In his historical narration of the

20. See, e.g., 1451b-1452a, 1452b-1453a, 1453a-b, 1462a, 1462b.

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origins of poetry, a similar choice may be seen in the treatment of literary history as a teleological evolution from rudimentary, oral forms to the advanced and "natural" forms of his own day. Thus tragedy "certainly began in improvisations...its advance after that was little by little, through [authors] improving on whatever they had before them at each stage. It was in fact only after a long series of changes that the movement of Tragedy stopped on its attaining to its natural form" (1449a). The virtues of this approach are inseparable from its limitations. Aristotle's discovery of the natural, organic form of poetry toward which history has been moving severs the productions of oral culture from their ontological and social sources and purposes, and one result of this may be seen in his readiness to praise Homer for the achievement not of his own but of Aristotle's ends.[21] Of course, this radical surgery may be felt to mutilate not only the old epics but also the new tragedies, and it might be argued that even Sophocles' *Oedipus* — Aristotle's exemplary text of the unified plot[22] and in itself a drastically "modern" reduction of the Oedipus myth — undergoes a further linealist reduction in the *Poetics* that takes it far beyond even its author's cultural premises. On the other hand, once the surgery has been performed it permits a breathtaking reconceptualization of the notion of wholeness and an unprecedentedly sharp focus on the severed part as itself, in turn, a complete whole of interrelated parts. The positive consequences of this act of division, of Aristotle's will to categorize in all spheres of knowledge, do not require emphasis.

If we return now to the puzzling problem of unequal development that seems to inhabit the Aristotelian analogy between economic and cultural production, we will find that the puzzle has evaporated. In the course of this discussion we will find, as well, that some degree of light has been shed upon Marx's problem of aesthetic value. The puzzle, it will be recalled, consists in the fact that "chrematistic" is the modern but unnatural development from the more ancient "economic;" whereas "hypotaxis" is the modern yet natural development of "parataxis." Why should the two forms that are relatively contemporaneous with Aristotle's writing be so antithetical as to require the respective designations "unnatural" and "natural?" The oral productions of archaic culture, as we know, are comprehensible not as abstracted, objective artifacts but as experiential processes in which human utterance is felt to establish a connection with a social and ontological reality that is both beyond that utterance and, as process, inseparable from it. Yet the very language of "connection" in a literate culture betrays linealist assumptions that are alien to the archaic sense of wholeness. Even to ask whether myth is causal or serial, "hypotactic" or "paratactic" is to employ a figure of the line which predetermines a response based upon the linealist premise that we are concerned with

21. For a consideration of Homeric epic according to the non-Aristotelian premises of oral culture see James A. Notopoulos, "Parataxis in Homer: A New Approach to Homeric Literary Criticism," *Transaction of the American Philological Association*, 80 (1949), 1-12; more generally, Havelock, *op. cit.*, Part One.

22. See *Poetics*, 1452a, 1453a, 1453b, 1454b, 1455a, 1460a, 1462b.

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a stable and objectively apprehensible product whose wholeness may be assessed by empirical and quantitative means. Just as "the doctrine of the autonomous psyche is the counterpart of the rejection of the oral culture,"[23] so the doctrine of the autonomous plot — the "soul" or psyche of tragedy — requires the hypostatization of that which exists, in oral culture, only in dialectical process. Wearing the spectacles of literacy, Aristotle reads the recent past as an evolution not from oral to literate production, but from unnatural parataxis to natural hypotaxis. Essential to this reading is the conflation of myth and history within the old mode of the paratactic-episodic, liberating the new mode to represent a natural wholeness which then appears to be incompatible with the new mode of chrematistic. But from the archaic perspetive, the new cultural mode is that of "unnatural" lineality, which comprises both history and poetry, the dichotomous pair that results from dividing the dialectical whole of myth. And this archaic view of cultural evolution is quite compatible with the Aristotelian view of economic evolution from economic to chrematistic.[24] It is only from the Aristotelian perspective, in other words, that the problem of unequal development is a problem; from the archaic perspective it dissolves altogether. The inconsistency would appear to lie not in "history" itself, then, but in Aristotle's application of method.

The archaic perspective on economic evolution, as well, is consistent enough with the Aristotelian, for archaic modes of economic production would approximate to those designated by Aristotle as "economic" and by Marx as "simple commodity production." And we are able to recognize this consistency because the Aristotelian view of economic change embodies a different notion of the "natural" from that contained in the Aristotelian view of cultural change. In the former view, "economic" is "natural" because it consists in the circulation and exchange of commodities as a contingent activity that has no autonomous purpose of its own but serves as a means to the natural end of consumption. In the latter view, "hypotaxis" is "natural" because it is autonomous and autotelic, bearing its purposiveness within itself and manifesting it in the form of the articulated plot structure. To assess the naturalness of this objective artifact requires an empirical examination of its structure or an attention to the response of its standardized consumer, in order to determine whether that response entails the pleasure that is proper to the structure which has been attempted. It is precisely because the standard of naturalness has been *internalized*, fixing each artifact apart from the flux of external experience, that it may be *abstracted* as a generalized standard of value that is separable from all experiential particularity. Through this abstraction, the idea of value itself is reconceived as a universal standard of comparison

23. Havelock, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

24. Of course Aristotle does not speak of a completed evolution in either case: in his own time economic forms coexist with chrematistic just as parataxis (e.g., history) coexists with hypotaxis. It should be clear that my simplification here of Aristotle's account of economic and cultural evolution aims at facilitating the presentation of my argument, but that it plays no part in the substance of the argument itself.

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whereby particular, qualitatively different experiences may be expressed in common, quantitative terms and measured accordingly. Whatever turns out not to be so expressible will become either disvalued or, more likely, invisible (as the notion of archaic "parataxis" renders invisible the notion of archaic wholeness).

This account of the Aristotelian revolution in what is deemed "natural" in cultural production suggests, of course, that "aesthetic value" is, like "poetry," a mental category that is conceived in the Greek Enlightenment. And to pose the puzzle of the reversal in our economic/cultural analogy may then be only to ask why there was no comparable revolution in what is deemed natural in economic production. The answer to this question, is of course, that there was: not for Aristotle and not during the Greek Enlightenment, but for classical economists two thousand years later. As Marx never tires of pointing out,[25] one central feature of bourgeois ideology is the validation of capitalist modes of intercourse, and the mentality required to sustain them, as natural laws — the universal and eternal result of historical development. R. H. Tawney has some relevant observations on the abstract internalization of "the natural" during the capitalist era: "The law of nature had been invoked by medieval writers as a moral restraint upon economic self-interest. By the seventeenth century, a significant revolution had taken place. 'Nature' had come to connote, not divine ordinance, but human appetites, and natural rights were invoked by the individualism of the age as a reason why self-interest should be given free play."[26] All of this is no more than to say that "capitalism" itself emerged as a mental category during the European Enlightenment, coinciding with the re-emergence of poetry and aesthetic value as abstract universals, now to be embraced as widely and as enthusiastically as the ideology of capitalism would be.[27]

For as the history of literary theory makes clear, Aristotle's invention of poetry simply did not catch on, and even when the *Poetics* was "re-discovered" in the Renaissance it continued to be routinely misread for several centuries thereafter.[28] There is no evidence, on the other hand, that Aristotle was tempted to invent the mental category of "capitalism" by validating it as the natural mode of economic intercourse, even though, as we learn from the eighteenth-century experience, such an argument was able to be made not

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25. See, e.g., "Introduction," p. 127. Cf. Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, ed. Edward Cannan (New York: Modern Library, [1776] 1937), IV ix 651: "All systems of preference or of restraint, therefore, being thus completely taken away, the obvious and simple system of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord."

26. *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (New York: Mentor [1926] 1958), pp. 152-53.

27. On the emergence of "aesthetics" and the idea of "aesthetics" in the eighteenth century and for one classic account of its intellectual pre-history, see Paul O. Kristeller, "The Modern System of the Arts," in *Renaissance Thought H: Papers on Humanism and the Arts* (New York: Harper, 1965), p. 163-227. For one attempt to correlate this emergence with the dominance of capitalist economic production, see Robert C. Holub, "The Rise of Aesthetics in the Eighteenth Century," *Comparative Literature Studies*, 15 (September, 1978), 271-83.

28. For a brief account of the *Poetics* as an uninfluential theory of poetry see Elder Olson, ed., *Aristotle's Poetics and English Literature* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. ix-xviii.

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only persuasively but with overwhelming conviction. What is extraordinary about Aristotle in these contexts is not his willingness to leave the category of "capitalism" in its pre-historical potentiality as "chrematistic," for in this respect he was in complete accord with his age. In the epochal transformations of social, economic, and cultural life from Homer to Aristotle, the vantage point of the modern social sciences permits us to discern an upheaval comparable both in scope and in detail to the typographical, scientific, democratic, and capitalist revolutions of early modern European civilization.[29] But the differences are, in the present context at least, as arresting as the similarities: the later period produced both the idea and the systematic practice of capitalism; the earlier one did not. As Tawney's remarks will suggest, the full transformation of the idea of the natural from the "archaic" to the "modern" model, in spheres both economic and cultural, was the complex and gradual work not simply of the Greek Enlightenment or of the literacy revolution, but also of the two succeeding millenia. What is extraordinary about Aristotle, then, is not his attitude toward chrematistic but his abstraction of "poetry" as an autonomous category two thousand years before the rest of Western culture was interested in listening. It is an anomalous case that does not pose the problem of unequal development precisely because it is an individual anomaly, testimony to the will of a supreme intellect to pursue, in solitude, the logic of a radically innovative method as far as it would go.

Aesthetic Value as Cultural Exchange-Value

The Aristotelian emergence of the category of "poetry" will have suggested, in this account of it, an analogy between aesthetic value and exchange-value, the transformation of particular and qualitative uses into the equalizing and levelling currency of exchange. When the discretionary limits of story-telling and economic circulation are thoroughly internalized, they cease to function as limits because they sanction these activities as ends in themselves. Aesthetic value is a mode of exchange-value in that it presides over the production and consumption of literature that is "endless," interminable in the sense of being systematically oblivious to its own use-values — literature that understands itself primarily through an abstraction from the external needs and purposes that it putatively is produced and consumed to serve. When, in the "Introduction," Marx asks himself why Homer "still gives us aesthetic pleasure," his formulation of the question presupposes an answer that must assume an abstract, universal standard of exchange in literary response. As we have seen, Aristotle's valuation of Homer — the use that he makes of him — requires an abstraction from the use-values that occupied Homer's archaic listeners; Marx's pleasure in Homer is similarly at variance with that both of the archaic audience and of Aristotle. The fact that Homer "still" gives us

29. For analyses of classical antiquity that, in diverse ways, shed light on this comparison, see George Thomson, *The First Philosophers (Studies in Ancient Greek Society*, Vol. 2), 3rd ed. (London: Lawrence & Wishart, [1955] 1973); Alvin W. Gouldner, *Enter Plato: Classical Greece and the Origins of Social Theory* (New York: Basic Books, 1965); and Perry Anderson, *Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism* (London: New Left Books, 1974).

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aesthetic pleasure is, in the end, not a difficulty but a tautology, for aesthetic pleasure is nothing but the dissolution of pleasure through its indeterminate expansion, the temporal expression of which is perpetuity.

Homer is one classic instance of this inevitable abstraction, because his cultural use-values must necessarily be transformed by the sharply divergent use-values of a literate culture (perhaps this explains why Marx and others often specify Homer as the exemplar of aesthetic persistence). But he is only an extreme case of what always must hold. For the appeal to aesthetic value as an explicit principle of literary response is by definition a limitless transformation of individual uses into the universal medium of evaluation, whereby the most idiosyncratically particular features of our response to literature are equalized, homogenized, or made invisible. To be sure, the impulse toward any such transformation arises in the consciousness that it already is taking place, in mental and material experience, within the dialectical interaction of whole and part, abstraction and concretion. But aesthetic value is the counterpart of exchange-value because it seeks to freeze that dialectic, to mystify or fetishize the creation of value into an activity that occurs exclusively in the process of transforming the work of literary production and consumption into something else, its lowest common denominator. Not only the problem, but the idea itself of aesthetic value, disappears as soon as we recognize that like the products of economic activity, literary products receive their most responsive and definitive evaluation according to the standards not of exchange-value, but of value in use.

The very triumph of aesthetic value, its autonomy and exclusivity, signals a radical emptiness within, for its qualitative substance consists in the quantitative assertion that more people have valued a given work more for a longer time. This superfluity of valuation does indeed entail a certain confirmation. But if we inquire as to the substance, the use-value, of that confirmation, we are obliged to recognize that what is confirmed is nothing else than the exchange-value of the work in question, its capacity to induce us to abstract its particular uses and to efface our particular needs. If we engage with a work, on the other hand, it becomes replete with use-value, and in this engagement we abandon our concern with its aesthetic value because we re-enter the dialectical circuit of comprehension in which abstraction and concretion are non-exclusive, interdependent parts of an ongoing process. This is of course to describe in simpler terms that dialectical interaction of wholes and parts that Marx's "Introduction" seeks to propound as method. That he does not have recourse to this method in resolving "the difficulty that [Greek art and epic poetry] still give us aesthetic pleasure..." is testimony, perhaps, to the formidable power of received mental categories — of "aesthetic value," for Marx, if not also of "exchange-value" — to resist the self-critical act of understanding by which they may be transformed from natural "things" into historical products.

What is neglected in Marx's incomplete application of the method of political economy to the subject of "literary economy" is, most of all, the crucial

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role of consumption. Thus he concludes the "Introduction" with the wistful remark that "the immature social conditions which gave rise, and which alone could give rise, to [Greek] art cannot recur" (p. 151). But it is clear by now that the original "consumption" of Homer — the "aesthetic pleasure" experienced by his first listeners — is no more repeatable than is the production of the Homeric narratives. Of course, the abstraction of production as distinct from, and prior to, consumption must have a special plausibility for a culture that is as thoroughly committed to literate and scientific objectifications as ours has become. It is difficult for us to regard the literary work as anything but an inert physical object, produced at a single moment and persisting (if it is "good") through perpetual and "finally" equalizable re-consumptions by different readers. How confusing this must be as a model of literary consumption if it fails, as Marx argues earlier in the "Introduction," even to capture the creatively constitutive power of economic consumption. As we come self-consciously to know for ourselves this power of economic and literary consumption, we free ourselves from subjection to the mental category of aesthetic value and learn to know "Homer" himself as a nominal whole fabricated of partial versions which also are vestigial precursors of our own. Once again, Homer is the extreme instance — the name with which a literate and capitalist age fixes the trans-individual experience of archaic cognition — of what yet must hold in all cases of literary response. On the one hand, the stability of the literary product is perpetually proclaimed by the endless re-consumption and revaluation of a confidently denominated thing. On the other hand, the literary work always is done anew, reproduced by each successive act of useful consumption that comprehends it according to altered personal and social circumstance. It is only in the dialectical unity of these movements that the reality, and the value, of literature may be found.

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address inquiries to:
Scott Giantvalley
Managing Editor
Center for the Humanities
Taper Hall of Humanities 326
University of Southern California
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0350.

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GRAMSCI AS A (NON) LITERARY CRITIC

by Arshi Pipa

Gramsci began writing on questions of literature and culture while a student at the University of Turin. From 1916 to 1920, he reviewed Italian and foreign plays, performed in Turin theaters, in the socialist newspaper *Avanti*. "Theater Chronicles" have a militant character, occasionally touching on technical and aesthetic questions. Gramsci saw the stage as a tribune for political education, a means for exposing the insoluble contradictions of the bourgeois way of life. This approach led him to favor popular dramatized epics (*drammoni d'arena*) and even to prefer *pochades* to plays in which rhetoric dissimulates hypocrisy and moral emptiness.

Literary critics have paid little attention to Gramsci's "Theatre Chronicles" on account of their partisan spirit as well as journalistic style. Bonino, who devoted a monograph to those articles, concludes that Gramsci appreciated theater as an "autonomous" aesthetic activity.[1] Marxist literary critics have been at pains to legitimize Gramsci as a literary critic for his writings on literature in his *Prison Notebooks*. Their attempts have been dismissed as futile by other, usually non-Marxist, literary critics. Foreign scholars who have extolled Gramsci as a Marxist theoretician for his original ideas on the party, the state, fascism, the role of the intellectuals, etc., have ignored altogether his notes on literature. An exception is Thibaudeau,[2] who approaches Gramsci as a writer rather than a literary critic, something Italian scholars have been reluctant to do, on the assumption, it would seem, that a Sardinian could not possibly write good Italian.

Articles and reviews on Gramsci as a literary critic began to appear immediately after the publication of *Literature and National Life*,[3] a volume including Gramsci's notes on literature in *Prison Notebooks* as well as "Theater Chronicles." Leading Italian literary scholars and critics — Della Volpe, Sapegno, Salinari, Petronio, Asor Rosa — commented on that volume. At the Cagliari International Congress on Gramsci (1967), a special session was devoted to Gramsci as a literary scholar. Sapegno belittled Gramsci as such, describing him as a historian of culture, whereas Salinari and Petronio reacted by going to the other extreme.[4] They discovered, in *Prison Notebooks*, the potential for a Marxist theory of aesthetics and theory of literature. Yet neither Salinari nor Petronio, or any other Marxist literary critic, would subsequently

1. Guido Davide Bonino, *Gramsci e il teatro* (Einaudi: Turin, 1970), p. 139.
2. Jean Thibaudeau, "Premières notes sur les écrits de prison de Gramsci dans la théorie marxiste" in *Dialectiques* (1974) 4-5.
3. *Letteratura e vita nazionale*. Einaudi: Turin, 1950.
4. Natalino Sapegno, "Gramsci e i problemi della letteratura" in *Gramsci e la cultura contemporanea* (Editori Riuniti: Rome, 1970), Vol. I, pp. 265-77. The discussions of Carlo Salinari and Giuseppe Petronio are found on pp. 284-86 and 287-90 respectively.

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venture to develop that potential into a monograph. A more recent work by Bernardi[5] is a sequence of two essays, the first of which analyzes exhaustively the Gramscian tenet of "popular-national literature" while the second goes astray in chasing the ghost of the autonomy of art. Reading Bernardi and other Italian critics, for whom discussion of that phantasmic question has become compulsory, one is left with the impression that imprisonment acted on Gramsci as a soporific and Croce's influence as an aphrodisiac: he forgot a basic tenet of Marxism, i.e., that art, a superstructural product, is dependent on the structure. Gramsci's *Prison Notebooks* do not evidence an epistemological break in his thought, as it has sometimes been stated. Gramsci remains a Marxist in his *Prison Notebooks*, despite some departures that occurred when he tried to adjust Marxism to the Italian situation. A simpler way of saying this is that Gramsci was an Italian Marxist. He was an Italian Marxist just as Lenin was a Russian Marxist, or Mao a Chinese Marxist, necessarily revisionists all of them.

The important difference is that Gramsci is a revisionist in the tradition of Italian historicism, founded by Vico and continued by De Sanctis, Labriola, Croce and Gentile, to name its most illustrious representatives. Reading Gramsci without reference to these authors and without inserting him into the cultural context of that tradition is misreading him. With respect to literature, Gramsci is closer to Vico rather than De Sanctis. It was Vico who, in his *New Science*, considered literature as a sociological document reflecting the culture of the time. Gramsci's approach to literature is also sociological, stressing literature's political role. His thesis that "all men are philosophers" is a modern translation of a Vichian concept, "the conceit of the learned" ("*la boria dei dotti*").

We shall see that Gramsci did not want to be a writer, although at times he was tempted to act like one. In a letter to Tania (March 19, 1927), he expresses "regret" for not having complied with the desire of Matteo Bartoli, his professor of linguistics at the University of Turin, to take up the cudgel against the neogrammarians, Bartoli's adversaries. In that letter Gramsci describes the neogrammarians as "this most infamous pack of men" ("*questa geldra di infamissimi uomini*") (LC 58).[6] And in his *Prison Notebooks*, he calls "neolalics" (prattlers, babblers") those writers who pretend to be original by performing "language acrobatics" (*QC* 1720),[7] and, as such, he identifies Ungaretti, among others.[8]

Gramsci's approach to literature is essentially not different from the way he

5. Luigi Bernardi, *Letteratura e rivoluzione in Gramsci*. Editrice Tecnico-Scientifica: Pisa, 1973.

6. *Lettere dal carcere*. Ed. by S. Capriolo & E. Fubini. Einaudi: Turin, 1965. Citations are from this edition, abbreviated *LC*.

7. *Quaderni del carcere*. Ed. by V. Gerratana. Einaudi: Turin, 1975. 4 vols., consecutively paginated. Citations are from this edition, abbreviated *LC*, as well as from *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. by Q. Hoare and G.N. Smith (International Publishers: New York, 1971) abbreviated *SPN*.

8. "It is often true that those who chat of form, etc., as against content, are simply empty; they jumble words that, even grammatically, do not always hold (an example: Ungaretti)" (*QC* 1737-38).

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had previously treated the theater. To say that he wanted literature to serve only political purposes, thus denying him an appreciation of literature as art, is unfair. On the other hand, to say that he viewed literature, and art in general, as autonomous is false. Gramsci admits that writing literature is an activity requiring a particular skill. But he also stresses that the language of words, the medium of literature, is a collective achievement. Neogrammarians and "neolalics" were both odious to Gramsci because the former disregarded the influence of society on the evolution of phonetic laws, believed by them to have no exceptions, whereas the latter ignored the social function of language as communication. At stake in both cases is language as a social product, divested of its political potential.

Everything Gramsci wrote in prison, be it on politics or economics, history or education, literature or folklore, is politically motivated. A militant Marxist turned into a writer by dint of circumstance, Gramsci makes his prison writings an extension of his political activity as a Marxist leader. The difference between Gramsci as a political writer and the typical literary critic is glaring in this respect. For whereas a political writer resorts to writing for political purposes, a literary critic makes of writing his or her *raison d'être*.

To realize the differences between these two approaches to writing, let us look closer into the nature and function of literary critics: who they are and what they do.

As a rule, they are professors who teach literature at school and write about it at home. The first occupation is a source of income, the second only occasionally (when books are textbooks). But writing books of literary criticism bestows on their authors a reputation, which in turn has financial and social implications (promotion in rank, access to a better school, public recognition). Writing books of literary criticism is part of the profession of a professor of literature, who, without publications, is like a soldier without weapons. Teaching literature and writing about it are complementary activities defining the profession. But whereas teaching literature is an educational activity involving human contact with students, writing texts about texts serves only a restricted numbers of readers, members of the profession and students aspiring to belong to it. Some of the students will write dissertations under the guidance of professors, who will thereby become their mentors. Thus will form congenial groups, whose main concern will be defending particular interpretations of texts, known as trends or currents in literary criticism, which are never politically innocent. Some of these groups will form associations and publish their own journals, through which they will influence the literary environment and especially institutions of higher learning. Some of their members or acolytes will be placed in key administrative positions, which open the door for dealing with publishers, reaching to the mass media, and having access to influential social and political clubs. In the guise of literary activity, those coteries will promote their own vested interest.

This is, I think, what Gramsci had in mind when he called the neogrammarians *geldra*, a Germanic word akin to Medieval Latin *gilda*, 'corpora-

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tion.' According to the Sardinian thinker, economic-corporate consciousness is the lowest stage of political consciousness. The economic-corporate, typical of feudal economy, persists in a degraded form under capitalism. Linguistic clans and literary cliques breed a corporate mentality, which stands in the way of promoting class consciousness, the necessary condition for bringing down the rule of the capital.

The university system in fascist Italy was a typical instance of an institution generating a corporate mentality. The system was a feudal-bourgeois hierarchy based on the prerogatives of professors holding chairs (*cattedratici*). These "cultural barons" (*baroni della cultura*") were omnipotent in their little domains while they also exercised influence on the ruling circles. Their salaries were disproportionately high compared to the salaries of teachers of other ranks and, in addition, they benefited from various emoluments.

Only very recently has this university system moved towards a degree of democratization. But for more than thirty years following the end of World War II, chair-holders belonging to political parties of the Right or Left had the same socio-economic base. A series of questions arise. If the base is the same for professors with different and even opposed political loyalties, can their ideology be substantially different? Can a feudal-bourgeois base support a Marxist-inspired scholarly activity without altering it at least to some extent? Can a literary critic perched on a chair be compared to Gramsci writing in jail? Can the chair understand the jail?

The case of Marxist literary critics looking at Gramsci as a sourc eof inspiration is a case of Freudian transference. The very milieu in which Gramsci wrote made it imposssible for him to write literary criticism. Let us look at the nature of his writings. Whereas literary critics write articles and books, Gramsci wrote "notes," "little notes," "remarks" ("*note,*" "*noterelle,*" "*appunti*"). Notes and remarks are usually written in the margin of a book or in a notebook. Gramsci was a writer of notebooks, not books. He was not even sure whether his notes would ever reach the public, since the notebooks could have been confiscated and destroyed by the prison authorities. Indeed, for the first two years of his captivity, all he was permitted to write was letters to his family. As to style, the notes on literature differ little from the family letters, many of which are interspersed with literary observations and reflections. There is continuity and overlapping between *Letters from Prison* and *Prison Notebooks*.

To understand why Gramsci did not write books, we need to consider his distinction between "organic" and "traditional" intellectuals. The traditional intellectual is loosely tied to his class, a consequence of his serving any class or group holding power. The organic intellectual, an offshoot of his class, serves solely the latter. The function of both the organic and traditional intellectual is to "organize culture," a phrase that means different things according to whether it applies to a class or to the society as a whole. The traditional intellectual organizes culture by transmitting to members of society an ensemble of values as sanctioned by the rulers. This role of the traditional

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intellectual as perpetuator of a cultural tradition whose custodians are those in power is essential to their holding power. For unless a society is governed by brute force, governance is exercised by a combination of coercion and persuasion. And while coercion remains a prerogative of rulers, persuasion devolves upon traditional intellectuals. On the other hand, the organic intellectual organizes culture in his class by generating class consciousness in its members, i.e., by raising their feelings to the stage of clear thinking. Whereas the organic intellectual is a generator and a transformer of society, the traditional intellectual isa rather passive conveyor of conservative values, subservient to the rulers of the moment and instrumental in legitimizing their rule.

Gramsci's theory of the organic intellectual theorizes his own form of intellect as compared to the great majority of Marxist theoreticians and proletarian leaders. These naturalized themselves proletarians after disowning their bourgeois origins. Gramsci was born a proletarian, or something close to it. He was, moreover, a second-class citizen, being a Sardinian of Albanian origin. And he was, in addition, a physically deformed human being, due to an accident whose consequences might have been forestalled, had his family not been poor. If there ever was an organic intellectual grown into a leader and theoretician of the proletariat, he was it. And if he thought of himself as such, as, I think, he did, he could not have suffered to be confused with literary scholars, the very type of the traditional intellectual.

But if Gramsci cannot be called a literary critic without distorting his personality and his frame of mind, how are we to define his activity as writer of notes on literature? Anticipating the answer to the question, we can say he is a critical reader.

Gramsci wanted first of all to remain a reader, thus associating himself with the public at large that reads but does not write. And while literature is read by the public at large, literary criticism is read only by a restricted number of people, persons belonging or aspiring to be part of the profession. Again, a reader is one who approaches literature for the sake of enjoyment or learning or both, i.e., for interests other than the professional ones of a literary critic. As a user of literature, the reader looks at it as a social product, the writer as producer not being his concern. On the other hand, a typical literary critic is author-oriented. He views the literary work as an author's product and values it as a personal expression of the author's mind. Gramsci's merit has been to orient Italian criticism towards looking at literature from the reader's viewpoint, thus substituting the sociology of literature for traditional literary criticism.

An evaluator of literary products, the literary critic pronounces judgments that necessary reflect his conception of literature as overdetermined by personal and professional interests. These interests, as a rule, are at odds with the interests of readers as users of literature. A literary critic is a writer who produces a by-product, the product itself being a poem, a novel, a drama. A com-

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mon reader of literature reads products, not by-products. And whereas literature is complementary to reality, literary criticism is only supplementary to literature itself. It did not exist in the past as a literary genre, and it may well disappear in the future when the function of criticism will be taken over by the reader grown critical. But whereas the common reader is usually uncritical, i.e., indifferent or impervious to aesthetic and ideological distinctions, the critical reader is concerned with just those distinctions. In the case of Gramsci, a Marxist leader and theoretician only marginally interested in aesthetics, his reading of literature was critical mostly from a political perspective. Thus, it might be said that Gramsci is a Marxist critical reader.

Gramsci's refusal to write literary criticism is a logical consequence of his philosophy of praxis. That philosophy is rooted in Marx's Theses on Feuerbach, to which Gramsci repeatedly refers in his *Prison Notebooks*.[9] In those theses Marx criticizes Feuerbach for upholding a version of materialism that supports a receptive conception of the mind: reality relfected in the mind in the form of an "object," an object of "contemplation" and not an object for the subject to act upon (Thesis I). But human activity is "objective" no less than the world itself, for human activity is "practical-critical"; it acts upon the world, thereby modifying it. But by modifying the world, the subject modifies itself. Philosophers in the past might have been critical, but not also practical; they have "interpreted" the world, but have not "changed" it (Thesis XI). They could not change the world because they conceived of it as independent from the subject, a datum which the subject merely interprets. This attitude has generated a type of knowledge described as the search for "objective truth." For Marx, objective and subjective truth coincide in "revolutionary praxis" ("*umwälzende Praxis*"), which changes the world while also changing the knowing subject (Thesis III). "Human essence," as Feuerbach conceives it, "is no abstraction inherent in single individuals...it is the ensemble of social relations" (Thesis VI). "All social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their solution in human praxis and with the comprehension of this praxis" (Thesis VIII).

The last sentence states the unity of theory and praxis, a unity already present in the phrase "practical-critical" attributed to the "revolutionary" subject. Gramsci accepts the formula while being aware of its loose formulation: "In the most recent developments of the philosophy of praxis the exploration and refinement of the concept of the unity of theory and praxis is still at an early stage" (*SPN* 334). Gramsci disagrees with those (Stalin, among others) who think of theory as "the handmaid of praxis" (*ibid.*). According to Gramsci, the articulation between theory and praxis is achieved by the organic intellectual involved in revolutionary praxis. "The active man-in-the mass has a practical activity, but has no theoretical consciousness of his practical activity, which nonetheless involves understanding the world insofar as it transforms it" (*SPN* 333). The intellectual provides that understanding. "The process of

9. Sixteen times according to Gerratana (*QC* 3063).

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development of culture among the masses is tied to a dialectic between the intellectuals and the masses" (*SPN* 334).

The role of literature, as instance of that dialectic, is an integral part of Gramsci's philosophy of praxis, no less than his reflections on Italian history and fascism, his comments on Americanism, and his more theoretical writings on Machiavelli and the Communist Party. Cut off from the rest of the corpus and considered as literary specimens, they lose their specifics. The Italian Communist Party provided the ground for the mutilation by disregarding chronology and having the notebooks published separately according to themes. This explains to a great extent why foreign scholars who, fascinated by Gramsci's originality, began translating him and writing on him as a Marxist theoretician, remained cool toward his writings on literature. Gramsci' literary writings do not appear in any of the French, German, and English anthologies that succeeded each other in the late sixties and seventies. The authorized literary anthology by Manacorda[10] can be likened to the beautifying process a corpse undergoes in American funeral homes.

Could a person who wanted to change the world identify with literary critics, who are not even interpreters of the world, but merely interpreters of texts? Among Gramsci's writings on political theory there is one entitled "Analysis of situations: relations of force" (*SPN* 175-85). The article (one of the few in the notebooks that can be called an article) is a methodological inquiry into the concept of political situation, of which the author distinguishes two kinds, one that is "organic" and the other "conjunctural." Gramsci then considers the interplay of three "moments or levels" of force: economic, political (subdivided in economic-corporate, trade-unionistic, and political *tout* court), and military (subdivided in politico-military and specifically military). This theoretical model is then applied to a concrete historical period, French history from 1789 to 1870, the two dates marking respectively the beginning and the end of the French Revolution. The Revolution in its initial stage is explained as occurring "in context of conflicts on a higher plane than the immediate work of economy" (*SPN* 184), a departure from orthodox Marxism. The French Revolution proved the strength of the bourgeoisie as against the privileged classes. The crushing of the Commune by the bourgeoisie in 1870 proved its vitality as against the rising proletariat. The article ends with a characteristic "practical-critical" statement: "Such analyses cannot and must not be ends in themselves (unless the intention is merely to write a chapter of past history), but acquire significance only if they serve to justify a practical activity, or initiative of the will" (*SPN* 185). The dismissal of theory divorced from praxis is peremptory. Gramsci's writings on literature are governed by the same "practical-critical" concern — not to be found in either Crocean literary criticism or "hermetic" criticism, the two major literary trends at the time.

"Questions of method" (*SPN* 382-86), can be taken to illustrate what

10. Giuliano Manacorda, *Antonio Gramsci. Marxismo e letteratura.* Editori Riuniti: Rome, 1975.

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Gramsci thought of systematic writing, a *sine qua non* of scholarly writing. Here, in order to identify Marx's conception of life which he never expounded "systematically," Gramsci proposes a methodological model for singling out Marx's text from works written by Marx in collaboration with Engels. The search has to be conducted by stages. First, "a preliminary detailed philological work...[ought] to be carried out with the most scrupulous accuracy, scientific honesty and intellectual loyalty, and without any preconceptions, apriorism or *parti pris*" (*SPN* 383). Such a work should lead to identifying those elements that are constant and permanent, as distinct from adventitious material represented by passing influences and which must be discarded. Then comes a biography of the author, above all his intellectual biography. And finally "a catalogue of all his works...in chronological order," conducted as a "search for the author's *Leitmotiv*, for the rhythm of the thought as it develops" (*ibid.*).

Here again Gramsci theorizes his own rather than Marx's way of writing. For if both Marx and Gramsci share "a polemical character," Marx was not lacking an *"esprit de système,"* which Gramsci himself lacked. A phrase in the text explains why Gramsci did not want to be systematic: to him system meant, among other things, arrest of the "rhythm of thought," probably a Bergsonian influence on Gramsci by way of Sorel, from whom Gramsci borrowed the concept of "historical bloc." Bloc, not system; rhythmic flow, not arresting form. Take, for instance, the longest piece Gramsci wrote, his comments on Bukharin's *Theory of Historical Materialism*. These "notes and Critical Observations" criticize Bukharin's work by looking at it from different angles. The writing, discontinuous and at times haphazard, is broken into four parts[11] by interpolations of chapters unrelated to the work under examination and which are missing from the first version, which presented a certain unity. Could he not have brought order to these "notes," making them look less fragmentary and more congruous? But then he would have written an essay, which he did not want to do. Some of the notebooks have undergone a certain elaboration, conceptual rather than formal. Yet fragmentariness remains. Some of the texts in the first version have been collapsed into a single text in the second version, whereas other texts, originally single, have been parcelled in the more elaborate version. There is, however, an attempt to group affinal notes into separate notebooks by subject matter. Notebooks 10 and 11 are entitled "The Philosophy of Benedetto Croce" and "Introduction to the Study of Philosophy." Notebooks 13 and 14 are on Machiavelli; Notebook 19 deals with the Italian Risorgimento while Notebook 22 is entitled "Americanism and Fordism." The notes on literature have been grouped in two notebooks, "National Literature" (22) and "Literary Criticism" (23).

The name is there. Let us see what it means. Notebook 23 opens with a chapter, "Going Back to De Sanctis," seen by Gramsci as a model for literary criticism. He admires De Sanctis because his literary works evidence a high degree of civic commitment and moral earnestness. It was De Sanctis who

11. *QC* 1411-18, 1420-26, 1431-50, 1486-91.

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wrote a scathing essay against a Jesuit, Father Bresciani, revealing the hypocrisy underlying Bresciani's verbose style. Gramsci calls fascist writers "The Grandchildren of Father Bresciani" in the notebook in question. He reviews fascist literature — which occupies the greater part of the notebook — by picking up some more resounding names: Ojetti, Panzini, Malaparte, Papini, Ungaretti. Panzini has discovered the greatness of Father Bresciani (*QC* 2223), while also discovering the greatness of the king (Victor Emanuel II). An excerpt from Panzini's book, *Life of Cavour*, is cited: "A terrific moustache and a big goatee. He liked beautiful women and the rumble of cannon. A great king." Comments Gramsci: "Tavern oleograph" (*QC* 2219). Elsewhere one reads: "Titta Rosa, Angioletti, Malaparte...jackasses! ugly even when colts" (*QC* 2202). Someone had written an article on a novel by Margherita Sarfatti, praising her: "Very true, that shyness of the virgin [Fiorella] holding back from the wedding bed, anticipating its benign and hearty welcome for the forthcoming tournaments." And Gramsci: "Priceless! The virgin Fiorella must have also anticipated the forthcoming 'many miles' of riding and the well-shaken 'fur' (*QC* 2200) — the allusion is to Boccaccio's short story on the scholar and the widow.

As to Gramsci's use of the term "literary criticism," we should keep in mind that he conceives of the philosophy of praxis as a preparatory stage destined to phase out with the advent of communism. During the transitory period in which it arises and which is characterized by the contradictions of the capitalist system, the philosophy of praxis cannot be immune from some of those contradictions (*QC* 1487). Fighting capitalism on its own ground cannot be done without using some of its weapons. A combative literary criticism like that of De Sanctis is therefore indispensable. But while admiring De Sanctis as a literary historian and critic, Gramsci does not identify with him. For if De Sanctis differs from the posivitistic scholars of his time, his writing shares traditional features of literary scholarship such as veneration for the form and respect for *esprit de système*. De Sanctis wrote essays and books which Gramsci did not write. And while De Sanctis remained a progressive democrat, Gramsci became a Marxist.

The closest Gramsci comes to literary criticism is with his notes on *Inferno* X, which figures as a partial title in Noteboook 4. He must have been proud of his original interpretation of that canto: "No one has observed that failure to notice Cavalcante's drama entails missing the torment *in actu* of the damned souls" (*QC* 517). The same feeling of elation is expressed in a letter to Tania (September 20, 1931): "It seems to me that my interpretation is a hard blow to Croce's thesis on the relationship between poetry and structure in the *Comedy*" (*LC* 492). Yet when a Dante scholar, Umberto Cosmo, suggested to Gramsci that he collect his notes on Dante into an essay, he refused (*QC* 52). Cosmo, who was Gramsci's professor of Italian literature at the University of Turin, had previously offered to preface a volume in which Gramsci would have collected some of his journalistic writings (*LC* 480). This we learn from a letter to Tania (September 7, 1931), which includes other instances of refusal to

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write and publish. In November 1920, Giuseppe Prezzolini had persuaded Gramsci to let him publish a collection of Gramsci's writings. Two months later Gramsci withdrew the manuscript, paying for the part of it that had been typeset. In 1924, an offer by Franco Ciarlantini to write a book on the *Ordine Nuovo* movement was likewise turned down (*ibid*).

In his March 19, 1927 letter to Tania, Gramsci expressed a desire to "write something *für ewig*," listing four possible topics: the Italian intellectuals, comparative linguistics, Pirandello's theater, and popular literature (*LC* 58). He wrote on all four, completing none. Writing notes was a pondered solution for resisting the temptation to become a *letterato*. The expression must have sounded to him, a Marxist leader, something like *cartaceo*, 'a man of paper' in the sense of 'a straw man.'

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

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ROCK MUSIC, THE STAR-SYSTEM AND THE RISE OF CONSUMERISM

by David Buxton

Rock music permeates all areas of social life, from supermarkets to homes. The intensity of its reception ranges from the fanatical devotion of youth subcultures to cheery accompaniment for household chores. The following deals primarily with analysis of the stars in rock music and its relation to consumerism. It does not pretend to be exhaustive of its subject — other obviously important factors like sexuality are artificially left aside. Marxism has tended to attack rock music (and earlier, swing music) because of its commodity basis, and upheld folk music as ideologically superior. The American Communist Party consciously used folk music as part of its political strategy in the 1930s and 40s.[1] Thus, following the Bolsheviks' example, Classical and contemporary popular music (the swing and jazz music favored by the new American urban population) were declared to be "tools of the ruling class." The canons of socialist realism, that proletarian art should be "national in form and revolutionary in content," led to the search for a national folk music. The folk music of rural Southern hamlets selected for this task, however, was a foreign, esoteric form to urban dwellers outside the South who made up an ever-increasing proportion of the American population after 1920. The impact of this musical strategy never went beyond its Southern, rural roots. Radical folk singers took shelter in their extreme isolation, waiting for the revolutionary leap which never occurred.[2]

This folk-purist approach resurfaced in the late 1950s and early 60s, this time linked with a wider, non-Communist Left, and enjoyed wide commercial success. Whereas the American Communist Party consistently worked outside the commodity market, using direct participatory singing on picket lines and at meetings (albeit, at a time when records and radio had not established their dominance) the new folk singers were successful recording artists. While the older radical singers of the 1930s had kept to a strict ethic of anonymity, the folk revival was marked by the heightened individuality of its stars. The feeling that "every artist's first responsibility is to himself," was shared by Tom Paxton, Bob Dylan and Phil Ochs among others. These stars expressed themselves mostly through recordings, saturating the market with issues and rhetorical protest statements. The later folk-purists were mistaken

1. The political idealization of folk was of Bolshevik and Stalinist origin (Stalin reputedly liked folk music). In the revolution, folk songs and fairy tales were used to win over an illiterate peasantry, and in the 1920s rural culture was deemed "proletarian." In 1929 the Proletarian's Musicians' Association of Moscow is reported to have characterized folk music "as the true expression of the working class."

2. For more detail, see Serge Denisoff, *Great Day Coming*, (Chicago, 1971).

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in the belief that with the use of non-electric technology, they were somehow less compromised with monopoly capitalism and its advanced technology: folk music was a commodity on the mass-market, and no less "commercial" than the rock and roll they criticized.[3]

This argument had become displaced by the mid-60s as influential critics like Jon Landau argued that rock music was, in fact, a genuine folk music, with shared values between audience and performer. The mass consumption of rock, supposedly a folk form with radical, "alternative" values, was seen as evidence of political change among American youth.[4] Ideologues like Tom Hayden and Eldridge Cleaver agreed that the "liberation" of white youth could be rooted in rock: this was only a short step from the idea that "cultural revolution" or "freeing one's mind" (through psychedelic means or otherwise) was an alternative to, or the very manifestation of political revolution.

Robert Christgau has argued that: "Rock and roll, as we all know, was instrumental in opening up the generation gap and fertilizing the largely sexual energy that has flowered into the youth lifestyle, and this lifestyle, as we all know, is going to revolutionize the world."[5]

Yet, Rock music, in spite of its apparent desire to be a vehicle for rebellion, had somehow become a valuable corporate interest. A Columbia record advertisement in 1967 claimed: "The Man can't bust *our* music...Know who your friends are. And look and see and touch and be together. Then listen. *We* do." (my emphasis) An advertisement for *Rolling Stone*, in 1967 appealed for subscribers: "you know rock and roll is more than just music; it is the energy center of the new culture and youth revolution."[6] How had this extraordinary situation come about, in which the radical Left and multinational record companies both proclaimed the central importance of rock as a radical cultural force?

There was nothing pre-given in the emergence and dominance of the record commodity form in popular music. Although the anonymous, participatory and localist folk tradition had largely diminished in both England and the U.S. by the turn of the century due to the breakdown of rural commodities under the influence of rapid industrialization, popular music still largely existed outside of the commodity market or as a marginal part of it.

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3. A similar confusion appears in the critique of disco by rock "purists" as "mass-produced," as if rock retained artisan status. This attitude often rests on a naive humanism of the artists and their "work." As Landau put it: "To me, the criterion of art in rock is the capacity of the musician to create a personal, almost private universe and to express it fully" (*It's too late to stop now,* Straight Arrow Books, p. 15). The initial folk versus pop opposition surfaced within rock in the 60s in the demarcation of what was characterized as "progressive" or "art" rock, from "mass art" (commercial pop).

4. As Christopher Lasch points out, as politics becomes more and more unmistakeably an occupation of elites, ordinary citizens feel they can make their influence felt by designing an "alternative lifestyle." C.F. Lasch, "Happy Endings," *New York Review of Books,* March 12, 1981.

5. Christgau, *Any Old Way You Choose It: Rock and Other Pop Music, 1967-73*, Penguin, p. 95.

6. The previous quotes are from Michael Lydon, "Rock for Sale," in *Age of Rock 2*, J. Eisen, Editor, (Vintage Books, New York, 1970).

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Tavern singing, amateur performance, and minstrelism predominated. The most common commodity form of popular music in this period was sheet music, which reinforced amateur performance. The rapid growth of the record into a mass commodity cannot be postulated as the satisfaction of some pre-existing "need." Even after the emergence of the record as a musical commodity, no *a priori* reason why this form should have predominated can be given, especially to the extent it became an almost mandatory aspect of youth culture by the late 1960s, largely replacing the significance of live performance. The record could conceivably have remained a marginal commodity for music-lovers and collectors. Economistic explanations also presuppose an a-historical concept of need and do not tell us why consumers spend their extra money on records in particular. The emergence of the record as a *mass* commodity was dependent on the corresponding creation of a new social use value for popular music in its record form. However, the specific social "usefulness" of the record must be explained.

According to Baudrillard, use value as conceived by Marx is essentially naturalist: the commodity has use value because it "satisfies human wants of some sort or another." The fetishization of the commodity then is a socially mediated form, exchange value. Baudrillard, however, argues that use value is a fetishized social relation as well. Use value today should not be understood as something "natural" or even as being broadly determined by historical and social factors, but as a fluctuating, variable factor within the commodity itself, which depends on transformations or shifts in the abstract code of signs which regulate social use value in general. This code goes beyond mere "functional" use value,[7] all the more so in products lacking any precise functional use like the record; in this case the ability of the commodity to absorb signifiers is potentially infinite. This absorption can be called the commodity's *enhanced use value*.

This process of absorption, achieved by capitalism through advertising, seeks to generalize the commodity to increasingly mass status by loading it with symbolic value. The synonymity of denim jeans with relaxed, energetic, anti-puritan youth is an example of enhanced use value. The product transcends its immediate functional use to become a key symbol of a whole "lifestyle," and an anthropomorphized sexuality of the commodity has been a major strategy in this enhancement. This argument implies that the accession of the record to mass status has been a consequence of the symbolic strategies invested in it, rather than any inherent quality of the music recorded on it.

Unlike sheet music, the record is intimately associated with a star-system. Once Blues music (which can be considered a Folk music) was recorded in the

7. This is not to suggest, of course, that there is any isolable, "zero-degree" of functionality. The difference between Marx and Baudrillard may be more historical than conceptual. In the *Grundrisse*, Marx does remark that the capitalist "searches for means to spur workers on to consumption, to give his wares new charms, to inspire them with new needs through constant chatter, etc." Karl Marx, *Grundrisse: Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy*, trans. Nicolaus (New York, 1973), p. 287.

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1920s, it developed a tradition of "great singers." Initially, the invention of the microphone as an aid to recording favored a relaxed style of singing, which heightened the nuances of "personality" in each singer, rather than the rigorous technical perfection of the operatic tradition. Moreover, the freezing of social relations as a characteristic of recordings, their congealment into commodity form, circulates the human voice without physical limits, thus fulfilling one of the essential preconditions for the star-system: that the star be known without reciprocation by a mass of individuals, whose only common point lies in being represented by the same star. The development of radio technology, which also served to distribute recordings on a mass scale, corresponded with the decline of regional cultures. And whereas in the past, one became a famous personality through the performance of extraordinary deeds, the recording artist became known to hundreds of thousands simply through "being" on record. The emphasis changed from what one "did," to what one was "like."

If we conclude that the record brought with it, for a number of contingent reasons, a star-system, what then was the "usefulness" of this star-system which enabled the record to accede to mass status? In his historical etymology of the word "consumer," Raymond Williams argues that its original meaning of devouring, waste and using up was highly unfavorable. Early uses of "consumer" carried over this general sense of destruction or waste. "In a context where value is derived from the land or the direct appropriation of nature, consumption is suicide. It is to use up that which must be maintained and replenished in order to survive."[8]

For the non-urban, or the newly urbanised, the wage system represented an intrinsic violation of a basic assumption. The initial reaction was a compulsion to *save*, to appropriate money as if it were land. However, the American economy in the 1920s needed to expand and create new consumer demands, in other words, to educate the "masses" in the culture of consumption. The mass production of commodities in ever-increasing abundance demanded a mass-market to absorb them. Previously, the worker was seen as a beast of burden, whose leisure time was of little interest, provided it remained within certain moral boundaries. Few employers understood that mass production required the organization of consumption and leisure as well. As Boston magnate Edward Filene stated in 1919: "Mass production demands the education of the masses; the masses must learn to behave like human beings in a mass production world. They must achieve, not mere literacy, but culture."[9]

However, this "enlightened" attitude was not sufficiently predominant to prevent the Great Depression, which was essentially a crisis in the circulation of capital, or "inefficient consumption." It was not until the stability of the mid-1950s that consumerist themes became consecrated in social practice,

8. Stuart and Elizabeth Ewen, "Americanisation and Consumption," in *Telos*, 37 (Fall, 1978), p. 45.

9. Stuart Ewen, *Captains of Consciousness* (New York, 1976), pp. 54-55.

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although they had already been well established. As early as 1892, Simon Patten, an apostle of industrial consumerism, affirmed that the mechanical reproduction of *images* would be decisive for a new economic order.[10]

Monopoly capitalism needed to increase its consumers; markets had to grow horizontally (nationally), vertically (into the working classes) and ideologically (enhanced use values). Of course, this was not an automatic process. While capitalism could discipline people in work, it could not *make* them consume. For the ideologues of the new consumerism, leisure time could no longer be wasted.

As Ewen has shown, advertising theorists were directly influenced by the work of behaviorists, who placed the emphasis on the social construction of personal identity. The transition to a consumer economy required a careful supervision of consumer demands. In other words, the consumer had to be produced along with the product. Advertisers preferred "blank-slate" characters, uncontaminated by a puritan reluctance to consume — the "young" were the logical contenders for this honor.

Advertisers presented a world in which values were no longer communicated in the localized private sphere but rather in the marketplace where the commodity held the promise of "mass" community. Consumerism was the basic social relation the "liberation" of the self from the traditional family or regional solidarity was the highest form of existence. Having wrenched the self from the security of the traditional, advertisers shattered the body into a series of potential physical and social disasters that only commodity consumption could avert. In the commodity lay the possibility of a united self, the fulfillment of "liberation."

The breakdown of traditional social relations due to urbanization and mass production left personal identity in a void, which consumerism filled as *the* basic social relation. An individual bombarded with a mosaic-like set of commodities (especially those that move beyond comfort-oriented or obviously functional uses), through which an individual identity is established, was likely to make decisions conforming to a certain life-style. These life-styles found conceptual models, in various degrees of specificity, in the person of celebrities. Complete, or more often, partial acceptance simplified the numerous consumer decisions confronting the individual.

The rock star as a life-style model was the outcome of a long process which corresponded to the rise in the 1960s of a large, affluent middle class in the West. Pop singers of the 1930s, who also were associated with a middle-class public, had conveyed a relaxed image which implied that spending on leisure activities was acceptable social behavior. Bing Crosby was an archetype of what later would be described as a role model: a casual, athletic, conformist family man, who stated that "every man who likes me sees in me the image of himself." Participation in advertising furthered the development of the star's life-style model. Kate Smith advertised cigars, while several bandleaders pro-

10. Patten was also to announce the end of the work ethic in *The New Basis for Civilization* (1905). This new civilization was to be based on "self-expression," rather than "self-denial."

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moted cheese, beer, and household items. The star's personality was embodied in the product they sold. Thus, a fan could describe the cigars promoted by Kate Smith as being "really mellow and full of contentment." The presentation of the life-style of the stars as the ideal of sophisticated modern living grew as part of the American dream manufactured during the 1930s.

Some stars were active in defining their role. In 1932, Joan Crawford published a manifesto entitled "Spend!" In response to widespread complaints that film stars were grossly overpaid, Crawford replied that it was the stars' *duty* to maintain the life-style the public associated with their highly visible position. She argued that she must surround herself with the height of luxury so that fans would be satisfied, and further exhorted them to imitate her; "I, Joan Crawford believe in the dollar. Everything I earn, I spend."[11]

This quasi-direct role of the star in organizing consumption was later to be lost as consumption norms became interiorized and advertising more sophisticated.[12] However, Crawford's manifesto does remind us of the extent to which the star played a normative role in promoting consumption. It was only with rock music in the 1960s (and by this time, rock stars had replaced film stars as the dominant star-figures)[13] that the essential themes of the 1920s, namely consumption as "liberation" (and no longer as a "duty") and the key role of youth in accelerating the consumption cycle (and thus the circulation of capital) were finally realized. This "liberation" from puritan restraints on consumption (and sexuality) was realized when youth were

11. Kenneth Anger (1975).

12. This can be seen in the evolution of record album covers which followed general patterns in advertising. At first (1950s-mid 60s), a full-frontal image of the star dominated covers; later, a more subtle, complex image was to be given by codes or design motifs which constituted the star's image in his or her *absence*. This coincides with the decline of personality sponsorship in advertising and the rise of signs of connotation, often totally arbitrary to the function of the product. This evolution indicates the integration of rock music into the world of fashion and design. See the *Album Cover Album*, ed. Roger Dean and Hipgnosis, 1977.

13. Rock music assumed the liberation ethic of consumerism to the full, as unlike the stars of another new medium, television, they were not directly overseen by sponsors aiming at a mass-market:" . . . the stars of TV are very circumspect, because the people who sponsor them won't put up with any nonsense. So you have . . . people who are not particularly colorful, not particularly maverick." (Walter Scott's Personality Parade in 1958, quoted by A. Cockburn in *Celebrity*, ed. James Monaco. [New York, 1978].) The difference between film and rock stars is more difficult to theorize because of a long tradition of frequent cross-overs between the cinema and popular music. Rock stars replaced cinema stars in the 1960s, especially among the young; this was to a large extent a consequence of the decline of the film. American film-maker Paul Morrissey, known for his work with Andy Warhol, commented: "You had this vacuum in the 1960s, there were no young stars put out by Hollywood . . . So the kids wanted heroes, and in the vacuum, they turned to the dreariest source material — musicians . . . but at least they were young" (Interview in *Rolling Stone*, April 15, 1971). In their pre-consumer affluence period, and before the "embourgeoisement" of film in the 1930s (E. Morin), film stars were "interesting personalities" who, surrounded by luxury, brought glamour into the lives of fans. Apart from obvious exceptions, the reverse is probably more true of rock stars: dull professionals are made glamorous by the excitement and imagination of fans. However, the distinction between the worlds of rock and television remains significant — to a large extent, television personalities have taken over the circumspect, normative, family-oriented role of pre-rock and roll popular singers.

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sufficiently well-off to assume their role as consumers.

In *Discipline and Punish*, Michel Foucault details the development, elaboration and refinement of a new series of disciplinary techniques which emerged in the army, schools and workshops. The human body was the object of these measures. Movements and gestures were studied in order to be broken down into simple, machine-like movements. The most obvious impact of this "training of docile bodies" was in work discipline. As the industrialization process increasingly reduced the worker to a mere appendage of a machine the body was trained to be a machine as well. In this context, physical comfort and relaxation were subversive to work discipline, which extended beyond the factory gate. From an early age, schoolchildren were trained to sit erect; failure to do so was punished.

Public moralists have always sought to rein in the "loose morals" inevitably connected with popular music and dancing[14] which involved body movements that violated work discipline. The undisciplined consumer body was defined in part by the functional relation between music and dance in rock music a relation enhanced by rhythmic borrowings from the blues and jazz; the sexual freedom widely accepted to be inherent in the music and dance of American blacks provided an apparently liberatory element, eroticism. Rock music could be said to have given back to middle class whites their bodies.[15]

At the same time that rock music assisted in loosening cultural norms against consumption in favor of material fulfillment, there emerged a discriminating consumer "awareness." Typical of this new trend were the Mods, a cultural movement in Britain in the 1960s which expressed itself primarily through music and fashion. Mods distinguished themselves through commodities, using goods "as weapons of exclusion, to avoid contamination from other, alien worlds of teenage taste...Mods exploited the expressive potential within commodity choice to its logical exclusion ... they 'chose' [in order] to make themselves into Mods, attempting to impose systematic control over the narrow domain which was theirs and within which they saw their real selves...When the Italian scooter was first chosen ...it was lifted into a larger unity of taste...Value was conferred upon the scooter by the simple act of selection."[16] The same idea of active, "life-style" consumption is shared by Charles Reich, an ideologue of the American counter-culture. According to Reich, "A new generation can come along and can say we're going to take all these things, the stereo, the motorcycles, the things in the supermarket and the music above all, and we'll command them. Now they'll be tools of revolu-

14. Before the 1920s, dancing was equated with the suffragette movement by conservative moralists who saw dancehalls, and the debauchery popularly associated with them, as a radical alternative to the "hearth and home." Jazz was seen as a threat on business life. The *Ladies Home Journal* traced the moral downfall of 1000 girls in Chicago between 1920-22 to jazz.

15. However, the acceptance of the "black body" requires mimicry by white musicians. Elvis Presley imitated black singers and achieved mass popularity, while none of the singers he copies achieved a similar status.

16. Hebdige, 1981, "Object as Image," *Block* 5.

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tion instead of tools of repression because we'll use them as we wish. [Now] in both films, and in music, people are making their own culture right in the heart of the repressive machine...That's the miracle of it."[17]

What this analysis presupposes is the internalization of *taste* or *style*: in buying even functional products one must choose among a series of styles, only a few of which *fit* one's personality. However, the development of an individual style reintroduces discipline in respect to consumption norms at another level. Style (and by extension sexuality) becomes publicly visible through externalization. Failure to consume "in style" becomes the basis of social rejection.

Just as the labor process was rationalized by advanced industrialism, consumption had to be made efficient for the stabilization of cyclical economic developments. "Consumer discipline" necessitated not only the confinement of psychological release to the leisure sphere, but also — on a higher level — the cultivation of individual style.

Consumer discipline, however, could not be repressive because 1) the freedom to choose was the basis of "market democracy" and 2) in bourgeois ideology, there has always been a fundamental antinomy between work and leisure. The historical identification of the star-system and rock music with "liberation" can be understood better as constituting a reverse image of Bentham's Panopticon.[18] Whereas in the Panopticon, one hidden surveillant in a central tower could survey many individuals while remaining invisible to them, the star, unable to see outwards and exposed in intimate detail, is the object of the relentless gaze of an anonymous mass society. The seduction exercized in obtaining this gaze becomes synonymous with "liberation."

Rock stars, as agents of consumer discipline, help to define the norms and limits of the existing socio-historical consumer, and thus individual possibilities.[19] They anchor a chaotic aesthetico-ideological discourse and represent it in a "humanized" form by investing the human body itself. Thus the record managed to achieve an enhanced social usefulness far exceeding the mere "need" for recorded music. It has become one of the key elements in the constitution of the modern self, increasingly defined in terms of "lifestyle". It is not without reason that the more farsighted record executives of the 1960s were enthusiastic over the identification of rock with the "youth revolution."

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17. Interview with Charles Reich, *Rolling Stone*, February 4, 1971.

18. For a more detailed discussion of the Panopticon cf. Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punishment: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Sheridan (New York, 1979), pp. 195-228, and Norberto Bobbio, "Democracy and Invisible Government," in *Telos*, 52 (Summer, 1982), pp. 50-51.

19. It should be emphasized that rock music stars are overwhelmingly male and that the few women in rock music are generally constrained by stereotypes of female sexuality. This does not mean, of course, that women are uninfluenced by rock music lifestyles. However, the current "New Wave" music features an increasing number of women as musicians and "stars," a development which requires the analysis of women in rock music concerning their influence on life-style making. This lies beyond the scope of this study.

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This is not to suggest that genuinely counter-cultural values were not an important part of rock music during the 1960s. It is undeniable that rock music served a key role in the struggle over cultural norms. However, it is important not to see rock music as a perpetual conflict between two pure entities, counter-culture and corporate capitalism, in which the latter always unfortunately appropriates the former to its own ends. There is no easy demarcation line between radical and capitalist strategies; after all, participants in the counter-cultural movement were as enthusiastic about McLuhan's "wired-up global village" as were media executives.

Apart from contradictory ties to the political New Left, the counter-culture was marked by two discourses: McLuhanism and pyschedelia. McLuhan's arguments can be briefly summarized: because electronic media are extensions of man, they have come to determine social being (and not the inverse). The "radical" conclusion of this argument was that one must work through the media for social change. Rock music (along with advertising) was the area in which McLuhan's ideas made the most headway, valorizing a previously despised cultural form into the vanguard of technico-cultural revolution. Counter-cultural McLuhanites thus argued that the music of Dylan, the Rolling Stones or the Beatles had done more to change peoples' consciousness than radical theory or practice. McLuhan and Buckminster Fuller were declared to be "more revolutionary than Marx."[20]

Just as McLuhan served as a bridgehead between "rebellious youth" and economic restructuration, rock music was the fruit of a historically unique alliance between organic cultural forms continually re-animated by a popular base and advanced technology. In the 1960s, the extent to which McLuhanism converged with rock music can be seen in the way it integrated one of the latter's central canons, the "sexual revolution." As McLuhan argued: "...the electric media, by stimulating all senses simultaneously, also give a new and richer sensual dimension to everyday sexuality that makes Henry Miller . . . old-fashioned and obsolete."[21]

The other major element of the counter-culture, the belief in the spiritually therapeutic value of psychedelic drugs, was not unrelated to McLuhanism. Psychedelia played an important role in the aestheticization of social life in the 1960s which accompanied the media explosion and arguably led to a greater sensibility to color and design, both essential for a more discriminating consumer consciousness. LSD, which in Richard Neville's words, "transforms the mundane into the sensational," was to have a profound influence on pop culture, media style as well as on advertising. Rock music was a key terrain for psychedelia, not only because of the traditional involvement of musicians with drugs, but also because rock music's McLuhanist outlook for social

20. In retrospect, this "revolution" accompanied a profound restructuring in which computers, electronics and the media began to replace the old industrial base of capitalism. McLuhanism was the natural ideology of the new technocratic strata which still bathes in McLuhan's glamor.

21. An interview in *Playboy*, March 1969.

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change conferred on psychedelic drugs a complementary role of transforming consciousness.

With the relative success of the alternative lifestyle wing of the counter-culture over its more political counterpart and the heavy media promotion of the "Woodstock Nation," a large aesthetically-responsive middle-class youth audience that transcended regional tastes became visible. Furthermore, the association of counter-cultural ideas with instrumentally dominated "progressive rock" provided a ready frame of reference for the music to penetrate non-English speaking Europe. From the period after 1970 emerged new rock music genres, marketing types and "supergroups," a prelude to the sclerosis from which rock music has not yet recovered.

Attempts to link rock with political action, despite their naiveté, were forgotten. Rock music became synonymous with radicalism *tout court*. This is not to suggest that rock music was "reactionary," but that its potential for critical judgement seems to have been suspended. Gastigated from the outset as being symptomatic of moral disintegration, vulgarity and the lowering of cultural standards, rock music has grown into an established aspect of modern personality — it seemingly is beyond criticism. Rock music is strikingly devoid of critical concepts, apart from the elitist arguments of Adorno and the occasional references to corporate domination. It remains immersed in the hubris of individualism, and sexism, and has become an important agent for the Americanization of western culture. By ignoring the possibilities of an alternative organization of culture in favor of symbolic radicalism, rock music helped play an important role in the production of the necessary creative imaginary for capitalist reorganization.

The star is a recent phenomenon. Music hall singers of last century cannot be considered stars in the modern sense of the word. They were rather personalities whose celebrity was rooted in local traditions. The fame of popular singers in the Caruso mold, however, depended on their talent being widely recognized in order to transcend local audiences. Their "image," if one can use this word, was "functional" — it conformed to the standards of their profession. Attempts by entertainers to identify with their audiences were initially criticized as "unprofessional."[22]

The large-larynxed concert-style voice effected by earlier popular singers like Al Jolson proved, however, unsuitable for the microphone and radio. The role of the microphone in establishing a singer's personality can be seen in the sex-appeal attributed to Rudy Vallee on the basis of his broadcast voice alone. The primary personality attribute of the popular music star was "sincerity."[23]

22. Commenting on the behavior of popular singer Eddie Jobson, who went so far as to take off his collar and tie, and stroll among the audience, critic Patterson James wrote in the December 1921 issue of *Billboard* that "(a more sophisticated audience) will decline to be put on a footing of personal social intimacy, and will demand that he work at his business of entertaining, not by using them, but by using the stage and his own wits for material."

23. The rise of the singer as personality threatened bandleaders, who saw popular singers as rivals to their own "professional" fame. While a singer in Paul Whiteman's band, Bing Crosby had to pretend he was a musician by fiddling with a rubber-stringed violin or guitar between verses. After WW II, singers replaced bandleaders as "stars."

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Second level stars also tried to embody this characteristic but with less authenticity and aura. As Robert Merton suggests, in his study of Kate Smith, this sincerity of the star is a denial "of a discrepancy between appearance and reality in the sphere of human relationship."[24] The star seemed to be a guarantee of community in a world where it is lost.

The emphasis on personality continued through the rock music period, in spite of a sharp musical rupture. Personalities, however, were now young, and aimed at a youthful audience.[25] They referred to other personalities not always musical, and were manufactured accordingly: Elvis Presley was described as a "guitar-playing Marlon Brando," while Terry Dene and Cliff Richard in Britain were modelled as Elvis Presley lookalikes. Adam Faith was modelled on James Dean. In short, stars were manufactured on the basis of already-proven personalities, preferably as physical lookalikes of established idols.

Whereas previously, the style of singers and their music was supposed to flow naturally from their personality, style was now constructed to suit the music, and was arbitrarily related to the singer's "personality." This opened the way for the total integration of the singer into fashion and design. With the wave of British groups from 1964 onwards, little attempt was made to promote individual personalities: rather, a distinctive group style was presented that borrowed heavily from fashion. Styles were reproduced instead of personalities. This is not to suggest that the age of the great personalities was over (the Beatles successfully traversed both formats), but rather that a "group style" replaced stars at the second level of the pop hierarchy.

As the work of design engineers became oriented towards the creation of artificial differences between products, rock groups too began to be distinguished on the basis of superficial stylistic features. No form of visual overkill was excluded to make the "product" *interesting*. The very success of styles originating in pop music in formulating a design aesthetic in the wider sense (Mod, psychedelia, glitter rock, and even punk rock to some extent) suggests that rock music plays a role in product design, creating enhanced use values in abstract form which can subsequently be transferred to other products. The rock star mediates between this abstract enhanced use value and the consumer in anthropomorphic form, thus creating new use values which engender specialized consumers. Rock stars, like commodities, move within a totally designed environment.

Rock musicians, in response to what they saw as the increasing commercialization of music during the 1960s, sought to distinguish themselves from this trend by emphasizing the internal convictions of the *artist* as opposed to the external trappings of style. In opposing stylistic manipulation,

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24. Robert Merton, *Mass Persuasion*, Harper, New York, 1946.

25. "The main point about pre-rock and roll culture is that society conducted itself as if it were homogeneous. . . It was, in brief, theoretically possible for everyone to dig the common culture . . . [This] worked very effectively until kids demanded music the family couldn't take." Howard Junker, "Ah, the Unsung Glories of Pre-Rock," *Rolling Stone*, December 2, 1970.

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musicians returned to "sincerity," a previous criterion of the star, manifested by a commitment to counter-culture values and the themes of 19th century Romanticism, from the communication of higher spiritual values like "love" (Shelley, Donovan, Jefferson Airplane) to the exaltation of decadence (Baudelaire, Velvet Underground, the Doors).

The later, more violent critique of established rock stars by the punk rock movement (which questioned the social relations involved in the production of music as well) also, in its own way, resurrected the criterion of sincerity to mythical rock values. Its polemic condemned the failure to conform to the norms of rock musical stardom: shared values between audience and performer, and youth.

The "homological" relation between pop sub-cultures and a life-style manifested in symbolically laden objects does not necessarily mean that all pop sub-cultures are capable of transferring enhanced use value on a mass scale. Nevertheless cultural movements are always *potentially* capable of being re-packaged for mass marketing and aesthetically generalized. This process of generalization has more to do with the specific aesthetico-ideological conjuncture than any inherent, self-defined quality of "rebellion" or the lack of it. To the extent that rock music in the late 1960s embodied "alternative values" for a mass of middle-class youth, it raised the enhanced use value of the record to new heights.[26]

There is evidence that the star is a declining force today. This decline is a complex process that cannot be reduced to one or several causes. A large part of the reason, however, is the decline in record sales. This decline cannot be explained away as an effect of the general economic crisis for all leisure commodities have not been similarly affected. The record has lost much of its aura as a commodity; its social use value has fallen. This is especially evident with the rise of disco music, in which music was reduced to its most functional use as dance music.[27] There are other reasons as well; rock music as an art form is undoubtedly in crisis. Musically limited from the beginning, it has vainly sought to extend itself through eclectic borrowings from other traditions. The musical stagnation of the 1970s is reflected in the number of re-releases and endless revivals of rock music's own past.

Another factor in the decline of the star has been the emergence of computer technology in music, which bypasses the relation between musicians and traditional instruments on which a large part of the star mythology was based. Music making has become an affair of technicians and record producers. Kraftwerk, an electronic group, has pushed this development to its logical conclusion by employing robots as onstage replacements.

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26. Conversely, that record sales do not necessarily follow economic trends can be seen in the relatively low sales growth during musically "unexciting" years. See R. Peterson and D. Berger "Cycles in Symbol Production; The Case of Popular Music," *American Sociological Review*, 1975: 40, pp. 158-173.

27. Disco music was problematic for record companies because it was "non-creative," i.e., it did not easily transmit other cultural spin-offs. Cf. "Industry in Crisis," *Melody Maker*, June 30, 1979.

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Record production for a smaller market will probably follow the same path as film production after the latter lost most of its audience to television.[28] In most cases, a record must break internationally to become profitable. Under these circumstances, stars become homogenized and abstract, deprived of any organic content. Moreover the criticism of a "moral decay" and "60s permissiveness" as causes of America's economic decline, also implicates the hedonism which is essential to rock star mythology.

As argued earlier, the star-system presupposes the breakdown of traditional forms of organic culture and the creation of a mass audience. This lack of organic community has enormous consequences on the way in which we think of popular music. If the quality of individual life depends on the coherence and depth of social relations, then the existence of stars and the individual-mass society dialectic on which they draw, implies not only an impoverished sphere of social relations, but also an impoverished sense of the individual; it is not insignificant that mass culture aims at "average" individuals who make up a *silent* majority.

Under these circumstances, mass culture cannot be confronted on the free market. Using rock music as a "weapon" to win over a mass of isolated individuals would employ behaviorist presuppositions as a cynical manipulator of public taste. On the other hand, the bias for "high" culture, or for an essentially working class culture, parallels the corporate search for the essential commercial form. What is forgotten is that popular cultures have historically existed as local, organic cultures until the onset of social massification. It is important for the Left to resist following a "leftist massification" of culture when instead there should be a defense of cultural pluralism and encouragement of popular experimentation in popular music.

In this context, the Left has almost no cultural policy, apart from the rejection of "commercialism" or the more recent "enlightened" support for certain "liberal-minded" singers who are usually successful recording artists like the others. In such a situation, concern with the content of records barely scratches the surface. We must return to a more fundamental concept: the social relations of production and consumption, dealing with the issues raised in popular music in their own terms, rather than as epiphenomena of a class struggle. The aim of radical strategies must be to create alternative cultures on the margin of the capitalist commodity circuit and involve new forms of social solidarity both in the production and reception of cultural items. If this sounds utopian, one could at least begin by laying the foundations for a socialist cultural policy towards popular music.

In spite of its reputation for radicalism, albeit almost entirely limited to the symbolic level, rock music remains one of the last bastions of laissez-faire capitalism. Whereas in most domains, the advanced capitalist countries have, to a greater or lesser extent, instituted a public sphere to protect society against the excesses of the market, such a sphere is singularly lacking in popular

28. Cf. Armand Mattelart, *Multinational Corporations and the Control of Culture*, (1979), Chapter 6.

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music, thus making it an abnormally conservative domain. The notion of a public sphere, involving complex relations between state and civil society, is not, of course, unproblematic: nothing could be worse than state control of licensed pop groups as in the Soviet bloc.

Such a public sphere would encourage the flourishing of forms of popular music that do not obey the logic of a market increasingly content to pack stadiums with bland supergroups. It is also important that rock music and the issues surrounding it (sexism, youth culture, computerization) be subject to much more *critical* discussion than has been hitherto the case. What is desperately needed are forms of cultural intervention which allow pleasure, satisfaction and aesthetic experience outside the dominant modes of commodity consumption. The present stagnation in capitalist cultural industries, due largely to a "petrification of the social" (Baudrillard), demands imaginative alternatives.



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EVOLUTIONARY THEORY IN FERMENT

by Martha R. Herbert

In understanding the material world and the ecology crisis, the choice seems to be between positivism and its abstract negation. The threat of positivism led theorists from Dilthey, Lukács and Korsch onwards to advocate a radical split between nature and culture, in order to save the subject. This move, in turn, entailed a repudiation of 19th century German Idealism for its "spiritualization" of nature. Dilthey argued that human culture requires a hermeneutic, i.e., empathic, method of understanding. And within Marxism, Lukács and Korsch undertook a dialectical interpretation of social history as the history of class struggle, or the evolution of humanity's self-consciousness. They argued that, since nature was incapable of such self-consciousness, the dialectic applies only to the social realm, and they abandoned nature to "positive science." Because of this history, the critique of positivism has remained external to substantive issues within the natural sciences, especially biology. The oversimplified discussions of Soviet dialectical materialism or "Diamat" have been used as evidence of the inevitable vulgarity resulting from any attempted philosophy of nature. Thus, Western Marxism has basically ignored this area altogether, with one exception: Marcuse's call for a new science which, however, never offered substantive alternatives.

In the meantime, the destructive consequences of the application of positivist, instrumental science to external nature have become overwhelmingly inescapable. The ecology crisis, as well as the potentially alarming consequences of new biotechnologies like genetic engineering, are forcing a new consideration of the relation of society with nature. A first reaction to instrumental science is often its abstract negation, i.e., a romantic defense of the holistic unity and harmony of nature and of humanity with nature. However, because it avoids the task of building a *concrete and detailed* approach to nature, it is not a real alternative to positivism. Beyond this lies the project of reconstructing science immanently, which requires a reconsideration of the positivist interpretation of science itself, and therewith a reconsideration of our relation to nature.

Advocates of the nature/culture split have avoided this question, by failing to ask whether positivism offers a satisfactory account of science and of the natural world. The ecology crisis as well as the immanent development of science suggests that it cannot. In branch after branch of science, scientists themselves are experiencing the restrictiveness of the positivist program.

The inadequacy of positivism becomes especially obvious in the study of life. The positivist-reductionist program for biology involves 1) the isolation of phenomena from their developmental and ecological contexts, 2) the lack

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of frameworks to account for complex causations and consequences, 3) the homogenizations of phenomena — the search for statis, constants and similarities, and the sacrifice of dynamism and differences, 4) a focus on quantity at the expense of quality, 5) the lack of a framework for comprehending qualitative transformation, and 6) the imposition of mechanisms and laws from one level onto another qualitatively different levels where these laws may not be appropriate. The living world, however, is characterized by complexity, transformation over time, unevenness, interaction and interdependence, heterogeneity and the emergence of novelty. Reductionism is hardly an adequate approach for comprehending these qualities. Despite its discoveries it will at the same time necessarily overlook very significant aspects of its living objects of study.[1]

This is not to say that reductionism has been an entirely unsuccessful research strategy. One of the main triumphs of modern biology — the "decoding" of DNA — was accomplished using the reductionist approaches of molecular biology and crystallography. Indeed, the elucidation of the structure of DNA and the explanation of its means of replication and relation with RNA (at least in lower organisms), the deciphering of DNA's code for determining the sequence of amino acids in proteins, and the more recent manipulation of DNA with genetic engineering technology — whatever its problems — are all tremendous achievements.

The discovery of DNA had, until recently, given tremendous credence to the reductionist program. First, it seemed to establish a hierarchy of command, where DNA gives orders to RNA, which in turn carries out these orders in the construction of specific proteins. This hierarchy of command, DNA-RNA-protein, is labeled the "central dogma" of molecular biology.[2] And second, it reinforced the goal of reducing biological studies to work on the molecular level. If DNA is basically the same throughout the animal and plant kingdoms, then all life should be comprehensible through study of the genetic code and its transmission.

Thus, we are easily seduced into thinking that we hold the key to the determination of all the diversity and interactions of life on earth. Yet the move from the "central dogma" to a living organism is not fully explained by the genetic code and amino acid sequencing in proteins. In many ways this move is an act of faith. Many questions remain partially or completely unanswered.[3]

1. Donna Haraway, *Crystals, Fabrics and Fields: Metaphors of Organicism in Twentieth Century Developmental Biology* (New Haven, 1976); Garland Allen, *Life Sciences in the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1975). See also Arthur Koestler and J.R. Smythies, eds., *Beyond Reductionism: New Perspectives in the Life Sciences* (New York, 1969), and Steven Rose, ed., *Against Biological Determinism* and *Towards a Liberatory Biology* (London & New York, 1982).

2. F. H. C. Crick, "The Genetic Code: III," *Scientific American*, October 1966.

3. For example, one the proteins coded for in the DNA are manufactured, how do these protains constitute organisms as structurally and functionally organized entities? How do organisms develop? Is development all programmed in the genes, or do genetic processes set off other processes that then feed back into development? Two fairly radical discussions of this are Lynn Margulis and Carl Lindegren, "Dogma and Iconoclasm in Biology: The Gene is Not Enough" *Co-*

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The fact is that the relation between microbiological genetic mechanisms and anatomy and physiology is not clarified by deciphering the protein-coding aspects of DNA. In fact, in the "higher" organisms (those whose cells have true nuclei) the role of the bulk of the DNA is still unknown.[4] This should provoke us to ask whether we can really understand the relation between DNA and the temporal changes in organismic development and evolution — let alone interactions among organisms in ecological communities — solely by invoking genetic and molecular mechanisms. In upcoming research a shift is likely to take place from studying DNA as such to studying the ensemble of conditions which affect its activity.

The example of DNA research should illustrate both the accomplishments and limitations of the reductionist approach. The problem with reductionism is not its emphasis on simple cause and effect relations but rather its failure to recognize the limits of this mode of explanation. Scientific advances occur on the basis of necessary abstractions of phenomena. Problems arise, however, because the fact that these abstractions are provisional, somewhat arbitrary, and historically conditioned is often forgotten. Since in organic systems it is rarely, if ever, possible to isolate one subsystem thoroughly from all others, at some point factors from outside the realm of study (as the abstraction defines it) are bound to impinge on the domain in question in a significant way. A non-reductionist response would reconsider the model, and construct another one more helpful for studying the new parameters, while a reductionist response would redouble efforts to make the given level of abstraction sufficient.[5]

The current ferment in evolutionary theory involves a confrontation with the limits of previous levels of abstraction, and a formulation of new models to account for different sets of relations. From a broad perspective, the overall umbrella disciplines of biology are evolution and ecology; each is a different entry point into the same totality. Evolution studies variation and continuity over time, while ecology studies variation and interaction in space. These fields seem to be broadly defined, yet even here is abstraction, since not merely individual organisms but also ecological systems change over time; and evolutionary transformations occur in the context of ecological pressures and constraints. The study of evolution has abstracted from this whole to study certain changes while leaving others unexamined and assumed constant.

In recent years there has been an increasingly self-conscious struggle against reductionism in biology, and to some extent the hegemony of reduc-

Evolution Quarterly, Spring 1980, no. 26, pp. 60-68; and Ruth Hubbard, "The Theory and Practice of Reductionism — From Mendel's Laws to Genetic Engineering" *Towards a Liberatory Biology, op. cit.* An early critic of the central dogma was Barry Commoner; see, for example, his "Failure of the Watson-Crick Theory as a Chemical Explanation of Inheritance", *Nature* no. 220, 1968, pp. 334-40.

4. See the last chapter of James Watson and John Tooze, *The DNA Story: A Documentary History of Gene Cloning* (San Francisco, 1981).

5. Richard Levins and Richard Lewontin, "Dialectics and Reductionism in Ecology," *Synthese*, vol. 43, 1980, pp. 47-78.

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tionism and 19th century mechanism has begun to give way. Organicism, systems theory, cybernetics, structuralism, theories of levels and hierarchies, and various other conceptual modalities circulate in theoretical biology and even make their way ito some empirical research programs.[6] Mainstream biology, however, has not been substantially transformed. Notwithstanding their claims to the contrary, the fashionable system-oriented alternatives by no means automatically transcend reductionism.

Several of the biologists most prominently involved in the evolution debates have turned to the questions of the philosophy of nature that were abandoned with the critique of Engels as a source of insight for moving beyond reductionism and its only partly adequate alternatives. While this tradition has been banished from sophisticated western social theory, it is serving as a useful heuristic for biologists. Contemporary "dialectical" scientists are not using this tradition to impose schematic Hegelian notions of the transformation of quantity to quality, or the negation of the negation, on already existing scientific knowledge, as was often done and properly criticized in the past. Rather, they are using it as an aid in developing much needed alternative scientific approaches, guiding research and the formation of hypotheses, and highlighting relations that would otherwise probably remain obscure.[7]

Though some social theorists are finding their way back to nature via political debates about ecology or perhaps sociobiology, the scientific dimensions of these issues will remain impenetrable as long as science's dominant reductionism remains unquestioned. Awareness of the lively anti-reductionist ferment and its political overtones, should be helpful; conversely, ignorance can have unfortunate consequences for social theories. Thus, Habermas is one of the few social theorists to tackle the issue of social evolution, and to draw on evolutionary biology. But he uses biological information basically to bolster his argument for dividing nature from culture. Furthermore, his use of the evidence is sloppy: he relies on a simplistic version of reductionist evolutionary theory that would not be satisfying even to sophisticated reductionists. The task of adequately incorporating biology into social theory remains to be tackled.

Evolutionary biology studies that aspect of life involving change over time. It asks, for example: What is the origin of the various species? What are the mechanisms of transformation? How can the striking fitness, or adaptation, of organisms to their environments be explained? Until recently, a body of theories known as the "modern synthesis" seemed to have provided the

6. For a valuable critical history of cybernetics and other recent conceptual modes see Donna Haraway, "The Biological Enterprise: Sex, Mind and Profit from Human Engineering to Sociobiology," *Radical History Review* 20, Spring/Summer 1979, pp. 206-237, and Haraway, "The High Cost of Information in Post World War II Evolutionary Biology: Ergonomics, semiotics, and the Sociobiology of Communications Systems," *The Philosophical Forum,* vol. 13, nos. 203, 1981-2, pp. 244-278.

7. Levins and Lewontin, "Dialectics and Reductionism in Ecology," *op. cit.*; Richard Levins and Martha Herbert, "Marxism and Biology," Bertell Ollman and Edward Vernoff *The Left Academy* vol. 2 (New York: forthcoming, 1983) and Richard Lewontin, "The Liberation of Biology," *New York Review of Books* (vol. 29, no. 21-22), January 20, 1983.

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answers to these questions. However, in recent years some aspects of the modern synthesis appear inadequate, and part of the problem results from its reductionist approach.

Darwin, the key figure in the development of evolutionary theory, had a central revolutionary insight, namely that the differences betwen individuals within a species are converted into the differences between species in space and time.[8] By facing the implications of the heterogeneity of living organisms, and in particular the heterogeneity *within* species, Darwin broke this conceptual barrier which the presupposition of eternal species had posed to all prior considerations of evolution. The transformation of worldviews meant that variance was no longer understood in relation to a basic, central, underlying constancy. Rather, any apparent constancy was seen merely as an instance of temporary, relative and local stability. This, in particular, included the apparent stability of species, which were now understood to be undergoing ceaseless change.[9]

While this unified understanding of the connections among variation, selection and heredity was a revolutionary advance beyond previous attempts to understand evolution, several problems remained that Darwin could not explain. One was the *source* of variation within species, and another the *mechanism* of heredity. Without this information, Darwin made several moves that are now considered mistakes: 1) he granted too much explanatory power to natural selection and, 2) for an explanation of heredity he reverted to the new discredited ideas of blending interitance, pangenesis and Lamarkian notions of the inheritance of acquired characteristics, none of which sufficiently distinguished hereditary mechanisms from other metabolic functions.

Mendel's work on the patterns of inheritance of variation provided the means to get beyond these inadequate notions of heredity and variation. Mendel was not merely a monk whose farm background predisposed him to study breeding; he also had a background in mathematical physics. This training sensitized him to patterns of binomial variation, and he set out to find such patterns of variation in the offspring of hybrid crosses in plants. The recognition of variation as being significant in itself rather than as a deviation from an ideal norm was important again in Mendel's approach to heredity. As Darwin had solved the problem of evolution by seeing intra-specific variations where others had seen only ideal-types, Mendel solved the problem of heredity by looking at the actual pattern of variation among the offspring of a cross, rather than trying to find one single idealized description that homogenized the range of variation.

Mendel accomplished this in his classic experiments with sweet peas by selecting for study certain characters which varied sharply and discontinuous-

8. A major influence on the train of thought in this paper is a long article, "Evolution," by Richard Levins and Richard Lewontin, published in Italian as "Evoluzione," in *Enciclopedia* vol. V, (Torino, Einaudi) pp. 995-1051. Unfortunately, it is not published in English, and available only as a xeroxed manuscript. But see Richard Lewontin, "Darwin's Real Revolution" in *New York Review of Books*, (vol. 30, no. 10). June 16, 1983.

9. See Ernst Mayr, *Animal Species and Evolution* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963).

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ly, rather than smoothly and continuously, such as round and smooth versus angular and wrinkled seeds. By concentrating his attention on discrete characters, Mendel was able to show how the mechanisms of hereditary recombination mediated between the existence of discrete, particulate, heritable traits and the patterns of their expression in the organism. In this way, Mendel's discoveries changed our understanding of the relation between appearances and the forces which shape then in biology. It allowed the distinction to be made between *genotype* — the information contained in the genes — and *phenotype* — the actual expression of this information in the real living organism.

By separating a set of rules of heredity discontinuous from other aspects of metabolism, Mendel forced a rethinking of how organisms adapt to their environments, which could no longer be explained by the inheritance of acquired characteristics. This also laid the groundwork for the development of much more careful investigations of inheritance patterns. Mendel did not live to see his work become influential. He sent his work to Darwin, who never read it, and it remained unrecognized for several decades. It was rediscovered at the turn of the century, and with this rediscovery, there arose the problem of just how to reconcile Mendelism and Darwinism.[11]

Once again much of the problem was how to reconcile different levels of abstraction. Mendel's accomplishment rested on abstracting specific processes of heredity from the totality of the organism. The significance and usefulness of his discoveries varied depending on how easily other kinds of biological work could benefit by similar abstractions. A major difficulty with the integration of Mendel and Darwin was how to relate the small-scale and short-term changes studies by genetics with large-scale and long-term changes studied by natural history, as well as discrete with continuous differences. For those biologists whose interests lay at the level of the individual organism or species, Mendel's findings were often helpful because they allowed a more careful focus upon the particulars of variation within species.

On the other hand, naturalists, students of biological phenomena at the population level, and other students of evolution "above the species level" did not find Mendelism useful for explaining phenomena. Small-scale, particulate variation and inheritance of individual characteristics did not explain changing patterns of characteristics where more than one character was involved, or when variation seemed continuous rather than discrete. Moreover, it did not explain qualitatively different larger-order phenomena like the emergence of new species or taxa. The challenge, then, was to show the relation between variation as Mendel had studied it and variation as Darwin had described it.

The apparent resolution of this difference was accomplished in the thirties

11. William Provine, *The Origins of Theoretical Population Genetics* (Chicago, 1971).

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and forties in what has been called, since Huxley, the "modern synthesis."[12] The construction of this synthesis involved building communication between different specializations and levels of inquiry in biology and geology. Developments in genetics were particularly important. Whereas early in the century genetics had dealt with individual genes and organisms, in the teens and twenties the approach of the discipline became transformed so that there was now consideration of gene "pools" in populations of organisms. Population genetics, as this field came to be called, used highly mathematical techniques to explain traits with continuous ranges of variation as the result of the combination of effects of discrete genes. With attention to more complex transformations on these levels, the apparent polarization between discrete and discontinuous change seemed to be overcome, and it seemed possible to develop a genetical approch to phenomena on a scale relevant to the more organismic, developmental and historically oriented biological sciences.[13]

This synthesis provides the textbook orthodoxy that is taught in most schools and taken to be the theory of evolution. According to these ideas, the *quantitative* variations examined in the micro-evolutionary genetic explanations are sufficient to account for the *qualitative* variations between species and larger groupings. This works in the following way: the gene pools of populations of organisms contain a variety of different genes. Under certain circumstances, subgroups of a species become genetically isolated from one another, and can diverge to the point that reproductive interaction between this group and its parent group is no longer possible.[14] What results is a gradual emergence of qualitative differences — new species — from the accumulation of small quantitative differences.

For some time it seemed that this synthesis provided the missing pieces in the Darwinian evolutionary picture. It offered a continuum of understanding: from the genetic mechanisms and patterns of heredity through natural selection to the emergence of large-scale, qualitative differences in the natural world. Moreover, the synthesis seemed to be dramatically supported by the discovery of DNA, which gave a basis for these mechanisms of variation and evolution even at the biochemical level. DNA seemed triumphant proof of the adequacy of reductionism for biology: the key to life appeared to consist in understanding the molecular functioning of the genetic material.[15]

In many respects, however, this sythesis and reconciliation was achieved by oversimplification. Fox example, it fails to confront the question of how these individual, small quantitative changes *interact* to produce large-scale qualitative changes. Critics of the modern synthesis maintain that this interaction is so important that it needs to be considered in its own right and will be lost if

12. Julian Huxley, *Evolution: The Modern Synthesis* (New York, 1942); Ernst Mayr and William Provine, eds., *The Evolutionary Synthesis* (Cambridge, Mass., 1980).

13. Mayr and Provine, *ibid.*; Provine, *op. cit.*

14. M. J. D. White, *Modes of Speciation* (San Francisco, 1978).

15. Richard Dawkins, *The Extended Phenotype: The gene as the Unit of Selection* (San Francisco, 1982); Charles Lumsden and Edward O. Wilson, *Genes, Mind and Culture: The Coevolutionary Process* (Cambridge, 1981).

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approached only in terms of its isolated components. This problem already arose in the earlier discussion of DNA which noted that it is not at all clear what it means to say that DNA and genes "determine" larger-scale properties. Since every last detail of form, every quirk of behavior, is by no means programmed in our genetic code, the relation between the role of the genes and the role of other forces needs to be considered. If these quantitative factors are not sufficient to explain the entire range of qualitative variety in the living world, then what is the relation between these different kinds of factors and explanations?

Since these problems are now being confronted rather than evaded, a series of critiques and reconstructive programs have been developing. The critiques have tried to demonstrate the cost of a merely quantitative orientation to evolution; and the reconstructive programs have tried to develop concrete means of integrating qualitative considerations into evolutionary investigation and theorizing. Although yet another synthesis has not emerged, the mid-century hegemony of the modern synthesis has been seriously challenged.

Failure to account adquately for qualitative change is only one of the problems with the modern synthesis. While organisms indeed differ from each other in qualitative ways, the role these differences play in adaptation to their environments is equally remarkable. The modern synthesis, however, offers problematic explanations for this adaptation. This is because the phenomenon of adaptation to the environment is a complex and changing *relation*, and the reductionism of the modern synthesis ill-equiped to comprehend this level of complexity.[16]

The critiques and reconstructive programs aimed at the modern synthesis's limited notion of the relation of organisms with their environments follow two characteristic lines of argument: 1) the critique of adaptationism, which attacks the idea that evolution is oriented completely toward adaptation and optimization of efficiency; and 2) the reconstructive program, which argues that evolutionary theory must encompass factors in addition to mutation and natural selection of individual genes and traits. These other factors include the structural integrity and constraints of organic form, the relation of organism and environment, and the activity of organisms in constructing their environments (rather than merely their passive responses to impinging forces).

The critique of adaptationism. Although organisms are generally well-adapted to their environments, they are by no means perfectly adapted in every respect. A development that is adaptive in some respects is often linked to other less than optimal changes.[17]

It is a fact that natural selection and evolutionary change do not always lead to adaptation. However, the adaptationist program dominating evolutionary

16. R. C. Lewontin, "Adaptation," *Scientific American* vol. 239, no. 3, September, 1978.

17. For example, the erect posture of human beings, which freed our hands to work and our brains to develop, also brought with it a much greater tendency to lower back pain, since we still basically have the skeletal structure of quadrupedal creatures. See Wilton M. Drogman, "The Scars of Human Evolution," *Scientific American,* December, 1951.

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theory assumes that traits are selected only because they optimize certain selective advantages. The initial assumption then dictates research and the construction of explanations for data. The basic strategy is: first, to isolate certain problems that organisms must solve, second, to regard evolutionary change as the acquisition of solutions to these problems, and third, to regard the task of evolutionary theory as giving a plausible mechamism for how these solutions came about.[18] While adaptationists will go so far as to recognize the existence of non-adaptive developments, they try to incorporate these factors in a model which describes optimization as the result of trade-offs and competition among different factors rather than questioning their basic approach, which still assumes that these factors are essentially separate and equally commensurable.

Unfortunately, the choice of traits assumed to be the product of optimization and adaptation has often been quite arbitrary. Locating the real differences and discontinuities, and defining the relations, multiple causations, and processes of change and interaction, is a fundamental problem for life science. The adaptationists, however, have largely avoided a serious confrontation of these questions. Many developments in life indeed frustrate attempts at explanation by any simple criterion like adaptation, improvement, or increased efficiency. But adaptationism isolates individual traits and assumes that they follow a single trajectory even when their context changes, and it thereby confuses present function with prior history. By taking this approach, adaptationism has from the start relinquished its ability to work meaningfully with the more complex questions that arise when these oversimplified relations are abandoned.

Adaptationism implies a tinkering with a machine to impove its functional fit to a specific goal. As such, the adaptationist program is sorely inadequate because it does not take into account the constraints and influences of factors other than the ones it specifically isolates for study. The critique of adaptationism, then, is part of an attempt to resuscitate the repressed plurality of factors of evolution.[19] In the main, this critique has taken two major forms: 1) an argument at the level of genotype and 2) an argument at the level of phenotype.

Genotype. There are several aspects of genetics which run counter to adaptationism. The tempo of molecular change at the DNA and protein levels are not easily accounted for by adaptationist arguments. While changes in an organism's DNA sequence (genotype) are random with respect to the environment, and seem to occur at a regular rate, potential changes in the organism's expressed characteristics (phenotype) are not.[20] But these problems are

18. Richard Lewontin, "Sociobiology as an Adaptationist Program," *Behavioral Science*, vol. 24, 1979, pp. 5-14.

19. Stephen Gould, "Darwinism and the Expansion of Evolutionary Theory," *Science* vol. 216, 23, pp. 380-387, April, 1982 and "Is a New and General Evolutionary Synthesis Emerging?" In *Paleobiology*, vol. 6, 1980. The latter article and the position it presented was critically evaluated in "Is a New Evolutionary Synthesis Necessary?" by G. Ledyard Stebbins and Francisco Ayala, *Science*, vol. 213, August 28, 1981, pp. 967-971.

20. C. H. Waddington, "The Basic Ideas of Biology," in *Toward a Theoretical Biology*, 1, ed., C. H.

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avoided by adaptationism, which reads its explanations into random molecular changes.

Population genetics also presents us with some interesting facts in this regard. Recently, it has been shown that there is a much greater amount of genetic variability in populations than would be necessary merely to maintain the existing range of phenotypic variation. If the adaptationist argument were correct, all genetic variability could be accounted for by its immediate adaptive value. But the empirical fact of vast quantities of unadaptive variation undermines the idea that since there is no immediate need for such variability, nothing extra should be maintained. Instead, it suggests that this variability actually serves as a reserve that can be drawn upon quickly in changing conditions, but is maintained in the population because under ordinary conditions it is selectively neutral.[21]

There are several consequences of this large pool of variation. a) Genes are generally selected not individually but in groups, and a group of particularly advantageous genes is called an "adaptive peak." Multiple "adaptive peaks" are possible and several different combinations of genetic factors may be more or less equally adaptive. b) There is an element of contingency in which genetic combinations chance to become dominant in a population, so that, for example, it is pointless to try to find an adaptive explanation for why the Indian rhinoceros has one horn while the African rhinoceros has two. c) A good deal of genetic change in populations is due not to natural selection but to random "genetic drift." d) Owing to this sort of randomness and contingency, genes may be lost even if they are adaptive, should they become isolated in too small of a population). e) Different pathways of further change may be open or closed depending on the genes in the particular adaptive peak at which a population has stabilized.[22]

In sum, none of these genetic processes, molecular or populational, are explicable in terms of adaptationism or optimization theory. What we see instead are patterns which cannot be explained either by aggregating particulate changes or by invoking optimization. Thus, a level of reality above the reductionist rock bottom asserts its ability to contribute independently to the shape of evolution.

Phenotype. On the phenotypic level, we find that any factor we may choose to consider is constrained from many directions by its integration into the organism (and, as we shall see, into the ecosystem). That is, factors other than the ones of immediate interest are crucial in determining and restricting possible structures, processes and pathways of development. Two major examples of such factors are a) architectural constraints necessary for maintaining the structural integrity of organic form, and b) multiple determinants and multiple functions of any particular characteristic.

Waddington (Chicago, 1968).

21. Christopher Wills, "Genetic Load," *Scientific American*, March, 1970; Motoo Kimura, "The Neutral Theory of Molecular Evolution," *Scientific American*, November, 1979.

22. See especially Richard Lewontin, *The Genetic Basis of Evolutionary Change* (New York, 1974).

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Architectural constraints assume several forms. In one direction, certain develpments are simple precluded because they will compromise the structural viability of the organism. In a conceptual sense this is an "ecological" problem, because the various parts (and activities) of the organism serve as environment for each other, so that one part cannot "maximize its advantage" at the expense of the others without compromising the basic conditions of its existence. Quantitative variation in size of an organism or its parts is only possible within a limited range, beyond which qualitatively new structural design becomes necessary. A fly the size of an elephant would need elephant-sized legs to support itself.[23]

Another kind of architectural constraint consists in the creation of certain forms merely as byproducts of other developments. In their widely cited critique of adaptationism, Gould and Lewontin use the example of the spandrels in the central dome of St.Mark's Cathedral in Venice. The spandrels are triangular spaces between the arches that support the central dome, and they are a necessary architectural consequences of this form of structural support. But in the cathedral, each of these spaces on the dome contains a design that is an integral part of the iconographic representation of the Christian faith. The spandrels are merely architectural byproducts that have then been used for other purposes. The adaptationist argument might easily reverse this relationship, however, by making the symbolic function primary, and explaining how the architecture of the dome follows from this.[24]

The emergence of form out of architectural necessity and its cooptation for other purposes is similar to the broader phenomenon of "pleiotropy." Pleiotropy refers to the fact that every characteristic has many properties besides the ones for which it was initially selected. It follows from this that some of these extra properties, initially merely by-products, can then themselves become objects of selection.

This overdetermination of characteristics, as well as the multifarious and shifting functions of structures, can not be comprehended by an adaptationist program which essentially assumes a constancy of purpose that is selected for consistently through long lines of descent. If anything, this overdetermination makes the necessity of an alternative approach more apparent. It also reasserts the complexity and integrity of living matter, and its *resistance* to arbitrary manipulation. Although all living things need to maintain some degree of responsiveness to changing circumstances, the malleability and adaptability are not uniformly characteristic of every aspect of an organism. Thus, certain modes of change will not be viable unless they are coordinated with other related changes. Because of this an organism (or species) is likely to remain stable in these respects until a sufficient number of interrelated changes happen concomitantly. A consequence of this on the macro-

23. See D'Arcy Thompson, *On Growth and Form* (Cambridge, England, 1961); and Stephen Gould, "The Evolutionary Biology of Constraint," *Daedelus*, Spring 1980, pp. 39-52.

24. Stephen Gould and Richard Lewontin, "The Spandrels of San Marcos and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adap»tationist Program," *Proceedings of the Royal Society of London*, B, 205, pp. 581-598.

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evolutionary level is that evolutionary development is characterized not by a random and even filling of all possible forms and niches, but of distinct and separate long-term pathways. Recent research in biology, then, is rediscovering empirically ideas that were current in the old anti-mechanistic schools of philosophical biology.

The reconstructive program. To leave behind the limitations of the reductionist approach, biology must develop its sensitivity to complex and multi-leveled webs of causation, to discontinuity and the emergence of novelty, and to the integrity of levels of inquiry above the most rudimentary. This requires putting the parts of the organism back into the context of the organism as a whole, and the organism back into the context of its environment. Such a recontextualization entails not only a substantive but also a methodological shift. The development of alternatives to reductionism therefore must involve not merely reconstruction of the concepts of organism and environment, but also self-conscious reflection on the philosophical content of empirical methodology. The previously outlined problems with adaptationism cover the range of issues a non-reductionist approach must consider, and a sketch of the responses to these problems should suggest the nature of the emerging anti-reductionist alternative.

In response to the overly simple adaptationist idea that organisms can be understood in terms of individual traits and their functions isolated from their contexts, anti-reductionists attempt to recover the integrity of the organism in its complex unity as an object of study. Once it is recognized that the different parts of the organism change in relation to one another, then it becomes reasonable to inquire just how these relations work, how constraints operate, and how such constraints are transcended.

One productive approch to this problem has been to shift emphasis from structures and forms to the processes which shape them. In examining the range of relations in an organism, one consideration is the kinds and degrees of flexibility that are present. In opposition to the adaptationist tendency to isolate traits from each other, anti-reductionists study relations among traits, and attempt to differentiate degrees of interdependency, since among physiological and developmental processes, some are more tightly bound together than others. Studying this interaction contributes to a concrete understanding not only of organic integrity, but also of the nature of organic change. Thus, change over time often involves changes in the relations of those factors which are more loosely bound together, and thus more labile.

Attention to this kind of differentiated interdependency is important in several domains of biological inquiry. In development, the rates of different kinds of growth can vary independently. This differential variation of growth rates is called allometry, and it can have impressive results.[25] A particularly dramatic example of allometry is the difference between chimpanzees and human being. Chimpanzees are our closest relatives and adult human beings

25. Stephen Gould, *Ontogeny and Phylogeny* (Cambridge, Mass., 1977); "Evolution" by Levins and Lewontin, *op. cit.*

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quite strikingly resemble infant chimps in a number of important respects. It has been suggested that the shift from chimp-like ancestors to human beings occurred in part because somatic maturation slowed down in relation to sexual maturation, so that at the time we reach sexual maturity we are still at a physical stage similar to that of infant chimps. This particular type of allometric change is called "neoteny," and is one particular pathway to speciation. Neoteny in human beings as well as in other species may have served to preserve the flexibility of juvenile forms, thereby enabling the organism to jettison earlier adult forms which were more highly determined and thus less flexible. In human beings the lengthened period of childhood flexibility that arose in this postulated neotenic change has allowed more time for free play (as well as for prolonged infant helplessness and childhood dependency on adults, which accounts in significant measure for both our great intelligence and our proclivity to neurosis).[26]

If this phenomenon of neoteny can account for human emergence from our ancestors, we are still in need of an explanation of how it works. It has been shown that human beings and chimpanzees differ in genetic material to such a small degree that the difference is less than what one often finds between races in other species.[27] This means that a very small genetic change indeed enabled a qualitatively much more significant transformation to occur. In order to explain this, investigators have sought "regulator genes," small changes which could bring about large changes in organisms. But no such genes in complex organisms have been found, and there is some reason to suspect that this is not the right formulation for understanding processes at the genetic level. It is clear that mutations, though they may be of limited nature chemically, can result in a wide range of degrees of change when translated into their expression in the organism. But the idea of regulatory genes is still wedded to a reductionist model of gene expression, retaining the idea that one gene is associated with one function, and merely extending the range of possible functions. A more detailed explanation of this and similar phenomena will probably await a reformulation of our approach to genetics in a more complex, interactive direction.

Understanding the coupling and uncoupling of rates of growth, as well as other similar variable relations, involves the consideration of whole organisms, and takes us far beyond simple adaptationism. But once we consider the complex relation of organisms to their environments, we are moving even further beyond the dominant emphases in evolutionary biology. Until the last few years the relation of organism and environment had not been a major concern of evolutionary theory. It is quite striking, in fact, how frequently organisms have been studies abstracted from their ecological contexts.[28]

26. Gould, *Ontogeny and Phylogeny, ibid.*; Ashley Montague, *Growing Young* (New York, 1981); Peter Fuller, "Art and Biology," *New Left Review*, no. 132, March-April, 1982.

27. M. C. King and A. C. Wilson, "Evolution at Two Levels in Humans and Chimpanzees," *Science*, vol. 188, 1975, pp. 107-116.

28. A differentiated sensitivity to the environment has made its way into evolutionary theory largely through contributions from agricultural biology, where this area is much more highly

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The inclusion of the environment in evolutionary studies is a central part of a counter-reductionist program. Until now, evolutionary theory, in its organism-centeredness, has generally treated the environment as a capricious back-drop — a source, perhaps, of nourishment and of hostile forces of natural selection, but otherwise merely generating random stimulation. The environment, however, is neither capricious nor unimportant; in fact, it is highly differentiated in its microenvironments. To abstract away from the huge variety of local differences is to lose the possibility of putting the organism back into the environment, since the organism's relation with its environment is very specific.

The emphasis here on the range of local variation in the environment should save antireductionist evolutionists from the global holism which, as already indicated is merely an initial abstract negation of reductionism. What in fact makes ecology interesting and dynamic is that all phenomena are *not* equally related to all other phenomena, and that nature exhibits not placid harmony, but a great deal of instability. Thus, a more accurate way of looking at nature is as a shifting pattern of relations which evolves over time.[29]

An organism-centered approach also interferes with an appreciation of how organisms and environments affect *each other.* Organisms condition, as well as are conditioned by, their environments, but evidence of this mutual conditioning does not survive into overly general abstractions about "*the* environment." It is ironic that an organism-centered approach, by understudying the environment, also mechanisically severs the organism from what it does, and thereby undercuts an appreciation of the organism's *activity* in relation to the environment. This reductionist "organism-centeredness" makes it impossible to appreciate the full range of activities of the organism itself.

Once we advance beyond the antinomy of reductionism and its complementary idealist holism, we can begin to make distinctions for which neither of these alternatives are helpful. By recognizing that there are no absolute boundaries between the organism and its environment, which need to be studied in their interrelations, a genuine alternative to reductionism will thereby allow us to observe differentiations within the whole. We are thus more likely to see how at different points in the system some relations are predominant and others are irrelevant or even absent. This applies in particular to the mode of life of specific organisms. Each organism has its characteristic way of life: certain resources, temperatures, amounts of humidity or exposure to the sun are more favorable than others. And organisms, to the extent that they are mobile, seek out these conditions, rather than merely passively

developed out of necessity. That communication between "pure" evolutionary theory and "applied" agriculture is so rare is an instance of the pervasive split between theory and practice; in this case as in others it has hindered scientific development. Cf. Richard Levins, "Genetics and Hunger," *Genetics* 78: 1974.

29. Richard Levins, *Evolution in Changing Environments* (Princeton, 1968), and Levins, "Evolution in Communities Near Equilibrium," in *Ecology and Evolution of Communities*, eds. Martin L. Cody and Jarad M. Diamond (Cambridge, 1975), pp. 16-50.

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accepting existing conditions.

This activity of organisms has several consequences. First, while the orgainism's activity generally improves its situation, it cannot be described in terms of optimization theory. Organisms have requirements which are not necessarily entirely synchronized with each other, and which cannot all be optimized simultaneously. Thus, habitats often constitute compromises; for example, a creature may live at a high temperature that is tolerable but not optimal in order to minimize its vulnerability to predation. Evolutionary change can be triggered by a shift in conditions that no longer favors this particular compromise.

Second, the activity of organisms relates to both internal and external factors. When it is said that an organism is affected by something in the environment, a process is being described in a general and superficial way which is in fact more complex. The initial stimulus sets off a series of processes involving quite different substances and systems. A change in external temperature, for example, sets off changes in sugar metabolism, circulation, thirst, and so on. Furthermore, it can affect opportunities for gathering food, which will in turn set off other processes to respond to the altered nutritional supply. And finally, sometimes an organism's response is not merely in terms of the moment, but involves history, as when, for example, the accumulation of "degree days" determines the rate of development of certain insects. Thus, the effect of a given stimulus must often be understood more in terms of a diverging and converging set of pathways than in terms of a simple stimulus-response interaction.

Since the environment is constantly changing in minor ways, the organism must maintain constant activity to preserve a viable internal milieu, or homeostasis. The term homeostasis is deceptive, however, because its implication of minimal variability obscures the constant *activity* necessary to maintain it, as well as the constantly progressing senility of the organism.

The impact of the activity of organisms goes beyond maintaining individual survival; it changes the environment. Such changes are difficult to incorporate into a reductionist model of evolution. Even on a small scale, the activity of an organism leaves its traces on the environment, in the form of depleted resources, moved objects, excreta and other byproducts. On a larger scale we should appreciate, for example, how worms, insects and microorganisms transform the soil, and how beavers with the dams they build transform the wet and dry lay of the land. And in a large sense, an environment like a forest is the product of the collective activity of all the organisms that constitute it. Even our oxygen-rich atmosphere is, in a real sense, a product (as well as a condition) of oxygen producing and consuming life on earch.[30] None of these environmental conditions are merely "givens."

There are even ways in which the activity of organisms can in turn affect the

30. J. D. Bernal, *The Origin of Life* (Cleveland, 1967).

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very selection pressures that determine the species' continuing destiny.[31] An example of this is the emergence of human beings from primates, where increased sociality and the tendency to use tools enhanced selection pressures for further "hominization" — further development of the hand, brain and capacity to speak. Each development enhanced the other in a circuit of positive feedback.[32]

To introduce this creative role of organisms into evolutionary theory is at least as much of a departure from the orthodox approach as to recover the integrity of the whole organism. The pathway that goes schematically from organism to environment and back again is more complex than the mode of explanation that sees organisms responding to the environment but not vice versa. In order to grasp such pathways in concrete terms, a re-evaluation of epistemological approaches and empirical tools is necessary. Mathematical tools that require the division of the world into dependent and independent variables are no longer adequate, since organisms and environments vary in relation to each other, and the attribution of the status of dependence and independence is in the end arbitrary. And epistemological approaches that foster the expectation that explanation should be achieved at the lowest level prevent the study of the relation of phenomena at different levels. Thus, some anti-reductionist biologists are developing theories of levels and hierarchies to conceptualize the interaction of different levels of phenomena.[33] Others are developing mathematical tools to study phenomena at different levels in their mutual interactions.[34]

Opening this longer and more complex set of causes and effects to investigation is what is required to uncover some of the missing links in the question of how organisms adapt to their specific environments. By falling short of this more comprehensive approach, the adaptationist program avoids the most crucial questions. In the end, it is condemned to mystify the very phenomena it attempts to explain.

That evolutionary theory needs to reconstruct itself is not evidence that its past work was mistaken, but rather that it has reached a new stage of development.[35] While one of the major challenges facing evolutionary theory today is

31. C. H. Waddington, *The Strategy of the Genes* (London, 1957); I. I. Schmalhausen, *Factors of Evolution* (Philadelphia, 1949). A list of references to research about inheritance of acquired characteristics can be found in "The Problem of Lysenkoism," *op. cit.* Many evolutionary developments were probably initiated by behavior rather than mutation, such as the emergence of life from the seas, in which behavior was presumably prior to physical modifications.

32. Frederick Engels, "The Part Played by Labor in the Transition from Ape to Man;" Sherwood Washburn, "Tools and Human Evolution," *Scientific American*, September, 1960.

33. For example, Stanley Salthe, "Problems of Macroevolution (Molecular Evolution, Phenotype Definition, Canalization) As Seen From a Hierarchical Viewpoint," *American Zoologist*, vol. 15, pp. 295-314, 1982; Anthony J. Arnold and Kurt Fristrup, "The Theory of Evolution by Natural Selection: A Hierarchical Expansion," *Paleobiology*, vol. 8, pp. 113-129, 1982; T. F. H. Allen and Thomas B. Starr, *Hierarchy: Perspectives for Ecological Complexity*, Chicago: 1982.

34. Richard Levins, "Evolution in Communities Near Equilibrium," *op. cit.*; Richard Lewontin, "The Analysis of Variance and the Analysis of Causes," *The American Journal of Human Genetics*, vol. 26, no. 3 May, 1974, pp. 400-411.

35. Waddington, *The Strategy of the Genes*, *op. cit.*

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to incorporate these longer pathways of change and mutual transformation, rather than to abstract away from them, does not mean that such abstractions have been entirely useless. Darwin and Mendel both abstracted from the activity of the organism, and this allowed them to make their monumental contributions. For Darwin, the organism was a product of external selection pressures; for Mendel, the organism was a product of internal mutation pressures. But for both of them, the organism responded passively, whether the pressures were from within or without.

The abstraction of the organism from its activity sufficed for elucidting many mechanical aspects of evolution. As such, it was also overdetermined by its conformity to the ideological hegemony of a mechanistic worldview. However, is is now time to relocate the objects of inquiry into the contexts from which they were abstracted. As long as such abstractions are automatically made, research will not illuminate the nature of adaptation, nor will it uncover the mediations between small scale, short term evolutionary change and large scale, long term evolutionary change. These issues can no longer be avoided, but unless biology undergoes a significant conceptual reorientation, it will not be able to address these questions in any thorough manner.

While all of this anti-reductionist ferment is going on in biology, social theorists have continued to regard science as entirely dominated by positivism. Thus, many radical social theorists have advocated a unique methodology for the social sciences, ignoring the natural sciences completely.[36] Habermas is one of the few social theorists who incorporates information from biology, but in his case the exception proves the rule. While he takes organic evolution seriously, his incursion into this realm is basically meant to bolster his dualistic position. What is even more appalling is that he uncritically accepts the modern synthesis, and evinces no knowledge that it has lately undergone a serious critique. Habermas, in other words, uncritically accepts neo-positivism's self-understanding and is content to hand over the material realm *in toto* to the positivists. To entertain the notion that positivism is inadequate to the natural sciences would upset the dualistic construction on which his philosophy rests.

Habermas's intentions are revealed most clearly in his comparison of biological and social evolution. He suggests that biological evolution has a heuristic usefulness for social theory because it directs attention to the evolutionary learning mechanism. That is, cultural tradition seems to contain some variety-generating mechanism that corresponds at least vaguely to genetic mutation. But having made this comparison Habermas immediately

36. For discussions of the relation of social science, social theory and biology, see Howard Gruber, "Darwin on Psychology and its Relation to Evolutionary Thought," in *Psychology: Theoretical-Historical Perspectives,* ed., R. Rieber (New York, 1980); Anthony Leeds, "The Language of Sociobiology: Reduction, Emergence, History, Social Science, Normativeness," Valentine Dusek, "Socialist Anthropology Versus Sociobiology," the latter two in *Philosophical Forum*, vol. 13, nos. 2-3, 1981-2; and Paul Heyer, *Nature, Human Nature and Society*: Marx, Darwin, Biology, and the Human Sciences (Greenwood, CT., 1982).

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makes distinctions: while natural evolution, in his rendition of it, is not affected by the learning processes of individual organisms, socio-cultural evolution is from the start the product of socially organized learning processes. At the basis of this contrast is his belief that "natural evolution leads to a more or less homogeneous repertoire of behavior among the members of a species, whereas social learning results in an accelerated diversification of behavior." Habermas continues: "But I see a fundamental difficulty in the fact that while biochemistry has recently met with success in analyzing the process of mutation, the learning mechanism that is at the basis of so complex a phenomenon as cultural tradition is almost unknown. Again cognitive and analytical developmental psychology hold out some promise here; as learning mechanisms they propose either accommodation and assimilation in the learning of new cognitive structures or identification and projection in the construction of a motivational basis. As long as these mechanisms are not adequately analyzed, however, we cannot judge whether the comparison between mutation and tradition is merely metaphorical or whether the underlying social learning mechanism is in some ways functionally equivalent to the process of mutation. One difference should arouse our suspicion; whereas the mutation process produces chance variations, the ontogenesis of structures of consciousness is a highly selective and directional process."[37]

What Habermas is seeking from biology is an across the board justification for using a separate methodology for the level of social evolution. But his exposition of biological evolution indicates how little he appreciates the current state of biological knowledge. Habermas uses an interpretation of biological evolution that is almost hyper-reductionist as his foil for a more sophisticated notion of human cognitive and social activity; in effect he erects a straw man rather than dealing with the more subtle problems involved in such a contrast.

Several particulars should be elaborated. First, the way Habermas contrasts the mutation process in DNA and the learning process in human beings is mistaken on several levels. In his respect for the accomplishments of biochemistry in elucidating the mechanisms of DNA, he fails to take account of what was discussed above, namely the as yet mysterious relation between the genetic level and organismic and ecological realities.

Several other mistakes follow from this. The comparison he suggests between organic mutation processes and the ontogenesis of structures of consciousness involves a category mistake, since mutation on the level of DNA is at a more rudimentary level in relation to organismic change than the ontogenesis of structures of consciousness is to human learning and development. Thus, to say that mutation is random while learning is not is a meaningless comparison, at least in these terms. Yet, Habermas does not show awareness of the different kinds of mediations in the two domains.

37. Jürgen Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston, 1979), pp. 171-172.

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Moreover, to seek at all for a mechanism in these terms is somewhat misguided, since it does not respect the real contributions from levels above the most rudimentary molecular ones even in organic evolution. The activity of organisms indeed shapes the evolutionary process, and this activity is not completely random. While this is not to say that non-human organisms have full-fledged socially organized collective learning processes, it is to say that this qualitatively new feature of the human species did not emerge entirely *de novo*. Habermas, in his claim that natural evolution is not affected by individual learning processes, does not qualify his statement in the slightest by taking account of some of the work which indicates otherwise.[38]

Another methodological error Habermas makes is his focus on the individual as the relevant unit. He does not show any awareness of the variety of levels which are relevant — in particular the levels of population and community. Even mainstream evolutionary biology left Habermas' level of individual-oriented reductionism behind decades ago, and now engages in reductionism at the population level.[39] This focus on the individual in organic evolution is consistent with Habermas's assumption that intraspecific behavior (and presumably morphology) is more or less homogeneous; and this assumption was indeed characteristic of the mid-century synthesis. But the recent discoveries of a vast range of intra-populational diversity discussed above are undermining this assumption, and making the differences at this level between organic and social evolution less clear-cut.

Habermas unabashedly uses a reductionist program that relies on optimization criteria at the expense of everything else. He suggests that while the success of biological "learning processes" is measured in the final analysis against the individual organism's ability to survive, such a criterion cannot be applied in social evolution, since the very meaning of a society's avoidance of death is unclear. But what is this "final analysis" to which Habermas refers? Who uses this measure, and why? Is it inherent in the natural world, or is it an ideological construct imposed on nature by a natural science conditioned by a particular social context?[40] Many biologists raise as many questions about the meaning of death, particularly at the population level, as Habermas does at the level of society. There is no need to argue that biological and social evolu-

38. It should be noted here that while Habermas's understanding of learning comes to a major extent from Piaget, it is ironic that Piaget's late work on evolutionary biology emphasizes the pre-human precedents for the human learning capacity. But Habermas, in his appropriation of Piagetian genetic structuralism through its application by Kohlberg to moral development, jettisons this rich contradiction between continuity and discontinuity entirely in favor of utter discontinuity. See Martha Herbert, "Evolution as a Learning Process in Marx, Piaget and Habermas," Dissertation, 1981, University of California, Santa Cruz; also, Jean Piaget, *Behavior and Evolution*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York, 1978), and *Biology and Knowledge*, trans. Beatrix Walsh (Chicago, 1971).

39. See Richard Lewontin, *The Genetic Basis of Evolutionary Change, op. cit.*

40. See Robert Young, "Evolutionary Biology and Ideology: Then and Now" in *The Biological Revolution: Social Good or Social Evil*, ed., Watson Fuller, 1971; Robert Young, "Science *is* Social Relations," *Radical Science Journal* no. 5, 1977; and Hilary Rose and Steven Rose, "Metaphor in Orbit" and Richard Levins "Class Science and Scientific Truth" in *Working Papers on Marxism and Science*, no. 1, 1981.

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tion are comparable at every point in order to maintain at least that certainly biological evolution is a great deal more complicated and ambiguous than Habermas can acknowledge given the constraints of his general theoretical construction.

It is not sufficient to say, as Habermas does, that biological and social evolution are in some respects parallel but essentially discontinuous. In fact, there are continuities as well as discontinuities, and insofar as radicals do not tackle the challenge of understanding these relations they are only abandoning the terrain to the right, which is quite prepared to interpret them in terms of a reactionary biological determinism. In order to work in this domain the left will have to move beyond reductionism in biology as much as it has had to reject positivism in the social domain.

It was the attack on sociobiology — a particularly ideologically pernicious application of the adaptationist program — that precipitated the development of the more general critique of adaptationism. This political critique produced the insight that sociobiology's ideological misuse of science is in fact only a specific instance of the dominant structure of inquiry in the reductionist form of evolutionary biology. Sociobiology isolates certain human traits and hypostasizes them into the essentially human. Then it invents evolutionary accounts to demonstrate and *ipso facto* legitimate the biological roots of these traits. So, for example, male domination or entrepreneurial ability are traits whose universal functionality is assumed obvious, and evolutionary accounts are constructed for their development, thereby supposedly demonstrating their roots in biologically determined human nature. Whether there are any reasons for isolating these particular traits other than the ideological is, of course, questionable.

Sociobiology engages in reductionism as well by failing to distinguish between different levels, such as the individual and the social, or the biological and the cultural. Thus sociobiology tries to explain war on the basis of biologically rooted individual aggression, with no mention of specific social, historical and political forces, and with no idea that such a social phenomenon cannot be explained by merely agglomerating individual factors, let alone whether innate individual aggression really exists.

Sociobiology avoids the problem of how to abstract objects of study from nature by a particularly blatant reliance upon dominant cultural prejudices. This reductionist failure to distinguish different levels is quite compatible with the reactionary stance of sociobiology's proponents. While it took the glaringly offensive case of sociobiology to alert some evolutionary biologists to the more widespread problem of adaptationism, the ideological component of adaptationism and the program of optimization is no less real when these approaches are used to study less immediately socio-cultural phenomena.

An analysis of the *methodological* weakness of sociobiology is important not only to identify the roots of the critique of adaptationism. Sociobiology's reduction of society to nature was so offensive that it placed the very project of

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studying the relation of society and biology beyond the realm of acceptable inquiry. Locating a major source of sociobiology's problem in its methodology can also rescue the overall problematic by encouraging a reconsideration of the relation of nature and society from a more satisfactory perspective.

The persistence of reductionism in biology and in science more generally cannot be understood without reference to the social relations in which science is practiced. The fragmentation resulting from the division of labor certainly affects the communication, or lack of it, between scientific subdisciplines. In addition, for certain applications of biology, a reductionist approach legitimates the failure to confront side-effects and longer-term consequences that is so congenial to the short-term interests of profit-makers. In genetic engineering, for example, the fact that gene splicing can be turned to profit is of an importance that overrides more troubling questions about known and unknown hazards. Proponents of genetic engineering act as though reductionist molecular and evolutionary biology have already found out all we need to know about genetics and evolution to proceed safely with this technology. But new research is revealing much more complicated mechanisms of genetic interaction. In fact, we have no idea what the effects of genetic engineering might be on the *ecology* of gene expression, which we only dimly understand, let alone on the larger ecology of introducing novel life forms into the environment.[41]

In issues like sociobiology, biotechnology or ecology the political character of the anti-reductionist struggle is clear. But the struggle against domination of nature and of human beings will be hampered insofar as the scientific tools it uses still unreflectively recreate reductionist analyses. It has often been shown how capitalism permeates the very design of technology, and how its social relations cannot be eradicated merely by the establishment of public ownership, despite the significance that step may have.

Capitalism has also left its mark on science and scientific methodology. The influence of capitalism on science is revealed both in what science does and in what it does not do. Right now, for example, molecular biology — "gene busting" — is receiving a great deal of funding, and ecology is receiving very little. And areas like ecology, with conceptually complex structures, will probably remain unattractive to reductionist scientific establishment — even, perhaps, under socialism, should socialism restrict its questioning of capitalist epistemology to the political domain. Indeed, there is no simple road to socialist science, and releasing science from servitude to capitalism, while it can allow some dramatic short-term reorientations, would also be just the beginning of a longer-term conceptual reorganization whose directions we can just begin to indicate.[42]

41. See the contributions by Robert Sinsheimer and Science for the People in David Jackson and Stephen Stich, eds., *The Recombinant DNA Debate* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1979).

42. Suggesting there might be such a thing as a "socialist science" conjures up the spectre of Lysenkoism; but as mistaken and damaging as Lysenkoism was, it was not merely a capricious and opportunistic deviation from a satisfactory mainstream genetics. For an analysis of this

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Western radicals are beginning to awaken to the fact that genuine social transformation calls for a practical confrontation with science and technology, rather than either a passive acceptance or a total rejection of the forms they take under capitalism. But we should be cautious in our approach. On the one hand, we have a tremendous amount to learn from the detail and sophistication of natural science. But on the other hand, even as we learn we need to be constantly suspicious and on the lookout for all the forms reductionism can take.

We need to remain on guard even in fields like ecology, where one would expect to find a greater degree of anti-reductionism. Ecology is precisely a concern where abstraction to a - temporal, isolated elements of investigation should be least desirable. And yet scientific tools providing an alternative to such reductionism are generally poorly developed. Scientific ecology can in fact be largely characterized by the fetishization of partial truths, so that too often models of large-scale systems sacrifice good judgement about what it makes sense to model or how the model might help; or attention to synchronic interaction crowds out attention to change.[43] And ecologists are too often content to study "pure" biological systems, rather than the interaction of biology and society. Thus, evolutionary theory, social theory and planning, and radical political activism all require not merely an ecological perspective, but a transformation of scientific ecology and indeed of science more generally, insofar as other fields present similar weaknesses.

We are being strangled by positivism and its abstract negations from every direction. Yet, at the same time, the concrete character of the problems here provides a fresh arena for developing workable approaches both at the specific and the general levels. But this requires a reflective interaction of work in biology and society which is just re-emerging as part of the emancipatory agenda.

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phenomenon that takes into account the weaknesses in the method as well as the social relations of mainstream science, see "The Problem of Lysenkoism" by Richard Levins and Richard Lewontin, in Hilary Rose and Steven Rose, eds., *Ideology of/in the Natural Sciences*, (Schenkman, 1979).

One of many handicaps of science under capitalism is the difficulty in studying problems that require long-term attention, since the reward system is based on immediate results. Thus, it is easier to study problems amenable to reductionist approaches, since it is hard to accumulate much understanding of large-scale, complex patterns of interaction.

43. Richard Levins and Richard Lewontin, "Dialectics and Reductionism in Ecology," *op. cit.*; Richard Levins, "The Qualitative Analysis of Partially Specified Systems," in *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences,* vol. 231, 1974, pp. 123-138.

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Notes and Commentary:

THE PEACE MOVEMENT DEBATE: PROVISIONAL CONCLUSIONS

By Russell A. Berman

In the world of high diplomacy, negotiations all too often address only the external possibilities of their own institutionalization; recall how the course of the war in Vietnam once seemed to depend on the shape of the table in Paris. The world of intellectual debate, objectively much less consequential and therefore rhetorically all the more grandiose, functions not very differently. The new round of negotiations on the peace movement in this issue of *Telos* unfolds in an atmosphere less elegant perhaps than that of the boulevards of Geneva where the *haute monde* of the military bureaucracies promenades, chattering coyly beneath nuclear parasols in front of a crowd transfixed by fear, boredom and an excited anticipation of its own destruction. But just as the negotiators unceasingly ponder the possibility of negotiation, the participants in the *Telos* debate, all good Kantians, similarly surrender the thing itself and turn their attention in sleepless nights to the formal legitimacy of debate. Here is a journal, born of 1968, which devoted itself for ten long years to the Sisyphean task of introducing radical European social theory to North America where, thanks to temperament, empiricism and the Bureau of Naturalization and Immigration, this exotic plant had never blossomed. Existentialism, phenomenology and critical theory were the journal's fare, its key achievement the Leftist rejection of Leninism in the course of a self-critique of Marxism, which inspired an extended review both of the historical workers' movements (especially Council Communism) and contemporary Soviet-style societies. And in that decade in which Left-wing movements in the West suffered through the same decline as did culture in general, *Telos*, correctly or by force of circumstance, turned most of its attention to philosophically rarefied or temporally distant matters. Not that a Left-wing within the staff did not repeatedly argue for discussions of immediately political issues, but aside from occasional forays into the meager conflicts of the seventies (*Berufsverbot* in West Germany, racial politics in the South), a major turn toward analyses of oppositional politics could not take place until oppositional politics themselves again took on major proportions. Hence the peace movement debate of the early eighties and hence its surfeit of difficulties, since many of the theoretical positions elaborated during the earlier period — and always understood as self-reflectively Leftist positions — now confronted new social movements of a populist character with a heterogeneous composition and a highly ambiguous ideological profile.

Anti-Leninism does not mean a refusal to denounce conditions in Chile, Argentina or South Africa; there are other and probably more powerful bases to attack torture and exploitation than the classical theory of imperialism. But anti-Leninism does mean a commitment to an open, public debate as an ideal for society and as a policy for the journal. As long as tolerance as regulatory principle involved only theoretical matters, the sort of discussions carried out in *Telos* were, if not accepted, then at least benignly ignored by neo-orthodox sectors of the American Left whose red, white and blue-blooded pragmatism leads to a perpetual disparagement of theory as just so much religion. But when hard-nosed political concerns came into focus, the very

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possibility of an open discussion came under fire. This transition explains the extremely self-referential character of the peace movement debate, in which issues of form increasingly displace issues of content. Interlocutors both from within the editorial staff and outside of it denounce the critical thematization of the social movements because they cannot conceive of a journal as a place of open debate but rather as an agent for the defense and propagation of the movements. Need it be pointed out that without critical reflection, which necessarily implies a diversity of opinions, it is impossible to determine rationally whether any given movement is worthy of support? Need it be pointed out that a multifaceted movement, in which — no one denies this — major differences exist, might well benefit from critical voices and that intellectuals who, due to an excessively ossified misunderstanding of solidarity, refuse to express their doubts, may in fact contribute to the dessication and demise of the movements they purport to cherish? And need it be pointed out that if intellectuals, reducing their own labor to a merely instrumental and tactical defense of given political movements, refuse to address primary questions of political substance, they consequently relegate politics to a non-rational, reactive-instinctive dimension which can only insure that the beast slouching toward the next demonstration will not be a pleasant one. Yes, this is a harsh accusation, but it must be made: there is a certain cowardice, a cowardice and irresponsibility in the refusal of the defenders of the new social movements to address their programmatic ambivalencies and political failings. A critical thematization of these issues is not tantamount to a one-dimensional denunciation, but instead of a discussion of those issues, the movements' proponents have denounced their critics — I described some of their rhetorical ploys earlier[1] — and they have denounced the very principle of discussion; thus Segbers misrepresents Arato and Cohen's privilieging of an open civil society as a defense of capitalism,[2] and he thereby jettisons the vision of a confluence of democracy and socialism which, if anything, ought to be preserved in these dark times. If the debate must be pushed in a formal direction, away from history and toward the abstract terms of discourse, then the crucial question becomes whether substantive debate on political matters can ever take place within the Left and especially in *Telos*. The merely laudatory and uncritical treatments the peace movement has recently received in *Radical America* and *New Left Review* would suggest a negative response, since positions which deviate from that of the majority Left are apparently taboo.[3] Once upon a time, the Left was able to generate and encourage more internal diversity. Yet, despite the Left's oppositional stance, a pessimist might conclude that it is less immune than it assumes to the dynamic of the surrounding culture in which the Tocquevillian prophecy holds true: pluralism means levelling, levelling means conformity, and conformity erodes dissent which is quickly denounced as the arrogance of aristocratic privilege. When the critics of the *Telos* discussion call for less criticism and more support, affirmation or whatever other term is introduced, they are at one with the *Zeitgeist* of positive thinking in the era of Reagan's optimism.

The increasing exclusion of political and historical substance, which characterizes the hostile responses to the initial thematization of the social movements, has pushed

1. "The Peace Movement and its Critics' Critics: Reply to Breines and Benhabib," in *Telos* 52, (Summer 1982), pp. 105-106.

2. Klaus Segbers, "The European Peace Movement, The Soviet Union, and The American Left," in *Telos* 54, (Winter 1982), p. 167.

3. Cf. Tom Athanasiou, "A Cure for the Common Cold War," in *Radical America* 16, No. 4-5 (1982), pp. 21-34; Alexander Cockburn and James Ridgeway, "The Freeze vs. Reagan," in *New Left Review*, 137 (January-February, 1983), pp. 5-21.

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the debate in two antinomic directions: toward both a depoliticized empiricism and a purely formal solidarity. The former empirical tendency has occupied and continues to usurp a central position in the controversy in the various missile-counting essays. Certainly no discussion of these matters can do without an analysis of the real military situation and, equally certainly, differences of opinion may ensue. Yet, this subdiscussion has obviously become trapped in its own inflationary spiral with expanding lists of facts and figures which — this is the important point — are disassociated from wider contents. Instead of alleged enumerations of the various arsenals, one might have presented these data within analyses of economic pressures, political (not only defense) goals, and social conflicts. Despite some few exceptions (e.g., Castoriadis), the arithmeticians of destruction have excluded this political substance and have been content to count and counter-count. This structural deficiency has been compounded by an unfortunate distortion. *Telos* has published a wide range of positions on the peace movement and the rearmament debate, including proponents of the movement, critics from the Left and critics, like Herf, who put forward a pro-NATO stance. Although Herf occupied an extreme position within the spectrum of published pieces and although he was in fact criticized in the editorial introduction to the issue in which his essay appeared, the opponents of the discussion seized upon his piece as proof that the sort of analyses undertaken by the journal necessarily led straight to the deepest circle of hell in the NATO general headquarters. Herf's contentions (and the very fact of their publication) became the scandal and the center of attention, which further eclipsed the significant political matters raised elsewhere, themselves already partially hidden by the growing stockpiles of nuclear data.

In contrast to this depoliticized empiricism, a purely formal solidarity emerged when, in response to initial criticisms of the movement, its defenders denied the right to criticize and asserted — abstractly — the legitimacy of the movement as a political force but refused even to address, let alone analyze, the sorts of political and cultural ambivalencies (e.g., irrationalism, nationalism) that had been alleged. Solidarity with the movement (which had little solidarity with Solidarity) is proclaimed, demanded and ostentatiously displayed, but a discussion of the politics of the movement beneath the slogans and speeches, or for that matter, even within the slogans and speeches, is forbidden. When my own efforts to examine statements by representative figures of the peace movement in order to specify its political character met resistance, the objection was raised that the texts I had chosen were simply not truly representative statements. In fact, however, the opposition to the analyses was probably motivated by a fundamental unwillingness to examine the movement's politics at all; the flaunted solidarity consequently threatens to amount to only a perfunctory gesture. That the Left might do well to inspect the character of the forces it decides to support ought, by the way, to be obvious after the debacle around the Iranian revolution. Not every opposition to a reprehensible regime is as Leftist or progressive as sanguine commentators might like to imagine — the lesson of which is not to renounce opposition but to scrutinize one's allies more closely, if one is not to be caught again, for example, defending the veil and other emblems of regressive sexual politics as symbols of a heroic anti-imperialism.

Heterogeneity

While the defenders of the peace movement have resisted the unfolding of a heterogeneous discussion in *Telos*, where a variety of positions might compete, they have emblazoned heterogeneity on their own banner as the watchword of the move-

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ment, presented as the mysterious sum of infinite and diverse parts with no common character. Of course the peace movement, like other political forces, is not uniform and encompasses a variety of tendencies. Yet, the self-appointed defenders are utilizing a rhetorical ploy in order to avoid debate: the peace movement has no single political position since it has hundreds, the peace movement is nowhere, since it is everywhere. No issue is worthy of analysis, no text is worth of examination since neither could be universally valid. Segbers denies the relevance of the statements by Sölle and Ranke-Heinemann, vocal peace activists, whom he gentlemanly chooses to dub "Lady-theologians."[4] Nor, however, does he consider it worthwhile to examine the social democratic pronouncements. Might there be a term for intellectuals anxious to support a political movement which they admire for its lack of character? In fact, this cult of heterogeneity is more than just an argumentative tactic; it is also symptomatic of the anti-theoretical turn in West German culture of the mid-seventies, a corollary to the cult of authenticity which provided the peace movement with many of its rhetorical forms, as I have analyzed in my initial contribution to the discussion.[5] I will not recapitulate the full argument but only indicate the following parallel: just as the peace movement in West Germany often understands its political task as the defense of local (national) autonomy against foreign (superpower) imposition, the movement's defenders insist on the independence and autonomy of its separate parts against any overriding categories or organizational forms. Hence, the decentralized character of the movement as well as the antagonism toward efforts by critics to impute any unified position. While the insistence on heterogeneity may have rendered the movement flexible and capable of rapid expansion (i.e., contrast its fate with that of the miniscule Marxist-Leninist groups of the early seventies), it probably also left it especially susceptible to media manipulation.

In addition, the lack of a political and intellectual center explains the difference between the role of writers and intellectuals in the new oppositional forces and their functions in earlier periods. Both in the 1920's and the 1960's, when processes of political and cultural modernization converged, German writers played important public roles as the leaders and interlocutors of democratic forces: the Mann brothers, the *Weltbühne* group or the whole slew of politicized writers who accompanied the student movement. In both cases, the intellectual as the carrier of an enlightenment rationality could address a public commited to the progress of reason. After 1970 a variety of causes crippled this faith in reason-as-progress and the possible progressive role of the rational intellectual: the outright attacks on intellectuals by neoconservatives had an intimidating effect, the Left's own development seriously questioned the autonomy of theory, and the cultural shift of the seventies added insult to injury with its denunciation of reason and intellectuality as inadequate modes of experience. The importation of the post-structuralist critique of logocentricity from France in the work of Foucault and Derrida also took its toll. The erosion of the status of the political intellectual — for the prominence of which West Germany barely fifteen years ago had presented a shining example — leads to the specific composition of the peace movement, the alternative movement, the ecology movement, etc., all of which have intellectual supporters but in none of which do intellectuals play as important a role as in the earlier periods. Given a general climate hostile to theoretical sophistication, this tendential exclusion of the potential theoretical cadre from leadership positions may

4. Segbergs, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

5. "Opposition to Rearmament and West German Culture," in *Telos* 51, (Spring 1982), pp. 141-48.

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explain why the defenders of the peace movement are partially correct in their contention of heterogeneity, i.e., because the movement is incapable of generating a consistent global vision or an organized political program, not to mention a project for a total social transformation. Instead, an ideological imprecision prevails; it is not surprising that a movement which asks of its participants only to subscribe to the tenet that *chacun a son goût* can find mass appeal. While one can only wonder why this sort of political unclarity is presented by Leftists as a *desideratum*, one need not wonder why cases like that of Werner Vogel, who nearly became the senior member of the Green's parliamentary group until his past in the National Socialist regime was uncovered, occur;[6] in the 1960's political, theoretical and ideological matters would have come up much sooner, but where heterogeneity prevails, there is little reason to talk about politics beyond the next short-term goals. Practical concerns predominate, and Left, Right and Center can all equally participate in a populist movement without serious conflict, since substantive politics beyond the matter at hand seem banished. The heterogeneity of the peace movement therefore is not a mere virtue but rather a function of the ambiguity of populism and the dialectic of compromise and diversity in a single-issue movement drawing on a differentiated social base.

Autonomy of Politics

The repeated insistence on the heterogeneous composition of the peace movement served as an argumentative mechanism to impede any political debate: if no central political position can be identified, then no criticism is possible. Debate was blocked in an additional manner as well. Against various claims that the rapid growth of the peace movement might be explained in terms of economic frictions between the United States and Western Europe, divergent strategic-political concepts or the cultural context in which it arose, defenders of the movement like Benhabib, Honneth and Kallscheuer present it simply as a rational and transparent response to the NATO double decision. For them politics apparently takes place in an autonomous realm, uninfluenced by extraneous pressures, as separate from the world of lived experience as is a hermetic work of art. Indeed, the effort to sever any ties between oppositional political statements and their respective contexts represents a sort of aestheticization of politics as a dimension of utopian clarity. If, however, one can subscribe to the tenet that political consciousness has something to do with social being, then it is not absurd to inquire whether the contexts of the peace movement determine its political contents.

The claim that the rise of the peace movement might be explained in part in terms of the specific national interests of West German capital, the "collusion of interests" theorem, has proven particularly controversial.[7] No one will deny that the specific opposition to the new missiles merges gradually into a rejection of Reagan's harsh anti-Soviet tones and military build-up, and that much of the peace movement regards the administration in Washington as a greater threat to the European peace than the regime in Moscow. This dissatisfaction with American policy unfolds, however, against the background of growing international trade competition and, in particular, American-German differences on trade with the Soviet Union, most notably around the Siberian pipeline. The collusion of interests theorem does not claim that the demonstrators in the peace movement are all agents of the West German banking

6. *New York Times*, March 14, 1983, p. A6; Gerd Kröncke, "Die Widerhaken eines deutschen Lebens," in *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Mach 14, 1983, p. 3.

7. Berman, "The Peace Movement and its Critics' Critics," *op. cit.*, pp. 99-101.

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industry; it does, however, claim that the movement has been able to flourish because its middle-range goals — the emancipation of West Germany from the strictures of an excessively anti-Soviet American foreign policy — converge with those of truly influential interest groups. This factor explains why the peace movmenet and the missile debate have made their way into the established press which thereby contributes to the spread of the movement, while, to offer a counter-example, the *Berufsverbot* issue never attracted significant attention outside of the Left-wing ghetto: the bankers, frankly, didn't give a damn.

Conservative and liberal opponents of the movement against the Vietnam War regularly pointed to the low level of American investment in Southeast Asia in order to discount Leftist allegations of imperialist motives. Interestingly, Segbers presents the parallel argument; the collusion of interests theorem is false, he argues, because of the relatively small percentage of West German economic activity dependent on the U.S.S.R. He misses the point that, in a period of severe economic competition, much of the friction between the United States and Western Europe (and Japan) has to do with the terms of international trade and access to markets in the East and the Third World. West German economic interests are caught in a contradictory situation *vis-à-vis* the United States. On the one hand, West Germany is extremely dependent on the world market guaranteed by the West (particularly the United States); on the other, it has moved increasingly into the role of an economic competitor. Hence, the characteristic constellation of regional foreign policies which diverge significantly from the Washington line (e.g., in Africa) and a simultaneous loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance. This sort of two-track foreign policy is dictated by the structure of fundamental economic interests and will determine the profile of West German diplomacy no matter which party is in control. The contradictory character of this policy reappears within the peace movement itself as a general distancing from American hegemony and an ambiguous position on all other issues.

In addition to the economic context as one important determinant of the peace movement, the strategic-political context has also been invoked in discussions of the potential geopolitical consequences of non-deployment. What is the attitude toward the Western alliance? Does the movement envision a broader rapprochement with the Soviet Union? How do plans and pipedreams for national reunification fit into the equation? The texts by Brandt, Bahro and Haveman prove that these are not irrelevant questions, concocted by the American press in order to defame the movement, as some have suggested (in fact, the American press in general seems to present a not-too-incorrect image of the anti-missile sentiment carried by a confused anti-Americanism and a hazy nationalism). It is not at all implausible that the resistance to the stationing of the Cruise and Pershing missiles might reflect a vague neutralist yearning. Honneth and Kallscheuer's testy response is so surprising not because they disagree with the neutralist thesis but because their disagreement is so clearly an overstrained effort to prevent any wider ranging political debate. For them, the peace movement involves only the missiles issue, while the problem of neutralism is apparently only a slur generated by warmongers anxious to denounce the movement. All well and good, if not necessarily true, but let us follow their political acumen a bit more closely: "(...) beyond preventing the establishment of a West German 'theater' for 'limited nuclear wars,' no goal of the peace movement can be circumscribed as 'neutralism.' *If* there is such a common goal, then it would be the '*disengagement*' of both nuclear superpowers, i.e., the removal of the nuclear potential from the front-line of block-confrontation in Central Europe. As to how this goal should be reached, the peace movement provides

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many very different answers, among which (...) the neutralist option is only one possibility."[8] I will not comment further on the function of the implicit denial of a common goal (i.e., the cult of heterogeneity) as an argumentative device. Nor is it useful to harp on the contradiction between the denial of a neutralist goal and the admission of neutralist tendencies. Honneth and Kallscheuer are, however, overexerting their argument when they suggest that instead of neutralism, the peace movement's goal (if it has one) is the disengagement of the superpowers and the removal of their nuclear forces from Central Europe. The distance between a retreat of the superpowers from Central Europe and an outright neutralism is not great, and it is rather artificial for Honneth and Kallscheuer to construct a Chinese Wall between the two. One can certainly argue cogently for the desirability of a neutral Europe no longer tied to either the American or the Russian military machine (although one can also be skeptical about its achievement in the near future). It is silly, however, to argue for neutralism, i.e., independence from either block (which is what the term has come to mean since the Second World War), and to pretend one is not doing so. This curious gesture can be explained first in terms of the general resistance to substantive political debate around the peace movement and, secondly, perhaps, in terms of the domestic character of West German political culture where "neutral" apparently has a rhetorically pejorative sense, which Honneth and Kallscheuer adopt and consequently end up entangling themselves in the contradictions of their own vocabulary.

The cocky tone with which the defenders of the peace movement deny the very possiblity that it might be influenced by economic interests or geopolitical strategies tells us ultimately less about the movement than about its defenders. Their insistence on the autonomy of political debate and the rational clarity of its discourse reflects their own status as intellectuals, which they proceed to project onto the mass movements. This explains the particular hostility with which they respond to the claim that irrationalist tendencies are present in the movement. Recreating the movement in their own image, they cannot accept the allegation that any of its actions might have non-rational, subjectivist sources. The movement's rationality is in the eye of its beholders, who regard the world as if it were already enlightened and not in fact passing through a contradictory process of enlightenment (at best). This refusal to recognize irrational curents repeats the classical failure of the Weimar Left, according to Bloch's diagnosis at least: the commitment to reason and progress prevents the perception of alternative desires. Furthermore, the intellectuals' solely intellectual understanding of the peace movement explains their resistance to efforts to place it in a cultural context. Again: for Benhabib, Honneth and Kallscheuer, the pure reason of the citizenry responds with shock and discursive logic to the NATO decision; hence the peace movement, which thinks itself into being unencumbered by mundane experience. This sort of rational idealism resents not only references to economic exigencies and Realpolitik but also the suggestion that political positions might be prestructured by the available cultural vocabulary. I had presented such an argument in an earlier essay: the *Tendenzwende* moved against the radicalism of the sixties by privileging experience over theory and self over other. This new "discourse of authenticity," initially unpolitical, was filled with a political content after 1979 when the national self was counterposed to the threat from the other, i.e., foreign missiles and Reagan's America. This transition was demonstrated with an admittedly cursory

8. Axel Honneth and Otto Kallscheuer, "Strange Encounter with a Familiar Ghost," in *Telos* 56 (Summer 1983).

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review of recent literary and cinematic works in which issues of national history seemed to occupy a place of ever greater importance. Unfortunately, Honneth and Kallscheuer simply failed to comprehend the finer points of the argument, since, for example, their grotesque misrepresenation of my essay can only be explained as a catastrophic misreading; where I contrasted the cases of Böll and Syberberg, Honneth and Kallscheuer claim I equated them. But their error ultimately was part and parcel of their judgment, since they were anxious to separate politics as an autonomous realm not only from economics and geopolitics but from culture as well. This anti-cultural bias, like the rigid separation of politics from culture, has a long tradition within the social democratic Left from which Honneth and Kallscheuer emerge. This explains their inability to follow the cultural analysis closely as well as — and more importantly — their contempt for any discussion of culture which they label derisively as merely a "feuilletonistic" concern. The epithet implies that literature and film are solely matters of entertainment, unconnected to the real world of demonstrations and missiles where the big boys play. Consequently, one finds truncated understanding of both culture (for Honneth and Kallscheur apparently an unpolitical matter) and politics (for Honneth and Kallscheuer apparently independent of cultural forms). Their anti-aestheticism, as well as the hostility to discussions of the context of the peace movement, insures that the intellectual defenders of the movement will only be able to recognize in it the qualities they ascribe to themselves.The psychology of this defense is comprehensible: after more than a decade of left-wing defeat, progressive intellectuals are anxious to find a winner, and the peace movement looks like a good bet. It is protected more than examined, since fault will not be found where it must not be found. Problems are overlooked or denied, and the necessary ideological unclarity is declared a virtue so that even these highly ambiguous signs of political life are mistaken, with eager glee, as the reruns of May 1968.

The Peace Movement

On rare occasions, the proponents of the peace movement will admit that things are not what they may seem and that the movement does display some problematic aspects. Süss and Lukas, for example, have now conceded that a movement which defines itself largely as an opposition to superpower presence in Europe must elaborate a sharper analysis of the Polish crisis than has yet been done. Even the superficial treatment which the peace movement received in *Radical America* recognized a link to the problem of German national identity, but the matter was quickly swept under the rug, probably because of a provincial American unfamiliarity with the European scene, which understands developments abroad only in terms of domestic experiences: a text-book case of an imperialist perspective. The problem is that the rigorous defenders of the movement, regardless of their national origin, tend to close their eyes to the fact that within the West German Left itself precisely those complaints are being voiced that have become the center of the *Telos* controversy: the inadequate response to Poland, the emergence of nationalist impulses, and the cultural (not solely military) decoupling from the United States, with a concomittant distancing from ideals of Western democracy (i.e., the civil libertarian tradition which the historical Left, at its best, intended to universalize, not eradicate). The following comments on these three points are not intended to be exhaustive but only indicative of the degree to which a Leftist critique of peace movement positions has developed within West Germany.

Alexander Haig's dictum that peace is not the sole or most important goal was able

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to mobilize massive demonstrations against the missiles and Reagan's foreign policy. Wolf Biermann used the same phrase however from the Left: the Polish workers' movement is worth supporting even if it endangers the European status quo.[9] As Sigrid Meuschel points out in the previous issue, Poland poses a severe problem for the peace movement, for if peace is accepted as an absolute ethical priority, then Solidarity's near provocation of a Soviet invasion would have to be condemned. Freedom is displaced by peace, particularly after the realpolitical assumption is made that the Soviets have the power and the intention and hence the right to respond to insurgencies within their sphere of influence, regardless of the political substance of the affair. The West German author Peter Schneider has commented on this process: "Peace is reduced to the avoidance of atomic war. Peaceful life becomes the hostage of the fear of massive death. Gradually any situation short of atomic war becomes acceptable. Nothing makes this process clearer than the reaction of the German public to the military putsch in Poland. In short, public opinion in West Germany accepted, if not condoned, martial law in Poland in order to preserve world peace. I address this accusation particularly to that part of the public which, thanks to its critique of the military dictatorships in the West — Chile, El Salvador, Turkey — would have had the moral legitimacy to protest against the coup in Poland. Instead, liberal commentators — not to be confused with opponents of *détente* like Strauss and Reagan — used all their energy to warn against 'provocative phrases' and 'verbal radicalism.' This project was so exhausting that they barely had the strength left to designate or even recognize the events in Poland."[10]

Schneider complains that West German left-liberals were prepared to accept the crushing of Solidarity in order to preserve the stable post-war status quo and thereby their own comfortable peace. If peace is given absolute priority, then any other political goods lose their importance. Schneider unravels the implication of this position in his comment on the explicit wish that the coup succeed, expressed by the influential political journalist Theo Sommer in *Die Zeit*: "Sommer's argumentation looks like this: the Soviets cannot tolerate a democratic adventure like Poland for long. Therefore, if no other solution is found, they will have to invade Poland. However, since an invasion poses the danger of a world war, any other solution is preferable. — Here it becomes evident how a recognition of actual power interests turns into an acceptance of them. With the same arguments, Sommer might justify an American invasion of El Salvador. Since the linguistic difference between the politically possible and the politically desirable cannot be upheld, the inevitable is transformed unintentionally into the object of desire — thus he 'wishes success' to the putsch of General Jaruzelski! In the name of peace! But it is all too clear what sort of peace is preserved: a peace in which one must sign a loyalty oath to the military in order to keep one's job; a peace in which martial law becomes a peace-keeping measure; a peace with prison camps. But I fear that a society which is determined to preserve peace at any price, including this one, will end up getting precisely this miserable peace."[11] Meuschel draws out the connections between the politics of the peace movement and the Polish crisis extensively, so they need not be elaborated on here. Schneider's comments indicate, however, to what extent, within West Germany — his essay appeared in *Kursbuch* — Leftist writers criticize an overly conciliatory attitude toward the putsch both from establishment commentators like Sommer and from the peace movement itself. The relegation of freedom and justice to a secondary status under the priority of peace is recognized as a

9. Cf. Interview with Biermann in *Gegenstimmen*, No. 7 (March, 1982).
10. Peter Schneider, "Warnung vor diesem Frieden," *Kursbuch*, 68 (June 1982), pp. 180-81.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 185.

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weakness of the national political culture and the Achilles heel of the anti-superpower peace movement. As far as Poland goes, the distance between establishment politics and the purported opposition of the peace movement is non-existent. Schneider formulates: "What does Theo Sommer's position express if not that acceptance of 'despotism' for which André Gorz so furiously berates the Germans? (...) Is this all that there was to be learned from fascism: forty years after the yes to total war, an unconditional yes to a total peace? (...) The peace movement does not go far enough, if it understands itself only as movement to prevent atomic war. Ultimately it must become a movement to prevent an atomic peace."[12]

Schneider does not attack peace or the peace movement as such, but he does attack the exclusion of all other political and social issues in the name of peace, as took place in the non-response to Poland. The peace movement launched no major protests against the declaration of martial law, although it presented itself often enough as an opposition to the superpower hegemonies in both East and West. This claim to symmetry is no longer plausible. In addition, the suppression of social issues in the name of peace raises questions about the movement's political character. Classical left-wing movements are carried by class politics and, ideologically at least, by an image of class struggle; the peace movement instead appeals to a national unity in which partisan differences and domestic struggle disappear. This may expalin the rapid spread of the movement, since within the hegemonic cultures of capitalist society, identification with a national collective is always more accessible than class solidarity.

It is not difficult to demonstrate that the problems of a neonationalism or new patriotism are discussed explicitly within West Germany and are not concoctions of the *Telos* editorial board in collusion with the *New York times*. At the risk of riling Honneth and Kallscheuer unnecessarily, I will present some dangerously feuilletonistic material, a passage from Werner Herzog's review of a book by Peter Schneider. In anticipation of the expected objections, it must be pointed out that Herzog can hardly be equated with the peace movement (nor can Sommer). He is neither a political spokesman for a group nor has he given particular expression to his own political beliefs. Nevertheless, his works do represent major statements of an anti-civilizational primitivism, the critique of modern industrial society which pervades at least much of the ecological protest which merges into the peace movement. His work has been symptomatic of important cultural currents in West Germany, and the following statement is presented similarly as indicative of a new sentiment one would have been hard put to locate a decade ago. Herzog in the *Spiegel*: "How can we rescue Germany, this country which is in danger of disappearing into the abyss of history? Before it finally becomes a no-man's-land, like Holland, that slow country that has reached the edge of the forest where the great forgetting resides. Or does Germany face the ineluctable fate of Austria, this reduced state which, after a great historical existence, has now fallen into the madness of an all the more wild nothingness? but precisely there, because the desperation is so profound, a salvation emerges out of the depths in an important and serious literature. Peter Schneider's book has arisen from a deep necessity; the author is a new sort of patriot. We barely have any politics anymore, only administration, in which the Germans are so overwhelmingly magnificent."[13] Whether Herzog's comment on Schneider's *Mauerspringer* is vaiid need not be discussed. At stake are rather the implicit assumptions as indicators of a curious new nationalism not based on any positive program but on the abstract desire to create one: the new subjectivity expands into

12. Ibid., pp. 185-87.
13. Werner Herzog, "Absurde Anfälle der Ordnung," in *Der Spiegel*, No. 21 (1982), p. 210.

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the search for a collective identity. One hardly need to point out the arrogance toward Holland and Austria, denounced not so much as smaller nations (although that is certainly suggested) than as non-entities which, despite their historical pasts, have no historical future. In contrast, Herzog accords Germany a special status: it has a future or deserves one or will achieve one if, as he exhorts his readers, new patriots come to the rescue of their fatherland. An existentialist heroism underlies this vision in which history as destiny is counterposed to the abyss of forgetfulness; the subject leaps out of nothingness with the absurd deed which saves the nation. Herzog's statement indicates how a perceived identity crisis provides the basis for the collective identity formation implicit in the usage of the first person plural pronoun which, falsely, appears less problematic in the present than the singular. Wolfgang Pohrt has analyzed the character of this same "we" in the peace movement,[14] and Henryk Broder has commented that even among Leftists, nationalist statements have become as normal "as the Lord's Prayer in Church. They are no opportunistic exercise but rather honest and serious, the expression of the desire to end the alienation from one's own country, a sign of the return of prodigal sons and daughters to the womb of the family-nation."[15]

The discourse of authenticity which took shape in the early seventies was of course not merely a rhetorical innovation. It corresponded to the renewed experience of personal dislocation and isolation after the demise of the student movement. After a decade of erosion of Leftist positions (a critique of theory in the name of experience, a critique of politics in the name of a personal-private sphere), the peace movement provides an alternative to individual isolation on national, not Leftist terms. This is not to say that the movement is uniformly nationalist or, as Honneth and Kallscheuer impute with a quotation they fail to identify, the expression of "reactionary nationalism." Nor is it inconceivable that Leftists might attempt to engage nationalists in a dialogue in order to influence the latter. Yet, it is simply irresponsible to deny that these nationalist tendiencies operate within the peace movement and have managed to set the tone of much of the political debate and mobilization. In contrast to conservative opponents who portray the movement as anti-capitalist and/or an agent of the U.S.S.R., I am proposing a Leftist critique of a mass movement in which the many conservative and nationalist categories threaten to overpower and homogenize what remains of the older Left-wing culture. It is disappointing that figures like Honneth and Kallscheuer blindly refuse to recognize this problematic development and rigorously maintain a white-washed version of the movement purged of all impalatable traits, particularly after the emergence of conservative positions within the Left has been thematized within the West German discussion itself.[16]

The politicization of the discourse of authenticity, i.e., the peace movement's antinomy of the national self and the foreign other, has generated a cultural tension

14. Cf. Wolfgang Pohrt, "Wir Deutsche," in *Endstation* (Berlin: Rotbuch, 1982), pp. 138-40.

15. Henryk M. Broder, "Die Linke fühlt deutsch," in *Der Spiegel,* February 21, 1983, p. 193.

16. *Vide* the discussion on Left-wing conservatism in *Ästhetik un Kommunikation*, No. 36 (June, 1979). The complex of neo-nationalism and the peace movement is discussed extensively in: *Wie souverän ist die Bundesrepublik?*, ed. Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm and Eberhard Knödler-Bunte (Berlin: Ästhetik und Kommunikation, 1982). In his contribution to this volume, Kallscheuer argues essentially what he disputes in *Telos*, i.e., that a nationalist tone has crept into the self-understanding of parts of the Left and the peace movement. He speaks of the "positive identification of Leftists, greens, pacifists with Germany" (p. 138) and the "hasty, unreflected manner with which young people today leap into a new patriotism in the peace movement" (p. 139).

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toward the United States and the West which concerns much more than the new generation of missiles. First, however, let it be noted that it is hardly surprising that cultural hostilities are not equally distributed toward the two superpowers. Even if it is the SS-20s which objectively threaten the West Germans, it is in fact American influence which they experience in their everyday lives, and the character of this dependence can certainly be subject to political scrutiny. However, the current re-examination of the ties to the West has moved toward solutions which are themselves highly problematic. This is most evident in the new rhetoric of colonialism. Here a contrast with the sixties is in order. While the student movement certainly did not deny the dependence of West Germany on the United States, it did perceive Germany essentially as an equally guilty junior partner in a Western imperialist project. The protests against the American presence in Southeast Asia were always linked to a critique of West German support and, especially, Germany's own Third-World scandal, the special ties between Bonn and Teheran. In the sixteen years since the crucial demonstration against the Shah's visit to Berlin, West German political and economic clout on the world scene has grown, and its foreign policy has become increasingly independent of Washington. Nevertheless, the oppositional movement no longer regards West Germany as an agent of imperialism; instead it is cast in the role of a victim, as an American colony in cultural terms and as an American battlefield in military terms. Pardoxically, this specious claim to the status of victim implies a certain privileging, since it provides the movement of German national liberation with the same moral authority earlier reserved for Third World anti-colonialism. Obviously, the image of West Germany-as-colony is faulty on many counts, especially the following two. First, it ignores Bonn's growing international power; the collusion of interests theorem would even suggest that this growing power needs the colonial metaphor in order to legitimize, at least on the domestic scene, the emancipation from American diplomatic hegemony. Secondly, the claim to colonial status, be it in cultural or military terms, indicates a shocking trivialization and disregard for the character of authentic colonial (or neo-colonial) experiences. The relation of the United States to West Germany is simply not similar to that of England to India or France to Algeria when colonial relations existed. The inability to recognize this difference provides a further example of the erosion of Leftist categories. More importantly, this inflated rhetoric — despite its substantive illegitimacy — accelerates the mobilization of nationalist sentiment, as is evident in much of the peace movement's literature which misrepresents the new missiles as an American imposition on Bonn (it was Schmidt who initiated the discussion) or which denounces the Bonn regime for a treasonous surrender of German sovereignty to Washington.[17]

The passage from Herzog quoted above demonstrated the important linkage between personal crisis and collective identity at the root of the peace movement. This dynamic is particularly evident in terms of the relation to the United States. The individual search for a subjective identity moves from the private sphere through ambiguous political programs and culminates in an insistence on the national whole. Instead of a critique of capitalist alienation, one ends up with a denunciation of an alien presence. Witness the following comments by the author Hermann Peter Piwitt from 1981: "When Heinrich Albertz say, 'We are living in an occupied country' — what does that mean for me? I grew up here. What occupies me? Helmut Schmidt occupies me with his rearmament decision. The people who are gradually cementing us in keep us occupied; the Americans with rockets and Yankee-culture. So how can I

17. Cf. *Wie souverän ist die Bundesrepublik?*

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resist everyday colonialism? What should be saved and preserved? This is the question that sent me back to my first years. How did I try to become happy? What made me unhappy? How did I become involved in history and how does this history continue to me and outside of me?"[18] These are undoubtedly reasonable questions; in any case, the passage demonstrates the characteristic link between personal crisis and national membership. At this point I will have to eschew an extended contrast between Piwitt's statement and Habermas' thesis on the colonization of the life-world. Suffice it to note that for Piwitt colonialism is not the result of immanent social processes — modernization, secularization, capitalism — but of nefarious external forces: the foreign missiles, the "people who..." and "Yankee-culture." This anti-foreign sense is of course close to the classical usage of the term "colony" (although, that classical usage makes little objective sense for West Germany) and explains the xenophobic potential inherent in the whole development. Foreign influence is regarded solely as deleterious to what is deemed the truly natural situation: a culturally and ethnically homogeneous world. Such a world, of course, never exists, except as an image of provincial asceticism, mobilized for specific political ends.

For Piwitt, American cultural presence apparently poses a severe threat to his own personal identity and stability. The German diplomat Günter Gaus has similarly indicated the link between a readjustment of German-American ties and the problem of German national identity. According to Gaus, the peace movement's critique of American military policy provides an opportunity for Germany as a stateless nation to regain its identity.[19] In a 1981 speech, Gaus professes support for NATO. His opposition to the new missiles and flexible response is based on a preference for the doctrine of massive retaliation as a preferable basis for détente and not on radical notions of unilateral disarmament. Furthermore his détentist argument for an acceptance of the European status quo, i.e., the Soviet presence in Eastern Euripe, is addressed not only to advocates of a Reaganite roll-back but also to the peace movement's opponents of the block dichotomy, both of which groups look forward to an immiment redrawing of the continental map. Nevertheless, even Gaus in this relatively moderate mood, clearly no neutralist visionary, recognizes and implicitly applauds the intimate relation between the peace movement and a reawakened national identity, which he explains with reference to post-war cultural history: "West Germany is not as sovereign as France, neither factually nor in terms of political psychology nor even legally, given the veto rights of the allies. Nevertheless, it is difficult to understand why there is so little gaullist thought in Bonn, especially given the situation of NATO caused by President Reagan's America. For the period before Ronald Reagan it is possible, albeit complicated, to explain the unchallenged fixation of most West Germans on American interests. Put simply, the pose of becoming more American than the Americans grew out of the effort of the post-war West German majority to adjust: not simply through an obligatory obsequiousness toward the new powers but also through an acceptance of their ideals and an immersion in their mentality. The related loss of indigenous identity even seemed useful, and fundamentally it continues to do so today for most citizens, thirty years later; only very recently have doubts emerged regarding the solidity of West German values based on a borrowed identity.(...) This only superficially successful identity-change will become the German theme of the

18. "Heimat ist ein besetztes Land," an interview with Gerd Fuchs and Hermann Peter Piwitt in *Konkret*, September, 1981, pp. 38-41.

19. Günter Gaus, "Schöner ist der Friede nicht zu haben: Zur Aussen- und Deutschlandpolitik," in *Kursbuch* 71 (March, 1983), p. 117.

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next decade."[20]

Gaus suggests that the renewed perception of specific German interests which collide with American military strategy catalyzes a rediscovery of a specifically German national identity. The rejection of the mimetic Americanism of the post-war period ensues and, simultaneously, the associated political values are called into question. Robert Havemann's letter to Brezhnev (which was signed by so many of West Germany's Left intellectuals), which linked the critique of rearmament to the possibility of reunification, is symptomatic of the slide from peace movement positions into national strategy. Such sensational geopolitical pipedreams are ultimately less interesting than the increased skepticism toward the democratic values which, according to Gaus, the American occupaton imported into Germany but which, of course, had had their own indigenous (if not particularly successful) histories. To overstate the case: if the new social movements, including the peace movement, mix irrationalism with anti-modernism, nationalism with a back-to-nature primitivism, if they hold the principles of West German represenative democracy in contempt[21] and essentially condone the declaration of martial law in Poland, then one is entitled to inquire whether the participants in the movements, with all their heterogeneity, have a serious commitment to democratic institutions. This question is much less rigorous than the one implicitly posed above, i.e., whether the peace movement is a Leftist movement. Clearly it is not; it is a populist movement with Leftist and other decidedly non-Leftist tendencies. Now, however, the issue is not the absence of class politics and other signs of a traditional Leftist movement, but the broader problem of the democratic values of bourgeois society since 1789 on which the Left certainly has no particular monopoly. Honneth and Kallscheuer feel compelled to promise that they "all naturally share the goals of 'equality fraternity and justice' " It is, of course, solely an accident that the triadic phrase which is intended to sum up the ideals of Western democracy in a classic formulation has been misquoted so as to suppress the authentic first term: liberty. One must in any case find it heart-warming and reassuring to watch Honneth and Kallscheuer, despite their historical peocadillo, display their loyalty to democratic values, after Rudolf Bahro, a *bona fide* spokesmen of the new movement, denounced the legacy of the French Revolution as only a facade for imperialism.[22] For Bahro, the Declaration of the Rights of Man is merely an alibi for the terror, Napoleonic expansionism, the occupation of Germany, European imperialism and the nuclear death promised by the logic of exterminism. Bahro's implicit insistence on a linear continuity between the French guillotine and the American missiles is motivated in part by his own biography, since even in the West his world view is still structured by rather orthodox East German perceptions and the historical fixation on the anti-Napoleonic Wars of Liberation as a model for a German-Russian alliance against the West. Yet, his antagonism toward the legacy of the French Revolution must also be seen as part of the

20. *Ibid.*, p. 118.

21. Reporting on a visit to Libya by Green leaders in the summer of 1982, Sebastian Cobler recounts the following anecdote: "The trip to Tripoli turned into a total political disaster when the peace activist Gertrud Schilling lost control during an audience with Khaddafi and frankly declared what a future member of parliament — especially during a campaign — better not declare: 'The Greens of Hessia,' she assured Libya's leader, 'have chosen the goal of doing away with parliament and practicing direct democracy. As far as the critique of parliamentarianism goes, I believe our groups have a good deal in common with the first chapter of the *Green Book*. The Greens are organized much like the (Libyan) peoples' congresses, and we are aiming for the same for the citizenry.'" In "'Die grüne Sache:' Karrieren fürs Volk," in *Kursbuch* 70, (December, 1982), p. 28.

22. Rudolf Bahro, "Rapallo-Why Not? Reply to Gorz," in *Telos* 51, (Spring, 1982), pp. 123-25.

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'value-reorientation Gaus analyzed: the increased perception of German national interests different from those of the West, especially the United States, leads to a questioning and perhaps a renunciation of the imported values. This cultural distancing in turn exacerbates the military-strategic differences and opens up the debate to all sorts of hidden resentment:[23] Piwitt's opposition to the missiles seems to be only an excuse to give expression to his frantic antipathy toward "Yankee-culture."

This cursory review of the peace movement in relation to Poland, neo-nationalism and the anti-Western turn was designed to demonstrate above all that the sorts of criticisms raised in the *Telos* debate in fact reflect controversies now being carried out within the West German Left. The essays by Pohrt and Meuschel in the previous *Telos* provide further proof.[24] Beyond the general intention of institutionalizing an open discussion of political questions, the journal has pursued several particular goals in its critical thematization of the peace movement. First, given the repetitive claims of heterogeneity articulated by the defenders of the movement, it becomes imperative to attempt to identify competing tendencies within the populist amalgam, even at the risk of discovering aspects which significantly diverge from traditional understandings of Left-progressive politics. The Western Left has organized itself historically around characteristics such as class politics, welfare-state bureaucratization, socio-economic modernization, theoretical sophistication and explicit anti-nationalism. On all these points the new movements seem to differ significantly from the Leftist paradigm: hence the question as to their political character. A second interest behind this debate involves more specifically the central motif of oppositional politicss in the eighties. In place of an older critique of capitalism, the new movements — due to the cult of authenticity — tend instead to provide a critique of foreign domination, which leads potentially to rather conformist consequences. The image of foreign domination — NATO missiles or cultural imperialism — induces the formulation of an undifferentiated national collective on a nativist basis, while real social differences are obscured. In terms of the rearmament issue, this explains the shocking truncation of an analysis which presents an undifferentiated American will imposing nuclear arms on a fully unwilling but equally helpless and victimized West Germany. This not only distorts the actual course of events and constellation of power but also provides an alibi for entrenched national interests able to instrumentalize the peace movement in its own power struggle with the United States. To the extent that the collusion of interests theorem holds, not every movement which purports to play an oppositional role in fact successfully carries out a system-critical project. On the contrary, through a ruse of reason, the protest potential of the peace movement may eventually simply help to readjust and stabilize West German foreign policy *vis-à-vis* the United States and the Soviet Union. Beyond these specific matters, however, a third concern has motivated this discussion and the *Telos* debate in general. Leftist defenders of the movement like Kallscheuer, Honneth, Süss, Lukas, Benhabib and Breines have reacted strongly against critical discussion by underscoring the multiplicity of positions within the movement or by presenting it as an essentially unproblematic anti-war effort. In fact, on closer examination, the ideological complexities and ambiguities take on greater importance. If the anti-theoretical bias, the irrationalist undercurrents and the tendential nationalism render the political character of the movement at least questionable, it is certainly more than disappointing to see these sorts of elements usurping the center of West German oppositional poltiics. In the late sixties and early seventies, the

23. Cf. Pohrt, *Endstation*, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

24. Sigrid Meuschel, "Neo-Nationalism and the West German Peace Movement's Reaction to the Polish Military Coup," *Telos* 56 (Summer 1983), pp. 119-29; Wolfgang Pohrt, "One Nation, One Reich, One Peace," *Ibid.*, pp. 180-83.

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German Left generated an oppositional culture which set high standards admired in many other countries and of particular importance to the American Left, which ended up borrowing much more from West Germany than, say, from England. Indeed, this journal in many ways is deeply indebted to that legacy. At this point however one is compelled to ask how much of that culture, how much Adorno, how much Dutschke, how much Krahl survives in Bahro's anti-occidentalism or Piwitt's cultural xenophobia. Ravaged by the *Tendenzwende*, decimated in the anti-terrorist hysteria and besieged by neo-conservative bullies, the Left was put on the defensive long before the fall of the social-liberal coalition. If it has indeed been forced to retreat, like the Left elsewhere, from an earlier radicalism, then it is better to admit the shift and reflect on its consequences than to deny the change with the help of categories, like heterogeneity, which only obscure actual political developments. Otherwise, if the Left renounces its own critical self-consciousness and continues to fetishize any social movement simply for the sake of motion, it will be condemned to a perpetual servitude to the hegemonic national interests and their heralds in the culture industry: Left-wing politics commence outside and against the organization of national conformisms.

ON BEING ANTI-NUCLEAR IN SOVIET SOCIETIES

by Ferenc Feher and Agnes Heller

Introduction

This paper seeks to substantiate a prediction that runs counter to the cherished hopes, illusions or, sometimes, even delusions of the Western peace movement. Stated boldly our prediction runs as follows: of all the possible autonomous social movements, the anti-nuclear movement is the one least likely to become of any consequence and least likely to exert an impact on the future course of Soviet societies.[1]

In a somewhat more cautious formulation, we can state that, should anti-nuclear movements emerge in Soviet societies on a wide scale, they will either immediately become bearers of other, broader and more complex, social issues, or will degenerate into state sponsored peace carnivals. It is this view which we shall seek to defend here.

Our main interest will not be to enter the debate concerning which of the existing 'peace' or 'anti-nuclear' groups in Soviet societies are state-sponsored and which are genuinely autonomous, although the ability to draw a distinction between the two is crucial to our argument. To put it in a nutshell, official peace organizations are part and parcel of the strategy and policy of the ruling strata in the Soviet Union, for reasons which are either obvious or which will become clear in our presentation. On the other hand, and principally in the USSR, there were and perhaps there will again be

1. For the purposes of this paper, Soviet societies' designates the Soviet Union and its East European Empire and not the Soviet societies of Asia.

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independent militants trying to launch a genuine campaign for bilateral nuclear disarmament. Their fate is both predictable and inevitable: most of them have already been arrested, and they will be convicted for "slandering the socialist society." Their activity raised no wide interest in that society, nor is it likely to do so in the future, for reasons which constitute the subject matter proper of this paper. In one country, East Germany, there is a *pacifist* movement which is, overwhelmingly, though not exclusively, religious in nature, weak but not unsupported by certain strata of the East German society, which pays lip services to party ideology (as it simply must do in order to survive) but is to some extent autonomous, and pacifist in the strict sense and, therefore, not specifically anti-nuclear. On the lighter side, there is a Soviet regime, Rumania, where the state plays, in grandiosely launched official campaigns and with the unmistakable *Beigeschmack* of Vienna operettas, the role of an autonomous peace movement following closely a strictly orchestrated and centrally supervised scenario. Hungary is, of course, once again "open" and extremely inventive: she keeps squaring the circle. The country invented the non-official but not entirely autonomous peace movement which protects itself vigorously from even the presence of dissident elements in its ranks — testifying thereby to its degree of autonomy. All in all, this is not a very impressive inventory, and in what follows we shall try to explain the causes of the widespread disinterest found in Soviet societies for peace or anti-nuclear initiatives — something which contrasts markedly with the West-European scene.

A further qualification seems necessary. We are relying here entirely *on our personal experiences,* and on the reported and recorded *personal experiences of other observers*, and not on any wide-scale scientifically based surveys or opinion polls, with all the uncertainties and inaccuracies that such methods entail. We can only give an assurance that we have not tampered retrospectively with our personal impressions, experiences and recollections.

Finally, it is necessary to distinguish between the following perspectives when discussing attitudes in Soviet societies to the nuclear weapon and its eventual use: the view from the top, that from the base, official-non-official, Soviet (in the sense of Russian) - East-European. The top, by which we mean the *nomenklatura*, or the ruling apparatus, has worked out a homogeneous medium of public communication which we will try to penetrate further below. For now, let us note simply that the *nomenklatura* claims for itself the role of sole advocate and champion of peace. According to its public claims, the fate of peace is directly dependent on the strength of the Soviet Union, including its military might. When others build up their nuclear arsenal, it is labelled a threat to world peace. On the other hand, when they do the same, its sole motivation is the promotion of global peace. Therefore, the officialdom including professional peaceniks, however broadminded and ready to admit past errors and excesses, will never acknowledge, not even in a hypothetical scenario, that Soviet nuclear armaments *could* be the source of a *potential threat* to humankind.

The social "base" has several different views on this, as indeed they have on many other questions. On the question of nuclear armaments, however, this distance from the official position is clearly evident in their *argumentation* though not as far as the *end result* is concerned. Nonetheless, the "base," which, in Soviet societies, almost always reveals itself in confidential conversations, and in some cases through *samizdat* publications, can be clearly distinguished from the "top": it has its own separate interests, considerations and ways of thinking. The distinction "official — non-official" is nearly, but not entirely, identical with the distinction "top-base." The "top" might play upon the feelings of the "base" which cannot be expressed in the official

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language and media, but only through "confidential meetings of information." Conversely, the "base" occasionally speaks the language of the "top" in the private space as well, though sometimes with such frankness that the officialdom cannot openly acknowledge them as their own. Therefore, the distinction "official" — "non-official" largely overlaps, but is not entirely coextensive with the distinction "top-base."

Somewhat more consideration deserves to be given to the distinction Soviet (Russian) -East-European, although here, once again, the conclusion we draw is much the same; that the anti-nuclear movement does not have serious chances in either version of Soviet societies, albeit for different reasons. One of the major features of the (highly reactionary) consensus in the post-Stalin paternalist state between "top" and "base" is Russian chauvinism. There is no space here to analyze this phenomenon thugh it has received a good deal of attention in several recent studies.[2] For our purposes, it will suffice to point to a recent paper by the "dissident Marxists," Roy and Zhores Medvedev,[3] which assimilates almost entirely the perspectives of the ruling Soviet-Russian apparatus they otherwise outspokenly (if narrow-mindedly) criticize at least insofar as nuclear armament is concerned. Identification with the Russian apparatus, its interests and considerations, for obvious reasons, is entirely missing from the occupied East-European scene. This makes the separate analysis of the two scenes methodologically necessary.

The Nomenklatura and the Nuclear Threat

As mentioned, the official and vigorously advertised self-image of the ruling apparatus is its complete and exclusive identity with "the cause of peace": in its own image, it alone represents peace-loving humankind against all sorts of warmongers. Is this to be understood as a simple deception of the politically naive, a mere exercise in propaganda? The anwser is perforce much too dialectical: yes and no. Of course, it is deception and propaganda. Firstly, the leadership in the USSR has never renounced, and never can renounce, their claim for the victory of what they call the "world-revolutionary process" and what, in simpler terms, means the global triumph of the Soviet system of the "dictatorship over needs." (To what extent such an exclusive dominance would be a viable and long-term solution, is another question.) Such an option is obviously incompatible with excessive claim for love and peace constantly made by the regime's official peaceniks. At least theoretically, the self-professed goal of a "world-revolutionary process" has to comprise wars, as one of its options; and possibly, though not necessarily, also a limited nuclear war, or at least the limited use of nuclear weapons.[4]

2. Its best analysis can be found in Victor Zaslavsky: *The Neo-Stalinist State*, 1982, New York/Brighton, M.E. Sharpe-Harvester.

3. It is almost entertaining to detect the symptoms of this assimilation to Russian imperial chauvinism: at one point the Medvedev brothers speak of the "dark days" of the Cuban missile crisis. (Roy Medvedev and Zhores Medvedev, "The USSR and the Arms Race," in *New Left Review*, 113, November-December, 1981, p. 13). But for whom were they dark? Obviously, there is absolutely no reason for socialists to worry about American strategic positions, particularly not when the whole elaborate ballet takes place within the framework of a capacity for overkill. Nor is there, however, any need to feel "humiliated" in the name of the Soviet missiles. For, as Alan Roberts asked quite correctly, which are the "socialist bombs?" (A. Roberts, "Preparing to Fight a Nuclear War," *Arena*, 57 [1981], pp. 45-93). We can recall our feelings *then*, those of very heretic Khrushchevite reformist communists. Once again Khrushchev bungled it, we felt, and thus endangered anew the chances of structural reforms, hinted at so often but always postponed.

4. Very often, the genuine intentions of Soviet (Russian) leaders is spelt out by their East European sycophants. *We strongly recommend* the reading of the following quote stemming from Heinz

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These days it is almost forgotten, notwithstanding that it is a historical fact, that Stalin, in the post-World-War-Two period, when he would have had to have been aware that in future all global wars would, sooner or later, turn into a nuclear clash, nevertheless always emphatically declared that only "the given war" could be prevented; wars as such remain inevitable as long as capitalism exists. True, this thesis of his, together with several others, was revised by the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. But the 20th Congress is now dead and forgotten, and its main decisions, Khrushchev's very superficial and limited criticism of Stalin, have been largely revoked. Specifically, who knows whether or not Stalin's views of the inevitability of wars have "confidentially" been restored with binding validity? The sole certainty is that the Brezhnev-Andropov leadership approves (in the case of others), but does not practice or imitate, unilateral (nuclear or non-nuclear) disarmament. Finally, it is difficult to see where the Medvedevs take their following conviction from: "no serious official statement has ever envisaged the USSR winning such a [nuclear — F.F. and A.H.] war. In fact, the Soviet population is told that global nuclear war is lunacy and that no one would survive it."[5] Obviously, there is a great amount of confusion in statements regarding such a highly sensitive issue as a "winnable" nuclear war, and Soviet marshalls, East-European ministers of defence, just as American Presidents, talk irresponsibly and untruthfully about it. However, the fact remains that, beginning with Marshall Malinovksi and his speech at the 22nd Party Congress, one could quote from *all* Soviet Ministers of Defense and Warsaw Pact Commanders-in-Chief sentences which state or suggest that the "socialist community" will retaliate in kind for any nuclear strike, and this retaliation will result in the annihilation of capitalism. By implication, this can only mean that a nuclear war is seen as *winnable*. But, more importantly, and this applies to *both* superpowers, no one sacrifices so much wealth and energies on the preparations for a war which the respective political leaders regard as unthinkable. But the permutation of this sentence into another with the meaning that the preparations for the nuclear war imply *ipso facto* that the powers concerned are in fact prepared to wage a thermonuclear war would be equally wrong, once again on both sides. In all probability, a certain instability in strategic thinking concerning the winnability of a nuclear war reigns supreme in all leading political circles and, if anything, this is an extremely dangerous factor. This instability is fuelled by the total moral irresponsibility of the Soviet and American ruling strata. Both think in terms of success alone, and neither regards as morally inconceivable (if they consider it to be physically possible) the perspective of our survival as humans in a world the greater part of which shall have been exterminated by a war unleashed as a result of their conjoint efforts. Without doubt then, the claim of the peace apostles of the *nomenklatura* is an exercise in shamelessly deceitful propaganda.

On the other hand, there are genuine elements in this claim as well. Although we have stated several times that the Soviet dictatorship over needs is *not* a socialist sys-

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Hoffmann, East Germany's Minister of Defense for Western peace activists: "With all the suffering that would be caused to the peoples, especially those of the capitalist world in this final and decisvie conflict between progress and reaction, it would be nonetheless a just war on our part. We do not share the conception advocated in the peace movement even by progressives, that a just war is no longer conceivable in the nuclear age, nor do we accept the thesis that a nuclear-missile war would not be the continuation of the politics of struggling classes, but a nuclear inferno, doomsday." Heinz Hoffmann, "Sozialistische Landesverteidigung," in *Aus Reden und Aufsätzen, 1974 bis Juni 1978,* (Berlin, 1979), p. 221.

5. R. and Z. Medvedev, *op. cit.*, p. 18. The seriousness of this statement is borne out by the previously cited quotation from Minister Hoffmann.

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tem,[6] up until now the leading apparatus has found it impossible to break formally and publicly with the socialist vocabulary and state explicitly the real social objectives of the new society. However, as long as they remain within the framework of a socialist phraseology, they simply cannot dismiss peace as a central slogan of their policy, the ultimate objectives of socialists and the dream of eternal peace being mutually inseparable. Therefore, peaceful gestures are deceitful, but integral parts of their public performance. Much more importantly, Russia suffered terribly in two world wars, so that therefore the word "peace" appeals there to everyone, and the denial of an ultimate peace objective is virtually impossible for any government. But there are even indications that in certain periods, and during the rule of certain leaders, the instability of strategic thinking mentioned above was present to much less a degree than in others. For instance, after Stalin's death, Malenkov seemed to take the position of the unwinnability of a nuclear war which would threaten the whole of our civilization (though it is hard to tell whether he argued this for tactical or other reasons). Khrushchev, born comedian that he was, seemed to have been genuinely shocked by Mao Tse-tung's humanitarian perspectives of global emancipation.[7] It was the "moderate" and "realist" Brezhnev who invested all his hopes in the military superiority of the USSR and who, therefore, can be suspected of having had delusions regarding the winnability of a nuclear war. But even in his case we find indications to the contrary. His insistence on the SALT-treaties stem, of course, from the number of purely tactical considerations but they indicate, even in this mediocre and otherwise morally totally unscrupulous man, a measure of realism arising from fear.

At present, and as far as we can see it, the guiding principles and considerations of the ruling Soviet apparatus regarding the winnability of a nuclear war are (apart from technological expertise for which they are totally dependent on their specialists), composed of and conditioned by the following, often contradictory theses. Firstly, they have constant fears about being outmanoeuvred by the Americans. The Medvedev brothers argue correctly, and this is a result of the technologically parasitic and dependent nature of the economy of the dictatorship over needs, that in every new round, all technologically new families of nuclear weapons and their carriers have always been introduced by the American military complex. (They, of course, fail to add that the Soviets have not only immediately copied the new inventions but regularly overproduced them in the vain hope that the new invention will be the "last word," thus giving them ultimate superiority). Thus, the Soviet leadership is constantly on the alert and ready for a new cycle in the armaments race. Secondly, and in blatant contradiction to the above, while the Soviets have a technological inferiority complex, sociologically and politically they have an increasing feeling of superiority over the West. They are more and more convinced especially after Vietnam and the Watergate affair (which for them was the ultimate proof of the contemptible lack of authority in this unruly society), that the West has very weak knees and that a combination of menacing gestures and peace-loving phrases will force Western countries into important political and economic concessions. Thirdly, the relative strength of the military-industrial complex is constantly growing in the Soviet-Union. Castoriadis' thesis about a "stratocracy," a military-ruled society, is arguable, even after Poland and

6. See our book, written with George Markus: *The Dictatorship Over Needs*, (Blackwell: Oxford, 1983).

7. Mao Tse-tung was perhaps the only statesman of the world who was harmoniously optimistic about the outcome of a nuclear Holocaust in which the majority of humankind will perish, leaving the rest to live freely, as he stated at the Moscow world conference of the communist parties in 1960.

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martial law. However, the Medvedev thesis according to which there is no military-industrial complex in the USSR because everything is controlled by the party, is not a proposition worthy of serious discussion, because it is not only sociologically absurd, but also logically incorrect. Ultimate party control and arbitration does not eliminate the existence of the military-industrial complex. The question is how the cake will be cut and divided — and here all lobbies, the military more than others, have a say. But finally, to add one more feature to the set of contradictions, while the role of the military is growing constantly so that a formal seizure of power cannot be excluded somewhere in the future (though it would certainly imply a *formal* rupture with the socialist facade, a major earthquake in Soviet history), the only telos which would legitimize the army's rule — victory in a global nuclear war — seems, in the final analysis, to be excluded. This is partly because in both systems the soldiers are more well-versed and therefore more sceptical than the civilians about the chances of survival, and this consideration will finally prevail, or so we hope, over the instability in strategic thinking. In part though, it is also because, as the Medvedevs note with respect to Western Europe, the Soviet Union, should it want to conquer the globe, certainly would not want to inherit a space full of nuclear debris.

We have described both alternative strategies of the ruling Soviet apparatus in matters of nuclear war. In sum, whichever of the two alternatives will be realized, both exclude the existence of autonomous anti-nuclear movements, as far as the intentions of the "top" are concerned, and these much more emphatically than the existence of any other movement aspiring for a measure of autonomy. Should the ruling apparatus decide to launch a nuclear war in a suicidal gamble, and should it start to prepare for it, it is obvious why they would not tolerate the existence of autonomous anti-nuclear movements. However, should they decide on behalf of the incomparably more realistic alternative, and in our opinion ultimately they will do so, and should they use nuclear parity, or their eventual minimal superiority, as a shield and means for global expansion, they cannot tolerate anti-nuclear agitators either. In fact, it is easier and more realistic to project a compromise between a politically toned-down and neutralized labor movement (an eventual successor of *Solidarity*) and the ruling apparatus, than one between the latter and any anti-nuclear movement that means business. There is no member of the ruling oligarchy, whether hawk or dove, hard-liner or "liberal," who would not be absolutely convinced of the exclusive prerogative of the oligarchy to decide in all matters nuclear.

The Base

It could be objected that the preceding discussion is equally applicable to the behavior of the American power elite. In all probability it is. After all, if we could overhear confidential Capital Hill or Pentagon conversations we would, more than likely, hear remarkably similar views, even if they are supported by different, technocratic, arguments. Yet, it is not so much the existence of democracy and public opinion in one society and their total absence in the other that we want to emphasize here — even though we disagree profoundly with the neo-Leninism of the Medvedev brothers which sees the differences as insignificant. What we would like to emphasize rather, is that the social base, even though its interests are far from identical with those of the "top," is, for a number of reasons which we will analyze below, overwhelmingly uninterested in supporting any serious anti-nuclear movement. The militants of attempts at the latter may suffer persecution and serve long prison terms without even acquiring the halo of martyrdom that is conferred upon some their colleagues in persecution,

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(e.g., militants of religious or national freedoms).

The first and overriding factor is that while the average Western citizen's life is determined by *insecurity* (particularly heightened during the last decade in the face of an ever deepening capitalist depression), the life of the subject of Soviet societies is determined by a *total lack of freedom*. The dominant and rapidly accelerating general insecurity provides an answer to the question: why did the anti-nuclear movement flare up *precisely now*, after nearly a four decade-long coexistence with the Bomb?[8] In fact, increase in insecurity is the only all-embracing answer we can find to the "anti-nuclear phenomenon." While it seems beyond reasonable doubt that the Reagan administration is the worst post-war government of the United States, we do not think that any objective anaylsis could point out any fact corroborating the actually heightened danger of a nuclear war caused by this administration. There are, of course, many aspects of the activities of this superpower which sustain such appearances, such as the mentioned, near-total rupture of communication with the other superpower. We do not deny either the fact of an enormously increased military budget under Reagan, nor

8. The following objections could be made even to our raising such a question. Was it not reason enough for starting the anti-nuclear movement *now*, one would ask, that Schlesinger, then Defense Secretary, spoke already in 1973 about the possibility of "surgical" *nuclear* strikes which did not imply Armageddon? Was it not reason enough that, much later, President Reagan mentioned the abstract possibility of limited nuclear wars, even if this option was later most resolutely rejected (including the futile denial of the authenticity of the President's statement) by his staff and the State Department? Is it not reason enough that new weapons keep emerging which are either "pure," so that they "only" kill humans, but not destroy cities and industry, or which are limited, therefore allegedly only annihilate a part of the world, not the whole? Is it not reason enough that the part of the tension which had been eliminated at the end of the Cold War, was reimported into Europe by the medium-range missile issue accompanied by the vigorous language of anti-communist crusaders plus a near total destruction by the recent administration of all communication between the superpowers? These facts are undeniable and they, in their ensemble, do not only contain the moral indictment of American foreign policy; they also demonstrate its ineptitude which finally succeeded in undermining the deterrent character of its own deterrent in a part of the public opinion. They are also partial, *but only partial, not primary*, factors of the upsurge of anti-nuclear movements. First of all, any survey of the political climate of the political climate of the 50s, when there was no peace movement except the official pro-Soviet world organization, would show a much more undisguised display of American nuclear superiority and much more untarnished threats to use them, both by the press and the politicians. Moreover, even if public opinion perhaps was not familiar with the details but basically everyone knew that MacArthur categorically demanded the use of nuclear (and laser) weapons against the Chinese troops. In the event, the option was turned down by the White House. But the Korean crisis could have equally served as an encouragement to a future use of, or a future abstinence from, the nuclear weapon. Much more importantly, and this is what we regard as the crucial factor, if one looks at the actual parallels of foreign policies, it will be immediately clear that while in the United States the belligerent rhetoric has become fortified, indecision has only grown, and this great power suffered humiliations, like the one inflicted by Iran, which would have been inconceivable 15 years earlier, without seriously considering military retaliation. (Or if it did consider such action, it must have been quite effectively discouraged by its military experts and this is also a telling fact.) At the same time, Soviet agressivity keeps increasing year after year, and the USSR has been involved in its Vietnam, the Afghanistan-war, for the third year. (Needless to say, the latter serves only for Andropov as an excuse for the Central-American policy of the USA. He mentioned in a recent interview, in a lucidly Machiavellian comparison, that the USSR defends its national interests in Afghanistan to the same extent as the USA does in Central America.) The fact of the Afghan war, as well as the blatant disregard which surrounds this fairly obvious and public constellation, convinces us again that it is not the upsurge in US war preparations, but the general Western upsurge of the feeling of insecurity (with a number of collateral factors) that triggered the present dynamic of the anti-nuclear movements.

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its socially scandalous character when seen alongside the attempt to progressively demolish the welfare system. What we deny most emphatically is that an increase in the military budget is an automatic indication of an increased threat of nuclear war.

If we accept this, we shall see anti-nuclear movements in the West as symbolic movements full of positive democratic demands, but also full of the rhetoric and intolerance of romantic gestures which given vent to the feeling of insecurity engendered by the collapse of the affluent society, the disappearance of job security, fears for a genuinely threatened environment and a livelihood threatened by an excessive and uncritical industrialization. It would also account for the fact that the movement is tainted with important elements of anti-American nationalism, especially in West-Germany and in the United Kingdom. This new anti-Americanism, a just punishment for the haughtiness of a dominant position now lost, in all probability for good, a feeling which, despite its often Leftist vocabulary, is not necessarily Leftist in character (in fact, in Germany it can be, and often is, ultra-Rightist, or bears long-time and hidden grudges for "wartime humiliations")is central to the movement. The psychological, instead of sociological way of argument about the imminent dangers of the present situation used by the anti-nuclear movement, the main bearer of this anti-American feeling, is most telling about the dominant atmosphere of insecurity as the very basis of the movement. Should the question arise as to whether Western Europe is exposed *directly* to any danger from the United States, no one would answer in the affirmative. A statement like this would not normally make sense. As far as the Soviet threat is concerned, one can rather witness a near-hysterical toning-down and underestimation of the very substantial danger of the Finlandization of Europe, to a point where activists such as Rudolf Bahro are actually advocating such an option.[9] Logically speaking then, one scenario remains: the psychological argument which runs as follows The Western alliance is too strong, too threatening. This could either conclude in a loss of self-control on its part, or provoke a loss of self-control on the part of the others. In both cases, Western-Europeans are likely to be sacrificed. Very clearly, this is a straightforward case of disturbances stemming from insecurity, one, in which the Bomb really loses its deterrent character, for, after all, who would be deterred from anything if at the other end people see themselves in the complex mental state of being too weak because they are too strong?[10]

Nothing like that can be found in the oppressive atmosphere of the neo-Stalinist state. We basically agree with Zaslavsky in his structural description of the post-Stalin paternalism which is just as unfree as Stalin's state was but which, under Khrushchev, closed the devastating periods and cycles of "revolutions from above" and, in exchange for confiscated freedom, provides a certain type of security. This is a security of unfree life, of a life without political objectives and activities, a life without genuine culture, a life without the burden of having an opinion of one's own, but undeniably a life not exposed, except on the top, to the risks of competition, of loosing one's prestige because of incompetence or sheer bad luck in a dynamic and egoistic society, a life which does not demand the unpleasant business of self-governing one's own fate. Therefore, everything people like and dislike in this world, has hardly anything to do with insecurity, and can only be expressed in and through another overriding

9. See his interview with *Le Nouvel Observateur* (June 26, 1982, pp. 36-37).

10. At this point, we simply wish to state with emphasis that all this is indeed a criticism of the movements but *not* a condescending and ironical statement of their futility. Their democratic potentials are enormous and have a crucial importance for non-doctrinaire Western radicalism.

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category: lack of freedom.[11]

Of course, all this does not mean that *fear* plays no role in the life of Soviet society. On the contrary, under Stalin, fear became a way of life for the Soviet subject and has remained so ever since. But this fear is a clear-cut, easily comprehensible, easily internalizable feeling, not even similar to the polyphonic and objectless anxiety which stems from the insecurity caused by Western capitalism. Needless to say, the lack of insecurity (the obverse of which is the self-renouncement of our freedom) is not an asset. One can see its devastating results on both poles of Soviet life: in Solzhenytsin's quest for a strong authority and his contempt for "weak democracy," and the ever increasing consciousness of the ruling apparatus, sometime even surfacing in the still sporadic and immediately suppressed publications which treats freedom as a chimera and the strong state and paternal guidance as the only social realities.

What are people afraid of in Soviet (Russian, not East-European) societies, or, what are they not afraid of? Above all, the average "citizen" there does not live in fear of nuclear war. In fact, the nuclear threat hardly ever enters their daily thoughts and ruminations. When the Medvedev brothers write that "a preemptive strike by the United States is an...imaginable and frightening scenario to the Soviet leadership,"[12] they may well be right. However, they are once again identifying with their favorite subject, the ruling apparatus. As for the average citizens, their general feelings are widely different. Not even the famous ecological issue, the peaceful use of nuclear energy, was ever widely thematized in the unofficial public opinion of the Soviet (Russian or non-Russian) societies for reasons which are almost self-evident. Societies governed by the "dictatorship over needs" are "asinine" societies. They pushed industrialization to pathological extremes, but never satisfied consumerist needs. Therefore, people, being well aware that there is no way back, now yearn for satisfaction, even saturation, by industrial consumer goods, and they could not care less about pollution, ecological consequences and the potential dangers of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It belongs to the full truth that, in this respect, there is a discrepancy between popular feelings and the attitudes of dissident intellectuals. A significant part of the opposition, especially in the USSR, is deeply concerned about problems of environmentalism and the "cancerous" growth of industry. The Medvedev brothers (of whom Zhores in particular, during his years of emigration, did some extremely valuable work in exposing nuclear power-station catastrophes in the Soviet-Union — catastrophes which have, needless to say, never been mentioned in the press,) warned Soviet public opinion about certain irreversible consequences of Khrushchev's agricultural escapades already in the early sixties. For Solzhenytsin, who originally spoke of "cancerous" growth, industrialism has been one of the main targets of his hates. However, at least at this stage, these are overwhelmingly feelings of intellectuals and, by and large, at odds with people who want more consumer goods, irrespective of the natural costs at which they are produced.

In addition, Soviet authorities (both in the USSR and in Eastern Europe) go out of their ways *to keep social imagination shielded from fears of a nuclear Holocaust.* When the

11. As one can learn from the interesting article of J. Kis, "Quelques idées pour l'opposition hongroise," *Esprit*. (February 1983), a specific type of insecurity and collateral anxiety is emerging now in the relatively well-off countries of Eastern Europe (Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany). They look at Polish and Rumanian shopwindows and ask: when will this happen to us? But this is such a *concrete* type of insecurity, with such â tangible object that it cannot perhaps be even compared to the Western type.

12. R. and Z. Medvedev: *op. cit.*, p. 17.

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Medvedev brothers mention that "there is no planning in the USSR for mass survival in a nuclear conflict: shelters are non-existent in the new Moscow housing districts, while civil defense training in the provinces is confined to perfunctory bus trips into the forests,"[13] the statement, according to our personal experiences, is correct. Yet, it betrays an excessive confidence in the humanity of a government which (or the predecessors of which but with whom they accept historical continuity) sent millions to extermination camps, if all this is interpreted as a sign of peaceful intentions. This total and (if Soviet leaders believe a single word of their own propaganda) criminal neglect of the protection of the populace is part of a wider plan. Soviet authorities are, through secret police reports, certainly not unacquainted with the disinterest of the populace in nuclear threat, and they want to keep them in this state of disinterest. Therefore, everything that even distantly reminds them of the dangers of a nuclear Holocaust, is removed from public display. Not only are there no shelters or plans and exercises of a civil defense training program. Movies available in abundance in Western cinema and television programs about nuclear doomsday are generally banned from the Soviet media.[14] In military training courses for civilians (at universities, sometimes for high school students), the lectures tone down the eventual consequences of a nuclear attack sometimes to a comic-book level. It is, thus, a precondition of unhindered strategical planning and the unperturbed and exclusive prerogatives of the ruling apparatus over all strategic matters to keep the social imagination in a state of dangerous passivity. Thus, people will not, or to a much lesser degree, interfere with the superior wisdom of the apparatus.

Nor are people in Soviet (Russian) society afraid of the "Western enemy." This statement calls for immediate qualifications. The general argument on behalf of "peaceful Soviet intentions" is the fact of the enormous losses in World War Two. Apart from the minor flaw in the argument that it was first of all the populace, incomparably more than the apparatus even in relative terms, that suffered the losses (the party leadership in Leningrad survived the blockade, while hundreds of thousands died of famine), and if this is not simply a pro-Russian racist argument, two objections can be levelled against it. While people will certainly not forget the world war (this is why the slogan of peace should always remain part of the officially stated policy objectives), the actual world of experience of the overwhelming majority of the population of the USSR, those below 45 years of age, is no longer shaped by World War Two recollections but by other events the importance of which in so far as they impinge on the chances of anti-nuclear movements, we shall immediately address. Further, the extent of losses in a previous war works more than one way in any national community; it can either stymie or reinforce militarism.[15] In the same spirit one could say, without slandering a much-suffered nation, that certain, unfortunately very wide, strata within it, behave as any other national communities do: they are most reluctant to wage a war which would entail excessive casualties, and they are ready to support any military action which ensures an easy and costless victory.[16] As the Soviet populace is, we repeat, not afraid of

13. R. and Z. Medvedev, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

14. We heard, but could not verify, that Peter Watkins' *The War Games* was shown on Soviet elevision. If this is true, it is a remarkable, and obviously tactically motivated, exception to a generally very strict rule.

15. For instance, in post-World War One France the crippling losses of the war had, despite the victory, a paralysing effect both on the leadership and populace, in the critical days of the German invasion, while in Germany of the same period they fuelled an aggressive, even suicidal militarism.

16. Whatever our methodological reservations, this is borne out powerfully by V. Zaslavsky's

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the "Western enemy," this simple but fundamental bifurcation works in this case *against, not for* anti-nuclear movements.

But why are they not afraid of the West? The answer can be divided into two parts. As to general Soviet (Russian) attitudes towards *Western Europe*, the Medvedev brothers sum up the situation so succinctly that we have nothing to add to it: "If a television commentator from Norway, Sweden, Greece, France, Italy, Holland, or Spain arrived in Moscow what evidence would they find amongst the Soviet public of the fear of aggression from *Europe*? Almost none... It could be argued that West-Germany is a special case, and, indeed, until 1958-1962 there was still an anxiety amongst ordinary people and sections of Soviet officialdom over possible revanchist tendencies on the German Right. The memories of Nazi aggression were still too fresh to allay all suspicions about Bonn's ultimate intentions, whatever common sense might suggest. But the perception of a "German threat" has slowly receded with time, especially since the emergence of *Ostpolitik*; and although not completely extinct, these fears no longer play an important role in forming the general Soviet view of Western Europe."[17]

As to the fear from the United States, not even these authors, who, as we have argued, identify with the feelings of their enemy, the ruling apparatus, can produce evidence of any feeling other than that of a *hurt national pride*. For instance, it is conceivable that the espionage flights of the U-2 planes, of which the Soviet public only learned retrospectively (after the first was shot down) that they had been going on for years, did perhaps provoke a retrospective feeling of offended nationalism which spilled over even beyond officialdom. Equal, or similar, feelings can be stipulated in connection with the Cuban missile crisis (the Medvedevs themselves are evidence of it!), although of course it is hard to tell how widespread such feelings were. However, there are at least two solid reasons which point to an absence of fear about the "American enemy." The first is a very widely held contempt in the USSR for American qualities of valour which is strangely mingled with an envy for their wealth and an appreciation of their liberal constitution (this curious mixture is sometimes present in the same person who makes voluntary statements on behalf of a strong authority). Yet, such a mixture is not at all unusual in unfree societies. In our experiences, Soviet (Russian) people never really believed official propaganda about the low standards of living in American capitalism, not even when the propaganda touched upon serious realities (such as the situation of the Blacks), but they almost always believed it when it depicted the "moral disintegration," high criminality, wide drug addiction, the lack of respect for authorities and "sexual licentiousness" of American society. There is no recognition for American military performance in World War Two in generations whose fathers, because of Stalin's criminal mistakes *and* whims, often had to storm German trenches and fortresses without artillery, and certainly without air cover, to perish uselessly by the hundreds of thousands. The Korean War, with its absence of a decisive victor, hardly did much to bolster respect or fear; and the Vietnam defeat, despite the Americans' enormous technological superiority undermined its vestiges. It is a matter of self esteem for the average Soviet citizen, and it is also socially rewarding, not to be afraid of an army of gum-chewing addicts who rebel unpunished against their superior officers. Secondly, the Medvedevs underestimate the general intelligence of the Soviet public if they believe that their "ordinary" Russian citizen was unaware of the fact that the West (America in particular), both as far as the number of bombs and the long-

clandestinely performed sociological investigation about popular reactions to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, see *The Neo-Stalinist State, op. cit.*

17. *Ibid.*, p. 8-9.

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range carriers are concerned, enjoyed unchallenged nuclear superiority between 1945-1950. After all, the USSR had, at the end of the war, an army of 20 million, so that huge masses of people simply had to be aware of certain military realities. Soviet citizens, according to our experiences, knew about this superiority perfectly well and, *therefore*, they also had to come to the conclusion that if the United States, for a number of reasons which cannot be analyzed here and which perhaps do not even figure in popular Soviet fantasy, did not attempt to destroy the USSR *then*, they certainly would not dare to do so in an age of nuclear parity, if not in that of Soviet superiority.

Further, there is amongst the populace no fear of the possibility of an impetuous and unilateral Soviet action provoking a nuclear war. This confidence (which we shared as well) must not be considered as a vote of confidence to ideological tenets: it is a politically neutral but widespread feeling. There is a well-established image of Stalin behind it and the firm belief that, at least in this respect, all Soviet leaders have remained orthodox Stalinists. Stalin's image was the exact opposite of Trotsky, of the latter's leanings of a "red Bonaparte"; Stalin, on the other hand, can only be seen as a "cautious Ghengis Khan." He certainly intended world-domination but not only did he master the resigned wisdom that this would not to be achieved in his lifetime, and not ony did he feel to be powerfully confirmed in his caution by the crippling defeats of the first year of the war but, most importantly, this real founder of the dictatorship over needs contemplated, sometimes over-anxiously, the capacities of the "Soviet world-system"[18] to absorb, economically and socially, what it had conquered with military might. Naturally, the intricate details of this strategy never percolated down to the minds of the "ordinary" subject of Soviet society. Nonetheless, people understood one cardinal and permanent touchstone of Soviet statesmanship: do not reach out for more than you can consume, but once having grabbed it, keep it for good. Brezhnev's rule *de facto* ended when he violated this principle by embarking on the unwinnable Afghanistan war, and we are only now witnessing the beginning of a long route along which the chickens shall come home to roost. It goes without saying that this attitude can be explained as shrewd imperialism as well as the realistic observance of the "patriotic interest" of the USSR, but in both cases, it does not generate the fear of nuclear adventurism either in the enemies or the supporters of the regime. In this sense, the Soviet "citizens," however unpolitical, are politically more conscious and perceptive on this score than over-politicized Western anti-nuclear activists. They consider the Bomb what it in fact is: a *deterrent*, up until now the only guarantee against new world wars.

Finally, militarism, a marked and ever increasing feature of Soviet society, is not likely to fuel anti-nuclear passions for a number of reasons. First, and here we have to quote again the Medvedevs because of their accuracy, the "citizen" of Soviet societies does *not* hold, either in the USSR or elsewhere, the military responsible for the incomparable lower standards of living than those of their West-European or American counterparts: "Soviet defense spending, contrary to a widespread belief, is not generally perceived as a major cause of their economic difficulties by the Russian people. The ordinary Soviet citizen blames the omnipresent bureaucracy for shortages, inefficiency and poor quality products, not the army."[19] Nor is this simply an instance of "false consciousness." These days we already have some analyses (Zaslavsky, Castoriadis) of the hermetically separated world of the military complex, of the so-called

18. We are going to elaborate this category triggered by Wallerstein's pioneering works on the capitalist world system in a future project.

19. *Op. cit.*, p. 20.

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"closed factories" which pay better wages and salaries, ensure incomparably higher level social amenities creating thereby a distinct wage-earning stratum which is much better-off than the rest. In addition, G.W. Breslauer, in a new book on Khrushchev and Brezhnev[20] demonstrates that Soviet leaders, from Malenkov to Brezhnev, relied invariably on the "marginal products" of the military industry whenever they wanted to satisfy the demands of the population with really modern and good quality products, and not on the "peace industry." But, equally importantly, Zaslavsky also convincingly analyzes that the army is a major channel of upward mobility for wide social strata in the USSR — in particular for the village conscripts who do not have an internal passport of their own. In the army they learn industrial skills, they have some experience of the urban life otherwise unattainable to them, and when discharged, some of them can even obtain the cherished internal passport.

What are Soviet people afraid of? What are the really frightening experiences of those 45 or younger? The most frightening experiences and, at the same time, the menacing future options of the average Soviet citizen, are *the conventional wars and armed conflicts* in the outer reaches of the Soviet empire — principally in Asia, but also in Europe — in which Soviet soldiers were, or could be, involved and the recurrence of which threatens eventually to spread over the Soviet homeland as well. These conflicts could take place between "socialist" and capitalist states, as well as between those of "real socialism." The conflicts we have in mind are the Korean War in which a fortunate coincidence of events ensured that Soviet contingents were not deployed (a "fortunate coincidence" which, however, was purchased at the price of hundreds of thousands of Chinese "volunteers" killed or wounded); the Vietnam War where, again, Soviet "volunteers" could have been used (and, in fact, the American administration anticipated it when calculating the chances of a frontal attack on Hanoi); the 1956 police actions against Poland and Hungary, and their repetition in 1968 against Czechoslovakia all of which finally turned out to be small-scale operations from a military viewpoint, although there is absolutely no telling when a new edition of such "liberating operations" will cost tens of thousands of Soviet lives; the Ussuri war in 1971 between the USSR and Maoist China which in fact demanded at least thousands of Soviet and tens of thousands of Chinese lives, and in which major battles raged with ultramodern weapons, just short of a limited nuclear conflict; the constant Chinese-Vietnamese tensions with the Soviet partner in the background, a flare-up of which in 1979 triggered Soviet fleet manoeuvres and troop concentrations in defense of a country whose cause and regional ambitions mean absolutely nothing for the average Soviet citizen; and finally the Afghan war which, after three years, has cost, according to more or less reliable sources, more than 10,000 Soviet lives. The Chinese danger, the "yellow peril," is the overriding nightmare for the Soviet citizens who now have the same feeling as European countries once had of facing the, apparently endless, Russian human mass, this steam-roller of the Russian empire. People in the USSR generally believe that it is only technological, i.e., nuclear superiority that can guarantee their safety and act as a deterrent against immense conventional wars with their Asian neighbor. However, this feeling works *against, not for* anti-nuclear movements in the USSR. No doubt, should China in 20-30 years build up its own nuclear arsenal to the present Soviet level, a feeling similar to that found in present-day West European countries could grip wide strata of the Soviet population. Until this entirely different

20. *Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Soviet Politics*, (London, Boston, Sydney, George Allen and Unwin, 1983).

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constellation emerges, however, the Russian people are unlikely to abandon their principal fear of conventional war. They are, therefore, also unlikely to be grasped by anti-nuclear sentiments.

Eastern Europe: Top and Base

In analyzing East European Soviet countries, there is hardly a great need to devote much space to an analysis of the "Top." There can be, and indeed there are, several important differences between each of the countries of the region and their respective ruling apparatus. However, in respect of the strategic problems of nuclear armament and preparation for a nuclear war, they are mere emanations of the Soviet-Russian apparatus, and there is one absolute precondition of their existence: they must not take foreign policy initiatives of their own.[21] In this sense, each of the particular ruling apparatuses can be understood through what they have in common: serving Soviet strategic interests which are also presented in each nation as being in the interests of peace.

More can, and should, be said of the attitude at the "base" which is equally unfavorable for nuclear movements as that of the "base" in the USSR, but for not entirely identical reasons. The East European Soviet society too is one of unfreedom and fear, not of insecurity and anxiety, and we have already seen that it is the latter that promotes the largely symbolic anti-nuclear movements. However, in order to understand the political climate, we have to ask our earlier question again: what are people afraid of and what are they not afraid of in this region. East European countries as occupied states, possess no great fear in them of "American aggression." Should Soviet predominance in this region somehow miraculously cease, each nation would in all probability choose courses entirely different from their present ones, courses which can be characterized by capitalist as well as genuinely socialist solutions. For all this, however, one could safely say that no inhabitant in each of these countries who is *not* incorporated in the power apparatus, regards the United States as an enemy.

However, there is a more sophisticated formulation of the same problem. One could contend that these countries have a "West German feeling," namely the argument so widespread in the West German anti-nuclear movement that the American target is the Soviet Union, and that West Germany will be used as a battle-field. Such a feeling has, indeed, emerged in certain "neutralists" of the region. For instance, Imre Nagy, the martyr of East European democratic socialism who, in his famous *Memoranda 1955*, in which he formulated his program which he tried to put to test in the short-lived Hungarian Revolution of 1956, explicitly spoke of the necessity of becoming neutral, lest Hungary become a battlefield for the superpowers. But in post-1956 generations this feeling of a *danger* is clearly fading. The reason is simple. As a result of the deep disillusionment felt in Eastern Europe about the absence of Western support in Hungary in 1956, which was to be further corroborated by the cynical tacit approval of Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia in 1968,[22] it is difficult to see precisely

21. As well-known, Soviet hostility towards Ceasescu's regime, one of the most oppressive in the region, is conditioned precisely by the Rumanian's flirting, mainly for internal political reasons, with sham-national independence and a foreign policy of his own.

22. In fact, we know from the book by Z. Mlynar, *Night Frost in Prague*, (C. Hurst and Co.: London, 1980) that the American approval was more than tacit. Brezhnev informed briskly the captured Czechoslovak leadership about his secret negotiations with President Johnson in the following words: "I asked President Johnson if the American Government still fully recognizes the results of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences. And on August 18 I received the reply: as far as Czechoslovakia and Rumania are concerned, it recognizes them without reservation; in the case of Yugoslavia, it would have to be discussed. So what do you think will be done on your behalf?

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who in the East would believe that the West was capable of the extremely audacious action needed to bring the world to the brink of Holocaust. Put another way, if the West has never intervened in Eastern Europe in the past when it was in a position of superiority, then why should it do so now? In short then, the West confronts a deeply rooted problem of credibility in Eastern Europe which will further militate against the formation of independent peace movements on a large scale. There is no fear of a nuclear clash between the superpowers because of an excessive American zeal to "liberate" Eastern Europe in the region concerned.

Nor is there any fear of a Soviet nuclear strike or threat. The idea of a possible Soviet nuclear attack on any East European target immediately ceases to sound as absurd as it might at first appear if we imagine an all-out and dogged Polish resistance to a Soviet army intervention. In fact, had Stalin had nuclear parity, it would not be possible to exclude that he might have tried his hand on Yugoslav cities for his realism had its limits when he met *weaker* opposition. But *au fond*, East Europeans tend to appreciate the Soviet Army on their territory as a *gendarmerie* of the Soviet Empire. Its duties consist of maintaining "order," the dispersion of eventual mutinies, the putting down of revolutions but *not* to transform regions, which are usefully incorporated into the mechanics of the Soviet world system, into nuclear wastelands.

Pacifism, however, plays an incomparably greater role at the base of East European societies than in the Soviet Russian society, especially the religious version of pacifism. In a document issued by the allegedly "independent peace movement of Hungary" which we have studied with the utmost scepticism, we can read, nonetheless, the following interesting statement: "While the student movement has been dealing exclusively with disarmament, the religious groups, called *base communities* have been concerned with militarism in general. Having first appeared in the sixties, the base communities are spreading in Hungary. There are now about 300 such communities, each numbering about 30-40 persons. They are against military conscription and are seeking a civilian alternative to military service. They are truly pacifist, and are popular especially among Catholic laity."[23] This is an important development and it displays the only alternative to, or substitute for, anti-nuclear movements of Western Europe in East European societies.

Such movements are possible when and where *the militarization of everyday life becomes excessive and unbearable*. The country *par excellence* for such a trend is obviously the German Democratic Republic, in which old-fashioned Prussian traditions are merged with Soviet authoritarianism. Let us quote briefly from *A Resolution of the Provincial Church Convention of Saxony in Halle on the Problem of Peace*: "We understand, affirm and advocate the security interests of our state. However, we have to spell out our concern regarding the fact that the military penetrates our whole social life in an ever increasing degree: from military parades to the kindergarten, from closed forests to certain criteria of admittance into (tertiary) education, from children's toys to the training exercises of civilian defense. All this does not serve the real security and the future of

Nothing. There will be no war." p. 241. This remarkable piece of statesmanship, once again a strongly recommended reading for West European anti-nuclear militants so concerned about the capacities for American belligerence, does not deserve particular attention for the reciprocal cynicism inherent in it, which has been stipulated by us from the beginning; only for the imbecility of American foreign policy. In effect, it was an open recommendation to act against Rumania (Yugoslavia could not *then* be a target but Rumania could), as well as against Czechoslovakia.

23. *The New Hungarian Peace Movement*, ed. by F. Köszegi and E.P. Thompson, (European Nuclear Disarmament: London, 1982), p. 12.

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our life. In result of it, anxiety will be generated on the one hand, people will be acclimatized to an eventual war on the other hand; perhaps discipline will be attained by it, but we are not going to be made capable of shaping peace creatively."[24]

Why are pacifist movements more successful in East European than in the Russian Soviet societies? One of the reasons is that in the former the army never provides such a distinguished avenue for upward mobility as it does in the USSR. Obviously where people complain about the militarization of life, the obverse of the picture must be a relatively increased role of the military which, therefore, has to serve as at least one of the channels of upward mobility as well. Some of the Warsaw Pact countries (in particular, Poland) have, indeed, armies and navies which are, as far as size is concerned, superior to some of the leading armies and navies of Western Europe. But these armed services are never entirely trusted by the Soviet leadership and therefore they are organically incorporated, through Warsaw Pact channels, in the Soviet Army. If, then, the Medvedev thesis of the non-existence of an independent military-industrial complex applies somewhere, it is to East European, not the Russian — Soviet societies. However, this means, irrespective of the measure of militarization, a reduced importance and social role for the army in these countries which, unlike the Russian-Soviet, presents, socially, other possible avenues for upward mobility. A further reason is that religious freedom, including that of the sects which are to our knowledge even more hostile to the armed services than the Catholic laity, is far greater in Eastern Europe than in the USSR. Finally, there is a much wider gap between military service and civilian life in East European Soviet societies than would make military service attractive, and a way-out of a social impasse for the average citizen. All these factors together promote at least the possibility of a widespread pacifist movement.

But what will be, and what could be, the physiognomy of such a pacifist movement? Perforce, it has to be overwhelmingly religious and non-political. Its religious character is a more or less inevitable feature: this is the sole consideration which the "socialist state," in its more liberal periods, is prepared to accept for the refusal of military service. If the ruling apparatus did otherwise, they would open the floodgates for a movement of general disobedience. As a result, even people with very mild, or no religious beliefs at all have to pretend to have a "conscientious objection" of a religious nature. The non-political character of the movement can be gleaned from the East German document we have quoted above. Obviously it would be totally unrewarding to make in-depth incognito analyses to decide whether those wording the document indeed think the way the document suggests. The important fact is that, as pacifists, they have to accept the authority of the state in all policy matters except the one on which they are assembled and organized: the refusal of participation in (even potential) violence. Therefore, for reasons of principle this movement is not capable of influencing state strategies.

Western Movements-Eastern Movements: Is a Dialogue Possible?

If, as we have argued, there are no serious chances for an independent anti-nuclear movement either in the USSR or in the East European Soviet societies, can a reasonable dialogue be maintained between the Eastern opposition and Western movements, the latter being from the later 70s onwards overwhelmingly centered on peace and ecology issues? The very formulation of our question will, we think,

24. "Vorschlag: Reduzieren der SS20 und der Panzer," "Beschluzur Friedensproblematik der provinzialsächsischen Kirche gefasst in Halle," in *Friedensbewegung in der DDR*, Texte, 1978-1982. Herausgegeben von Wolfgang Buscher, Peter Wensierski und Klaus Wolschner unter Mitarbeit von Reinhard Henkys (Edition Transit: Hattingen, 1982), p. 207.

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immediately provoke hostile comments from many West European militants. Why a dialogue only with the opposition, several of them will ask, why should we isolate ourselves from the official peace organizations? Our answers to these questions should be clear from our view that the official peace organizations form an integral part of official Party policy and strategy. As long as these organizations refuse even to admit that Soviet nuclear armaments could, even hypothetically, become a source of danger to humankind, they remain purely functional to official ends and in no way independent.

The single most important question for us remains, however, whether movements genuinely intend to meet movements or whether they are content to make purely symbolic gestures. Thus, if Western militants are serious about cooperating with movements in the East, they do not require much political astuteness to recognize that genuinely autonomous movements are few and far between. And further, they must recognize that the record of cooperation with these movements to date is hardly one which Western Leftists can be proud of. The two major peace movements of Western Europe, the British and the German, sometimes after a mild symbolic gesture of protest, sometimes even without such a symbolic gesture, turned over the page on Poland, December 1981, in the history book. And the anti-nuclear militants who uncritically participate in peace carnivals, refusing, by and large, to address the question concerning who their Soviet counterparts and co-demonstrators have been recruited by, and, further, refusing to ask any questions about the well-being of Sakharov, this super-Oppenheimer, the only genuine scientific hero of the anti-nuclear issue in the USSR, and also, who turn a blind eye to the fate of the autonomous Soviet peace movement which was under arrest or house-arrest during the visits of Western peace activists and the activists of which were later to be charged with "slandering the Soviet Union," will make absolutely no contribution to the cause they themselves deem to be cardinal for the future of present-day civilization. Precisely for this reason we cannot emphasize strongly enough the significance of gestures within the anti-nuclear movement which seriously question the value of the official Soviet facade of "peaceful intentions of the social community," which demand that acts, not only flattering words should emerge from the Soviet leadership, deeds which testify to at least a minimum of tolerance towards autonomous social movements without which there is not the slightest hope of the peaceful solution of world conflicts. In particular, E.P. Thompson, one of the theoretical and practical founders of the West European peace movements, demands vigorously in his recent statements and speeches that no credit should be given to the Soviet pose of the "sole guardian and trustee of the noble cause of peace." Whatever the actual wording of these statements, they are *beyond* the credulous, or self-deluding, unilateralism of the original British movement in that they demand reciprocal action on the part of *both* superpowers as the sole basis of credibility. Even if, for the time being, these important new developments remain on a gestural level (although they are represented in several national peace movements ever more vigorously by groups of varying strength), they shatter the illusions concerning Soviet societies so widespread in the anti-nuclear movements, as well as counteract to Soviet and pro-Soviet manipulations and promote an at least more lucid self-awareness of the movement itself.

The underlying dilemma can be formulated in terms of a "communication disturbance." Even where were are speaking of militants with genuine intentions of combining political freedom and survival, we must recognize that, in East and West, we are speaking of people who have experienced their political socialization in radically dif-

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ferent social climates. One group lives in a world of insecurity, speaks the language of insecurity (which for a decade now, has been replacing the language of alienation) and therefore perceives several underlying threats, in addition genuine ones, to the very existence of our civilization. But the movement is, at the same time, full of irrationalist intolerance and closed to rational arguments when its main values are concerned, and this is true to a greater extent than in other movements. The other group has been politically socialized in a society of unfreedom and speaks the language of unfreedom, and whether it does this with an approving or disapproving accent, does not really matter. The time perception of this group is short term, they are not interested in the strategic issues of the world they are living in, nor are they particularly concerned with hidden threats; the problems bothering them are much too visible. Therefore, on the one hand, they are much more realistic regarding several problems connected with the peace issue. For instance, as mentioned, the overwhelming majority of the populace of Soviet societies is, in our personal experience, adamant that the Bomb *does* work as a deterrent, otherwise we would already be up to our neck either in a new world war or equally devastating regional wars, for instance between China and the Soviet Union. On the other hand, they are just as blind and impenetrable concerning certain dangers, mostly the ones which are in the focus of the Western anti-nuclear militant, as their Western counterpart is concerning certain others. There is no way to convince the populace of an underindustrialized area of any Soviet society which lacks elementary industrial goods and other social amenities, often even electricity, that a nuclear plant *could* have dangerous side effects. The fact that they have no say whatsoever in the efficacy of safety regulations is really just an appendix to a dangerous indifference.[25]

In the final analysis, the "communication disturbance" and its causes boil down to the following formula. A certain type of social activist in the West lives *in anxiety about the potential suicide of a civilization*. The Doomsday atmosphere (a term which is part of today's fashionable lexicon), has to be understood in a literal sense, for up until now, there has never been a whole civilization (only single communities) that can contemplate committing suicide. The notion therefore carries a half-religious, half-mystical aura (irrespective of the reality or irrealism of the alarm signals and predictions). Its sense of time is the following: perhaps we are beyond the point of no return; its mythology a set of dramatic opposites: life versus death, health versus the "cancerous tumor" in the body of civilization, organic versus artificial. The ultimate content of this anxiety is the emphatic feeling of a New Fall, the doubt, in many already the conviction, that "progress" was poison. Very clearly, this is the most important and most influential romantic movement of the post-war world.

To the extent that there are movements in Soviet societies at all, and not just isolated moral fighters, they express a diametrically opposite life-feeling. For them, there is not enough, but in a different sense: it has never brought affluence which was the underlying promise held out to those who accepted "the temorary restrictions," and it certainly has not brought freedom. The sense of time of this type of activists works with is one again the exact opposite of the Western anti-capitalist romatic: not Doomsday, the approaching and menacing end of a civilization, rather infinitude, the endless duration of a world which, perhaps, may be habitable but which is certainly not the pro-

25. One must not interpret our objectivity as wise remarks of the *au-dessus-de-la-mêlée*. We are painfully aware of the extremely slow process in which we, after leaving a Soviet society, came to realize that certain issues advocated vigorously by our Western friends are not simply expressions of a collective neurosis.

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mised "land" of progress. As a result, the mythology is different as well. "Darkness at noon" is still a relevant symbol here but it means now the darkness of the tunnel that never ends. If there seem to be lights at the end of the tunnel, it is only a will-o'-the-wisp, a promise that never comes true. This is a world in which the myth of eternal repetition prevails, this myth of disillusionment, where everything always starts anew only in order to end in the same, humiliating and frustrating way. Then the story commences again.

Is there, then, a possibility of dialogue between two forces so differently socialized? We believe that there is such a possibility provided that both speak the language of freedom and democracy. It is futile for the Western militant to seek for people in a world totally alien from his or hers who have his or her life experiences. But it is not futile, it is rewarding to look for allies in a struggle to control fundamental social life processes now entirely in the hands of small and ruthless power elites. If survival and democracy (and for socialists this means radical democracy) become combined issues, both in East and West, a genuine dialogue may start.

THE BLIND ALLEY

by Ivan Sviták

The Problem

1. Indeed, we have to think about life and not about the quantity of deadly weapons, although the pacifist and militarist propagandists would like to convince us that what counts are the numbers of atomic missiles, placed at the disposal of M.A.D., N.U.T.s with B.O.O.B.s (M.A.D. —mutual assured destruction, N.U.T. —nuclear use theory, B.O.O.B. —blow out of the blue.) The current problem cannot be solved if we disregard the historical context, the relations between East and West (particularly between the superpowers) and if we ignore the main source of arms race —the existing social structures of industrial societies. The weapons are harmless and innocent, the social structures and the power elites which produce the need for the weapons, are criminally guilty. If we look for the causes of any problem —that is the business of science since Aristotle — we should remember that "Die Ursache ist die Ur-Sache" (Hegel); that is, we have to understand the origins to understand the causes.

2. So, do not count the weapons, learn from history. History of cold war, and detente shows very clearly, that the central antagonism between the superpowers has initiated and fueled the arms race for three decades. The atomic arsenals were constantly growing, irrespective of the changing labels (détente, coexistence) which were attached to the main conflict between East and West. Without ending the cold war there cannot be any end to the arms race; the cold war cannot disappear as long as the Soviet bureaucratic dictatorship continues to display its aggressive nature, in a constantly growing and menacing manner. The basic reason for the cold war is the aggressive character of the Soviet bureaucracy, the social structure based on forced labor and absence of human rights, the colonial nature of the Soviet Empire, enslaving and exploiting for-

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merly independent nations. The main threat to the West is not the Soviet atomic arsenal but the imperialist objectives of the Russian power elite, which is ready to help the West Europeans in the same way as they have helped the Hungarians and Czechs, the Baltic republics and Poles, the Afghanis and their own dissenters in concentration campus. The opposition to the imperialist design of Soviet domination is not a political fad, it is a basic precondition for the survival of Western culture.

3. The basic problem is the currently unbridgeable antagonism between political structures of open and closed societies. This antagonism between a democratic and a totalitarian system is derived from two basically different styles of exploitation of labor in the economic systems of "capitalism" and "socialism." This man-made problem cannot be undone either by the good will of the pacifists or by the militarist evil schemes, but it can be overcome by history, in history and through history. All historical situations have their beginning and their end. The military aspects and the arms race are the products of a historical situation and as such cannot be solved by counting atomic weapons. After we have identified the problem as a social, historical issue —not a military one— it is high time to admit that the increase of Russia's military power during the détente years has no parallel in history and that almost in all categories of classical warfare, the Soviets outnumber the NATO forces, at least three to one. Anybody who is willing to close one's eyes before the Soviet imperialist, militarist build up is a fool, who is ready to be finlandized or polonized. The pacifist who behaved in the same way, when they faced Hitler, ended in Hitler's concentration camps.

The Three Options

4. In the upcoming and ropoid era, the United States has at least three options. The first and the best would be unilateral American withdrawal of atomic weapons from European territory, that is an open retreat from the European scene, based on the recognition of deeply changed circumstances in Europe. Western European states can and should defend themselves as they wish. To phase out American involvement in Europe in a decade would be viable and possible, without changing the existing global balance of power. The Europeans, not the Americans, should decide their own defense needs. This crucial strategic reorientation requires not only a military, nor a political solution, it requires the re-definition of the role of the superpowers in the contemporary world. Such a change would demand the departure from the current behavior of the power elites and *both* superpowers would have to modify their roles in the global policy. This option is presently doomed, because neither the Soviet nor the American power elites recognize their own self-interest in ending the cold war. In ten years, they will.

5. The second option is a bilaterial, partial withdrawal of Soviet and American atomic weapons from Central Europe, which would create a zone without atomic weapons, running through both Germanies, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the already neutral countries. Such a move would have to coincide with the withdrawal of American and Soviet armies from both Germanies, which is exactly the reason why this option is doomed as well. The Soviets will not accept any withdrawal of their armies from the East European scene, because their Quisling governments would collapse while the withdrawal of 250,000 American soldiers from West Germany would have no immediate effect on the social structure. The disengagement of the superpowers from both Europes is a highly attractive option for all Europeans, but the Soviets want to keep their satellites under strict supervision; they can rule in East Europe only by increasing the intimidation, repression and exploitation —see Poland.

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They cannot accept major changes. The neutralization of West Germany would also mean the neutralization of some of the Soviet allies, particularly East Germany, Poland and the Czech republic. The Soviet refusal of this option will increase the conflicts between both Europes and both superpowers, but the resulting tensions will enforce some kind of a Rapacki plan in the near future.

6. The third —and worst option— is the continuation of the arms race, with some cosmetic changes which will be negotiated in Geneva to help Reagan's re-election campaign. The power elites in both superpowers are interested in creating a false impression, that the dangers have been diminished and that an improvement has been achieved, although there will be none, and the actual arms build up will continue in the new decade of increased tensions. Why will exactly this worst option dominate the eighties? Because the present economic problems in both superpowers are not yet sufficient reasons for the elites to recognize their own self-interest and to modify their strategies. They face deep structural changes in their own states, but the famous principle "quieta non movere" is preferable and less risky than the dismanteling of the mechanisms of oppression in the Soviet Union and the reorientation of profit oriented American economy to the needs of the American population.

Possible Consequences

7. Both options of American withdrawal from Europe would have very positive consequences for both superpowers and for the world, because the needed structural changes in all industrial societies could become the dominant theme of this century. In 1968, the Czechs failed in the East and the Western Left failed in France because these countries were too small to initiate structural changes against the will of the superpowers. The basic changes in the political system in the Soviet Union and some kind of economic democratization on the United States can succeed only if such programs become acceptable to the power elites of the superpowers, and if the tensions would relax. If the tensions and the arms race grow, even the most moderate program of structural adjustments is perceived as an attempt to weaken the intimidated power elites, East and West. Without the military build up, the US budgetary problems would quickly disappear, and the productivity of US labor —currently one of the lowest— would match the most successful Japanese and German competitors. Once the production would be directed to peaceful goals, a real recovery would follow.

8. The consequences for Europe would be more ambivalent, but it is not for the Americans to decide whether the Europeans should finlandize themselves, whether they should increase their military spending —or not to do so. If the Americans would withdraw from Europe, the anti-American pacifist illusions would diappear and the Europeans would realize that they have to face the Soviet threat. Once they would not be protected by Uncle Sam's nuclear umbrella, they would themselves double their military spending from the existing three-to-four percent of their GNP, while the Americans could reduce their current six or seven percent to one-half. The West Europeans would not be so shortsighted as to accept the Soviet offer of a non-aggression pact. They know the historical lesson of the Soviet non-aggression pact. They know the historical lesson of the Soviet non-aggression pact with Poland, which resulted in the Soviet occupation of half of Poland in 1939. Most Europeans still consider the Yalta agreements as a filthy deal, they are shocked by the Soviet constant violations of the Helsinki promises and the militarization of Poland scares the socialist Mitterrand so much, the he —not Reagan— is ready for the neutron bomb.

9. The beneficial consequences of a possible American withdrawal from Europe will

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not take place in the eighties, because the main source of conflict, the incompatibilities of the Soviet and Western political institutions, makes such a solution impossible. The optimum is the institutionalization of the cold war. Why? The Soviets are offering a non-aggression pact, but they would not withdraw from Afghanistan, or Czechoslovakia, they would not honor belatedly their Yalta commitment to free elections in East Europe, and they continue to disregard the third basket of the Helsinki Accords. Their offers are deceptive devices designed to fuel the pacifist delusions in the critical year when the new Pershings might reach Europe. And even if there could be an agreement with the Soviet Himmler, who is currently in power in the Kremlin, we would still have to ask what is the value of such a deal with a super-Kapo of the Soviet concentration camps, with the former Soviet Gestapo chief? The opposition to imperialism, to the bureaucratic dictatorship, to the Russian "peaceful" posturing is not a question of atomic weapons, it is a question of Western survival. The Soviet Union is vitally interested in the continuation of the cold war and that is the reason why any American initiative —except total surrender to Soviet domination— cannot currently succeed. We are facing history, not just Andropov or Reagan. History does not offer any immediate exit. The most dangerous source of a nuclear conflict is the built in destructive potential, inherent in the Soviet social structure, in the bureaucratic dictatorship. No exit. "Eh bien, continuons."

Conclusion

10. There will be no substantial changes in the global scene in this decade, because the power elites of both superpowers are not ready for them. The Soviet elite will continue in its expansionist course and will always grab power if the opportunity arises, because, for them, politics is a deadly game for power. The Soviets consider the expansion of their Empire "normal," as the Frenchmen believed in their "mission civilizatrise" and the English in the beneficial effect of their rule on the population in the colonies. The Soviet bureaucracy sees the Empire in the same light as the old imperialists of the nineteenth century and they consider their own expansion to be as "natural and justified," as the American businessmen consider the economic expansion in the Third World "natural and justified." In the Andropov era, the anonymous forces of historical necessity and the "hidden hand" of the "free market" will continue to manipulate history and will increase the tensions, not reduce them. The pacifists will have more chances to delude themselves, and the liberals will be again surprised when they will realize that the Soviets do not conduct global policies according to the principle *do ut des*, as if they were exchanging favors with the business partner. If there is a way out of this blind alley in which the Russians appear so strong and the West so vulnerable then it might be found in a strange article, published December 30, 1853, —yes, in 1853 not 1953— in *New York Tribune*: "The idea of Russian diplomatic supremacy owes its efficacy to the imbecility and timidity of Western nations, and...the belief in Russian's superior military power is hardly less a delusion." Who was this anti-communist reactionary, who saw through the Russian tricks so well? No militarist. No liberal. No pacifist. His name was Karl Marx.

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THE WORLD AS WILL AND REPRESENTATION: DELEUZE'S AND GUATTARI'S CRITIQUE OF CAPITALISM AS SCHIZO-ANALYSIS AND SCHIZO-DISCOURSE*

by Manfred Frank

The Lightning

If scholarly publications gain critical attention either through popularity or resistance among broad circles of the educated public, then *Anti-Oedipus* (subtitle: *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*), first published in Paris in 1972, has earned this even in Germany —despite the fact that it was translated only recently. Of course, sales of the volume have not been enormous: the influence of the French "new philosophy" is primarily restricted to fan-clubs and marginal groups around universities. It is also unpromising that almost everyone dealing with philosophy or psychoanalysis either as a profession or avocation is likely to dismiss Foucault's resounding acclaim for Deleuze: "A lightning bearing the name of Deleuze has struck: a new thought has become possible; thinking the new is once more possible. This not only draws near, promised by the faintest glimmer of a new beginning. It is here; it is taking place in the texts of Deleuze. It skips and dances before us, and in our midst...Perhaps one day this period will be recognized as 'Deleuzian'." The dawn of this new thought is still being awaited, although, there are some enthusiasts said to have perceived the glimmer. But can one deny that academic philosophy has deflated the wings of the *Zeitgeist*, and that one after another phenomenology, existentialism, critical theory and even analytical philosophy have been relegated to the library of classics and that their last representatives are still courting that streak of lightning which ought to have made thinking possible once again?

In the meantime, several of Deleuze's works are already well known. In all of these studies the author pursues the "deconstruction of traditional pairs of oppositions: expression and meaning, surface and deep structure, inwardness and outwardness, wish and representation, as they prevail in the 'discourse' of Western and particularly modern philosophy." What "deconstruction" means is not immediately clear. Deleuze calls his procedure "thinking against reason." And reason is a normative procedure that sees to it that one moment always falls victim to its opposite. As a rule in the prevailing European system of thought, it is the sentient, the vital, and the outer components which have to be overcome to attain "truth." But at what cost: "the untamed desire" in all of its phenomenal forms, which has been sacrificed in this process returns as the repressed and leaves the gentle hue of its traces upon the grand thought systems. Deleuze is able to decipher those traces. What neither Plato nor the Stoics, Spinoza, Hume or Kant were really able to block out is brought to light by "deconstruction."

The *Anti-Oedipus* begins with a flood of sentences which alone would have sufficed to draw attention to it (it also draws attention *away* from the reading): "It functions everywhere, sometimes restlessly, sometimes with interruptions. There is breathing, warmth, eating. There is defecation, there is fucking. ...Everywhere there are machines with their couplings and connections. An organ machine is fastened to the

* Translated by David Berger.

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energy machine: the flow produced by the latter is interrupted by the former. The breast is a machine for the production of milk and coupled with it is the oral machine. The mouth of the anoretic hovers between an eating machine, an anal machine, a talking machine, a breathing machine (asthma attack). In that sense everyone is an amateur constructor: to each one his small machines. An organ machine for an energy machine, continual flows and clefts. President Schreber has cosmic radiation in his arse. *Celestial arse*. And do not worry: it is working. President Schreber feels something, produces something and is capable beyond that to develop his theory. What steps in are machine effects, not the effects of metaphors."

That is how it begins and it continues, rather rages on in this style, page after page. It is the vision of total functioning that escalates to the primordial scream of affirmation and accommodation (everything fits, already as a child); a defiant yes to beautiful, cruel life. One could already read it in Deleuze's book on Neitzsche: "As the sole quality of the will to power there remains affirmation, action remains as the sole quality of strength and becoming active as the creative identity of power and of the will." Love for the "unlimited yes and amen saying" suffuses *Anti-Oedipus.* Nor is the exposition of the eternal return as the affirmation of "breeding, of selection" missing. The odd thing is that this neo-vitalism is accompanied by a new fondness for the machine —traces of this are already found in Deleuze's earlier publications.

Everything is machine: machines of heaven, of the stars, of the rainbow and of the mountains. There is groaning, sighing, rattling, farting and belching in the body of the universe into which the delimited body of the vital subject has extended itself. In this cosmic idyll must one take into account the "uninterrupted machine noise just as one would the noise" of cars in front of our windows? It is unavoidable. Even what Scheler had called "cosmovital empathy" is turned by the authors into a "machine of chlorophyl or of protoplasm or into a desire at least to be able to let one's body slide in similar machines as if it were a component."

Does not this peculiar choice of concepts betray a faddish enthusiasm? At least, it is not exactly new: Nietzsche's *homo natura* and the Schelling-Feuerbachian "essential unity of man and nature" lurk in the background. And if the text were not so delirious one would be reminded of the magic analogies of romantic philosophy of nature. Here as there man turns into the analogical source of the universe: "even the stars and the animals are given to him as burden." A moving thought! One can already imagine the sequel: man as the shepherd of being. However, in the technological epoch he is no longer the shepherd (although it is especially this era that produces shepherds). Rather,he is the "eternal manager of the universe's machine," its "mechanic."

If man were the organizer of this universal machine, this though would perhaps approximate Lorenz Oken's idea of the unity of man and nature, and especially his idea of the universal productive unity of nature. Oken's system also contains the universal analogy, the mysticism of number (in his case it was five, for Deleuze and Guattari it is three) and the idea that the individual creature was only a "partial organism" (a particular organ) in the "flowing all of primordial life." What Hegel reproached Oken for, i.e., "largely empty formalisms as well as an unique brew of half-baked concepts, shallow and mostly even foolish fancies and ignorance both of philosophy as well as of the natural sciences," applies even more to *Anti-Oedipus*.

But why this totalitarianism of the machine? First, because it "functions"; second, because it is less problematic to find pleasure in its dismemberment, in its partialization and its renewed montage than would be assumed to be the case in organ-mutilation and recomposition. One does not think of the horror generated by

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Frankenstein's laboratory. The reader witnesses not a butcher's feast but a delirious *bricolage*: everywhere float machine parts that function only on the condition that they be screwed into or from other parts; everywhere there are conjunctions and cleavages. For example, the machine mouth hangs on the breast machine (a "source machine" is connected with an "organ machine"). Expressed pseudo-mathematically this means: wish machines form binary machines depending on binary rules and associative arrangements. But this is a binarism extending to infinity: through all those coils of screws and wheels flows an *elan vital*, a sort of cosmic electricity, that must resist universal entropy, "anti-production" and the "organless body": the wish, the Freudian libido, Schopenhauer's and Nietzsche's will to power and life, Lacanian desire. The will to life flows, causes flow, and separates what is united: "Sperm sac and kidney stones, streams of sperm, feces, urine, created by partial objects, once more separated from others that create new streams that are once more cut off from further partial objects"; etc.

At first one hesitates to believe this; at the same time something remarkable seems to be suggested. For Deleuze and Guattari, the machine parts as partial objects (in Melanie Klein's terminology) do not require assignment to specific personal bearers. The productive units are dissoluble and can be re-united at random; they slip away from the identity of reference compulsion, as with "to the breast of mother Amalie Freud and the wife of Jacob Freud" —in brief to the "source machine" of any fortified subject that would be self-contained and unambiguously distinguishable from all other subjects.

The Oedipal Registration

The act which refers wish impulses to persons is thus derived: it is the result of an obstruction in the gears of the machines that produces the "organless body" as the registering surface of their distinctions. In the body itself the unconscious is parentless and impersonal. It relates to partial objects with which it are production units and dissolves again if it desires. And "the partial objects form neither representatives of parental persons nor bearers of familial relations; they are components of the wish machines." The wish production is a "molecular force"; it does not prevent the particles coming into the union to enter at another period into a more attractive synthesis with other particles. For there are only production process on the one hand and the production relations on the other. At least this is primordial: the world of the wish before the figure of Oedipus became registered in it and caused it to become the arch-repressed and the unconscious (the wish we want to hold on to is thus *natura sua* which is not unconscious).

But how does that transformation of the "wish to wishing," to a desire for persons take place? How does the productive flow come under the law of the "Oedipal triangulation" (which we must conceive of at the same time as a strangulation, simply as suggested by the rhyme)? Deleuze's and Guattari's reply is that the wish, *le désir*, is displaced from the level of the pure machine-like functioning to that of signification (Lacan's "*intrusion du Significant*"). Instead of producing realities and instead of its desire holding fast to that real "identify of man with nature," the wish now produces images, shadows and representations: it actualizes itself indirectly, symbolically; it dies as wish and is resurrected as a chain of significations. Clearly, every representation presupposes a preceding presence in which the wish is familiar to itself before every representation and personalization. In his *Logique du sens*, Deleuze had already named this Sartre's "decisive" discovery, without however subscribing to Sartre's characterization of it as impersonal *consciousness*.

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Meanings are certainly not the spontaneous work of the "untamed wish," i.e., of the primordial production unity of man and nature. They are formed, as already shown by Saussure —though he was not the first to show this— in the interlocking of differential relations between material substrata of expression ("signifiers"); each one of these obtains its identity and thus its definite significance by standing out against all other expressive substrata. Saussure admitted that when he developed this thought he was thinking of the theory of exchange value in economics. (In fact, the comparison of the semiotic sign with money was a commonplace already during Humboldt's times.) Deleuze and Guattari remember this when they associate the "codification" of the wish —the condition for its Oedipalization— with the rise of capitalist commodity production.

The idea as such is not particularly original. Others have brought it out more forcefully —but Deleuze will have nothing to do with "depth." Lack of originality and the delirious chatter running through dozens of pages, causing all connections to sink into a swamp of retractions and unredeemed preinterpretations —all of these shortcomings surprisingly do not completely defeat the insight behind this work. As all eclecticisms, in *Anti-Oedipus* also useful and less useful ideas get mixed up. Nevertheless, one must bring some order to these, although the authors are suspicious of that and reconstruct them in the form of a language serving communication and not merely expressiveness.

To begin with the idea of representation, the precedence of Schopenhauer (and of Nietzsche) is evident. As is well known, in Schopenhauer we have the "in-itself," the wish that intimately holds the world together, in two forms of existence: as will and representation. In fact, only the will is active. The idea idealizes and derealizes it. It converts the wild living urge into a panopticon of ideas whose cruelty is only made tolerable by the aesthetic distancing maintained by art. Deleuze and Guattari retain this: "The objective being of the wish is the real in itself." And, by slightly altering the quote: "There is the order of production— which is at the same time societal and wish production — and the order of representation; the latter annihilates the former and subjects them to the law of economics." It is delicately expressed, a scornful euphemism in the authors' ears. With Nietzsche they push the metaphors of registration, inscription and incision to such an extent that we are transported to Kafka's penal colony or other such sites of torture. The symbolization of the wish —Nietzsche's "*Mnemotechnik*" (in French "*enrefistrement*")— dissects flesh of the will to live. *Style, stylo, stylet*: three words for the same instrument of torture. Behind it (starting with Nietzsche), there is "grammar." Its system is "the movement of culture that is carried out on bodies, registers in them and works upon them." "It converts people and their organs into components or gears of the social machine."

Conversion into a machine is, of course, all right. If only it functions, then there is "nothing wrong." It is only the bad machine which here is the agency of the flow of wishes: a totally alienated machine, i.e., that of culture. (It is difficult o imagine "alienation" in a system of pure machine functions).

Nonetheless, the older generation is familiar with such culture-critical tones from books that fortunately have been repressed: Spengler and the representatives of the "conservative revolution" flirted with descriptions of human history as a process of degeneration: first archaic wildness, then myth and finally culture. The final stage is totalitarian civilization which the myth of blood, power and honor is to revolutionize once more. The important thing is that the acculturation process —even with Spengler— comes off well in comparison with the civilizing process. In the scale of

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decline, Spengler himself stands fairly low and certain disciples of Nietzsche, e.g., Gentile, have not neglected to point out in him the violence of "mnemotechnical recording." Let us not forget that fascism too knows (and loves) its streams and floods, e.g., that "brown flood" which in 1933, in Röhm's words "would swamp" the gray rock of the military. The fantasy of the wild flow and its discursive taming grounds the minimal consensus of the counter-enlightenment which was not at all pro-capitalistic or philo-bourgeois. This applies to Nietzsche himself as well as to Spengler, Moeller van den Bruck, Heidegger or Alfred Rosenberg.

It also applies to Deleuze and Guattari. In a sometimes stimulating speculative survey of the history of the decline of humankind, they distinguish three stages in which the knife of script carves into the flesh of wishes and comes to completion in the castration of Oedipus. At the outset —as in Rousseau— there are savage societies; they constitute themselves over kinship which turns the individual directly into a representative of the social. By the mere fact of codification, of course, they dislodge with structural necessity the representations of the untamed wish. The "wild territorial machine" (named so because the originally boundless "deterritorialized" flows of archaic wish production are "territorialized" in landed property and enclosures, in parcels and differentiated property) gives way historically to the despotic state in which "the repressing representation" erects its terroristic regime: the "despotic signifier." As usual, how this is done exactly remains in the dark. The founders of states —"a pack of blond predators, a race of masters and conquerors" —overwhelm savage societies and "unscrupulously sink their claws into the people who in numbers are perhaps infinitely larger but who are still without form." The chain of horrors runs thus: the Greek city state, Christianity, feudalism, democratic and bourgeois humanism, industrial society, capitalism and socialism: "In the end the world becomes an insane asylum." To reach that point, the game of representation must acquiesce in its last, destructive *shifting*, brought about through the "instance of the displaced, distorted represented."

This is a complicated story, but one must follow its development for Oedipus stands only at its conclusion. For Oedipus is not the consistent end product of grammar and of the identification and differentiation compulsions registered in it (which place persons and owners in place of the wish-machine parts). "In order for Oedipus to be possessed it does not suffice that within the system of representations he depict a limit or a displaced represented; he must travel into the inside of the system, must himself take up the place of the signifier." This condition is supposed to have been realized in capitalism.

The Delimitation of Economics and the Stage of Madness

Here at last we have reached that point where Saussure's and Hjelmslev's theory of linguistic value can be fruitfully linked with the exchange value economics of capitalism. Capitalism is not maliciously a codification system. It is its nature to permanently "decode" codes, "deterritorialize" territories. Its streams of money, feces and goods know no fixed or definitive "limits." The authors share this view with Saussure's "language system" whose "values" (i.e., diferentially determined and unpitted units), in the course of the infinitely large number of language uses likewise float about their symbolic shells like currencies in order to repeatedly differentiate and identify themselves anew in specifically new and expanded "language grids." One might, with George Bataille, speak of a "delimitation of economics" carried out in structuralism. Its effect consists in that codification is replaced by an "axiology." This is a peculiar terminological proposal for, by "axiology," one usually means exactly a

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value system that is not subject to the free market of symbol exchange, and is typical of mythical or religious epochs, which were destroyed by capitalist nationalism (according to Weber). Still, the authors name five criteria for distinguishing the axioms from the codes of states: (1) They believe that code relations presuppose inequalities (Althusser's "dominances") among the elements (e.g., between noble and serf). (2) The free market brings, as opposed to this, a purely logical (or economic) differentiation between exchange values and with it introduces the law of equivalence into the realm of communication. In this manner symbols of power cease to be what they were under the viewpoint of the code: they become "immediate economic coefficients" without duplicating or referring to (representative) non-economic factors. (3) It is the strength of capital that its axiomatic is never saturated, that it can postpone every limit by the introduction of further axioms. "What it decodes with one hand (for example, religious or ethical obligations) it axiomizes with the other." (4) The capitalist axiomatic can be described as no more than a cruel registering instrument: everything takes place under the aura of full absence of violence. Everything is valid for everyone; there are no preferences. Already in *Das Kapital* this power of unfettered production extending productive forces and needs infinitely had been emphasized as universalizing, and as eliminating prejudices and overcoming national barriers. This is due to the fact that capital marks only quantities, while paying no attention to qualities: the value of the person forfeits its aura; he becomes a "private person" who receives his identity not as an inalienable characteristic of being recorded through God or humanistic dignity. This identity is created through free play of externalized relations. The person is what he possesses and it is "different from all others": this is at the same time the final and only thing which he has in common with all other individuals. (5) Capitalism is inclined to replace the social machine by technical machines. It is not the kinship code or the feudal-state "affiliation" that decide over the "value" of the person (as a system-element), but the machine in its non-metaphorical sense. One might say that capitalism —in contrast to the societies described by Lévi-Strauss —directly economizes the inter-subjective relations. According to Deleuze and Guattari the "privatization of the family" follows from this. In the capitalist stage of man's fall from savagery, the family no longer serves economic reproduction, but is placed outside it. Societal processes freed of kinship and filiations now take place through the alienated form of economic reproduction. Man becomes a product of his own product, which confronts him as an independent thing and instructs him about his value. We know this from Marx, but with a more compelling argument. To be fair, we must admit that the old patriarch did not explain the genesis of the Oedipus complex. But it would be exaggerating to say that one attains clarification about this from Deleuze and Guattari. Here and there —one can only express it via one of the innumerable jumble of words that abound in the book —a spark does come through from the "shitty floods" and even from the "sun's rays in the arse." Oedipus is the end stage of a total abstraction process in which all (concrete) relations between people are reduced to the final complex papa-mamma-I: "the despotic mark transferred to papa, the residual territoriality taken over by mamma and the split off, castrated I." The function of this linguistic play, uniquely impoverished where compared to the wealth of filiations consists in furnishing to the abstract private self its lost symbolical territory. Capital needs this in order not to destroy itself, i.e., to prescribe abstinence to its tendentionally infinite decoding hunger through constant reterritorialization. "Firstly and only in the capitalistic formation is the oedipal limit not only occupied, but also lived and inhabited; here the social images produced by the decoded streams are reduced effectively to the shrun-

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ken images occupied by the wish. At this point Oedipus is constituted and at the same time ends his wandering in the depth elements of representation: the displaced represented as such has become the representative of the wish."

Oedipus is thus not the invention of Freud: he has only given him a new home on the couch. Freud truly did not want to see how the familial images melt away as soon as one contemplates them strongly, allowing a view of those social images from which they derive their meaning. If Luther discovered the essence of religion in inwardness; Fichte the essence of the spirit in subjectivity; Smith and Ricardo the law of value in the abstract subjective essence of "productive activity," then Freud's historical accomplishment may be seen in that he discovered the abstract essence of libido. but then, as if apologizing to the "establishment" for his discovery, he turned it into those "dirty little stories" of the family *pool*: "Instead of impetuous decoded streams, the shallow streamlets redecoded in mamma's bed."

This may not be heard, but it can be understood. Admittedly, the rediscovery of Melanie Klein's theory of partial objects and the resulting doubts about the transhistorical validity of Freud's familial and personal psychology may have a liberating effect. But why turn from the "terroristic papa-mamma language" to the idiotic pipikaka talk? One could easily show how the images registered in this language open into worlds of repression and into the obstinate overcompensation of the pleasure prohibition. It does not suffice to shed academicism (for the time being *Anti-Oedipus* is most effective in universities). Before the barriers of linguistic resistance are likewise removed there will be many obstacle in the way of liberating wish production — the honest yes to the will to life. It is unfortunate for the really productive thoughts in *Anti-Oedipus* that its "discourse" locks out the reader. The impression is that the light that shines on the arse of President Schreber seldom illuminates (at any rate warms) the authors' thinking.

But there are more serious objections. One of them concerns their schizophrenia theory. According to them, theory of schizophrenia is a disturbance which psychoanalysts cunningly reduce to a neurosis. Their cure consists in oedipalizing the "schizo," i.e., in turning him into a functioning element of the capitalistic order. (Were there not schizos in precapitalistic times?)

However, the desire of the schizophrenic is exactly this: to absolutely break out of that relative limit through which capitalism protects its amoeba-like body. He wants to destroy it in order "to allow the flow of the streams in free condition over the desocialized organ-less body, the dead waste land." Thus, schizophrenia represents the *outer* limit of capitalism or the end point of its most intimate tendency, Yet, capitalism functions only if it restores or displaces that limit by progressively reproducing it on an extended scale. The schizo (as the authors call him in a friendly fashion) is produced by capitalism, but this time it is a product —in contrast to the familial tyrant Oedipus— that destroys capital's axiomatics. He must therefore be placed in the insane asylum.

A "Completely Unbourgeois Adventure"

We are already familiar with this from Foucault's *Civilization and Madness* on which Deleuze and Guattari rely. Each generation must mold myths of contrast out of its experience of real suffering. Frequently this takes place in the form of a simple reversal of the prevailing axiomatics. In the 18th century, for example, there was a growing criticism among the rising bourgeois intelligentsia against the legitimacy of imperial

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colonialism. At the same time there arose the complementary myths of the punished world conqueror (*The Flying Dutchman*) and the "good savage." In the 20th century this is replaced by the myth of the good madman, the "schizo." If we stay on the level of myth —the collective phantasy of a class or group at a definite time— it becomes difficult to contradict Deleuze's and Guattari's diagnosis. As long as they pick their references from literature (which they do frequently as compared to few clinical references), they can forcefully prove that the madman exiled by society is viewed as the "better person." The schizo is the collective subject: the savior with the crown of thorns but also the revolutionary *par excellence*, the representative bearer of all wishes and archaic desires which by their nature are inimical to order. Each one of us can discover this sympathy. In that sense "capitalism has made us all crazy."

It is questionable, of course, whether one must write about psychoses in the style of psychosis (and not just poetically like Beckett, Kafka, Proust, Lawrence, Artaud and Blandot): in a style which one cannot read for long without sharing Schopenhauer's joy in reading Hegel. There is something undigested and half thought out in the authors' bitter enmity against the idea of ordered relations, as if any discursive control of arguments implied a preference for repression against liberation. To suggest that the reader commits such a *category mistake* is to insult his intelligence. It is not different from placing before him the alternative "freedom or socialism." One should not break out of the habit of adding 2 plus 2 equals 4 through "schizo analyses."

First, although Deleuze and Guattari wish to proffer a theory of liberation —no one doubts the honesty and the enthusiasm of such purpose— through the categorical and epistemological framework of their investigation they destroy the conditions under which a free subject can be considered. Everything in that process of decline happens "by itself" and without the interposition of subjects. Everything is the work of autonomously acting codifications and decodifications. What could oppose such a decline —a free and (relatively) autonomous individual— is omitted. For subjectivity can be constituted only on the level of reflection and the latter presupposes representation. So far it is logical to associate the subject with Oedipus and to declare war on both of them. But in whose name are we fighting? In the final analysis one cannot revolutionize existing relations without referring to a "value" in the name of which what exists is negated. In critical theory it was an ethics of unreifed subjectivity *qua* non-identity which, as in the case of Deleuze and Guattari, took flight into the poets' imagination. Such a value reference is not far removed from a superego and smells of the stuffiness of the bourgeois joint with papa-mamma-I. Perhaps, but without purposes (and the production machine just does not know any purposes) this would mean leading them by the nose and codifying them. Without goals or a purpose the authors' anarchism remains, in the most fatal sense of the word, a matter of arbitrariness and chance. It resembles the "simplest surrealistic action" that Breton dreamed about ("walk down into the street, gun in hand and shoot into the crowd at random as long as possible.")

The methodical destruction of the possibility of reasoned opinions leaves the direction of wish streams undecided: they either flow in the direction of the "kingdom of ends" (Kant) or in those of a fascistic anarchism which, as we read in Doctor Faustus, likewise dreams of revolution and makes use of vital machines (Gentile, Morand, Drieu, are good examples).

This does not mean that such a consequence is imminent for Deleuze and Guattari (as little as it was for Breton): it only means that their claim cannot pose anything in

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opposition to it. This is connected with their condition of equating of the societal (i.e., *real*) and wish production. Such identification robs the wish of that contra-factual character that would make possible its virtualization, i.e., guarantee its displacement on the level of representation, and would make the fictions —constantly quoted by the authors— into a quasi-ethical authority as opposed to existing repression. Wishes transposed into the imaginary act against the happiness that real society has left behind. By emphatically denying the counter-real character of these phantasies, Deleuze and Guattari condemn wish production to a frenzied approval of existing power. This attempt to celebrate the postponement or the loss of meaning as a happening of hysterical overjoy moreover resembles even down to motivational details, the neurotic conversion to optimism of the failed revolutionaries of 1848.

The misconception of grammar goes back to Nietzsche, who coined the phrase "language prison." This idea presupposes the dismissal of a subject who, in speaking makes use of the given signs in order "to express everything but what the language prescribes." The protest against the compulsion which the "code" exercises over the "codified subject" logically presupposes the death (not only of God but also) of the subject who, acting linguistically, somehow relates to that language, i.e., transcends it and changes it. If there *were* no subject who would suffer the compulsions of language? But even if there existed a subject blindly executing the prescriptions of the code, abandoned in passivity, how could one propose liberation in his name? A machine which by its nature is passive (moved only by external forces, e.g., by compulsive streams), could not even perceive the freedom that "grammar" steals from it and could not even perceive it as loss. Thus, when Deleuze and Guattari (disregarding the logical contradiction in the very idea) demand the abolishing of laws, the "beyond of laws," "the destruction of the code," "force against syntax," "violation of grammar," etc., in favor of "a nonsense made into current schizo-nomadically," they appeal to a concept of man who must be able to give an account of his liberty or potential for liberation. Nowhere do they furnish this theory nor can I discover it in the essentially discursive earlier writings of Deleuze. Aside from two sympathetic addresses to Sartre, there is not even an attempt in that direction.

Deleuze and Guattari write: "one will never be able to go far enough in deterritorialization, the decoding of the flows." How should one think of the realization of that implied imperative? Surely not under capitalism which, although it causes all wish streams to flow, still sets up "displaceable limits." Could it be in schizophrenia which demolishes the "absolute limit" as well and thus approaches the "truth bursting open only in a delirium?"

I am not sure whether the authors will reject this thought; at any rate they do not do it expressly. But, again, there are passages where they indicate contradictions, for example as when they demand that one must once more "plead a purpose" for the "process" of the wishes deformed under the tools of repression. This may be the goal of liberation. The same can be said when they refer —affirmatively— to the "*order* of the wish production" (or the "savage order" into which the oedipal "theater of representation" is to be "reverted." So, there is order after all. In fact, the thought of a fully unhindered stream would dissolve by itself. It would be like an ocean extended on all sides and in all directions which was no longer flowing (flowing presupposes direction) and which in the end dissolved into the void of an organ-less All. A wish filling the All beside which nothing else existed could no longer exist as wish, nor would it have an object. The wish too must be differentiated in order to be itself, and it must constitute a world of the wishable outside of itself.

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This may appear sophisticated. Yet, no biologist, anthropologist or naturalist would deny that organic production finds its preliminary end in the attainment of a product, must be interrupted periodically, and can only function in processes that do not disrupt the law of "organic equilibrium." Complete effusion would be entropy. Without a minimum of order the organism that is dependent upon its environment and other persons (or partial objects) is not viable. Even Sartre has shown in his *Critique of Dialectical Reason* that praxis must permanently realize itself in material orders. This does not exclude the fact that it constantly attacks and works at the limits of these orders. However, in order to be able to pass over from an existing order into another, the idea of order must not be abolished, i.e., nonsense as such must not be introduced.

Such phrases only open the field to those visionaries who, tired of dialectical situational analysis, no longer choose between Hitler and Stalin (like some adherents to the "Nouvelle Philosophie"), but not even between "preference" and "rejection," "true" and "false."

This is the specific consequence of Foucault's structuralism (with which Deleuze is not only intimately related, but on which he depends). No one denies that it was Foucault that broke the ice and first drew attention to the phenomenon of "madness and society." But his works, and especially those of some of his disciples —namely Deleuze —the "new philosophers," and among those of the New Right centered around Benoist and Pauwels, operate with a concept of reason still inadequate in negation and highly charged with multiple meanings. On the one hand reason —as in the "Dialectic of Enlightenment"— is a path-breaking and emancipatory medium. One appeals to the reader's reason when attacking the conditions in our prisons and mental institutions. On the other hand, there is the "reason of torture," as Foucault recently called it, which locks up non-reason in the madhouse, exorcising it from the bourgeois order. This is due to the fact that reason implies order. But all order is intolerant of disorder— that deeply relative concept which becomes the adversary of order only according to the axioms of the participants of a definitely articulated worldview (a "symbolic order," in Lacan's word, constituted through all kinds of exclusions.) Well, in that abstractness Foucault's concept becomes anarchical in an untenable sense: it does not allow a difference between Stalin and Hitler, Marx and Nietzsche, Bakunin and Gentile (as the new philosophers in Paris instruct us). All forms of control or as some say, "productivity," of the vital machine will be drawn to violence. The resigned Left-wing challengers of yesterday take to theoretical quietism and spiritual analgesia rather than to grief and to a return of praxis. Through their indifference (i.e., their failure to stand against the existing order and articulate an alternative that is an order of inter-human togetherness) they become the protagonists of a deadly integration of the individual under the ruling power. the political and intellectual dropping out, the spiritual savagery, a certain remote style, the mental poverty hardly cloaked by a frenzy of images and a boundless self-pity of many of our former Left-wingers; these are the bad characteristics of this kind of Foucaultism. Let me only mention the neo-vitalisms, once more fascistically colored, which are creeping in France, this time less in Germany, the home of blind respect for blind productivity following the rediscovered Gobineau, Nietzsche and Chamberlain. They are all the more dangerous because they have an anarchical *touch* that displeases the man on the street; but it is not enough to displease citizens: Nazism, as Thomas Mann stated, also was a "completely unbourgeois adventure."

It is a matter of eliminating a danger which can be described as follows: Out of eager-

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ness to defend the claims of the "schizo" against the terror of the norm, one finally polemicizes against the concept of the norm altogether and becomes a militant accomplice of that norm-suicide which capitalism presents to us. Deleuze and Guattari have seen this well when they characterize fascism as a "paranoid" reaction to the constant displacement of the limit and the continual destruction of the "possibilities to believe." The capitalist state, they argue, is nourished by its own fascist nostalgia, namely the archaic, regressive desire for reterritorielization, the recovery of a fixed code (impossible under the conditions of a total economy).

On the other hand: "One never will go too far with deterritorialization and decoding of the flows." And since no one goes further than the schizo who has reached the "absolute limit," there arises the need to expose the truth in delirium.

Clearly, however, the terror of the code will not be disclosed by attacking the code as such. This would mean: not to look concretely at existing codes, to keep silent with regard to the *ruling* power in the name of all *possible* ones. One must rather expose the terror of this or that specific and definite norm in order to explain what is anticipated of a concept of nonviolent togetherness (in and through the phantasies of suppressed individuals). In other words, what counter-factual norm is condensed in the exiled phantasies of the Becketts, Artauds, and Aragons? When the question is put that way, Kantian morality is left out. One takes up arms for wish production of subjects and against the apparatuses which hinder their development. Such a morality of counter-factual engagements is present both in the works of Foucault as well as in those of Deleuze and Guattari. What is fatal is that these authors do represent their morality factually but they cannot justify it on the premise of semiotic anarchism. Therefore, if they have a morality, it remains unfounded, arbitrary, decisionistic and ideologically open to both Right and Left. This is the consequence of their radicalism-universalism. In the end, it touches everything and everyone but no one and nothing *in particular*, and for the dominant groups it is as acceptable as the universal condemnation of the existent and its powers through the radical and the impotent way Schopenhauer's pessimism was hurled at the world....

Traditional ethics does appeal to the theory of subjectivity and there are noteworthy reasons (Derrida has brought out some of them) for suspending the concepts 'subject' and 'self-evidence' until their function in philosophy, psychoanalysis and the social sciences is explained. But does this mean the liquidation of the subject (Existing industrial societies are more successful in that: why compete with them on the level of theory?) It can only amount to providing a better and more appropriate explanation of subjectivity than has hitherto been the case. For even if the classical-hermeneutical concept of self-understanding shows intellectual shortcomings, it is difficult to imagine how a solution can be expected from an alternative theoretical concept that rests on *not* understanding oneself.

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BUREAUCRATIC APPROACHES TO THE BUREAUCRACY: A CONFERENCE REPORT

by Robert Antonio

The "First International Conference on Comparative Historical and Critical Analysis of Bureaucracy" was held October 4-8, 1982 near Zurich, Switzerland at the "Gotlieb Duttweiler Institut fur wirtschaftliche und soziale Studien" which is supported by the "Migros Community" — a large Swiss firm that is organized along cooperative lines and, according to its literature, committed to "social responsibility" and "democratic participation" as well as profits. The Institut stages primarily conferences organized by its lone resident scholar and director, Rolf Homann (a leftist sinologist from Germany), and a small staff. Though the Migros presence was minimal, the participants could hardly avoid embourgeoisment from the plush surroundings high above Lake Zurich with an excellent view of the Alps.

The conference focused on four general themes: comparative historical analyses of bureaucratic states and social formations, theories of bureaucracy and rationalization (with strong emphasis on Weber and Marx), the bureaucratization of culture, and alternatives to bureaucracy (though little was done on this topic). Two sessions were held concurrently and the approximately seventy conferees tended to break into two groups: one attending the historically oriented sessions and the other participating in those emphasizing theory and culture. Despite some divisions, the historical group cohered around substantive issues as well as basic questions related to their macroscopic approach, while the theory and culture group never coalesced and failed to agree on almost anything.

The comparative historical sessions covered everything from ancient empires to modern systems. In one presentation on China, Oded Shenker stresed a "seminal" conceptual distinction in the comparative study of state bureaucracies. He argued that rational-legal bureaucracies, with strict central office control over lower offices, developed from stability. The central office's ability to define and coordinate an elaborate set of specific tasks for lower officials requires an environment with predictable conditions known by top officials. Shenker contrasted this to unstable environments in which such knowledge never reaches the top. Here, prefectural bureaucracy is likely to develop because it provides flexibility with respect to changing local conditions, and lower officials are given wide discretionary powers. The central office insists on certain goals such as the maintenance of order and extraction of surplus, but leaves the coordination of tasks up to field officials who exercise bureaucratic authority, but must mobilize local resources to do so.

This distinction was the basis for Shenker's comparative analysis of the Imperial, Nationalist, and Communist phases of Chinese history. Because it ruled over a massive territory of diverse people, the Confucian elite relied on perfectural bureaucracy. Sun Yatsen's modernization plans emphasized rational-legal bureaucracy. But because of China's low level of development, diversity and size (as well as the Japanese threat and communist insurgency) prevented this system from functioning effectively. The Maoists bureaucracy relied excessively on generalist officials and decentralized

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decision-making. The "cultural revolution," championed these notions to extremes, resulting in a huge disaster that caused serious malfunctions.

Despite their recognition of the importance of the material substructure (dependence on surplus appropriation) as well as the material function (in the production of power and stratification systems) of state bureaucracy, the presentations on the patrimonial states did not evoke crude materialism. My contribution dealt with the role of state bureaucracy in the decline of the Western Roman Empire, arguing that the transition to feudalism cannot be understood as the outcome of revolutionized productive forces and ensuing class struggle. In late Rome, productive forces and military appropriation both declined drastically while the costs of bureaucracy rose sharply. As other early empires, Rome had underdeveloped means for internal production of surplus product. Thus, its growth and maintenance depended on resources acquired through military conquest. Eventually, the state strangled its economic substructure, while generating the seedbed for feudalism.

Issues developed in the discussions of China and Rome reemerged in the papers on more recent forms of administration. The strongest of these was a detailed study of prefectural systems in colonial Africa by Bruce J. Berman, who argued that colonial administration was not a mere reflection of the logic of industrial capital, nor was it a pure imposition of centralized, political force. The home office avoided rigid and specific dictates because it lacked the machinery to enforce centrally determined policies. Though military intervention was a perpetual threat, the high costs and complicated logistics of such action discouraged its use.

Several papers on post-colonial Africa reiterated issues stressed by Berman. All agreed that the indigenous state bureaucracy continues to pump out peasant surplus for export.

Throughout the conference the rift between anti-Marxists, non-Marxists, cultural Marxists, and orthodox Marxists was manifest. Though it often resulted in pure ideological effusion, the debate raised fundamental questions about bureucracy and political economy. Berman's case study went the furthest in providing a nonreductionist approach to the interactions of bureaucratic power, capitalist surplus appropriation, and traditional structures.

Though he was equally critical of orthodox Marxists for their epiphenomenal treatment of bureaucracy, Steven Sampson attacked cultural Marxists for their totalizing concept of bureaucracy. He claimed that his field study of lower level Rumanian bureaucrats (he was the first American scholar to gain entry to the Party School for bureaucrats) contradicts the view that state socialist societies are *total* bureaucratic systems. He did *not* legitimate the political regimes of these societies, but attempted to demonstrate that the critical Left distort the relations between the party/state apparatus and society. According to Sampson, rural Party officials *must* function in a *non*-bureaucratic fashion. Like the colonial field officials described by Berman, they are brokers between the higher bureaucracy and the traditional life of the village. Lower Party officials personalize their services and must rely on kinship, friendship, and community ties to mobilize the local populace to carry out the goals set by higher party officials. To be successful, the official must conform to the nonbureaucratic ethos of the village, which stresses egalitarian relations, personalism, reciprocity, and flexibility.

Yet, Sampson's attack on the critical Left was misplaced. Total bureucratic domination does not mean that the entire society is uniformly bureaucratized, but only that there is no countervailing power to match the party/state apparatus. One bureaucratic

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elite controls both the means of terror and the centralized means for managing resources. This monopoly power eliminates political opposition, devastates the public sphere, destroys many voluntary associations, and erodes productive efficiency. The fact that village life escapes bureaucratization does not invalidate the description of this system as "total bureaucracy."

Alf Ludtke questioned another aspect of the theory of bureaucratic rationalization. He argued that Marx's and Weber's discussions of bureaucratic power and bourgeois law underplay the continuing application of violence. In Ludtke's estimate violence remains an important force, despite the rise of rational-legal authority. His case study of Prussia (1815-50) demonstrated that the growth of commerce, capital, and bureaucracy did not institute "parallel charges" in " 'extra-economic' forms of exploitation and control." Violent practices were essential to Prussian bureaucratic domination both for economic exploitation and the reproduction of state bureaucracy. How this account of the Prussian case can be generalized was not explained. Ludtke's argument would have been stronger had he provided exemplary evidence of the role of violence in a more fully modernized bureaucracy. This was needed to dispel counter claims that the Prussian violence was merely lingering traditionalism in an incompletely rationalized, patrimonial bureaucracy.

The sessions were punctuated by coffee and croissant breaks to energize the participants. During the five day meetings, the non-Europeans did not overcome their jet lag. Consequently, they divided their time between fighting off sleep and hyperactivity from massive doses of caffeine. Though the meeting was generally well organized, the large number of tightly scheduled papers did not provide sufficient time for critical discussion. Consequently many theoretical issues were not adequately developed.

Later John Keane discussed the welfare state's contradictory task of ensuring economic growth, maintaining social control, redistributing resources, and promoting equal opportunity, without undermining capitalist accumulation and "business confidence." The conjunctural stagnation of the contemporary capitalist economy and "muddled decision making" by the state, in its enlarged reproductive role, result in problems of accumulation and erosion of the state's revenue base. Keane described three reactions to the crisis which protray a more limited role for state bureaucracy: "New Liberalism" (the welfare state interferes with the free market and for that reason must be dismantled), "New Corporatism" (to compensate for its inefficiency, the welfare state must abandon its pretensions and reduce expectations), and "Autonomous Public Spheres" (the establishment of democratic initiatives in policy matters outside of the usual bureaucratic avenues). Keane hopes that public spheres, possibly emerging in the new social movements, will generate democratic policy responses that transcent thedepoliticized strategies of the welfare bureaucracy. Bureaucracy, according to Keane, has self-destructive tendencies" that unfold from its contradictory efforts at maintining both hierarchical discipline and unity. But he did not develop the point. Moreover, his analysis of the crisis and the responses to it are nothing new. The most important issue concerned the emerging public spheres and new social movements, and their connection to the rise of debureaucratized means of managing the crisis. It was unclear, however, why if any social movements were to emerge, they would not be mainly right-wing or one-issue apolitical in character. Also, Keane failed to explain how, in a highly bureaucratized and technocratized society where the population is increasingly alienated and depoliticized, can Left social movements advance genuine emancipatory and democratic interests. As a poorly disguised substitute for the traditional proletariat, the "new social movements" allow for a refurbishing of a ver-

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sion of neo-Marxist theory, but seem to remain elaborate exercises in political scholasticism devoid of any relation to social realities.

Wolf Schafer's comments, about his "Social Science of Nature Preoject" stressed that the traditional borders that once divided science, society, and politics have dissolved, opening new horizons in man's relation to nature. The damages infliced by industrial domination have deligitimized the "imperialist politics of nature." However, an emancipatory approach to nature has not emerged. Such an orientation is not reflected in the pseudo-politics of the envirnnmental regulatory bureaucracies, but must arise outside the bureaucratic system. The new social movements, and particularly those of the environmentalists and feminists, are movements of organic negativity that oppose the current devastation of nature and foreshadow the possibility of a deinstrumentalized relation of science, politics, and nature. On the other hand, the disintegration of scientific ideology has generated naive and nonemancipatory counterideologies: "going natural" (romantic visions of Mother Nature and happy peasants before the hearth), "going Luddite" (complete, militant rejection of science and technology), and "going technocrat" (recycled scientism). Schafer's project aims to contribute to the pacification of man's relation to nature. However, his brief, programmatic statement revealed little about the shape of the new politics geared toward that end. As in Keane's presentation, the key concepts of public sphere and new social movements remained empty slogans lacking any theoretical import.

Henry Etzkowitz called for an alternative to "over-determinism," which he attributed to the legacies of Weber and Marx as well as to conventional technocratic thought. In agreement with Keane and Schafer, Etzkowitz suggested that "alternatives" are likely to arise from the new social movements (environmental, consumer, anti-nuclear, and feminist). Disputes over such issues such as the Pinto, Love Canal, and Three Mile Island have discredited technology. Still, the resulting antibureaucratic critique has gone astray in Luddite rejections of high technology and naive optimism about low technology and low consumption life styles.After the oil crisis of the mid-1970s and the insertion of a second law of thermodynamics into the environmental debate (which portended doom from heat generated by production), some environmentalists proposed strict limits on energy use that would necessitate radical changes in social and productive life. Hip technological determinists argued that the alleged material constraints require utopian decentralization schemes as the only means of preserving the species.

The attack on high technology stimulated a growing division between the "old 'materialist' Left," who pursue increased consumption for the working class, and the "new 'post materialist' Left" who stress the preservation of the quality of life and environment. The goals of the "post materialists" have imposed "externalities" that reduce the speed of economic growth and slow the material advancement of the working class. Etzkowitz argued that a potential solution to this contradiction is renewable energy sources such as solar. More importantly, he called for the development of "mid-level technology," which would preserve many of the advantages of advanced industrialism, while cutting the reliance on oligopoly capitalism. Unfortunately, Etzkowitz' argument neglected to discuss the social dimension of his projected "socialist technology." Given the theme of the paper, it is ironic that his program for change stressed technical factors. Because he did not describe the articulation of "mid-level" technology with the *social* construction of an emancipated society, Etzkowitz, by omission, flirted with technological determinism.

One of the most heated exchanges took place during the session on "Microelec-

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tronics: The Bureaucratic Machine." The session began quietly with a continued critique of bureaucratically controlled technology. Angela Grosso-Ciponte and Isidor Wallimann discussed the spread of high technology computer-ware in the Swiss banking industry. Computerization increased cost efficiency as measured by sales over personnel employed, but incurred new costs by stimulating other types of productive inefficiency. Computer technology rationalized bookkeeping procedures, streamlined organizational functioning, and centralized decision making. In the process however, it also circumscribed and trivialized the activities of lower banking personnel. This deskilling increased turnover, absenteeism, and other problems that reflect reduced employee morale. Similarly Robert LeBailly provided a well delivered attack on the technological determinism implicit in the so-called "microcomputer revolution." LeBailly argued that technology sets limits and creates opportunities, but does not determine social life. Microcomputers, like other technologies, can be harnessed for either domination or emancipation. Their spread by no means guarantees organizational change in the direction of increased human freedom.

Clark C. Abet, the President of Abt Associates, Inc. (the Cambridge, Mass. corporate social research firm), began with ten American "mega-trends," portraying a liberal dreamland of post-industrialism, which was passé in the mid-1960s. The portrait was an upbeat version of that expressed by Talcott Parsons in *The System of Modern Societies* (1960), who at least could be excused by the fact that it appeared at the height of *Pax Americana*. Abt claims that the U.S. is becoming an "information society" where lateral networks replace hierarchies, decentralized structures emerge from centralized ones, and participatory democracy supplants the representative form. The quality of life is improved by the movement from an "either/or" society to one of "multiple options," which Abt aptly illustrated by the multiple possibilities, deriving from increasingly flexible marital and sexual relations. Abt admitted some short term economic problems, but these will be solved by technical progress. The soothing message was delivered in unbroken corporatese: "marketing multipliers" will raise "the average effectiveness of all competitors by reallocating unfitted surpluses to better fits" and "spawning strategic industries such as compunications, servomechanisms, bioengineering, and remote sensing." This will produce a "socio-economic renaissance . . ." "in those alliances and nations cooperatively and consistently partnering government and industry planning, investing, managing, and producing a steadily improving industrial base." What this means remains unclear, except that maybe the unemployed have bright futures in compunications or robotics and will live happily ever after.

Abt's discussion of mega-trends implied that capitalist society is ripe for a transformation to snap it out of its doldrums. The "microcomputerization of bureaucracy" is the event that will put the U.S. back on its post-industrial track toward the rational society, reaching new heights of productive efficiency as well as unparalleled organizational decentralization. This victory of the "microcomputing 'young Turks' " over the "mainframe Mafia" will generate the needed "marketing multipliers," and democratize the organizations that adopt them. The microcomputer nurtures Parsonsian "collegial" organization based on a cooperative, lateral network of experts with equal access to information, which displaces Weberian bureaucracy with its hierarchy, coercion, and secrecy. Abt's argument epitomizes the technological determinism berated by Etzkowitz and LeBailly. His scenario treats bureaucratic domination exclusively as a technical problem with a technical solution. The iron power of bureaucracy becomes an illusion propped up by the mainframe computer and easily punctured by the

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microcomputer. Change is painless in the "information society."

There was at least one other version of post-industrial theory. George Beam basked glowingly in the tradition of managerialism, spanning from Berle and Means to Simon and March. In Beam's view, the power of chief executives and large stock owners (who sit on corporate Boards) is chimerical, while the "real" elite is constituted of middle-level professionals. Executives are sometimes "influential," but only "because others *believe* [my emphasis] they should be obeyed." Higher officials lack the means and expertise to regulate specialists who manage the daily activities of modern complex organizations. Therefore, "real" power resides in the decision making of the middle ranks of officials who have effective control over these activities. Beam argued that this "modern bureaucratic elite" does not simply exercise power in individual organizations, but rule on a grander scale through something he calls the "New Organizational Unity" ("a ['international'] bureaucratic symbiosis" [?!]).

Beam's "John Dean" theory of corporate malfeasance did not hint that middle managers operate in a bureaucratic hierarchy and that their activities are at minimum constrained by goals established by top bureaucrats or Board members.

Of course high management and governing Boards seldom intervene directly in the day-to-day activities of the organization. But this is not a sound basis to argue that their power fails to shape these activities. Executives and trustees define goals that are translated into routines by middle and lower management. Often, consensus about *ultimate organizational goals* is high enough not to require explicity orders that command obedience.

Though Beam's argument may at first seem far fetched, it is not remote from mainline technocratic ideology. In this perspective, reified organizational goals are considered part of a natural and self-actuating order. The Board and executives become mere overseers, coordinators, and bookkeepers of a productive process that they effectively control. This view ignores the domination functions of bureaucracy, and as a result, production reigns as king. The remaining organizational heirarchy is not a means of power and control, but a functional reward structure that lures the most competent people into positions of responsibility. Because the steering mechanism of the entire bureaucratic apparatus derives from the activities of thousands of specialists, the responsibility for change rests with everyone. Systematic reform can occur only through the agency of the vast middle ranks who make the decisions and direct the activities of the organization. This is the classic tune of positivistic managerialism. Yet, this music can seduce even cultural Marxists if they fail to couch their critiques of instrumental reationality in an elite theory of complex organization.

There were numerous papers on the bureaucratization of culture, but their quality was uneven and they lacked a common theme. Several deserve brief mention. George Romoser blasted the new educational conservatism, arguing that the return to "standards" and "liberal education" seeks to reduce faculty power and increase administrative centralization. The new breed of career administrator (who chooses administration because it is a growth area) is increasingly divorced from educational programs and is concerned primarily with running a "tight ship" with the help of "financial and system managers." Their calls for "changes" and "innovation" constitute a subterfuge for the pursuit of bureaucratic power. Jerald Zaslove, drawing on Benjamin's *Einbahnstrasse* and other works in the critical theory tradition, provided a critique of formalist education and bureaucratic culture. He also attacked recent responses to the so-called "literacy" crisis, and argued that North American literary

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studies continue to be crippled by their separation from the sociology of art and history of literacy.

Leon Botstein, the onetime boy wonder (youngest College President ever at Franconia College) and still youthful head of Bard College, gave an animated presentation about the bureaucratization of classical music in late 19th and early 20th century Europe and the reduction of spontaneity in musical performance caused by its professionalization and rationalization. Botstein was entertaining and insightful, but there seemed to be at least a trace of remorse about the decline of the *noblesse oblige* of the skilled amateur and the erosion of elite culture. Vaclav Belohradsky, a Czech emigré teaching in Italy, portrayed bureaucracy as a shift away from individual responsibility. Arendt's concept of *banality* — "the separation of actions from their subjective meaning" — was used to criticize bureaucratic "objectivity" as a form of dissimulation. Under bureaucratic rules the legitimacy of action is equated with administrative rationality disconnected from its sources in human subjectivity. Belohradsky argued that the essence of "banality' is the growing "absorption of culture" by the state which erects a vast network of impersonal rules in place of subjective agency. The "human rights" movement was mentioned as an emergent orientation to resist the state's expropriation of culture and to uphold the subject against bureaucratic banality. Unfortunately, this interesting point was not elaborated.

Beginning on the afternoon of the third day, plenary sessions were convened. The opening plenum summarized the sessions on the bureaucratization of culture. The first speaker stated the obvious — that no single theme dominated and there was a lack of concensus on the most basic issues. After a few scattered comments raning from an attack on "cultural legitimacy" and the dominance of the English language at the conference to a criticism of positivism and bureaucracy, widespread dissatisfaction surfaced about the plenary format. Several participants complained about its large size and impersonal nature, while others argued that the various working groups did not have enough time together, that the individual sessions did not permit sufficient discussion, and that they were ended just as fruitful dialogue began. For a brief period, there was a tug-of-war between the presiders, David Levy and Wolf-Dieter Narr, and the audience who wanted to scrap the plenum and return to the working groups. Levy continued the session in the face of an hostile audience while insisting, somewhat irritably, that he had no investment in the format. At the same time, Narr, a severe critic of bureaucratic order, attemped to maintain order. Schafer, who spoke favorable of "anarchy," expressed the participants' desire to return to smaller discussions. After some heated exchanges, a solution was found.

Institute director Homan suggested a separation into several working groups that reflected roughtly the division of the participants' interests. The groups were to meet for the rest of the day in informal and open discussions, and they return to the plenum the following day. This satisfied most participants, though there were murmers about the conference being overly bureaucratized and about the disorder being engineered by the Marxists.

In one plenary session, Narr attempted to provide theorecticl focus by outlining Weber's theory of bureaucracy. Though he read a bit of Marx into Weber, it was a good presentation. His central position was that a theoretical departure is necessary to cut through the dense ideology surrounding bureaucracy. Despite its shortcomings, Weber provides the most important theory on this topic. Hence, it must be confronted seriously in critical reflection about bureaucratic society. The plenary sessions might have been more fruitful if Narr's argument was heeded. Unfortunately, these sessions

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merely verified his claims about mystification, incoherence and the absence of theory.

Among the most entertaining comments were those aimed at educating foggy-headed intellectuals by exposing them to the hard facts of organizational reality. For example, Curtis Henderson, a corporate consultant from New Jersey with firsthand experience of this reality, lectured the group for spending too much time defining questions. Instead, we should have "listed" the most serious problems of bureaucracy and then "listed" the possible ways to solve them. Henderson castigated the conferees for believing that profit is bad, and for not providing an alternative to it. Though he sang praises to profit, he argued that really big profits might not be all good. Therefore, the gigantic corporate bureaucracies should be reduced in size and limited to a mere six billion dollars in profits! Also, workers need added incentives to increase lagging productivity. Henderson would impose compulsory profit sharing schemes that adjust wages to corporate profits. After it was explained to Henderson that criticism of corporate capitalism should not be equated with a complete rejection of the market, George Beam came to his defense, arguing that people who had rejected pluralism and the market all week were now embracing it. Beam then asserted confidently that we must move away from speculation to theory based on the hard *facts*, that position is more important than class, that organizations are oriented more to production than to profit, and that managerial decision making, rather than elite power, is the dynamic force governing organizational activity. There were also the inevitable abstract discussions about alternatives to bureaucracy, which were frustrated by the lack of agreement about what bureaucracy is, what elements need to be changed, and what kind of society is worth striving for. An American professor of management stated that the meeting was a "hologram," but that there was not much integration (of course! — integration is "not possible at the level of the human ego"). His major point was that the reigning perspectives toward bureaucracy need more than patching: a paradigm revolution is needed! Since "consciousness fixes form" and bureaucracy is a typical expression of modern consciousness, the problem of bureaucracy can be overcome only by a transformation of consciousness. Simple enough, but this is predicted on the recognition that it is the *responsibility of the individual* to get beyond his/her ego. The greening of corporate America will occur after millions of individuals shed their egoism individually. A lady friend of the speaker, also in Consciousness Four, then told the participants (softly): "When you are traveling home you should reflect on your purpose for attending this meeting." After a moment of silence, she sat down — sincerely. An African followed by addressing the issue of economic dependency and the role of bureaucracy in meeting basic human needs. It was a welcome detour from a bad discussion.

In his concluding comments to the last plenary, Narr stated that "we cannot overemphasize the power of bureaucracy." An opposing position suggests critical analyses of bureaucracy that stress exclusivly its overarching power and its ability to divest humanity of subjectivity, in the process, unintentionally distort the subject matter and lose their emancipatory thrust. Theories of bureaucracy that give exclusive emphasis to total domination and total integration risk losing the subject, during efforts ostensibly aimed at rescuing it.

At least two points made during the meetings suggest a critical theory of bureaucracy might be framed such that the analysis of domination does not eclipse the goal of emancipation. First, Sampson's presentation, and his comments throughout the meeting, implied that there should be increased concern about the sectors of life that

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have not succumbed to bureaucratic rationalization. It is necessary to search for spontaneity even in those areas where the domination of the bureaucratic machine is believed to be most complete. Understanding how subjectivity survives in unadministered pockets of bureaucratic society provides clues about the broader task of debureaucratization. Second, Berman argued that bureaucracies need to be reproduced, and that it is necessary to analyze the problems, discontinuities, and breakdowns in this repreoductive process. Understanding these ruptures and contradictions might provide a meaningful starting point for thinking about *determinate* possibilities for change. Narr was correct about Weberian thought being the most reasonable starting point for theoretical reflection because the bureaucratic domination that Weber feared has become a reality. However, the limitations of his thought must also be recognized and somehow overcome. Presently, many of the critical variations of the theory of bureaucracy that claim to have gone beyond Weber retain the weaknesses of his approach without preserving its strengths.

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

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Reviews:

Zygmunt Bauman, *Memories of Class*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982, 209 pages. $21.95.

"Concepts tend to outlive the historical configurations which gave them birth and infused them with meaning." For Zygmunt Bauman, the capacity of concepts for lingering in an afterlife of obsolescence "applies in full to the case of 'class.' "

Like Gorz's *Adieux au proletariat*, Bauman's latest book bids farewell to that historical subject which has shown itself to be no longer the carrier of a universal project of emancipation. In his sober but rewarding book, Bauman traces the trajectory of the concept and the reality of class from pre-history to afterlife, and provides us with a picture of late-capitalist societies that draws its inspiration from the works of Habermas, Offe and Touraine. Bauman does not, however, indicate which social groups and movements might carry on the project of social transformation. The reason for this might lie in his systemic view of late capitalist societies, an approach that (witness Luhmann) seems blind to areas that escape the logic of the system, its presumptive "needs" and its repressive effects. To be fair, Bauman does give attention to the articulation of new interests, although he does not identify the actors that embody these interests and that might plausibly redraw the boundaries of legitimation and establish non-repressive modes of social life.

Bauman's investigation of the contradictory tendencies, ills and discontents of present-day Western societies and his identification of some of the underlying causes is masterful: few books provide such a clear picture of our contemporary predicament, combining theoretical arguments with historical analysis in a way that is both cogent and effective. The book is divided in two main parts: after an introductory chapter that sets out the main themes to be explored, a good half is devoted to a historical reconstruction of the phenomenon of class, its emergence from feudal divisions based on rank and its self-assembly under the pressure of the new industrial order; then, after an interim summary of the tendencies of industrial society, the second half is given to an analysis of corporatism or "simulated politics" and an investigation of the new contradictions and new victims, as well as the new conflicts, brought about by the failure of social engineering, the fall in economic growth and the inability of power to guarantee social integration and cultural reproduction.

Bauman's main contention is that the historical memory of class and class conflict, shaped by the experience of 19th-century capitalist industrialization, sustains the belief that collective interests coalesce around the right to the "whole product of labor," variously named "control of the economy," "ownership of the means of production," or "right to profit," depending on theoretical allegiances or political inclinations. Historical memory inspires a vision of class conflict based on the idealization of the capitalist market. As a result, conflict is reduced to "the management of the surplus product, rather than being about the regimentation of the body and soul of its producers" (p. 27). The "disciplining power" of capitalist production is lost in this vision. Issues of personal autonomy and fulfillment are displaced in favor of distributive struggles. What Bauman calls "the economisation of class conflict" is the well-known translation of struggles over the control of the productive process into struggles over the share of the surplus product. Power conflicts are thus "economised" and relegated to the sphere of distribution.

Even the now fashionable theories of the "New Class" (composed of intellectuals and technical intelligentsia aspiring to a position of dominance) fall prey to the worn-out categories of historical memory. "They all in the end agree that now, as much as in

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the time of bourgeois revolution, the moving force of history is the thrust of a new class to take over the management of the social surplus which previous rulers are not able to administer properly" (p. 28). Konrad and Szelenyi, together with Gouldner, are thus rebuked for providing answers framed by obsolescent categories and consequently for being oblivious to the new sources of conflict and social change. The "New Class," in this respect, is the modern re-enactment of the old drama of class struggle and class domination, set in the age of growing self-consciousness on the part of intellectuals. Bauman, for his part, counterposes eight theses, defended and argued extensively throughout the book, to explain the dynamics of late capitalist or industrial societies.

The *first* is that "late industrial society at its present stage is held together by systemic, rather than social dependencies." Accordingly, the "problems" and "crises" of this society are endemic: they stem from the system as a whole rather than from a dominant class and its policies. The *second* is that, similarly, the management of the surplus product is more an abstract function of the system than it is the prerogative of any concrete group that one could characterize as the dominant class. "The 'right to the whole product,' allegedly the focus of crystallization of the class-type conflict, is not, therefore, at issue." Consequently, and this is the *third* thesis, "no single group can be identified as the 'historical class' of the late industrial society; i.e., as a class whose group interests are identical with the interests of the society as a whole." The *fourth* thesis, by implication, is that "no group pressure, or a group program legitimizing this pressure, is likely to provide a solution to the system's problems."

Bauman then goes on to say, in his *fifth* thesis, that the deflation of class vision is compensated by the rising role of the state in producing and distributing the social surplus and in "legislating morals." "The support for the new forms of control over body and spirit was perhaps the single most important factor of growth in the first stage of state expansion. More directly economic tasks joined later." In the end, the state occupies the position of the main "throughput" of the system and can be seen as "a link within the communication network, without which no integrated existence of the system is further possible." These circumstances, Bauman maintains in his *sixth* thesis, breed several illusions: "the illusion of the centrality and the causal role of politics which the latter does not possess," the illusion of a conscious political process, and the formidable illusion of the extensive power potential of the state. These result in a chronic overload of demands on the state. "Under these circumstances," Bauman says in his *seventh* thesis, "the state moves steadily into the focus of group divisions and alliances. . . Alterations of policy lead to successive realignments of divisions. . . but no division seems to occupy an over-determining position in relation to others." This is partly due to the fact that the increasing role of the state in the economic and social spheres "favors some and harms some other aspects of individual interests, prompting truly schizophrenic attitudes towards the role of the state." The *eighth* thesis concludes that "the throughput role of the state in the social system does not split the society into opposing classes." Rather, "the present location of the state within the system has passed the threshold line beyond which it acquires a self-perpetuating and perhaps also a self-reinforcing capacity" (pp. 28-32).

Bauman maintains that only by focusing on the issue of "discipline power," which in its bid to control the producers led to endemic struggles over the distribution of the surplus, can we hope to come to grips with the present crisis in the mechanisms of social integration and cultural reproduction. In his words: "the crisis we experience is not 'more of the same' problems, but a qualitatively new stage in history which can be

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passed only with a change in the type of social power as seminal as the one which took place in the times preceding the advent of the industrial system" (p. 33).

This change in social power from the feudal to the industrial system (exemplified in the shift from sovereign power to discipline power) is the focus of the two historical chapters which draw upon the insights of Foucault and the work of E.P. Thompson and other historians. Briefly put, the argument that runs throughout these two chapters is that the issue of control over the life of the producers in both their private and productive roles, as exemplified in the birth of the factory system, was a causal factor in the emergence and formation of the working class and in the articulation of their interests in terms of historical memory ("the right to the whole product of labor") and eventual translation of these interests in distributive struggles over the surplus product. The fact that power conflicts were rechanneled into the struggle for the distribution of the surplus has had, in Bauman's view, profound repercussions over the development of industrial society, and lies at the root of our present troubles: "it accomplished what the direct assault on the body and spirit of producers in the early years of industrial revolution tried in vain at the enormous risk of a popular rebellion: it instilled in the minds and the actions of the workers not so much the 'spirit of capitalism' as the proclivity to assess one's own value and dignity in terms of monetary rewards; and to make up for the lost control over one's own productive contribution by an increased share in consumption" (p. 112).

Corporatist — or "simulated" — politics is a belated outcome of this process whereby organized interest groups articulate their demands over the share of the surplus within a framework set by the state and operating on the principle of monopoly power (over the means of production and over the representation of workers' interests). This institutionalization of the struggle for the share in consumption is analyzed in one of the most interesting chapters of the book, entitled "Corporatism and its discontents." Here Bauman deals with the issues raised by the writings of Pahl and Winkler, Schmitter and Lembruch, Jessop and Panitch, Crouch and Middlemas. His own reasoned view is that the process of consultation, bargaining and compromise between functional groups (capital and labor) which is carried inside the corporatist network "simulates" a public debate where antagonistic interests are not allowed an airing lest they disrupt the consensual frame of operation. The byproduct of such process is the "publicization of the private domain," whereby many conditions of economic survival and welfare are no longer under the control of individuals directly affected but in the hands of the state and of functional organizations, and a growing "privatization of the public sphere," whereby public issues are turned into personal squabbles between politicians, business leaders and trade-union representatives. The net result is the bureaucratization of conflict in its economized form, that is, the tendency to divorce the distributive allocation from public debate and collective action. This, in turn, implies the erosion of traditional notions of representation, which Bauman defines as "the discursive articulation of generalizable group interests realized with an active participation of all those concerned," in favor of the conservative and backward-looking pragmatics of simulated debate. In this context the crucial issue, for Bauman, is the disenfranchisement of powerless and destitute groups of society, which are denied the status of subjects with institutionalized means of expression; the likelihood of an open and violent confrontation between these groups and the state is therefore very high, as witnessed by the urban riots in England in the summer of 1981.

Bauman then considers the limits of the corporatist form of economized politics, which in his view are related to the contradictions that determined the corporatist ten-

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dency in the first place. State-management of the economy and the incorporation of functional groups in networks of consultation and bargaining arose, in fact, as a response to the failure of the capitalist economy to reproduce the conditions of its own existence, i.e., to maintain capital and labor in their commodity form, and to repair the damage done by the operations of a market economy by financing transfer payments, i.e., social welfare provisions. However, since the capitalist economy and the state "rotate around a common axis with economic growth as the flywheel, the distinctive prospect of this wheel not running forever (as it has not done for the past ten years) sets the limit to the new political solution (i.e., corporatism) to the old problem of economic vulnerability" (p. 145).

In other words, in times of economic crisis corporatist arrangements are less and less capable of overcoming the inherent contradictions of a capitalist economy and calls to let the market operate free of any restrictions or impediments gain increasing resonance at governmental-policy level, as witnessed in the case of Britain and the United States. In Luhmann's system-theoretical language, the state acts to reduce the level of complexity of its socio-economic environment by means of strong selective mechanisms that restrict the number and type of demands put to it, in this case that of managing the dysfunctions of the economy. In such a way rationality crises are avoided, or at least postponed, while the boundaries of legitimate state activity are redrawn along the lines of diminished intervention. The latter phenomenon, instead of provoking widespread protest or discontent, seems rather to be accompanied by fatalistic or resigned attitudes on the part of the population or, alternatively, to encourage the resurgence of meritocratic and individualistic values among privileged sectors. Bauman further notes, in this context, that classes are divided or ambiguous as regards the desirability of expanding the state management of the economy. Workers, in particular, "in their dual capacity of hired labor and consumers, find themselves often drawn in opposite directions in responding to the vagaries of successful governments' policies. The middle class. . . is similarly in two minds because of its complex composition and, again, the contradictory effects of state economic interventions" (p. 156). This means that social groups once thought to have potentially irreconcilable interests and clearly defined values and strategies in pursuing these interests are now locked up in contradictory situations and split among themselves in such a way as to be no longer the actors of a historical struggle or the subjects of a societal dynamic.

For Bauman, therefore, among the various crisis-tendencies of late capitalist societies, none "points towards the reappearance of the two traditional classes, capital and labor, as the major actors in the historical process." Instead, "institutionalized memories of the great class divide turn into a major obstacle to the understanding of the real working of the highly industrial system. They impede the sighting of the new types of conflict for the simple reason that these conflicts do not lend themselves to an articulation in traditional class language. But these conflicts nevertheless exist; and it is in these conflicts that the possibility of a true legitimation crisis of the system resides" (pp. 160-161). This crisis, in Bauman's view, is related to the question of the representation of neglected interests and of the redress of areas of deprivation that lack institutionalized channels of expression.

We might note, at this point, a problematic feature of Bauman's account, namely, the way in which a system-theoretical approach is used to indicate crisis potentials not just at the level of system integration but also at the level of social integration and cultural reproduction. Now, system analysis can indicate the areas of crisis, of destructuration, of loss of steering capacity, but *not* the way social groups will react to them or

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the strategies employed to overcome them. This can only be done by means of an analysis centered upon social actors, their needs and interests, attitudes and expectations, normative beliefs and symbolic meanings; in other words, by an analysis directed towards the communicative infrastructure of the *Lebenswelt,* the latter being in effect the source of the most salient crises of late capitalist society, expressed in legitimation and motivational deficits. The "logic of the system" cannot therefore explain the dynamics of social movements, but only the functional compatibility of the various sub-systems of a society, i.e., their structural differentiation and integration. It is no surprise, therefore, to see Bauman relying on Touraine's analysis of social movements in order to highlight the areas of deprivation and neglect which he sees as the source of potential crisis tendencies. Here the arguments become more plausible insofar as an action-theoretical approach is employed, i.e., a methodological apparatus that is appropriate to the object of inquiry. This methodology points toward "groups and categories left outside the oligarchy of order, and above all towards a diffuse, class-unspecific pressure for open participation in a discursive redemption of ends and values of society" (p. 162).

However, Bauman is quick to note that if these group interests and their articulation undermine the principles of institutional selectivity, functional representation and instrumental legitimation, they do it only indirectly, since "the range of issues they force into the public agenda and the type of interests they want to be heeded to is too wide to be contained in the limited space of corporatist arrangement." Moreover, the disaffection, dissent or protest of these groups subject to market-produced deprivations in the areas of housing, health, education and employment, are unlikely to cause structural changes comparable to those associated with the dynamics of class struggle. In Habermas' words, their struggle "lacks the chances of revolutionary success," insofar as it does not affect the mechanism of surplus production but is directed almost exclusively at the unequal patterns of distribution and consumption. In this respect, the arguments of many neo-Marxist writers that only class relations have an internal logic of development, a logic that generates systematic tendencies for the transformation of the power structure of class societies, still retain their overall validity and are, even if reluctantly, acknowledged by Bauman himself. Stated otherwise, class relations and class conflict have a specific primacy in that the social and political dynamics they generate provide an overall directionality to the trajectory of historical change. If this claim is accepted, then it follows that "situational groupings" (groups exposed to situationally dependent deprivations and frustrations, in Offe's definition) and the disparity between "vital areas" (education, transportation, housing and health) cannot be seen as the harbingers of social change, but as sectors and groups suffering, with little means of redress, the worst forms of pauperization, marginalization and oppression.

Bauman recognizes this, and notes also that "areas of deprivation from which a most critical challenge arises for the system . . . cannot be often expressed in terms of clearly defined groups and their interests" (p. 191). This means that their struggles are not usually as successful or as effective as the ones carried within the framework of corporatist, or "economized," politics. For Bauman, however, it is in these areas of deprivation that the most fundamental crises and challenges to the system tend to arise. He recommends shifting the focus of investigation "towards the politically operated repartition (of costs and rewards) . . . as the location where systemic crises are born and where the search for their solution can be conducted." For Bauman, contradictions "are explicable as the incongruence of the state-managed defense of the production-

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oriented power structure, rather than as a reflection of the antagonistic class interests." Therefore, it would be a mistake to interpret inequality as a function of class exploitation. Besides, "none of the great institutionalized class forces may be expected to funnel the diffuse grievances which articulate the malfunctions of the corporatist arrangement" (pp. 191, 193). Bauman therefore concludes that the most central issue of contemporary late capitalist societies is the progressive dissociation of distributive entitlements from the participation in the production of the surplus and, by implication, the increasingly political nature of distributive struggles. In his view, the political pressure on the distribution of the surplus can be relieved "only if the stiff and highly asymmetrical patterns of control (over the bodies and souls of the producers) are replaced by a pattern of interdependence, allowing for a direct confrontation . . . with the issues of personal autonomy and fulfillment" (p. 196).

The main theme of the book thus re-emerges at the end: the industrial form of social power — "discipline power" — that served up to now the function of social integration and cultural reproduction is increasingly under strain and may become historically obsolete if its mode of operation is radically challenged. In order for this to be so politics should cease to be "economics by proxy" and become the focus of struggles over "the organization of social life, self-management, restitution and preservation of human control over the ways in which human bodily and spiritual potential is developed and deployed" (p. 197). This means that social groups and movements should, as they have done recently, pose the question of the repossession by politics of "the right to validate, renegotiate and transform discursively the basic structure of power heretofore left to the discretion of economic institutions." Bauman's agenda calls for enlarging the scope of involvement in active politics and for "the redefinition of democracy in terms of the substance of political discourse" (pp. 197-198).

Bauman's political vision and recommendations are nothing but laudable and show the still extant optimism of his will. As regards the diagnosis of our present troubles, however, the pessimism of his intellect shows through, and provides us with little hope that the structural conditions generating systemic crises and social conflicts might be overcome.

Maurizio d'Entrèves

Bertell Ollman, *Class Struggle Is the Name of the Game: True Confessions of a Marxist Businessman.* William Morrow and Co. New York, 1983. 288 pages. $12.95.

It is impossible to read this book and not take a strong liking to Ollman. It is well written, witty, and humorous. Except for his rebaptism of Toni Negri as Paolo Negri (on page 209), this is a polished, extremely well edited, and generally elegant work. Ollman has written a book with a lot of *class,* (not the kind he prefers) and a modicum of *struggle* (between his ideology and his social being). This is the story of Ollman's attempt to market what he considers the socialist answer to "Monopoly": "Class Struggle,". On the level of entertainment, the book is a winner, as long as one does not take it seriously.

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But for those who are interested in its political content, the book is a disaster. It is another document in the voluminous file of orthodox Marxism's long-overdue petition for conceptual reorganization under Chapter 11 of the unwritten code governing theoretical integrity. Ollman really believes that in selling his silly game he was performing a political task, and he went at it with a zeal comparable only to that of newly converted Moonies and born-again fundamentalists.

Ollman is even more ambitious. He took the message to Wall Street and the Chamber of Commerce. And it is this Chaplinesque flavor that makes the book so funny and readable. If the publisher will not go the way of the naive and probably broke inventors in the Class Struggle game it is because this book is definitely *not* the "true story of a head-on collision between Marxist political theory and good business practice" advertised on the cover. If anything, it is a comedy of ideological ghosts unsuccessfully trying to haunt a capitalist household where the only ones who still believe in ghosts are the ghosts themselves and a few dinosaur right-wingers who refused to market the game.

Anyone reading this review has probably either played or seen Class Struggle — the game, that is, and not the metaphysical fiction that Ollman deduces out of his peculiar re-interpretation of Marxist theory. As a parody on Monopoly, it is a little on the boring side, especially if one tries to follow the Byzantine set of attached rules, and in any case is definitely out of the league of Pac-Man or Space Invaders. Ironically, in fictionalizing an obsolete theoretical concept, Ollman has chosen the equally historically obsolete form of a board game rather than the more advanced modes of collective cretinization, such as video games (although a computerized version is announced, almost as an afterthought, on page 280, after the game has been fully commodified and sold to a legitimate game manufacturer). It definitely belongs to the pre-electronic age. That it has managed to sell 85,000 copies may be attributed to the curiosity of the post-1968 generation which could not help confronting orthodox Marxism, yet never fully understood either its theory or its tragic history. Contrary to Ollman's conception of the game as a counter-hegemonic tool to teach children the virtues of socialism and how to get there, the game was probably bought and played (no more than once or twice) by middle-aged ex-radicals interested in reliving some aspects of their dubious political youth. Rather than as a radical educational stimulant, the game's limited success may be owing to its social function as a cute and politically intriguing curiosity. At any rate, in the half dozen times I have seen the game being played, none of the players has ever been younger than 30.

To understand why Ollman would waste three or four years of his life in this foolishness, it is necessary to consider his intellectual formation in England (even though he is a nice boy from Milwaukee) and his peculiar notion of Marxism. After all, Ollman learned his Marxism under the tutelage of none other than Isaiah Berlin in Oxford. It was there he ran into the remnants of late 19th century English neo-Hegelianism and rediscovered F.H. Bradley's theory of internal relations, which he immediately and correctly recognized as an integral part of Marxist epistemology. His dissertation, later published as his magnum opus, *Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society*, argues against crude materialist and orthodox accounts of the philosophical foundations of Marxism in favor of the neo-Hegelian interpretation. In so doing, Ollman was philosophically right, but, in failing to fully investigate the implications of his recycled neo-Hegelian account, he drew inadequate orthodox political conclusions validating the crudest possible versions of orthodox Marxism — which explains the success of the book and Ollman's own popularity within radical circles. Had Ollman

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spent more time reading turn-of-the-century neo-Hegelian thinkers such as Green, Bosanquet, Croce, etc., rather than stopping with Bradley and inventing silly games such as Class Struggle, he might have discovered the problem of the historicity of abstractions, and the dialectic of quantity and quality. This would have led him, as it has scores of other neo-Hegelian Marxists, to establish the obsolescence of 19th century categories such as class struggle and reformulate social theory along more adequate and historically grounded lines. But, after all, Ollman is a political scientist and a would-be small businessman, not a philosopher.

The problem with the theory of internal relations as embraced by Bradley and Ollman is that it is out-and-out objective idealism, which forgets about the nomological character of concepts and thus loses sight of the dynamism of the living reality out of which it abstracts. In so doing, it tends to produce theoretical elaborations based on empirical conditions which no longer exist and relations that no longer obtain. The final result is a philosophically sophisticated dogmatism no more adequate than the worst kind of Diamat. After the work of Gorz, Cohen or Bauman,[1] it is theoretically irresponsible to talk about class struggle in the same way one talks about the New York Yankees or the interest rate.

Having failed to realize that rather than being the "magnificently rich tapestry"[2] he thinks, Marxism is really a self-contradictory patchwork of irreconcilable theoretical fragments, Ollman for the last dozen years has indefatigably sought to apologize for every orthodox concept in the Marxist arsenal without paying the least attention to concrete historical developments. Occasionally the results are embarrassing, as when, in the opening pages of the book, he describes his attempts to sell socialism to the New York Chamber of Commerce under the pretext that socialism would solve all the problems of small businessmen. Of course, Ollman simply shrugs off all of the jokes and real nightmares of the Soviet economy as not being "really" democratic socialism. But he must have some familiarity with French socialism or bureaucracies in general to at least realize that swapping capitalist for socialist problems is probably as wise a move as marketing Class Struggle as a game! He writes of a mythological socialism as the answer to all real or imaginary problems, blissfully unaware that the New Deal or the welfare state in general long ago integrated whatever positive features socialism might have had. Today the only promise of a democratic socialism would be that guilt for socio-economic dysfunctions would be redistributed from a relatively small ruling group to a broader polity without in the least solving — and in all probability intensifying — existing problems. Since, in his typically messianic style, Ollman is talking about rosy ideals internally related within an equally rosy theory of society, practical problems never seriously pierce his ideology.

The surprising contradiction is that, when he tries to function as a bush-league capitalist, Ollman performs much better than one would expect. In fact, he comes out so well in *Class Struggle Is the Name of the Game* that few capitalists would have serious qualms about hiring him as a salesman — although social theorists may have second thoughts about his philosophical proclivities. Notwithstanding the fact that he was marketing as miserable a commodity as Class Struggle, he fared unexpectedly well, managing to rip off almost as many small businesses as had in turn ripped him off. Of

1. Cf. André Gorz, *Adieu au Proletariat* (Paris, 1980); Jean L. Cohen, *Class and Civil Society: The Limits of Marxian Critical Theory* (Amherst, 1982); and Zygmunt Bauman, *Memories of Class* (London, 1982).

2. Bertell Ollman, *Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society* (Cambridge, 1981), p. 231.

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course, his politics constantly got in the way. On the whole, however, it seems that the game would have done much worse than it did if Ollman had not been hawking it. What seems to have helped a lot was the large amount of publicity that the game generated — not so much because of its content but because of the as the peculiarity of the phenomenon. That Class Struggle becomes a game is a sure sign that its political content now rates no better than that of Dungeons and Dragons or even Monopoly, whose rules reflect contemporary reality about as much as do those of Class Struggle.

Appropriately, the book is dedicated "To the ten million small businesspeople in America." Each one of them would be proud of Ollman as a colleague. After all, Class Struggle Inc. went bust not because of its politics, but because of good, old-fashioned greed on the part of typical businessmen who really thought they could sell 50,000 copies of this inane game over a Christmas season. As it turned out, American consumers were as wise in rejecting Class Struggle as a game as they have been in rejecting it as politics.

Moishe Gonzales

Jürgen Habermas, *Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns* (Frankfurt, 1981), 2 vols.*

Any survey of social theory over the last two decades readily reveals that it remains under the firm control of functionalism. Though there have been significant inroads on the part of, e.g., French structuralism, they were never quite accepted by mainstream sociology. Critical Theory has restricted itself to merely nurturing its tradition, and "genuine" Marxism, which during the protest movements caused some disturbance with its critique of "bourgeois science," can no longer ignore the crisis it has been caught in for some time. Are all serious attempts at a theory of the social totality bound to the functionalist criterion of "success or failure?" Those who have fought their way through Habermas' most recent work may have noticed this, either with resignation or satisfaction. "No social theory," writes Habermas programatically (vol. II p. 297) can any longer "be taken seriously if it is not somehow related to Parsons." In fact, if writings which are taken seriously are equated with those that should be then, at least in West Germany. Compared with the positivism-dispute of twenty years ago the unification of intellectual methods is striking. These contributions are characterized as variations of Weberianism left versus right Weberians). Habermas' "theory of communicative action" is an impressive testament to this state of affairs. For Habermas, Weber's theory of rationalization still offers "the most promising approach for explaining social pathologies which appear in the wake of capitalist modernization" (vol. II, p. 449). For long stretches the book reads like an attempt to reformulate Weber's "diagnosis of the modern age" (loss of meaning and freedom through the secularization of religion, the monetarization of labor and the bureaucratization of job-performance) within the interpretive framework of the interaction of "system" and "life-world". Unlike functionalism, however, the author also tries to maintain a relation with Marx. Thus, the conclusion is titled: "From Parsons, via Weber, to Marx."

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Habermas' study is less concerned with Marx than with Western Marxism (vol. II, p. 489). But the theory of communicative action is Marxist through its reference, however modified, to the theme of "crisis and critique" obliterated in functionalism. Habermas' book claims to present a critical thoery of society (vol. II, p. 548 ff.) free of the difficulties encountered by the older Critical Theory of Horkheimer and Adorno.

Habermas wants to introduce a "theory of communicative action" that clarifies the normative foundations of a critical theory of society" (vol. II, p. 583, and vol. I, p. 8). The core of this theory is linguistic understanding or communicative rationality as the mechanism for coordinating action (vol. I, p. 370). This theory needs normative foundations which can be obtained only through a theory of action. This, however, is by no means obvious. Another standpoint is possible, e.g., by merely detaching the concept of modernization from that of rationality (vol. I, p. 23). For Habermas, rationality connects the theory of action with the theory of society. He derives these two from Weber's sociology where action was interpreted according to the guiding idea of purposive rationality. The *difficulties* of the theory of action then prejudice the direction of Weber's social theory. The excessively narrow basis led to viewing modernization in terms of the spread of purposive-rational action (vol. I, pp. 369, 455). On the basis of his estimation of the goal of social theory, Habermas adheres firmly to the concept of action and its rationality, but he seeks a more comprehensive concept of the rationality of action than merely purposive rationality. This concept is communicative rationality which was prefigured in the tradition stemming from Durkheim. It is expressed in all modes of behavior for which reasons can be given. It is embodied in the central experience of the "consensus-creating power of argumentational discourse which is oriented toward uncoerced agreement" and in which the various participants overcome their at first merely subjective views and, thanks to the shared nature of rationally motivated convictions, simultaneously assure themselves of the unity of the objective world and the intersubjectivity of their life situation (vol. I, p. 28).

For a theory that proceeds *reconstructively*, the idea of communicative rationality as the normative foundation for the theory of society is valid only to the extent that it is already inherent in the evaluative basis of discourse, i.e., it has already become "true in practice." But Habermas does not rest content with the presence of reason in the irreducible presuppositions of speech, but he postulates — in a sense different from the Dialectic of Enlightenment — an *increase* in communicative rationality with modernization. The process of bringing the sacred to language develops an increasingly pure mechanism for a process of linguistic communication oriented toward validity claims (vol. I, p. 459). "In modern societies," the book concludes, "the contingency leeway for interaction detached from normative contexts goes so far that the inner logic of communicative action becomes true in practice both in the non-institutionalized forms of association of the familial private sphere and in the public sphere shaped by the mass media." Bringing the sacred to language in symbolic reproduction (family and public sphere) is, however, only half of a rationalization process whose other half is the retreat from mechanisms of linguistically validated material reproduction, which includes economics and state administration. The latter become the domain of rational-purposive action that no longer must rely on language as a mechanism of consensus. The fact that Habermas does not merely exchange the concept of purposive rationality for that of communicative rationality, but splits the process of rationalization into these two contrary concepts, is the book's key argument. In the course of modernization rational-purposive orientations do not merely extend themselves, as in Weber (in

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Habermas' interpretation); nor does organic solidarity simply acquire a progressive preponderance over mechanical solidarity, as in Durkheim; similarly, history does not end inevitably in the context of total blindness engendered by instrumental reason, as in Horkheimer and Adorno. Rather, increasing communicative rationality in the "life-world" brings about [like two sine curves displaced toward one another] a growing purposive-rationality in the area of the "system". The basic problem of the continuation of the modernization process consists then in the difficulty that a *further* extension of purposive rationality forces a reversal in communicative rationality. However, it is not a matter of a cyclical development; the threat to communicative rationality by an increasingly expanding purposive rationality does not produce a lower threshold where purposive rationality diminishes and communicative rationality increases again. The opportunities for consensus provided by linguistic communication are, rather, *secularly* threatened, without the increase of purposive rationality generating a countertendency.

The distinction of two contrary types of rationality with irreducible criteria of rationality prevents Habermas from simply dissolving societies into processes of communication, as does the phenomenological tradition (vol. II, p. 10). "If social integration must increasingly be secured by a consensus achieved communicatively, the question of the limits of the integrative capacity of communication-oriented behavior and of the limits of the empirical effectiveness of rational motives must be raised" (vol. II, p. 169).

In keeping with this line of argument, Habermas develops a two-stage concept of society: society must be conceived at the same time as life-world and as system (vol. II, p. 380). As a normatively integrated life-world, it is accessible from the participatory perspective of acting subjects; as a functionally geared system it is accessible from the observational perspective of (system-theory schooled) sociologists. Accordingly, there are two types of the coordination of social action: either via the consensus of the participants, be it secured by world-images or produced linguistically; or via "functional connections" (a somewhat vague idea). Habermas introduces Lockwood's far-reaching distinction expanded into a critique of Parsons, but, surprisingly, without taking an explicit stand on it. The systematic development of this idea, is what takes Habermas beyond Parsons. The "rationalization of contexts of communicative behavior and the rise of subsystems of rational-purposive economic and administrative action" are, as Habermas does not tire of stressing, "processes which must be sharply separated" (vol. II, p. 450). Because Parsonian functionalism fundamentally equates the two processes it cannot grasp the pathologies of modernization.

Following Weber, Habermas describes the process of social rationalization in part as the expansion of subsystem-specific types of purposive rational action (vol. I, p. 384), and in part functionalistically as increased complexity or expanded steering (adaptation). Cultural rationalization or the rationalization of the social world is a multi-faceted process whose components Habermas analyzes in an original way. This is one of the book's outstanding achievements.

To fail to recognize the importance Habermas ascribes to the distinction between rationalization of the life-world and rationalization of the system, is to miss the book's central intention. With his theory of communicative action Habermas explicitly claims to be able to identify and explain the "pathologies of the modern age" which other research strategies ignore (vol. II, p. 554). There the theory of communicative action claims superiority over all comparable undertakings, e.g., Marxist orthodoxy. A critical advantage is also claimed over the older Critical Theory, which failed because

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of the exhaustion of the paradigm of a philosophy of consciousness (vol. I, p. 518). This superior critical power must apply all the more compared with social science approaches which obstruct their possibility to identify or expalin pathologies which can be reliably diagnosed only through a theory of communicative action. These pathologies all converge in the idea that [under "advanced capitalism,"] a communicatively structured life-world becomes structured as it were, by formally organized subsystems of rational-purposive action. The "unleashed functionalist reason of system maintenance," according to a dramatic and ambiguous formulation in the first volume, "disregards the claim of reason inherent in communicative socialization". (vol. I, p. 533). That *all* "social pathologies are becoming ever more pronounced today" is explained by the fact that "the communicatively structured spheres of life are subjected to the imperatives of formally organized systems of action which have become independent" (vol. I, p. 8). But neither the secularization of world-views ("cultural rationalization," according to conservatives) nor the structural differentiation of society as such is pathological in the sense of a developmental error. What is pathological is the "cultural impoverishment threatening the social world, whose traditional substance is devalued" as a result of the elitist autonomy of "expert-cultures" (vol. II, pp. 481, 488) — Weber's thesis of the "loss of meaning" *(Sinnverlust)*. Equally pathological is the intrusion of forms of economic and administrative rationality into areas whose reproduction takes place via linguistic communication — Weber's thesis of the "loss of freedom" *(Freiheitsverlust)*. That Habermas speaks of "pathologies" in the Durkheimian tradition and not of "crises" in the Marxist tradition is no accident: crises lead either to a resolution or to destruction. Pathologies continue or are stopped from the outside. As a developmental error, pathologies can be *corrected*. But the division of labor as such is not, according to Durkheim, a developmental error; it becomes one only if it goes too far too rapidly (thus Luhmann's claim that societies can differentiate themselves). It is not inequality as such that disrupts a society, but only a coerced inequality; it can be avoided by guaranteeing legal, political, and social equality of opportunity. Coerced inequality leads to class conflicts, which have their roots in crises. Only then does a new situation arise in which the proletarians have "nothing to lose but their chains." In this manner, Marx is displaced by Durkheim's sociology.

Now the threat to the possibilities of agreement *(Verständigung)* and the chances for achieving a consensus stems from the constantly expanding "monetary-administrative-bureaucratic complex" and from a paradoxical development — paradoxical insofar as the overburdening of the life-world by increasing "system-complexity" (vol. II, pp. 505, 550) first becomes possible through a methodical rationalization of the life-world itself (vol.II, p. 470). "The rationalized life-world makes possible the rise and growth of subsystems whose independent imperatives strike back at them destructively" (vol. II, p. 277). The degree of causality in this claim varies between necessary condition, causation, opening up of the margin of choice, etc.; at times only the claim to describe and interpret is made. "In a differentiated system of society," reads one important passage, "the life-world contracts into a subsystem. Of course, this must not be understood causally as if the sructures of the life-world changed depending on the degree of increased complexity of the system. The opposite is the case; increased complexity itself depends on the structural differentiation of the life-world and this structural change... in turn obeys the inner logic of a communicative rationalization" (vol. II, p. 258). Implicit here is a pronounced theory of evolution which seeks to explain the origin of modern societies and expands the basic ideas of Piaget's cognitive psychology

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into a cognitivist theory of evolution. This theory states that the rise of modern societies must be conceived as the translation of an onging cultural revolution into a social one. The threshold of modern societies is crossed precisely when progress in rationality already existing on a cultural level is, so to speak, taken out of the monasteries and introduced into social reality (vol. I, p. 299).

The diagnosis of the modern age is developed in the framework of a theory of communication. The intention of this approach is to give up the "paradigm of a philosophy of consciousness — i.e., a subject representing and laboring on objects — in favor of the paradigm of philosophy of language: intersubjective agreement or communication." A parallel formulation relating to acting rather than knowing reads: "Surrender of the means-end schema in favor of the schema of symbolically mediated interaction of at least two subjects capable of language and action." For the whole book seeks to bring about the paradigm change from goal-oriented to communicative action (vol. I, p. 455). According to Habermas, the tradition of sociology, at least from Marx, via Weber, to Parsons, reasts on excessively narrow foundations. In that tradition action was understood as "poiesis" and not as "praxis." The model for interpreting action was the individual craftsman purposively working on an object. The means-ends schema derived from this was in fact not designed for *ego/alter* situations.[1] The "teleological model" does not provide an accurate picture of the process of intersubjective communication. So it is only logical to replace the teleological model of action by a more encompassing communicative model.

In Habermas' eyes, the difficulties of the traditional theory of action are thus the ultimate reason for the deficiences of the diagnosis of the modern age. The problem cannot simply be solved by holding firmly to the means-end schema for the analysis of *ego/alter* relations. My objections are directed not against the replacement of the means-end schema by that of communicative rationality, but against the idea that a reorientation on the level of the theory of action *alone* guarantees a better social analysis. The close relation of the diagnosis of the modern age with a specific version of the theory of communicative action is the cause of the specific weaknesses of Habermas' account.

The point of reference for the analysis of real interactions becomes the "rationality potential" already inherent in the evaluative component of discourse" (vol. I, p. 455). Aspects of dissent, which are contained in the power relations of speech-situations (Foucault's microphysics of power) and repressed *vis-à-vis* the primary interest in "teaching, achieving, maintaining and renewing consensus" (vol. I, p. 37), become micro-sociological. And from a macro-sociological perspective, the course of history is stylized as the process of implementing communicative rationality, which is itself already present in communicative action. Does not Habermas' argument against Mead — that he neglects "economics, warfare, and the struggle for political power" (vol. II, p. 369), etc. — also apply to him? The author could insist that each book must first be measured by its own intentions and that the primary question is whether he has succeeded in adequately reconstructing the rationality potential. Nonetheless, this pathos for consensus accounts for a rationalistic weakness of the theory which, e.g., excludes or at least casts insufficient light on obstacles to communicative reason based on the instinctive structure or the hierarchical nature of social relations.

Decisvie for the difficulties of the diagnosis of the age is not the paradigm change of action-theory as such, but Habermas' characteristic contrasting of two types of action.

1. Niklas Luhmann, "Autopoiesis: Handlung und Kommunikative Verständigung," in *Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, Vo. II (1982), pp. 366-379.

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Moreover, specific obscurities and inconsistencies slip into this crucial contrast. Habermas safeguards himself from the misunderstanding of equating communicative action with linguistic communication: interaction must not be assimilated to conversation (vol. I, p. 143). But types of social action can be distinguished according to the *kind* of coordination of action. This happens in communicative action involving linguistic agreement. Communicative action occurs when linguistic communication is the mechanism for coordinating action. But is there any form of action that is not linguistically mediated? Thus, in the table on p. 429, vol. I, success-oriented action ranks among the types of linguistically mediated interaction. Moreover, just as communicative action contains teleological components, so teleological action contains communicative ones. One can communicate successfully and succeed communicatively. The two communicative figures cannot so easily be disentagled as Habermas imagines. Communication is possible for communication's sake and for the sake of realizing objectives; just think of the cunning traveling salesman who uses personal selling as part of his sales strategy. Similarly, one can be interested in goal-oriented activity in order to increase the chances for communication.[2]

But perhaps the two types of action cannot be distinguished by whether they are mediated linguistically or not, but instead according to their inner *telos*. Habermas distinguishes between goal- and communication-oriented action along these lines. The two varieties are not just analytical types; concrete actions can supposedly be classified from this viewpoint (vol. I, p. 385). Goal-oriented action is more narrowly defined than strategic action. Strategic action is governed by egocentric calculations of utility (vol. I, p. 141); but communicative action exists when the "plans of action of the participating actors are coordinated not by egocentric calculations of success, but by acts of understanding" (vol. I, p. 385). This distinction recalls Durkheim's identificationof morality with altruistic attitudes and the exclusion of all egoistic action from the moral sphere. Either the ego seeks its own success or the achievement of an understanding with the *alter ego*. Communicative action is essentially behavior based on consensus; its core lies in agreement. Whoever, on the contrary, acts strategically, only wishes to act upon others; whoever acts communicatively seeks an understanding. Criticism of social conditions that reduce the other person to a means can then be developed on this basis (see the key passage, vol. II, p. 292). This formulation of the differences between two types of action is problematic in its rigid separation of concrete actions in such a way that an action can only fall under one of the two specified types. Moreover, the two perspectives cannot constantly overlap in it, even though the boundary between the two types of action shifts — e.g., the non-communicative type of action is labelled alternately with terms such as teleological action, instrumental command, strategic action, rational-purposive action, etc. (see e.g. vol. I, p. 320). Sometimes purposiveness is contrasted with comunication, then strategic action with communicative action, purposive rationality with communicative rationality. Are all these contrasts

2. "Even practices apparently related strictly to functions of communication for its own sake . . . or communication for the purpose of knowledge and recognition, such as holidays and ceremonies, ritual exchange-relations or, on another plane, the circulation of scientific information, are always more or less overtly oriented toward political and economic functions." Cf. P. Bourdieu, *Entwurf einer Theorie der Praxis* (Frankfurt, 1979). Bourdieu calls for the discarding of the dichotomy between economic and non-economic because this dichotomy prevents "the science of economic practices from being grasped as a particular case of the economy of practical actions capable primarily of grasping all actions, even those that are understood as disinterested or unmotivated or freed from the economy, as economic actions directed toward the maximalization of material or symbolic profit" (*op. cit.*, p. 356f.).

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equivalent? Habermas admits (vol. I, p. 150) that all behavior has a teleological structure. Even communicative behavior follows plans (vol. II, p. 193). Then a sharper distinction would have to be made between goals and ends, and ends defined more closely as ends aiming toward success. Either instrumental command or communicative agreement is the *telos* of rationality, says Habermas (vol. I, p. 30). This is the old, hotly dispused distinction between work and interaction, though its criticism led to nothing but a reformulation of this distinction in concepts of strategic and communicative action. Even earlier the critique of the formulation of the relation between work and interaction implied that the two moments did not constitute sharply separated functional orders of instrumental and communicative action.

Furthermore, it is by no means evident that, e.g., rational-purposive action is of the same scope as the strategic action of *homo oeconomicus*; and the latter need not be absolutely the same as action that instrumentalizes the other only as means for egoistic ends. As Weber says[3] "a person acts in a rational-purposive sense of his or her action according to ends, means, and side-effects, and he or she rationally weighs both the means against the ends, and the ends against the side-effects, as well as finally also the various possible ends against one another." The institutionalization of purposive rationality is not *eo ipso* identical with an increase in the inversion of ends and means, for the very reason that the latter are based on structures other than goal-oriented. When Weber, for example, contrasts state administration as superior to all other forms of administration from the standpoint of efficiency, this does not mean that in it the inversion of ends and means is carried to the *n*th degree. The instituionalization of rational-purposive economic and administrative action must not only mean the institutionalization of conditions in which others are seen merely as a means. At least for *administrative* rationality, it is questionable whether it must be regarded as the area of selfish calculation or even as the area of the inversion of ends and means. In short, if it is a matter of distinguishing between purposive rationality (realization of a plan) and communication, then the two types are interrelated; if it is a matter of the inversion of ends and means, then this inversion cannot be universalized without further ado; rather, the task of theory consists in making its origin concretely demonstrable. Marx's proposal was to identify the inversion of use-value and exchange-value and to follow the history of its forms from this point of departure.

The most far-reaching consequence of the theory of action is, however, the firm ascription of types of strategic and communicative action to functional areas of the social system. Not only are, e.g., all traces of practical rationality extinguished from strategic action; this type of action is then assigned to an area in which it becomes the dominant type of action. In the diagnosis of the modern age, the areas of the family and the public sphere are merely classified under communicative action, the spheres of the economy and the state under rational-purposive action (where, e.g., does the transportation system belong?). The latter are *systematically* integrated via the media of money and power, the former are *socially* integrated via the medium of language. The intentions of Lockwood's distinction go astray as a result of attributing the effectiveness of various integration mechanisms to specific functional areas of society. These integration mechanisms are perceived more clearly if all social sub-systems are tought as integrated both systematically and socially. Bowles and Gintis,[4], for example, construe the connection between structures and actions along these lines.

3. Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Tübingen, 1972), p. 13.

4. Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, "Structure and Practice in the Labor Theory of Value," in *The Review of Radical Political Economy* (1981), p. 12.

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From this it follows that work is not just an expenditure of labor power in the manner of a machine-like performance; it shatters the framework of instrumental action as a technically applied appropriation of natural objects. It is rather an ensemble of economic, political and cultural practices, structured by the capitalist relations of production. Processes of plant management can thus be analyzed through this concept as well, rather than solely with that of instrumental action.

The prevalent theme of the critique of society is this restriction of the possibility of consensus-formation in the familial and public spheres as a result of the extension of the "monetary-administrative complex" beyond the limits of the subsystems economy and state. Instead of restricting itself to the economics and state administration where it belongs, instrumental rationality intrudes into communicatively structured areas of life and thereby causes disturbances in the symbolic life-world (Vol. II, p. 453). Crucial in this is not that the economy and the state are organized according to rational-purposive criteria, nor that areas of formerly communicative action are transformed into subsystems of rational-purposive action; but that this process does not stop at the boundaries of the economy and the state. "In capitalist societies, the pattern of rationalization . . . is determined by the fact that instrumental rationality wins out at the expense of practical rationality by reifying communicative conditions of life" (Vol. I, p. 485). Habermas reformulates the theme of reification in Critical Theory as a process of the deformation of the life-world through processes of bureaucratization and monetarization. The focus of reification is *not* the factory, and its source is not a particular form of organization of alienated labor; it is located rather, at the border between "life-world" and "system," and it consists in the deformation of the life-world structures by forms alien to everyday practice. Actions, as Habermas says, can be coordinated either systematically by the media of money and power, or socially by linguistic communication. Material reproduction is the domain of system integration, symbolic reproduction is the domain of social integration. Material production can be surrendered "painlessly" (!) to the steering mechanisms of non-linguistic media. The shift from symbolic reporduction (socialization, cultural reproduction, and social integration) to system-integration, however, is pathological. From the perspective of rationalization, the shift of the economic — separated out from comprehensive life-contexts and normatively neutralized (Polanyi) — to non-linguistic steering mechanisms (for this realm can be surrendered to system-integration just as "painlessly" as can state administration is not in itself problematic); pathologies result only at the intersection between "system" and "life-world," and even there only in *one* direction: the shft of the "system" into the "life-world."

If one follows Habermas, one must distinguish between progressive raising-to-linguistic-consciousness (*Versprachlichung*) and progressive (legimitate) removal-from-linguistic-consciousness (*Entsprachlichung*). In the course of development, the life-world experienced a raising-to-linguistic-consciousness of the "sacred" or a shift of normative social integration to discursive will-formation. This can be clarified by many examples from the everyday practice of family life and child-raising. (Mothers today tend to ask their children when crossing the street, whether they are sufficiently motivated to do so). This process of raising-to-linguistic-consciousness is understood by Habermas as progress in rationality. This absorbtion of norms by language of course leads to an enormous overburdening of the coordination of action. However, norms are supposed to reduce the contingencies of action. That is the idea behind the concept of institutionalization. Institutions delimit contingencies of action by singling out only certain ideas as acceptable. When this normative basis of behavior is

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expressed linguistically, uncertainties of action and the overburdening of the coordination of action result. Such a raising-to-linguistic-consciousness cannot occur in all areas; that would lead to the collapse of social cohesion. A solution to the problem of raising-to-linguistic-consciousness begins to take shape when this process is matched by a removal-from-linguistic-consciousness in other areas. Habermas identifies these areas with the subsystems "economy" and "state." The overburdening of linguistic coordination, on the one hand, is matched by an unburdening of coordination by a reverse polarization of the steering-mechamisms of power and money, on the other (Vol. II, p. 554). A critical phase of development begins only when those areas of action which must ineluctably rely on language (social integration, cultural tradition, and socialization) are also shifted to non-linguistic spheres of the coordination of action. In the economic sphere, language can and must be surrendered; it would only have a disruptive effect there. But the "life-world" cannot give up what disrupts the system. And conversely, the same process that represents a progressive rationalization of the system (a shift to steering-mechamisms) would mean a step backward in rationalization in the "life-world."

Habermas' key idea can be understood as a prophylactic against the revolutionary idea of wanting to shape all social realtions according to principles of communicative rationality (council socialism) and also as the recognition of the revolutionary advantage of the development of rational-purposive subsystems — an advantage that can no longer be abolished or evaded without relapsing behind the stage of modernization already attained. As in functionalism, there can be no further stage of social evolution after the stage of functional differentiation, but only a regression behind an attained level of differentiation, the process of uncoupling the "system" from the "life-world" can only be continued, but not reversed or surpassed.

A discussion of this analysis could also be carried on in such a way that deformations of genuinely communicative inner-structures of the life-world by encroachments of forms of economic and administrative rationality are either challenged or classified as inevitable social costs of social rationalization. Habermas would probably attribute objections of this type to functionalist reason (the critique of which is the prime object of the second volume). According to Habermas, the perspective from which the process of social rationalization can be understood as a contradiction between linguistically engendered "life-world" structures and the growing complexity of partial systems of rational-purposive action can be opened up only by the conceptual scheme of communicative action. The theory of communication, however, seems *only* able to grasp this contradiction, and either completely ignores or pays but slight attention to the internal contradictions of the "system" itself and to such contradiction stemming fromthe penetration of "life-world" orientations into the subsystems of rational-purposive action. An analysis that focuses on the threat to communication rationality posed by the expansion of the "monetary-bureaucratic complex" fails to grasp, first, contradictions in the area of system-integration and, second, specific problem areas that result from the intrusions of "life-world" principles into the subsystems of rational-purposive action.

Concerning the first objection: that Habermas on the whole gives an inadqequate picture of intra-systemic problems and contradictions, three points can be made: a) The subsystem analysis can be summed up in three statements. *First*, economic system and state administration are formally organized areas of activity; *secondly*, they are differentiated via the media of money and power; and *third*, they consititue the domain of purposive rationality.

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1) Compared with the familial and public sphere, the economic system is certainly to a greater extent formally organized. Nonetheless, I would prefer to analyze the economic system not just from the perspective of formation of formal organizations, but from the vantagepoint of the dualism of money-governed markets and administraitvely governed organizations, which are each organized according to different rationality-principles. This line of analysis on institutionalism was followed from Marx to Williamson.[5]

2)The media of money and power are not distributed, as Habermas' analysis suggests, between the economic system and the state apparatus. On the one hand, action *in* the organizations is not mediated by money alone; in the sociological analyses of industry, for exaple, personal instruction, hierarchization, formal procedures, and technologization have been discussed as mechamisms of the coordination of action.[6] On the other hand, though the calculation of all costs and income in monetary amounts was the basis for the rational orientation of profit, it is still relevant to distinguish between monetary control and profit orientation. All discussions of the possibility of limiting the profit-principle while retaining market allocation would otherwise become obsolete.

3) Under the guiding perspective of purposive-rationality, the analysis suggests the image of efficiently functioning apparatuses and thus disregards the internal problem-situation with which formal organizations are confronted. That such organizations do not just fulfill functions but also serve the perpetuation of domination is a viewpoint that is just as neglected as the whole analysis of the rationality-limits of formal organization-formation motivated by Habermas' discussion of Weber.

b) The diagnosis of modernity developed within the frame of reference of the theory of communicative action ignores analyses of instabilities of the economic system such as those developed from Marx to post-Keynesianism (Harrod). Stable subsystems expand more or less as though "self-propelled"; by their growth they destabilize only the life-world, but not themselves. In the analysis of the modern age there is little room for such a thing as immanent contradictions in the production of relative surplus value (Marx). When Habermas speaks of crises of the economic system, this tends to occur in the form of the argument of the "blanket that turned out to be too short": it is still just barely large enough to satisfy the industrial conflict between labor and capital, but too small for "disparity problems" that show up at the edges. Nor does it deal systematically with the effects which the implementation of restrictive forms of labor in factory and administration have in the area of symbolic reproduction. This point dovetails with the fact that in Habermas reification does not result *eo ipso* through the replacement of language by money and power, but only when this replacement happens where language cannot be dispensed with: in the area of the formation of communities, of cultural reproduction and socialization.

c) As regards interferences between economy and state: the diagnosis of modernity is permeated by a monolithic idea of the monetary-administrative complex. By their senseless growth the two subsystems cause fewer problems for one another than for the life-world. This line of analysis had dubious consequences for attempts to grasp the internal limits of welfare-state capitalism. Such internal limits result from the interferences of economy and state; crisis-retarding state interventions could, for example, have a crisis-producing effect precisely because they block the mechanism of the

5. O. E. Williamson, *Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications* (New York, 1975).

6. R. Edwards, *Herrschaft in Modernen Produktionsprozess* (Frankfurt, 1981).

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industrial reserve army as the central precondition for the growth of capitalist systems.[7] Of course, Habermas is familiar with such ideas; he has given numerous suggestions for the analysis of the welfare-state. But such a critique lies on the margins of the road taken by the analysis of modernity presented by the theory of communicative action.

A second line of criticism against Habermas' diagnosis of modernity can be developed along the idea that Critical Theory analyzes life-world system interferences only in *one* direction and does not notice the likewise significant expansion of life-world principles into subsystems of rational-purposive action. The latter tendency has been taken up by the conservative critique of society. The subsystems no longer function because of interference with life-world principles. For example, tendencies of the humanization of labor and democratization of the economy could be interpreted as interference of communicative rationality into formally organized subsystems. In fact, neither the stage of development of welfare-state capitalism nor its social conflicts are adequately characterized by the statement that a "functionalist reason gone wild" threatens the communicative infrastructure of the life-world. Broader problem-situations would be revealed with the more abstract formulation that the reliability of "principles" has become questionable for areas of action — the uncertainty as to which principles should be used to decide which problems has become general — a result of the interpenetration of system and life-world. Thus Bowles and Gintis' attempt to describe current conflicts by the polarity between *rights in persons* and *property rights*.[8] Principles such as "communicative rationality," "purposive-rationality," or "property rights" and "rights in persons" can hardly be kept in quarentine. For example, the disputes on the restructuring of the economic system after the "end of the postwar period" in the mid-seventies could be described as the attempt to decide whether property rights or economic civil rights should determine the accumulation process. (It is directly relevant to chances for reform whether the boundary between conflicting principles runs between "system" and "life-world" or between economy and state).

Thus, in the theory of communicative action only the assimilation of the realm of genuine linguistic agreement to media-directed subsystems is declared pathological and the removal of the economy from processes of linguistic validation is regarded as a quite normal development. However, the act of generalizing the idea of the "interference" of principles — i.e., their interference with the attempts of social groups to transfer practices which follow different rationality patterns to social situations in which they no longer apply — does not just complete the portrait of welfare-state capitalism ; it also could shed different light on the question of the possibility of social change. Habermas, in good Marxist fashion, links protests with conflicts. However, he considers the "old" conflicts to be settled and thus the old protest-potential (of the workers' movement) to be restricted. It no longer generates any essential unrest for the "system."The new conflicts arise at the seams between the "system" and the "life-world" (Vol. II, p. 581). As long as the boundary between the two existed in the realm of material reproduction, the process of modernization could successfully endure the protest of those affected: "On the front that runs between system and life-world, the life-world apparently gives stubborn and successful resistence only when the functions of the symbolic reproduction of the life-world are affected" (Vol. II, p. 516). Now, the

7. Johannes Berger, "Wandlunger von Krisisursachen im Wohlfahrtstaatlichen Kapitalismus," in *Monetäre Restriktioner: Die Inflationsbekämpfung Argument*, Sonderband n. 68.

8. Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, *The Crisis of Liberal Democratic Capitalism* (Amherst, 1980).

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Marxian theory of social change is in need of revision on two substantial points: the assumption that the working class is the subject of historical change and the idea of an emancipation of the working class at a "higher stage" after capitalism. With the abolition of a distinct bearer of social change, the direction of this change also becomes problematic. But must the idea of the intrinsic limitations of the system therefore be given up? Insofar as functionalism since Durkheim can speak only of differentiation, Habermas can only accuse the objective situation of having carried the process of adjustment to linguistic steering mechanisms too far. If the process of capitalist modernization was able successfully to disregard the protests of those affected as long as areas of material reproduction were affected, why should the resistance then be "potentially successful," when "systematic imperatives" pervade the "life-world"? The book is as far from giving a satisfactory answer to this question, as it is to the question of the causes for the "inexorable independent dynamics" of the subsystems (Vol. II, p. 488). Only communicative rationality, according to Habermas (Vol. II, p. 491) "confers an inner logic to the resistance to the mediation of the life-world by the independent dynamics of independent subsystems." For success, however, not just consistency but also resources are necessary.

Such resources might be found in the fact that a process of development can exhaust its own preconditions and thus precipitate a "turning point" or a "structural break" in development: there is some evidence that such a "structural break" took place in the mid-seventies. If this is correct, then the plausible conclusion is to take up again the analysis of the developmental potential of welfare-state capitalism, whose internal and external limits are beginning to be visible — an enterprise which certainly does not lie outside the horizon of Critical Theory.

Johannes Berger

Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison. *The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings, Community Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry.* New York: Basic Books, 1982. 323 pages. $19.95.

John C. Raines, Lenora E. Berson, David McI. Gracie, editors. *Community and Capital in Conflict: Plant Closings and Job Loss.* Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1982. 318 pages. $19.50.

Community and Capital in Conflict (CCC) is the result of a 1981 conference sponsored by the Center for Ethics and Social Policy, an agency which brings together community groups and activists, academics, and unions concerned with the deindustrialization of Philadelphia. During the 1970s the city experienced a 14% reduction in its job base as over 130,000 jobs, 80,000 in manufacturing alone, were lost. The deindustrialization of Philadelphia did much to reaffirm its image as a distinctively American city. For throughout the decade just past the nation as a whole lost between 32 and38 million jobs as a consequence of private disinvestment in American business. Deindustrialization —extensive and systematic disinvestment in basic productive capacity— is a

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national phenomenon almost as familiar to the Sunbelt as it is to the Frostbelt.[1] Plant closings are the most visible sign of disinvestment but, as Bluestone and Harrison show, capital flight takes other, less overt, forms as well. Milking "cash cows," a common policy of multibranch corporations, produces the gradual deterioration of older plants as their profits are reallocated to new facilities or product lines. Whatever its form, deindustrialization has occurred with a vengeance (and vengeance is the proper word, as we shall see), and its human and social costs have been immense.

Long-term unemployment is the fate for about one-third of those whose jobs are lost. Extraordinarily high rates of alcoholism, heart attack, depression, and suicide are found among these people, most of whom lack the protection of health benefits and life insurance. Those fortunate to secure new employment overwhelmingly find themselves in jobs with less security, less income, and less status than the ones they previously held. Time, rather than healing their wounds, sees the steady diminution of their standard of living. Communities, too, are victims of capital flight. As its younger and more skilled members become industrial refugees crisscrossing the country in search of jobs, the community begins to collapse in on itself. Community pride and morale erode, often to be replaced by anti-union hostility.[2] Tax revenues are reduced precisely when the need for expanded public services is most pressing. The human wreckage caused by private disinvestment becomes the responsibility of an overburdened and underfinanced public treasury.

The pain and disruption inflicted upon the 'losers' are widely recognized. Less well known are the costs capital movement imposes on the 'winners'. One of the many merits of Bluestone's and Harrison's book is its examination of the costs of winning. The 1970s brought to Houston over a half million new residents, and the city now is on the verge of surpassing Philadelphia as the country's fourth largest. By the end of the decade, Houston ranked high on every economic indicator and, despite a 45% growth in population, its unemployment rate stood at a mere 2.6%. With no income tax on corporate earnings, minimal workers' compensation costs, and stringent right-to-work laws, Houston became a boomtown. However, as it became more attractive to capital, it became less so to many of its residents. Houston's strong business climate translated into inadequate revenues for basic public services. Water shortages, air pollution, highway congestion, and overcrowded schools accompanied the influx of capital as did a murder rate which ranks among the highest in the nation, a profound housing crisis, and a rapidly expanding income gap between rich and poor. Lower-income families in Houston probably would agree with W.C. Fields' epitath: "All things considered, I'd rather be in Philadelphia."

Capital movement is inherent in any dynamic and growing economy. The problems faced by Philadelphia and Houston stem not from capital shift but from capital velocity. "The relative value of social benefit to social cost," Bluestone and Harrison write,

1. Bluestone and Harrison find that close to "*half* the jobs lost to plant closings (and relocations) during the 1970s occurred in the Sunbelt states of the South and the West. In fact, the odds of a Southern manufacturing plant shutting down were actually a little *higher* than for establishments in the North." The difference, of course, is that in the Sunbelt newly created jobs outnumbered the lost jobs while the reverse was the case in the North.

2. Bluestone and Harrison illustrate this point with reference to the community hostility and virulent anti-union sentiment which followed a 1977 plant closing in Cortland, New York. These discordant developments reached a higher level in 1982 when the city's largest employer eliminated over 1000 jobs. The Cortland model —a press and politicians friendly to absentee corporate landlords and a fairly docile labor force— may be more representative of where the country is going than is the widely publicized Santa Monica model. See Frank Hearn, Michael Mertens, and Jamie Faricellia, "Update on the American Tragedy," *Dissent*, Spring, 1983.

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"depends to a great extent on whether there is sufficient time allowed for the effects of capital disinvestment to dissipate or for the effects of new investment to be absorbed." The recent hyper-mobility of capital, the speed of disinvestment and investment, has been most responsible for the painful disruptions and social meanness found among losers and winners alike. Capital velocity is a crucial factor in the deindustrialization of America.

The Origins of Deindustrialization. The decisions that produce the massive erosion of America's productive capacity are not made by millions of individuals participating in the inexorable flow of natural market forces. Rather, these decisions are made with an eye toward high growth rates by a small group of managers of the large conglomorate and multinational corporations. Arthur Hochner's and Daniel Zibman's "Capital Flight and Job Loss" (*CCC*) shows that over half the plant shutdowns and 60% of the job loss in Philadelphia between 1976 and 1979 came from companies absentee-controlled or associated with multinationals or conglomorates. Firms with the greatest capital and strongest capacity to shift it rapidly, not the weakest and most marginal, engaged in the highest amount of disinvestment. This finding is consistent with Bluestone's and Harrison's observation that deindustrialization reaches torrential levels with the expansive merger movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s—precisely the time when the crisis of *Pax Americana* begins to take explicit shape. Indeed, Bluestone and Harrison argue, deindustrialization is at bottom a corporate strategy developed in response to this crisis and designed to increase profitability by disciplining labor and gutting state regulatory powers. Captial mobility is the means by which the firm expands its power and constricts that of both labor and the state.

Pax Americana spanned the quarter-century between 1946 and 1971 and saw the continuous expansion of the American economy. America's hegemonic position in the post-war international economy. symbolized best by the 1944 Bretton Woods agreement, assured the growth of overall production and corporate profits and made possible, in Thomas Weisskopf's words, the institutional order of security capitalism.[3] The security offered in this context had two primary bases. The first was the accord established between organized labor and capital. Corporations provided steadily rising real wages and a recognition of union rights in return for the unions' agreement to enter into longer contracts, to enforce labor discipline, and to confine their aims to the improvement of the wages and work conditions of their members, leaving the questions of resource allocation and plant location to managerial perogative. The second basis of security resided in the government's commitment to protect its citizens from the crueler consequences of the market. This commitment, backed up by the use of Keynesian techniques of demand management, resulted in an increase in the social wage and the growth of government regulations.

Security capitalism drew its strength and substance from the continuous economic growth brought by America's dominance in global affairs. As this dominance began to wane in the early 1970s, the always present tension between security and profit intensified. Heightened international competition greeted the collapse of American supremacy and the outcome for American corporations, Bluestone and Harrison note, was a severe profit-squeeze: The American share of world trade dropped by 16% in the 1960s and by another 23% in the following decade; American corporations saw

3. Thomas Weisskopf, "The Current Crisis in Historical Perspective," *Socialist Review*, 11, 3, 1981, pp. 9-53.

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their after-tax rates of profit decline from 15.5% during 1963-1966 to 12.7% (1967-1970) to 10.1% (1971-1974) and to only 9.7% in the period through 1978. In these circumstances, the business class acquired an unusually high degree of unity in its opposition both to the social contract made with labor and to the state's commitment to a social wage, each regarded as a serious constraint on the flexibility of captial required for the reversal of profit decline. Power as well as profit was at issue in the wide ranging offensive launched by business interests. From the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, David Vogel recently has shown, the political influence of business suffered an unprecedented erosion. A growing public interest movement, often in conjunction with organized labor, had taken the lead in shaping the political agenda and influencing broad changes in the character and scope of government regulation. A spate of legislation, ranging from the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 to the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, "represented a significant transfer of decision-making authority from the private to the public sector."[4] Profit-squeeze was accompanied by power-squeeze, a point insufficiently emphasized by Bluestone and Harrison.

To compound the problem, the increasingly fierce competition in the now open international economy hastened the move from an essentially demand-constrained accumulation process to one limited primarily by conditions of exploitation. "The evidence strongly suggests," writes Samuel Bowles, "that the dominant problem facing capital in the 1970s was not abundance but scarcity (not the realization of surplus value but its production)."[5] In the midst of an exploitation-constrained accumulation process, the strategies available to corporate managers for the restoration of profit and power were reduced to two: The first required the discovery of more profitable opportunities for the utilization of capital; the second entailed the radical reduction of production costs in established activities. Obviously, each strategy shared the immediate goal of dismantling the constraints on exploitation. Their simultaneous implementation, Bluestone and Harrison clearly demonstrate, unleashed a systematic and overt attack on both labor and the state and initiated the most disruptive period of capital flight in American history. In this way, corporate managers became the architects of deliberate deindustrialization. Their enemy was the institutional order of security capitalism.

Deindustrialization is designed in part to undercut the labor-capital accord. Decisions to relocate, to differentially contract and expand facilities, to reallocate capital from one sector to another, to establish parallel production and multiple sourcing, and to organize production on a transnational scale are motivated by a desire to shift capital away from the unionized segment of the labor force. The pattern of disinvestment very distinctively has been and continues to be in this direction, and to date has been effective in promoting significant union concessions on wages and work rules.[6] Yet, the assault on organized labor produces only a partial solution so long as the safeguards against insecurity —welfare, food stamps, adequate unemployment

4. David Vogel, "The Power of Business in America: A Re-appraisal," *British Journal of Political Science*. 13, 1, 1983, p. 26. Also see Vogel's "The 'New' Social Regulation in Historical and Comparative Regulation," pp. 155-186 in Thomas McCraw, editor, *Regulation in Perspective* (Boston: Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1981).

5. Samuel Bowles, "The Post-Keynesian Captial-Labor Stalemate," *Socialist Review*, 12, 5, 1982, p. 56.

6. To set Bluestone's and Harrison's discussion of these developments in broader context see Giovanni Arrighi, "A Crisis of Hegemony," pp. 55-108 in S. Amin, G. ARrighi, A.G. Frank, I. Wallerstein, *Dynamics of Global Crisis* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1982).

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compensation— embedded in the social wage remain. Government also must come under seige, and victory on this front is defined as the creation of a good business climate—minimal unemployment benefits and compensation insurance rates, a non-union, if not anti-union, labor force, low taxes and a range of inducements to business. The effort to foster a good business climate began at the local and state level and by the end of the 1970s had communities and states ferociously bidding against one another for the favors of business. With the Reagan-led charge against the social wage and government regulations, the pursuit of good business climate has attained the status of national policy.

Recall that the attack on unions and the social wage arose as part of the dual strategy to search out new, more profitable uses of capital and to cut existing productive costs. Bluestone and Harrison show how two key recent developments — the spectacular advance of "permissive technology" and the conitnued centralization of capital and concentration of productive control— greatly facilitated the implementation of these practices and exacerbated their destructive consequences. The production of a permissive technological environment, one which enlarged the scope and improved the speed of capital migration, initially was sponsored by government-financed research and development during World War II. These efforts, Bluestone and Harrison show, culminated in "the birth of the jet age— its jumbo transports, telex, and the computer with its satellite comunication links... [and] allowed production and coordination to be carried on in a truly worldwide market." Joined with advances in machine tools and computerized equipment, these new means of expansion made it possible to shift capital to cheap sources of labor around the country and the globe with unprecedented rapidity. Centralized capital and control became compatible with decentralized workplaces.

The full use of the new technology required the administrative and financial wherewithal created with the frenzied conglomeration-building activities of the late-1960s. Previously, American businesses primarily expanded into markets appropriate to their existing skills and expertise. Now, pressured by a constant need for cash, the key to flexibility and adaptability, and encouraged by tax laws supportive of accelerated depreciation and international expansion, corporate managers pursued conglomeration with force and alacrity. This movement gave rise to and presently is guided by what Bluestone and Harrison term the "new managerialism," a policy which places cash management over loyalty to particular product lines, which values most the capacity to shift surplus cash with rapidity, and which encourages the generation of paper profits by rule and number manipulation.[7] The new managerialism is based on a decision to forego modernization of existing facilities in favor of diversification. In its terms, subsidies are acquired as soon-to-be-abandoned "cash cows," profitable divisions are closed for not being profitable enough, and a strategy of planned disinvestment (necessary for financing diversification) is formulated and enacted. The goal is nothing less than the deindustrialization of America.

7. Robert Reich's term, "paper entrepreneurialism," captures well the spirit of Bluestone's and Harrison's "new managerialism." Bluestone and Harrison note that between 1975 and 1980 over $100 billion was spent on tender offers. In 1981 alone, Reich finds, American companies spent $82 billion acquiring one another, $60 billion more than the 1977 cost of corporate cannabilism. So much for Reagan's claim that productivity losses are attributable to a lack of investment capital. See Reich's important discussion of these issues, "The Next American Frontier," *The Atlantic*, March, 1983, pp. 43-58.

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Toward Democratic Reindustrialization. Market-guided reindustrialization imposes serious costs on "winners" as well as "losers." In the case of Houston, the problem is too much capital being introduced too quickly. A different problem arises from the recent revitalization of the New England economy. Sorely weakened by the exodus of the apparel, textile, and shoe industries, the New England economy bounced back in the late 1970s largely on the basis of the expansion of its service sector. The bulk of the new jobs making up the economic renaissance were in retail trade, personal services, and high technology. According to Bluestone and Harrison, jobs of this type do little to compensate for the jobs lost as a consequence of the destruction of the mill-based economy. The proportion of high-tech jobs which are high skill and high paying is small, and generally these are filled by people brought in from outside the area. The vast majority of the newly created jobs offer low income, little security, and few, if any, opportunities for career advancement. Thus, the reinvigoration of New England has been accompanied by an erosion of relative incomes, the downgrading of skill levels, and the creation of a dual economy. The high-tech/service sector solution provides little consolation to most of the work force.[8]

The shortcomings of the market-based strategy and the recognition that the liberal prescriptions of security capitalism have been rendered obsolete by conditions of international competition and capital hyper-mobility have prompted the emergence of a series of alternative proposals. Advocating corporatist modes of policy-making, Japanese patience and long-time horizons, or the targetting of small businesses, these alternative strategies address the question of economic growth but neglect the problem of the heightened velocity of private capital. Relying on the profit-motive, committed to a strengthened private sector, and insistent that policy-making be insulated from democratic pressures, they leave untouched the primary causes of personal insecurity and community disruption. In contrast, Bluestone and Harrison propose a reindustrialization plan which subordinates the standard of private profit to other criteria, namely raising the standard of living for workers, supplying socially useful goods and services, making more humane work environments, and democratizing American life.

Bluestone and Harrison are quite specific about the immediate tasks of a democratic reindustrialization program. The priority goals are plant closing legislation mandating advance notice and the provision of compensation to affected workers and their communities and rebuilding the safety net by beefing up the social wage and extending the range of regulatory oversight. Changes in the tax code and a partial reallocation of military expenditures would make available some of the revenues needed for this purpose. Another important source of support, as Randy Barber shows in "Gaining Control Over Our Economic Resources" (*CCC*), consists of the pension funds of over 50 million American workers. Presently, the dominant criteria for pension investments are determined by the logic of capital markets, a logic which channels a disproportionate amount of the funds into the largest and most mobile corporations. This is deplorably ironic, Barber notes, since "every time workers are able to gain increases in pension benefits, the funds deposited to pay for those increases will be

8. Bluestone and Harrison are critical not so much of the high-tech solution as they are of its use in the market-based strategyof reindustrialization. The assumption that high technology will save the American economy is widespread. Yet, it is an entirely erroneous assumption, as shown by Emma Rothschild, "Reagan and the Real America," *New York Review of Books*, February 5, 1981, pp. 12-18. Bluestone and Harrison would have done well to follow Rothschild's lead on this score.

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invested under criteria viewing those workers' jobs as less desirable investments precisely because of the greater cost that the employer must now bear." Efforts, like those recently undertaken by the AFL-CIO, to enhance union participation in pension fund management may help ensure that an important chunk of the capital used in the reindustrialization of America will be earmarked for social purposes.

Beyond the immediate agenda and with respect to a broad, workable industrial policy, Bluestone and Harrison, are able to offer only an "extremely tentative sketch." Among other things, this sketch calls for partial public ownership of subsidized private corporations, particularly those in the 'sunrise' industries; the formation of public enterprises, locally or municipally owned, responsible for housing, energy, health care, and mass transit; public investment in the conversion of older facilities to new uses and government support for retraining and community development; and experimentation with various types of workers' control and ownership.[9] While these proposals do constitute an important beginning for a democratic socialist strategy, the continued inability to go beyond sketches and outlinesis disappointing, particularly in light of the highly detailed programs formulated by proponents of less democratic alternatives.[10]

Bluestone and Harrison are not bothered by this lack of specificity, arguing that a more substantive and systematic program will evolve from the organization and struggle that is sure to take place in response to the personal pain and social instability wrought by deindustrialization. In the activities of unions, grass-roots community groups, and labor-community-religious coalitions they find the seeds of a broad based political movement and the impetus to democratic reindustrialization. At this time, it is difficult to assess the merits of their position.

On the one hand, coalitions of unions, church groups, activists, and political leaders often have proven effective on local and state levels, a point well illustrated in Pamela Haines' and Gary Klein's "Citizens and Unions Respond" (*CCC*). Haines and Klein discuss how one such coalition in Philadelphia, led by the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, organized large protest demonstrations and effective boycotts and in one case successfully pressured a runaway employer into providing its workers with adequate compensation. These actions gave rise to a more formal community group which had some success in fostering broad community awareness of exploitative corporate practices. No such similar coalition has been effected on the national level, however. Gregory Squires's " 'Runaway Plants', Capital Mobility, and Black Economic Rights" (*CCC*) shows how deindustrialization has victimized minority populations disproportionately and persuasively argues, first, that in many cases plant relocation may be in violation of civil rights law and, second, that the effort to manage capital flight for humane purposes should be linked to civil rights struggles. This would be an important development as, perhaps, would be the more active participation of national church groups whose contributions to the anti-nuclear movement have been of extraordinary value.[11]

9. Robert Lekachman, "How to Civilize Capital," (*CCC*) provides a virtually identical sketch of a "credible democratic Left program" of reindustrialization.

10. See, for example, Ira Magaziner and Robert Reich, *Minding America's Business* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1982) and Felix Rohatyn's many contributions to the *New York review of Books* between 1980 and 1982.

11. The American Conference of Catholic Bishops is scheduled to address these questions in September, 1983 in a way comparable to their influential treatment of the nuclear issue. In January, 1983 the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops issued a paper, "Ethical Reflections on the Economic Crisis," strongly critical of deindustrialization. Two papers in *CCC*, Charles

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On the other hand, it may be foolhardy to conceive a strategy of democratic reindustrialization which depends on the emergence of a national social democratic or, at least, anti-business movement. Organized labor would be indispensable to such a movement and its fortunes have been steadily declining over the past decade. The proportion of the labor force unionized is down to a level not seen in forty years; decertification is occurring at a record pace; unions are victorious in only about 40% of the certification elections; they have made only minor inroads on the service sector and high-tech industries appear virtually immune to unionization. To date, then, the largest and fastest growing sector of the economy has been shielded from union influence. With a few admirable exceptions, American unions have responded to this absolute decline of strength by becoming more bureaucratized in an effort to reacquire its position of influence within the Democratic Party.[12] So long as no effort is made to cultivate meaningful rank-and-file participation, a broad and effective democratic movement remains an unlikely development. In its absence, the democratic strategy may simply enlarge the opportunity for corruption. "Certainly it is not a coincidence," Vogel writes, "that the most corrupt unions are precisely those that manage their own pension fund...By merging both public and union pension funds into one pool of investment capital, we are liable to wind up with a system that combines the worst features of both the Central States Teamsters Pension Fund and the Small Business Administration."[13]

In short, Bluestone and Harrison are correct in their argument that democratic reindustrialization presupposes a national political movement. The issue of capital flight and plant closings, particularly as it connects with the questions of civil rights and peace, appears to be one around which the requisite mobilization can take place. However, despite the great suffering brought so far by the busniess-Reagan offensive, it has not taken place, and this makes it difficult to maintain the optimism with which Bluestone and Harrison conclude their analysis.

Conclusion. The process of deindustrialization has yet to peak. The Reagan tax cut will make available more capital to be used for further diversification and internationalization. Furthermore, the deindustrialization of America is consistent with the newly emerging global division of labor, the contours of which are beginning to take firm shape. Reich notes that "the most efficient places for much mass production are coming to the Third World countries...every year between 1980 and 2000, 36 million people will enter the labor force, and 85% of them will be from developing nations. The newly integrated world market will put many of them to work at America's old speciality of high-volume, strandardized production."[14] The cheaper production costs found in these areas combine with the fact that demand for standardized products is increasing faster in the developing than in the developed countries to assure the continued relocation of America's manufacturing base.

As deindustrialization proceeds at breakneck speed, each of the volumes considered here will gain in value. From the start, Bluestone and Harrison have been in the forefront of those committed to understanding and combatting reckless capital flight.

Rawling's "The Religious Community and Economic Justice," and John Raine's "Economics and the Justification of Sorrows," show what the religious critique looks like.

12. See Mike Davis, "The AFL-CIO's Second Century," *New Left Review*, 136, November-December, 1982, pp. 43-54 and Robert Samuelson, "An Endangered Species?" *National Journal*, February 26, 1983, p. 45 .

13. David Vogel, "On 'Democratic Investment'," *Democracy*, 2, 3, 1982, pp. 137-1%.

14. Reich, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

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Their book the culmination of a decade's work, is the single best treatment of the problem. *Community and Capital in Conflict* is an uneven volume. Some of the pieces, most notably Kotranski's and Porpora's "Tasty Baking Company: The Company That Stayed," belong in a Sunday supplement, so little do they add to discussion. Other contributions, however, are first-rate: Bluestone offers a solid overview of the themes developed in his book with Harrison; Squires, Barber, and Hochner and Zibman provide thoughtful assessments of important and often neglected aspects of the problem; Teich Adams summarizes neatly a good part of the relevant literature. Together, the two volumes let the secret out of the bag: The defense of America's best interests is no longer identical with the defense of capital's best interests. Democratic reindustrialization will begin only after this message becomes part of the popular consciousness.

Frank Hearn

Peter Clecak, *America's Quest for an Ideal Self: Dissent and Fulfillment in the 60s and 70s*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983).

Discussions of the nature of American life during the last twenty years have often relied upon the simplistic distinction between the sixties as a decade of intense concern with public matters as opposed to the preoccupation with the self and personal life so evident in the seventies. In *America's Quest for the Ideal Self*, Clecak challenges this "sentimental" view of the last two decades, a "framework of nostalgia" which ignores their essential "thematic and ideological continuities" that are characterized as "a quest for personal fulfillment, a pursuit of a free, gratified unalienated self within one or more communities or valued others" (pp. 4-5). Even if fulfillment remained for many an idea rather than an opportunity and therefore contributed to the proliferation of "myths of consolation" as well as "fantasies of omnipotence," he states that we should be grateful for the rise in self-assertion and the development of "more internal modes of authority" (pp. 230, 232) that accompanied the quest.

Thus Clecak challenges those social critics who focus upon the degree to which selfishness has increased and legitimate forms of authority have eroded.[1] For him, the notion of selfishness is a "tyrannizing image of vision"[2] which confuses the excesses of the quest for fulfillment with its essence. Americans only appear to be self-aggrandizing because so many people have made legitimate claims to fulfill themselves by challenging the oppressive and exploitative features of American life. It is the nature of this challenge and the degree to which it has been implemented that has prompted liberals, radicals, and conservatives to lament the direction of American life in the seventies and to employ ungenerously "the metaphor of 'the culture of selfishness'" (p. 276).

1. A considerably large body of literature has developed about this issue. Clecak spends a significant amount of time criticizing the work of Christopher Lasch, Daniel Bell, and Philip Rieff. See Lasch's *The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations* (New York: Norton, 1978); Bell's The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (New York: Basic Books, 1976); and Rieff's *The Triumph of the Therapeutic: Uses of Faith after Freud* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966).

2. Richard M. Weaver, *Visions of Order: The Cultural Crisis of Our Time* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), p. 20. Quoted in Clecak, p. 260.

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For Clecak, the results of the quest for self-fulfillment have been impressive: a rapid "democratization of personhood" that has involved "enhanced cultural options, rising economic resources and rewards, strengthened legal guarantees, and augmented personal and political rights" (p. 6). While he does acknowledge that there was not "uninterrupted improvement in every sphere" (p. 6), there were advances. The gains "were uneven. They were inadequate, especially when judged against any ideal standard, but also when measured against earlier hopes. They were distributed unevenly, even inequitably, among the various social groups and categories. By the end of the seventies, some of these advances — especially those in the economic condition of citizens — seemed precarious. And all of the advances appeared potentially trivial when seen in the larger context of global nuclear insecurity. Still, the cumulative effect of these changes was to permit significant numbers of Americans to discover (or hope to discover) a satisfactory synthesis of the main elements of fulfillment which I shall refer to as 'salvation' and 'a piece of social justice.' " (pp. 6-7).

In speaking of the search for "salvation," Clecak describes the manner in which it is rooted in the Judeo-Christian past, that has been reshaped, given today's heavy "secular" and "sensuous" (p. 11) emphasis. He refers much too rhapsodically to the widespread desire for a more abundant life and the wish "to define and enact possibilities of feeling and mind" with the aim of establishing beyond the confines of established institutional life "a sense of felt wholeness" in a community of "affective, touching selves" (pp. 10, 104, 115). This quest took many forms which involved 'various mixes of spiritual enlightenment, psychological gratification, and material security" (p. 104). Clecak tends to lump together much too loosely "communitarian advocates of the counterculture, student rebels, twice-born Christians, radical feminists, joggers, health food enthusiasts, human potential advocates, and the more fervent environmentalists" (p. 105), all of whom, he believes, were engaged in various forms of dissent. Despite their differences, he argues, they shared a concern with self-fulfillment which was to be pursued through the expansion of cultural freedom and social justice.

Thus he understands the Movement not so much in terms of the nature of its political concerns which "existed fitfully, even secondarily" but "as a personal quest, a wish to end alienation" that involved the "liberation of the self from an oppressive and alienating set of institutions'" with the hope of creating "a fraternity of equals" (pp. 117, 116). Coalition politics based on a felt sense of social injustice gave way to "autonomous action" (p. 123) in which self-liberation was pursued in one's own special group.

This emphasis also characterized the therapeutic quest in which claims for the expressive self were advanced to reflect the importance of "physical well-being, sexual amplitude, emotional intensity, and mental wholeness" (p. 145). If Clecak suggests that much of the therapeutic endeavor was not only "politically vacuous" but also "theoretically thin," empirically dubious, and often sectarian, he believes that many Americans pursued this route "moderately and eclectically" which enabled them "to experience life on a more intense scale, to lead fuller interior lives than their parents or grandparents had" (pp. 147, 152, 156).

He states that the therapeutic mode is the secularization of protestant forms of introspection which emphasized the primacy of the individual in the search for salvation. Conversely, he describes the Christian revival as having a "therapeutic cast" (p. 10). There has emerged "an emphasis on expressive forms of charismatic worship centered on the 'touch' of the largely feminine Holy Spirit, on individual salvation, on the

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search for affective communities of believers, and on a relative de-emphasis of doctrine, institutions, and ecclesiastical authority" (p. 135).

Placing this movement in a political context, he speaks of it as "a fundamentalist response to anxiety about the future occasioned by social and cultural dislocations," particularly the "rising economic expectations and satisfactions" (p. 136) spurred on in the sixties and the subsequent decline in the following decade. The revival, then, is still another form of dissent aimed, in part, at undermining "the social and cultural handicaps imposed by the 'structure of advantage'" (p. 141) that is implicit in differences in status and class.[3] Thus in contrast to many who condemn the revival "as shallow, rigid responses to modernist culture," Clecak underscores its "anti-hierarchical, antibureaucratic" (pp. 126,140) spirit. Despite the fact that he worries about "the regressive and anti-intellectual character of common born again responses to cultural change and social uncertainty," he believes that it has generally contributed to "the search for personal authenticity and to the release from inegalitarian social roles" (pp. 136, 141).[4]

In speaking of the therapeutic quest and the Christian revival, Clecak focuses on the importance of the Movement as a catalyst. As dissent was "diffused throughout the society," many people engaged in further modes of protest, albeit on a more limited scale and often with significantly different aims. Politically, economically, and culturally, he argues, the results, if "taken together," have been "remarkable" (p. 181). Politically, there has been an expansion of the idea of citizenship, so that formerly disenfranchised or under-represented members of the society now have much greater access to public life. Ethnic and racial minorities, women, the young, the handicapped, the aged, and homosexuals, all have demanded and received greater respect and consideration as the idea of equality has been advanced. Economically, there have been "less dramatic gains," because of "the onset of relative scarcity in the seventies" (p. 192). Though he acknowledges that unemployment, underemployment, poverty, and inflation are still too high, he argues that the rise in the number and kinds of available employment, the improvement in the conditions of work, and the increase in the amount of disposable income as well as household wealth, all suggest signs of well-being. In addition, he claims, just as political and economic life have become more democratized, cultural norms have been lowered, so that older standards of beauty, dress, appearance, and taste no longer assert the same power. Referring to the end of WASP cultural domination and the "upward diffusion of styles — black, southern, hillbilly, feminine, gay" which have helped to create a "democratized

3. Here Clecak is confusing. Though he speaks of the way that "The Christian revival cut across regional, ethnic, occupational, and educational lines" (p. 138), he suggests quite strongly that it catered primarily to those who are socially powerless. This ostensible contradiction points to the problematic nature of his discussion of the issue of class. Debunking the Marxian conception of the importance of class in social analysis, Clecak believes that the idea is limited since "Americans tend to associate with one another on the basis of less abstract, more palpable categories . . . : the cross-cutting and overlapping categories of ethnicity, race, locale, gender, age, religion, education, workplace, and common leisure-time interests" (p. 205). And, he intimates that since "the abstract division between those few who own or control the dominant means of production and those who do not fails to ignite the political imagination of Americans" (p. 205), the Marxian conception of the unequal dispersion of power cannot have much validity when applied to the United States.

4. Clecak's discussion of the continuing power of religion in America is important. At one point, he speaks of the tendency of "most intellectuals" to overlook the "importance of the Judeo-Christian vision" (p. 106). Citing Gallup polls taken in the middle seventies, he states that "94 percent of those questioned professed belief in God . . ." (p. 128).

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aesthetics of persons," Clecak celebrates "the presence of a multiplicity of new and revitalized subcultures" and suggests "that the status quo ante of American culture is unlikely to be restored" (pp. 213, 214, 218).

He does not believe that the conservative currents so evident in the seventies and eighties will be able to destroy the positive legacy of dissent initiated in the previous decade. In fact, he sees some value in the fact that "radical challenge," particularly from the "ultra left," was met by liberal and conservative "response," a process which enabled the innovative proposals of the sixties to be tested against older social values. But "disappointment, radical guilt, and the fear of deradicalization" prevented "sustained inquiry" (p. 60) into the positive effects of this confrontation. He is even convinced that "the conservative mood . . . did not subvert the search for fulfillment, but rather allowed people to explore other facets implicit in the ideology of the quest" (p. 328). The idea of limits "on ideas, feelings, values, resources, institutions, other people, and even themselves" (p. 327) was advanced appropriately in a world of increased economic scarcity. Thus a politics which stressed the importance of equal opportunity gave way to a more selective emphasis on achievement. In this context, Clecak notes the serious effects that the budget cuts have had on the poor as the country experienced a severe recession; however, he is convinced that Reagan did not totally undermine welfare spending. If the cuts increase, Clecak states that Reagan will harm the implementation of social justice. But the quest for personal fulfillment should continue, since it "does not depend upon achievement of *general* social justice any more than it depends upon even higher levels of personal consumption" (pp. 336-37). Moreover the quest "was more vital than ideology, larger than the conservative mood" which in its emphasis upon tradition rather than novelty is simply one of its "sources and expressions" (p. 341).

According to Clecak, the inability to accept this kind of heterogeneity has led many Americans, particularly some of our leading social critics, to despair about the present and the future. Given the "absence of a clear, ideological political winner in the seventies" (p. 39), no group has been satisfied. Luxuriating in his belief in the pluralism of American life, Clecak laments the inability of contending groups to accept the fact that American politics is inevitably "neutralized by a vast interplay of interests" (p. 40). He speaks most critically of intellectuals (specifically radicals, left liberals, and neoconservatives) for their pessimism which is rooted in the failure of their novel perspectives as well as their suspicion that all past solutions were inadequate. He is particularly harsh on those leftists who were virtually sealed in despair because of the conservative trends so evident at the end of the seventies. For, he argues, many of the principles held by Movement activists were incorporated into the fabric of American society either by altering the beliefs of a substantial number of Americans or seriously transforming the shape of institutional life.

If Clecak is critical of radicals who seek a perfect "community of free, equal, and fraternal revolutionaries" (p. 94), he has little use for other forms of puristic "nostalgia." The "simplicities of a laissez-faire society" champanioned by conservatives, "the rapture" (p. 94) of evangelical Christians, the singular emphasis on feeling by the therapeutically minded, the anti-technological bias of natural lifers, all are rejected. Clecak admonishes advocates of these positions for their failure to examine "fragments of thought, ideology and sensibility cautiously" and their unwillingness "to fashion preliminary interpretive mosaics that make fuller sense of the recent past than any single ideological vantage point can yield" (p. 98).

In the "disposition to bend ideological categories out of political shape and into

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complex, modernist modes of personal expression," Clecak sees a new "sophistication" (p. 316). Although he is also critical of the apolitical mood sometimes generated by this stance, he believes that it contributed to the possibility for social justice since the many claims put forth by individuals intent upon self-fulfillment necessarily required democratic innovations both economically and politically. This in turn "augmented the role of ideology, multiplied ideological options, and intensified ideological cleavages" (p. 314). Attempting to distill some coherence out of this picture of countervailing perspectives, Clecak speaks of a general adherence to anti-state values but a simultaneous commitment to equal rights and opportunities fostered by government.

He is not impressed by the concern shared by many that this stance has often involved a limited appreciation of the importance of authority. In fact, he speaks optimistically about the tendency to debunk all forms of power during this period with the aim of increasing liberty and equality. Nor does he believe that an undue emphasis on private life has accompanied the resulting increase in personal freedom. Rather, he refers to "the emergence and development of the private self" as "one of the most admirable fruits of freedom" (p. 291). Social critics who talk about the problem of privatization by emphasizing the declining interest in large social and political issues refuse to acknowledge that most people are more involved in public life than ever before — "at work, on extended trips, in neighborhoods, in voluntary associations," and even "in their own homes" (p. 292) where they are bombarded by information from the media. Furthermore, he claims, public life is rich, reflecting the "thickening of individuality," and the "embarrassment of psychic riches" (p. 294) which exists in the private sphere.

As an advocate of diversity, Clecak states that he may be too "inclusive," too intent upon accepting "nearly every claimant to salvation with the achievement of some worthy version of fulfillment," though each of them may not be "equally preferable" (pp. 295, 296, 32). In the preface, he says that he once believed in democratic socialism but has become "convinced that the project of the socialist left" was "misconceived," impossible to implement, and "in some sense undesirable" (p. 30). He suggests that a major catalyst for this shift in allegiance was that strain in the New Left which emphasized the importance of a cultural transformation with the aim of enhancing the possibilities for self-actualization. Though he says that he "did not lose faith in the egalitarian project" (p. 30), he became dismayed by the failure of the liberal state to enact its program in an equitable manner. About radicals, he was concerned with their contempt for liberal values such as "moderation, compromise, individual rights," and "democratic procedures" (p. 56). Thus he "returned to a liberal branch of the Christian church, in spite of a Pentecostal heart, a Roman Catholic heritage, and a stubbornly skeptical sensibility" (p. 30). If he acknowledges the "faulty, fitful, and impure" nature of the American economic and political system, he is now committed to democratic capitalism with its "stabilizing bureaucracy" and its capacity for reform.[5] This confluence of perspectives animates his all too zealous appreciation of "the various ideological strains," the "wonderfully rich, albeit cacophonic possibilities for personal expression and action that marked American culture by the late seventies" (p. 31).

He speaks much too positively about the "pervasive desire to realize individual 'potential' " in our "essentially individualistic culture" (p. 10) and rejects the equally

5. For a fuller sense of the nature of Clecak's political concerns and his subsequent transformation, see *Radical Paradoxes* (New York: Irvington, 1973); and *Crooked Paths* (New York: Harper and Row, 1978).

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plausible view that American society is far too much a homogenized collection of atomistic individuals uncritically pursuing their own gratification within the constraints provided by a consumer oriented economy. Thus he dismisses too contemptuously Robert Bellah's observation that there exists among white middle-class Americans "a private world of great intensity and no content whatever. There is a vehement insistence on selfhood but it is an absolutely empty self; except for the sheer quantity of excitation there is nothing there at all."[6] In referring to the work of Christopher Lasch, Clecak has little appreciation for the degree to which contemporary forms of individualism may mask a widespread narcissistic dilemma. For Clecak, selfishness and anomie are "unavoidable byproducts" of the quest for fulfillment and have been exaggerated by cultural historians like Lasch whose tone exemplifies the "trendy pessimism" of American social criticism which ranges too often from "tinny hysteria" to an "unearned weariness" (pp. 99, 98).

But in his optimism Clecak tends to dwell upon the surface of American life in a manner which is much too facile. Unlike Daniel Bell who speaks of "the tawdry rule of fad and fashion"[7] in the United States, Clecak believes that the "cultural elites" who promote their social criticism are not as wise as the bulk of the American people who "display sober if not altogether good sense" as they watch, test and sift through the latest "models of behavior and modes of thought" (p. 153). Unwilling to engage in a "radical" systemic analysis which he essentially sloughs off because of its style, "marked by a casual pseudo-Hegelian assumption of the interrelatedness of all phenomena" (p. 56), he is content to present an array of data from a variety of sources to support his contention that the quality of life in America has greatly improved over the last two decades.

It is important to remember just how selective Clecak is in his use of sources. Therefore he prefers the findings of Daniel Yankelovich[8] which tend to corroborate the idea that despite current conditions of instability the process of economic and political democratization has generally improved living conditions for most Americans, rather than data collected by Christopher Jencks[9] who concludes that family background and educational attainment combined with racial origin can still be a severe hindrance in the quest for self-fulfillment. Even with his debt to the political left, Clecak constantly berates those social critics whose work is rooted in the Marxian tradition. Lamentably, he chastises Christopher Lasch for the "Marxian noises" (p. 253) in *The Culture of Narcissism* which focuses at times on the degree to which people depend on bureaucratic endeavor and a cast of professional experts. He is no less harsh on Herbert Marcuse[10] whose concept of "one-dimensionality" "breaks the limits of theoretical credulity and violates evidence of the senses" (p. 207). Here Clecak rarely considers the idea that vast inequities in power and wealth still remain in America, a condition which makes it difficult to engage in meaningful dissent.[11]

6. "Cultural Vision and the Human Future," *Teachers College Record* 82 (Spring 1981), 502. Quoted in Clecak, p. 291.

7. *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism,* p. xxvii.

8. See *New Rules: Searching for Self-Fulfillment in a World Turned Upside Down* (New York: Random House, 1981).

9. See *Who Gets Ahead? — The Determinants of Economic Success in America* (New York: Basic Books, 1979).

10. See *One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964).

11. In this context, Clecak remarks: "When disenchantment does not take predicted forms, or when, as in the sixties and especially in the seventies, additional participation assumes largely

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Given his faith in democratic capitalism, it is not surprising that he often understates the severe problems that many Americans have experienced in the last decade as a result of inflation and unemployment. At one point, he states that "relative poverty within the context of generally rising levels of economic well being . . . is an unavoidable consequence of capitalist economy — one of its ambiguous blessings" (p. 198). In addition, he asks us to remain calm in the face of recent dissatisfaction with the economy because of "the tendency of people to measure present levels of well-being mainly against rising present criteria rather than against past standards" (p. 201); and he finds solace in the fact that "a sharp move toward equal distribution might not greatly increase the sum of reported happiness or even that of fulfillment, since in American culture relative advantage represents a major source of personal satisfaction" (p. 202).

Moreover, he has a very limited conception of the degree to which economic success is based upon investment and exploitation carried out by American firms in other parts of the world. In this context, he virtually never touches upon the extent to which the United States has interfered with the political process in other countries in order to advance American interests. He simply basks in the knowledge that Americans did not fight abroad in the last ten years. As for the possibility of a nuclear catastrophe, Clecak refers to it periodically, even as he safely retreats behind the facade of the "theological complexities of nuclear strategy" (p. 345).

Basically he accepts too readily the fact that many Americans have made "a separate peace" (p. 112), given the widespread perception of the intractable nature of political reality. This solution is the basis, in part, for Clecak's conviction that the focus of dissent over the last twenty years has been the quest for fulfillment beyond the confines of established institutional life. Thus he believes that a major mistake of radicals was their attempt to equate "community building with political action," since most Americans were not committed to "a politics of revolution or a more plausible politics of reform as a primary means to fulfillment, to salvation, or even to social justice" (p. 125). If Clecak may be correct in his evaluation of the American people, he is much too willing to accept the fact that the idea of community in the sixties evolved "in practice to include only the self and select circles of significant others" (p. 125). He does not adequately deal with the possibility that public life may have been seriously undermined by this focus; nor does he consider the evidence which suggests that the emphasis upon private life had some disastrous consequences given the kind of intensity and the lack of discipline with which it was often pursued. For example, he rarely comments on the transiency of so many personal relationships and "affective communities." Furthermore, when he says that in the last two decades "diminished selves are more a consequence of increased personal freedom than of any failure to participate in public . . . . life" (p. 291), he demonstrates his limited understanding of the way that individual options are seriously constrained by prevailing economic and political conditions. He is also much too cavalier when he essentially commends "the most elemental assumption of the quest — that personal fulfillment is widely available even in the absence of a high degree of general social justice and a unified, influential high culture" (p. 289).

Clecak's failure to confront fully the implications of his Rousseauian emphasis on the existence of a pristine self beyond the boundaries imposed by the social order seriously undermines his argument. Throughout *America's Quest for an Ideal Self*, he sug-

conservative or even reactionary shapes, certain critics characterize protest as weaker and politics in general as less democratic than they are" (pp. 208-9).

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gests the importance of uncovering our "authentic, buried selves" (p. 151). His premise that there exists "a free, gratified, unalienated self with sufficient energy and resources, both personal and cultural, to explore a range of possibilities" (p. 270) leads to theoretical confusion.

He erroneously believes that Philip Rieff, Christopher Lasch, and Daniel Bell maintain this benevolent perspective, despite the fact that he is dismayed with the "Hobbesean metaphors" (p. 275) that permeate their work. These social critics, he says, "perpetuate a false dichotomy of personality types: their own ideal selves versus a corruption of the idea of the self as an open-ended project, which they take to be representative of contemporary American culture — pure classic versus corrupt romantic" (p. 269). But in claiming that the "well crafted self" of the past with its emphasis on duty and service in public life is an admirable idea that need not conflict with the modern and dominant view of "the enlarged or growing self," Clecak never explores the underlying assumptions behind each conception of subjectivity. He refuses to acknowledge that the Freudian vision of "the well crafted self" whose development is tied to the inevitable conflict between instinct and culture is impossible to reconcile with the Post-Freudian view[12] that the self may be located beyond the constraints of the social world. With regard to the latter, Clecak is quite grateful for our "enlarged psychological options" (p. 147), the result of the rise of expressive therapeutic modes that challenged "the idea of original sin" and advanced the belief "that individuals are essentially free and able to choose a more abundant life in spite of their psychic past and social present" (p. 145).[13] In this context, if he correctly assesses the degree to which Lasch, Bell, and Rieff tend to minimize the "cause of sentiment" (p. 269) in their incessant pleas for civility and authority, Clecak fails to consider the possibility that the current stress upon fulfillment can often be a disguise for the ceaseless stimulation and satisfaction of desire in an economy heavily dependent upon continual consumption.

In addition, in speaking of the quest for fulfillment and the ideal self, Clecak never refers to the psychoanalytic notion of the ego ideal, that image of ourselves which we aspire to become. The ideal originates in the initial parental identifications, especially with the mother, and exerts a force on all later aspirations to the extent to which they reflect the desire to recreate the earliest sense of infantile union and bliss. Clecak has a minimal understanding of how this tendency to idealize is transmuted in the course of development. Though he is aware of the way that nostalgia may fuel the urge to recreate the conditions of primary narcissism, he does not recognize that whatever form the urge to fulfillment may take, it will be suffused to some extent with these primitive yearnings.

Clecak, then, does not sufficiently appreciate the regressive aspects of the quest for fulfillment. He is sensitive only to its most obvious side effects, the rise of selfishness and anomie, which are considered to be minor problems that do not offset a "stunning" social transformation. Therefore he states that a major political and economic reversal is a slim possibility and proclaims that the cultural gains are "irreversible." It is not surprising that he pollyannishly believes Reagan's vision of "malign neglect" will

12. For a fuller discussion of this distinction between Freudian and Post-Freudian perspectives, see Russell Jacoby's *Social Amnesia: A Critique of Contemporary Psychology from Adler to Laing* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975).

13. Clecak's argument here echoes the perspective in Theodore Roszak's *Person/Planet: The Creative Disintegration of Industrial Society* (Garden City, New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1978). Unfortunately, Clecak never mentions this book which is similar enough in its range of concerns to have warranted consideration.

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"shatter" and foresees the activation of an " 'egalitarian' politics of collective survival" (p. 343).

His vision, however generous, consists too much of a sanitized view of the self and the historical process. Though he attempts to find "a supple enough category of fulfillment" (p. 154) to encompass the diversity of American life, he never adequately adjudicates the conflicting claims of opposing individuals and groups. He rests too comfortably in his eclecticism which emphasizes too much the salutary effects of highly privatized versions of salvation and underestimates the erosion of community as the United States continues to be confronted with serious political and economic problems that have global implications.

Robert Ehrlich

Roslyn Wallach Bologh, *Dialectical Phenomenology: Marx's Method,* Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979.

This book is an ambitious attempt to analyze Marx's method as deployed in the *Grundrisse*. The author considers this method to be both dialectical as well as phenomenological. Unfortunately, the book shows no understanding whatever of either dialectics or phenomenology. It claims to differ from previous treatments of Marx. That it does to the extent that it is nothing but a collection of confusion, rudimentary mistakes and arbitrary distortion of key concepts. Many shoddy books have been written about Marx. But this one must be the most sophomoric attempt yet. How did it happen? By misreading works on phenomenological Marxism and embellishing these ideas with ethnomethodology, phenomenological sociology, Wittgenstein and Heidegger, she has come up with this strange work which, however, has succeeded in having some naive readers believe that it is a major theoretical breakthrough in Marxology.

With a patience above and beyond the call of duty, one can trace the way she obfuscates all basic and well-worn ideas into a pretentious bogus "originality." A few quotes will document this. In the preface, Bologh warns about the difficulty of understanding her metatheoretical introduction of chapter 1 that may be better understood if reread after other chapters. But no amount of reading other chapters would make it easier to understand, not because of its profoundity but because it is utterly vacuous and haphazard: "(I)t (*Dialectical Phenomenology*) engages the phenomeno-logic of the work, the relations between its formulations and its grounds. This relation is its method." (p. 29) What is the phenomeno-logic? What are the grounds? Do they refer to Heidegger's *phainomenon-logos* and the *Wesen des Grundes*? She does not explain. Her formulations and grounds are presumably related to her critique of positivism. Bologh strongly dislikes positivism and objective knowledge of science because they separate subject and object. Apparently, anything that is anti-positivistic is either phenomenological or on its way to becoming phenomenological. She likes phenomenology so much that she generously includes Althusser's work, at least in its beginning, as phenomenological, and judiciously ascribes this profound insight to John O'Neill. Since she is quite comfortable in completely confusing Hegel, Heidegger, and other phenomenologists, it is not surprising that she also includes Althusser into the club. The more the better!

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For Bologh, the main thrust of the "phenomeno-logic" is to move away from concrete theorizing to formulate analytic theorizing — which is what Marx's theorizing is all about. In a word, Marx's method is analytic theorizing, hence phenomenological. Bologh's teachers, Peter McHugh and Alan Blum, defined the term "concrete" to refer to the appearance of social phenomena as ungrounded things. (p. 16) In concrete theorizing, concepts are abstractions not grounded in specific forms of life, Bologh asserts. To go beyond concrete theorizing, we must resort to Wittgenstein's idea of language games as forms if life. Only then, she insists, we can understand what she means by the form of life that is the productive relation of subject and object. (p. 2) To understand Marx's phenomenological method one must understand Wittgenstein's language games as forms of life. Only then, she insists, can we understand what she helpful nor harmful for understanding Marx, and forms of life have nothing to do with productive relations in Marx's sense. Rejecting concrete theorizing as abstract and positivistic, she adopts McHugh's concept of analytic theorizing to the knowledge of social phenomena as grounded forms of life, i.e., language games as productive relations. She claims that to adopt analytic theorizing is to shift from an unself-conscious form of life to a self-conscious one, from positivism to phenomenology, from a thing-in-itself to a thing-for-a-subject, from nature to history, and above all, from capitalism to socialism. This is strange. Husserl, Heidegger, Wittgenstein and many other good and bad phenomenologists instantly become socialists, while socialists with positivistic outlook turn into capitalists! Well, it is not so simple to become analytic, phenomenological, and socialist. She sternly warns against subjective versions of phenomenology. Her analytic phenomenology stresses a reciprocal relation of subject and object, and hence she calls it dialectical. Bologh believes that chanting the reciprocity of subject and object one hundred times can open the gate of dialectical Nirvana.

But the best is yet to come. Historically specific conditions, i.e., rules or grammar, necessary for reproducing theorizing are its presuppositions or grounds. (p. 15) So grammars are grounds of dialectical reciprocity of subject and object! Her dialectical phenomenology treats those social conditions, i.e., grammars internal to the knowing of the object, as internal to the object as it is known. Anyway, reading Marx phenomenologically as dialectical phenomenologist, for her, means reading his analysis of capital in terms of the separation of subject and object as his main achievement. (p. 10) Poor Karl! What a trite achievement! But even this pitiful achievement, dialectical phenomenology, ceases to exist when the commodity form and its concomitant (alienated labor) abolish themselves, when subject and object are self-consciously united in production. Thus dialectical phenomenology is located in and limited to a form of life dominated by the commodity form. (p. 23) A subject's activity presupposes objective conditions for its accomplishment and those objective conditions presuppose a subject for which they have salience. (p. 4) Her dialectical phenomenology threats the unity of subject and object. Yet, the self-conscious unity of subject and object makes dialectical phenomenology superflous and impossible. How can we make heads or tails out of this? Bologh states: "By grounding a phenomenon in a form of life, phenomenology reveals a tension . . . Dialectical phenomenology is a critique . . . Its own possibility as a mode of theorizing is grounded in the dialectic of the concrete and its negation." (pp. 17-18)

Here patience wears out. Obviously, she does not know what she is talking about. Or she has invented her own private language — a practice Wittgenstein would definitely disapprove of. Consider the following samples of Bologh's private language game.

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Grounds are forms of life. Grounds are a way of seeing an object as having a history. (p. 13) A dialectical phenomenology grounds its objects in a contradictory form of life, a divided subjectivity. The separation of subject and object makes dialectical phenomenology possible. (p. 13) Then an amazing statement follows: "The contradiction derives from the separation of subject and object by a mediation that is neither subject nor object, but replaces both. It is both subject and non-subject, object and not-object, of production." (*Ibid.*) Where did she find such a definition of "mediation"? Apparently she mixes up this central dialectical concept with money as a medium of circulation. Here one is tempted to forget about this whole nonsense. But then one recalls the importance of "forgetting" Bologh presents with a pseudo-Heideggerian flavor. She writes: "Marx's analysis of the commodity shows that forgetting which is the basis of the dialectic and phenomenology, hence of dialectical phenomenology, is a necessary feature of production and exchange of commodities." (p. 23) One may be able to learn something sensible from the rest of the book after forgetting her metatheory. It is important to actively re-member the separation of subject and object — whatever "re-membering" means.

From chapter 2 on, the book reads better, not because she makes any more sense, but because extensive quotations from the *Grundrisse* provide oases for momentary theoretical respites. Bologh gives four reading rules that make possible Marx's categories. Rule 1. Treat concepts as grounded in an historically a specific form of life. This rule, she claims, includes: 1) The concrete is a totality of relations; 2) Relations are concepts; 3) The concrete is, therefore, a totality of concepts; 4) Concepts do not originate in consciousness. They presuppose a subject and its object; 5) A relation of subject and object is a production; 6) The concrete is the totality of a production, a form of life; 7) There are different modes of production; 8) The categories are historically specific to their mode of production; 9) Analysis reformulates objects of knowledge in term of the specific mode of production that makes them possible.

1) through 8) make some vague sense, but 9) makes the entire content of the rule 1 suspicious. As she proceeds, new problems develop. One cannot "forget" her metatheory. She continually reiterates it. "To fail to analyze is to fail to produce a comprehensive totality, an ongoing history." (p. 36) "Analysis shows the contingency of the categories by revealing their embeddedness. In this way, analysis calls attention to the reflexivity of language." (p. 46) Here one is lost again.

Rule 2: Treat individuals as grounded in an historically specific form of life. This rule "treats individual acts as made possible or intelligible by a form of life which they presuppose." (p. 24) Wittgenstein identifies language with a form of life. Bologh states: "I use Wittgenstein's term 'form of life' as equivalent to the Marxist terms, mode of production and social formation." (p. 47) Why? She does so in order to: "1. stress the conceiving of a social totality as social activity or process; and 2. to avoid a narrow economic connotation that the words production and mode of production have." This is absurd. Only a mind that identifies analytic and socialist would make sense out of this. She says phenomenologists tend to consider language as the totality of social production, and draws a parallel between Heidegger and Marx. "Heidegger, for example, refers to language as the 'house of Being.' For Marx, the totality is captured by the concept of production." Apparently, she never read a line of Heidegger. Why does she not simply say that individuals are social products and drop all these pretenses?

Rule 3: Treat a form of life as a totality of internal relations. Bologh makes two distinctions. The one between a form of life and a society, and the other between a totality of internal relations and a totality of external relations. Society is merely the generality

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of the concept, whereas the form of life is a dialectical process of social production of subject and object. (p. 51) A form of life as a totality of internal relations refers to the relations that are necessary for the production of the object that one studies. (p. 52) This contrasts with a conception of society as a totality of *external* relations where an object is a thing that is given to the senses or given with speech and accounted for in terms of its *external* relations to other things. (p. 52) Here we are going in a circle. Her examples, causality as an external relation and determination as an internal relation, do not help.

Rule 4: Treat a concrete form of life as contradictory. This rule constitutes the principle of growth. "Growth is development that is transcendence . . . growth for a subjectivity is learning. The resolution of contradiction is a learning." (p. 61) Concrete theorizing is a display of unself-conscious theorizing. Analytic theorizing is a display of self-conscious theorizing. (p. 62) Bologh thus equates analysis with self-consciousness. How can one achieve an analytic form of life? By remembering the commodity as a dual object that is exchange value and use value. (p. 64) She says that is why the bourgeoisie must forget and the proletariat must remind. (p. 27) Throughout this absurd account, Bologh understandably overlooks Marx's remark on human anatomy containing a key to the anatomy of the ape.

From chapter 3 to chapter 7, Bologh takes 160 pages to apply the four rules to an incredibly insipid reading of Marx's *Grundrisse*. According to her, Marx carried out a phenomenological analysis of money, and by phenomenological she means that he treats the notion itself as problematic — inquiring into the relations that are presupposed and (re)produced by it. (p. 74) Somehow Bologh has this strange notion that by putting a prefix "re" into a bracket or breaking up a word with an unnecessary hyphen makes anything phenomenological. She further attacks Max Weber for treating Roman law externally. (p. 88) She might change her mind if she ever reads his theory of the city in *Economy and Society*. It is perverse to accuse Weber of being concerned with external relations and to glorify Wittgenstein's language game as subject-object relations hence internal.

She makes innumerable amazing statements: "Contradictions can exist only within language." (p. 198) "Only within a formulation can we have a contradiction." On (pp. 198-199) she calls attention to one of Marx's statements and she then explains: "Again, we see Marx clearly referring to capital as a concept . . . Only a phenomenological analysis treats its object as a possibility or concept as opposed to a thing in itself . . . " (p. 199) But mediation, she says, externalizes and objectifies the relation of divided subject and object. (p. 210) She thinks so, because mediations for her are money and capital.

As if she did not spill out enough nonsense already, Bologh proceeds to criticize Lukács, Habermas, Merleau-Ponty, Althusser and O'Neill (how did the last one get in there?). She applies her four rules of animated reading to them and O'Neill comes out unscathed — probably because she and he share a great deal in common and, at any rate, he is the editor of the book series that had the dialectical phenomenologist to put in print her incredible amount of nonsense.

Bologh says she likes Habermas' theory of undistorted language communication. She even says his theory, like all good things, is similar to her analysis of dialectical phenomenology. Comparing her theory with that of Habermas is as absurd as comparing apples and metaphors. But she attacks Habermas' critique of Marx's theorizing as a failure of understanding that "history is a story." (p. 237) Habermas' critique of

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Marx, she says, implies a reading of Marx's version of history as a subjective and quasi-religious belief in the inevitability of a rational society taking the place of non-rational one. This reading reduces Marx's work to a subjective or idealistic view. She claims, Marx's approach shows how the future is already contained as a possibility in the movement of the present. In other words, Marx provides grounds for the future in his formulation and analysis of the present as a separation of subject and object. (p. 240) This is an absurd attack. Habermas' critique of Marx is based on the historical experience of our time that shattered the optimistic rationalism, ideas of progress, and specifically Marx's projections that did not materialize. Bologh, of course, would not be interested in anything that has to do with concrete experience. According to her, even poverty is not an empirical category for Marx, but an analytic formulation of the condition of wage labor. (p. 158) Present and future for her are not the question of real history but an analytic question of separation of subject and object. And she attacks Habermas for not taking the same absurd position. She asserts that Habermas concerns himself with the absence of reflection. But Marx concerns himself with the absence of self-conscious production. "Likewise my problematic, reflexivity in theorizing and reading, accounts for my reading of the *Grundrisse*. Thus one's problematic produces one's reading." (p. 244) Before she attacks Habermas she should have done a lot more reading.

Bologh now turns to Lukács, who allegedly failed to explicate how analysis determines totality and this failure leads into problems regarding the proletariat and class consciousness. That is, he fails to ground the concept of the proletariat in the totality as a process by which it produces as such." (p. 258) So the proletariat becomes a problem to be solved by a party.

I always thought it was Lukács's contribution to ground the concept of the proletariat in the totality. I do not know what to make of this since she does not explain how she came to conclude that Lukács made a problem out of the proletariat by divorcing it from the specific struggles in which it finds itself.

Bologh goes on to say that Althusser's conception of structure is bad because it is concrete, and he conceives society as composed of external relations. Also she makes some inane remarks about Merleau-Ponty for, like Lukács, reverting to a concrete critical reading of the proletariat. "Rather than seeing the party or theory as a metaphor for self-learning or self-consciousness, they (Lukács and Merleau-Ponty) interpret these concepts concretely." (p. 261) Merleau-Ponty does not understand, according to her, that the proletariat is not a group of individuals; it is a form of life." (p. 263) In other words, the proletariat is a language, a game, a grammar, and a metaphor.

And so it goes . . . The real negative achievements of this book, in the ultimate analysis, may have been to discredit any "dialectical phenomenology" or "phenomenological dialectic" for years to come and indirectly to re-legitimate positivist approaches. At least the latter are written in *public* languages. The only appropriate reward for Bologh is that she be given tenure in the same Department of Sociology with O'Neill, while having to teach her nonsense to incorrigibly positivistic students in a "real phenomenological-socialist country" as she defines the terms.

Sang-ki Kim

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Murray Bookchin. *The Ecology of Freedom: The Emergence and Dissolution of Hierarchy*. Palo Alto, California: Cheshire Books, 1982. 385pp.

The Ecology of Freedom, the culmination of Bookchin's efforts to construct a comprehensive ecological social theory, is a major achievement. Bookchin's perspective, as is clear from his earlier works, is deeply rooted in ecology. In this book he expands his ecological analysis to a full-scale teleological, organicist interpretation of reality. The result is a coherent, comprehensive metaphysical position which is capable of integrating his theories of the self, society, and nature.

Bookchin questions the direction in which Western thought has moved at crucial points in its evolution. From its beginnings, it bore the marks of social domination. While the pre-Socratics retain traces of the values of organic society that preceeded the rise of patriarchy, the state, and private property, by the time of Plato and Aristotle and rationality of domination was already deeply rooted. Hierarchical authority is reflected in the idea of a transcendent source of order, class values are intruded into conceptions of human nature, and nature itself is denigrated or accorded merely instrumental value. This hierarchical, dominating view of reality is inherited by the tradition.

As society begins to fragment with the rise of Protestantism, the nation-state, and capitalism, the unity of the hierarchical world view is itself shattered. As the dichotomy between society and "the individual" becomes defined, and the gap between self and other widens, Western thought becomes increasingly incapable of sustaining an integrated vision of reality. Cartesian dualism posits separate subjective and objective realms, and is unable to give a firm basis to either. Materialism and positivism opt for the objective, and yield a spectral subjectivity, if any at all, while idealism and subjectivism degenerate into irrationalism and egoism.

Bookchin seeks to go two steps back — beyond the fragmentation of modern thought, and beyond the hierarchy introduced in the classical period — in order to reconstruct the tradition. The result is an attempt to liberate Western philosophy from its limitations, so that it can fulfill its original promise: to reveal the Logos of the world and to guide us in the art of living.

The beginning of this project is a re-examination of the concept of reason. Bookchin argues that we must restore to reason the significance that it had at the beginnings of Western thought: reason as Logos, as "an immanent feature of reality, indeed, as the organizing and motivating principle of the world" (p. 10). From the epistemological standpoint, reason means speculative knowledge, comprehension of the nature of this Logos. Yet, this knowledge is only possible because of the rationality inherent in reality itself. This "immanent world reason" signifies "the self-organizing attributes of substance; it is the latent subjectivity in the inorganic and organic levels of reality that reveal an inherent striving toward consciousness" (p. 11).

The conception that subjectivity somehow emerges full-blown from a purely objective world is highly problematic, and its implausibility is no doubt responsible for many capitulations to idealism or positivism. Yet, the alternative of coexisting objectivity and subjectivity at all levels of existence has always been present. Spinoza made a good case for such a view, and contemporary systems philosophy and process philosophy point strongly in the same direction. In Bookchin's version of this solution, Hegel's dictum that "substance is subjectivity" is divested of its idealist

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implications, and reinterpreted in terms of a naturalistic monism. "The term subjectivity expresses the fact that substance — at each level of its organization and in all its concrete forms — *actively* functions to maintain its identity, equilibrium, fecundity, and place in a given constellation of phenomena" (p. 275). Bookchin argues that reductionism (and, he might have added, subjectivism) denies "the high degree of nisus, of self-organization and self-creation inherent in non-human phenomena" (ibid.). This immanent teleology within all of nature is not interpreted as implying a rigid determinism. Rather, it signifies that each being has a coherent path of development which must be understood in relation to its dialectical interaction with other beings. The conceptions of organic totality and dialectical unfolding thus gain a much more comprehensive foundation than they had in Hegel's idealism or Marx's historical materialism, since they are rooted in the rationality of nature itself.

Nature, according to this view, is an organic unity-in-diversity in a process of self-development. Thus, "the true lies in the self-consummation of a *process* through its development, in the flowering of its latent particularities in their fullness or wholeness" (p. 32). This implies a concept of an "active nature" which is not a mere framework for *human* creative activity. The project of human domination of nature is illusory not only because human subjectivity reaches its limits over against the impervious objectivity of nature as other. Rather, it is more deeply illusory because it overlooks the inclusiveness of humanity in the underlying unity of an organic totality pervaded by activity and subjectivity.

In the scheme of the evolutionary development of subjectivity, humanity is "nature rendered self-conscious," an idea developed extensively in both Hegel and Marx. But for those thinkers the conception of humanity as universal self-consciousness is corrupted by the ideology of domination, and what Bookchin calls the "epistemology of rule." For Bookchin, our function is not to place ourselves above nature (whether as thinkers or producers), but rather to cooperate in the process of teleological development of which we are such a significant part. We should "make the implicit meanings in nature explicit," and "enhance its inner strivings toward greater variety" (p. 316). We must comprehend "the hidden desiderata of natural evolution," which are "to render nature more fecund, varied, whole, and integrated" (p. 342).

At this point, the connection between the metaphysics of ecology and ecological ethics and politics becomes evident. The conceptions of self-development and unity-in-diversity which emerge from a consideration of the rationality of nature must be given a concrete meaning in relation to the self and social institutions. The call for an "ecological society" is not, therefore, a proposal for a better solution to certain "environmental problems" that have arisen in modern society. Rather, it is a thoroughgoing metaphysical and moral critique of civilization, and a proposal to put an end to its rebellion against nature. But, for Bookchin, in order to understand a phenomenon critically, it is necessary to understand its origin and development. As he implicitly recognizes, it is also essential to understand its other. The understanding of civilization thus requires a comprehension of those societies out of which it arose, and about whose persistence "World History" has remained silent: tribal or, as Bookchin calls them, "organic societies."

The organic societies discussed by Bookchin are "spontaneously formed, noncoercive and egalitarian" (p. 5). Their merit does not consist in their spontaneous formation (which is, in fact, the basis for their limitations), but rather in the fact that their social institutions and value systems embody the principles of non-hierarchical unity-in-diversity implied in the ecological world view.

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Relying on the work of Paul Radin, Dorothy Lee and other anthropologists, Bookchin argues that these societies held social values emphasizing the uniqueness of each person, and stressing a cooperative mode of existence. Fundamental to the social structure is the requirement that the basic material and social needs of all be fulfilled. There is an "irreducible minimum" which is accorded to each merely on the basis of being a member of the community (p. 56). Leadership exists, but is non-coercive and functional in nature, and thus does not imply the existence of an institutionalized hierarchy. Given their moderate demands on nature and the emphasis on fulfillment of basic needs, such societies were able to avoid the generation of contradictory pleasure principles and reality principles. Thus, harsh instinctual repression was unnecessary and polymorphous perversity could be allowed relatively broad social expression. Finally, the cooperative nature of the community reflected the importance of the "nurturing sensibility" of women, who occupied a social and economic position of great consequence. The importance of women increased with the coming of the "fixed-soil community" in which food-gathering imagery, identified with the feminine, displaced hunting imagery in the symbolic repertoire of society (p. 58). In revering the feminine, the community paid hommage to such values as nurturance and non-objectifying love.

Bookchin believes that all societies derive their image of nature through a projection of their social structures. With their cooperative mode of existence and non-hierarchical values, these societies accordingly saw nature as a harmonious community of which the tribal community is an integral part. This outlook was made possible by the existing system of needs, which precluded the necessity of struggle with nature. As a consequence of these material, social, and imaginary factors, organic societies had a structure and consciousness which were "ecological." Still, they did not possess the self-consciousness and reflectiveness that Bookchin attributes to the "ecological society" that should be the goal of social transformative practice.

Bookchin emphasizes not only the merits of "the outlook of organic society," but also its severe restrictions. He is very careful to avoid idealization of primitive society. He contends that a reduction of scarcity to a question of "needs and resources" ultimately "capitulates to the very economistic stance it is meant to correct" (p. 67). Such criticism, directed at Sahlins in particular, seems unduly harsh, since his analysis of primitive "affluence" can serve an important critical function in uncovering the inadequacy of concepts of civilized "affluence," and it does not necessarily imply any desirability of a "return to the primitive" in a simplistic sense. Yet, Bookchin's point concerning primitive society is incisive. Whatever their achievements, one should never overlook their relative poverty of needs, and their failure to develop "humanity's obvious potentialities for producing a rich literary tradition, science, a sense of place, and a broad concept of shared humanity."

One of the most intriguing questions taken up by Bookchin is the process by which hierarchy and domination arose out of the organic societies that he describes. He contends that previous theories of the origin of systems of domination have usually been simplistic, whether they have posited an economic basis (e.g., that ruling classes arose when a sufficient surplus was generated to allow appropriation by a segment of society), or a political basis (e.g., that ruling classes established themselves through conquest, after which they were able continuously to extract a surplus from the labor of the subjected group).

Bookchin argues for a complex theory of the gradual emergence of social hierarchy and the state. He concedes that certain material preconditions are necessary, and that

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such phenomena as the development of the plow and the use of animal labor must be given due recognition. Yet, there is no simple correlation between technical development and the growth of hierarchy or the rise of the state. Some societies with relatively greater technological advances retained much of their traditional structure, while others, like the Aztecs, developed class systems in the absence of many such technological changes. Similarly, the idea of conquest does not explain why societies in which centralized rule was established developed different degrees of hierarchy, and partial or full formation of a state. Bookchin contends that an adequate theory must recognize the emergence of class society and the state out of organic society to be the result of a complex dialectic, and must consider all the technical, political, economic, cultural, psychological, and epistemological factors that conditioned such a development.

Most previous theories of the rise of hierarchy have strongly emphasized the "objective" factors (the technical, economic, and political ones). Yet, in Bookchin's view, "rulership rested less on proprietorship, personal possessions, wealth, and acquisition — in short, the *objects* that confer power — than it did on the symbolic weight of status, communal representation, religious authority, and the disaccumulation of goods..." (p. 73). Overlooking this cultural context makes the specific modes of development of hierarchy incomprehensible, and creates the illusion of greater discontinuities between social forms than actually existed. What the simplistic position ignores is the persistence of values carried over from organic society, and their frequent manifestation in reactions against the rationalization and politicization of social relations.

There is thus a long history of the evolution of the system of domination, and an accompanying history of resistance to it on behalf of freedom and communal values.

While Bookchin's wide-ranging discussion of the emergence of hierarchy cannot be fully outlined here, some of the key points should be mentioned. He notes the potential for generating power relations inherent in the early division of labor, in which the male specialized in hunting and defense. Society "tended to assimilate his temperament as a hunter, a guardian, and eventually as a warrior" (p. 78). A second source of power is in the tendency of the old to transform their natural authority into hierarchical social position, in order to gain security and self-protection. They desire social power as a substitute for their declining physical power; consequently, their precarious position produces "seeds for the hatred of eros and the body" (p. 82). Shamanism intensifies hierarchical development, since it concentrates the power of the gerontocracy in the hands of an exclusive segment of society which has a "specialization in fear" (p. 83).

While these phenomena could be contained within the structure of organic society, leaving its kinship-based communal organization and its delicate relations with nature relatively undisturbed, the growth of a true class system effects a more thorough social transformation. To account for such vast changes one must examine such phenomena as "the emergence of the city, the State, an authoritarian technics, and a highly organized market economy" (p. 89). But it also demands that attention be given to the mechanisms producing "a repressive sensibility and body of values" in which reality was reconceptualized "along lines of command and obedience" (ibid.). Bookchin calls such systems of valuation "epistemologies of rule."

The ensuing analysis of the rise of class society exhibits the complex dialectic between objective and subjective factors (factors which are, indeed, so interrelated that

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they can only be separated for purposes of analysis, as Bookchin later shows in his analysis of technology). In the realm of religion, anthropomorphic deities begin to displace remaining animistic values, and a formalized priesthood and priestly class replaces Shamanism. The values of priest and warrior increasingly become the dominant symbolic forces in society, but while the priesthood could exist within a prescribed realm, the asendency of the warriors and their values meant true class dominance over the whole of society, and required fundamental transformation of its character. For Bookchin, the rise of the city as a contributing factor in these developments "can hardly be overemphasized." The city "provided the territory for territorialism, the civic institutions for citizenship, the marketplace for elaborate forms of exchange, the exclusivity of quarters and neighborhoods for classes, and monumental structures for the state" (p. 97).

While Bookchin's analysis of the rise of hierarchy is impressive, there is a tendency to burden the theory with some hasty generalizations about its applicability. Granted that an adequate explanation requires consideration of an ensemble of factors that are usually over- or underemphasized, is it true that the relative weight attributed to the factors (which militates against the thesis of rapid emergence) is necessarily correct for all cases? Granted, for example, that Oppenheimer was wrong when he concluded that conquest of sedentary agrarian societies by predatory nomadic groups is the basis for the rise of "the state" and class society, is it not possible that conquest can be a revolutionary transforming force in some cases in which other factors have been relatively "underdeveloped?" Similarly, while Carneiro's theory seems simplistic, Bookchin might have devoted more attention to demographic questions. Clastres, for example, while rejecting the idea of a transition from the chieftainship to the state based on population influences, attributes to population increase much of the responsibility for expanded hierarchical tendencies *within* the chieftainship. Further exploration of topics such as these could have strengthened Bookchin's analysis.

Bookchin's recent work has moved consistently in the direction of a comprehensive analysis of systems of technics in their political, economic, cultural, and ecological context. The present work is particularly illuminating on the cultural context of technology. It emphasizes the extent to which meanings and symbols are embedded in "the technical," and explores the relation between technics (as objective social forces) and technical rationality (both as a system of organization and as a way of knowing) in the constitution of that realm.

The discussion of meanings and technics notes the permeation of all acitivity by cultural reason. Bookchin argues, for example, that to understand the nature of "skill" in Eskimo society, conceptions of technical proficiency and instrumental action are not sufficient. In addition, one must understand the highly developed conceptions of community and person that underlie the process of production. The narrow view of the technical leads to invalid generalizations concerning the effects of technological development. Surface similarities may disguise underlying diversities in meanings, and dissimilar social forms may be confounded. While technological determinism encounters numerous empirical difficulties, this account helps explain its theoretical inadequacy.

An understanding of the "technical" in any historical period requires attention to many phenomena other than tools, machines, or technologies in any narrow sense. If, as Ellul and other technological pessimists have argued, technique has indeed become an increasingly dominant force in modern society, it is not merely because of the size, or even the complexity and incomprehensibility of technologies. Neither is it because technology is inherently dehumanizing. Rather, it is in large part a consequence of the

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fact that capital and the bureaucratic state, the final products of the long evolution of hierarchy, have intruded technical rationality into every sphere of human existence, so that the technical sphere ultimately invades consciousness, personality, and the most intimate human relations.

Any assessment of the destructive and liberatory effects of such developments as capitalism, the modern state, and advanced technology must take into account both the expansion of possibilities which has taken place, and the corrosive effects on the self, human culture, and nature. Bookchin cautions capitalist and Marxist devotees of the dogmas of progress and modernity against their ill-considered propensity "to elevate a deadening, homogenizing mass media over the spiritual yearning elicited by religious ceremonies, a mechanistic scientism over a colorful mythopoeic sensibility, and an icy indifference to the fate of one's immediate neighbors over a richly interwined system of mutual aid" (p. 216). No doubt some will find in passages like this one evidence of a "Jewish Messianic" outlook that delights in overdrawn oppositions between Good and Evil, and betrays an atavism that is truly regressive. Yet, such attempts to point out dramatically the magnitude of the loss of cultural richness and organic interrelation should not simplemindedly be equated with rejection of any advances in modern society. In fact, Bookchin argues that "the material dispensation of capitalism" presents us with the potential for "the broadest conception of freedom known thus far: the autonomous individual's freedom to shape material life in a form that is...ecological, rational, and artistic" (p. 218).

In short, the realm of freedom is within our reach. The material basis, in the sense of the technology for freedom and abundance, is within our grasp, yet the social forms and consciousness to realize such a goal are as yet lacking. Bookchin feaçs that an obsession with technical development, including "alternative technologies," will obscure this issue. The key question is not scale, but rather the creation of an emancipatory society which can incorporate the technology appropriate to it (small is not necessarily beautiful, and there is no "appropriate technology" *tout court*). Technology cannot be separated from culture, and the creation of liberatory technology therefore implies not only the generation of new designs, but also new meanings. The former can easily be assimilated into the system of instrumental rationality.

What, then, is Bookchin's conception of freedom? In large part, it is a reconstruction of the Hegelian view, in whibh freedom is seen as "uninhibited volition and self-consciousness" (p. 36). But while Hegel vitiated the conception through idealism, Bookchin wishes to save its organicist content (lost in later radical thought) while giving it concrete psychological, cultural, and political meaning. The goal of social practice is the creation of the developed person who can participate actively in a community of self-realizing beings. Such a process of self-formation is the means by which the historically conditioned contradictions between individual will and desire and social need (or pleasure principle and reality principle) can finally be overcome. This requires a movement from the "fetishism of needs" to a situation in which needs become consciously directed, so that a truly rational society can finally be achieved.

As in his previous work, Bookchin finds in past historical experiments much evidence concerning human possibilities. Here, however, he goes further and presents an extensive "history of freedom," which is counterposed to the "legacy of domination" which is so much more prominent in world history. Many familiar examples appear: the Greek Polis, the sections of the early French Revolution, the New England town meetings, the Paris Commune, the collectives of the Spanish Revolu-

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tion, and so forth. Where the discussion is most enlightening, though, is in the presentation of evidence of a continuing tradition of libertarian and communal strivings throughout the Middle Ages and the early modern period. Here we find a submerged tradition of freedom, in which heretics, peasants, and, finally, radical Protestant sects rebelled against the established order. While most studies of political thought and practice in the West recognize this tradition (if at all) merely with a perfunctory comment on Winstanley and the Diggers, Bookchin shows it to be quite extensive, and to include an astounding variety of groups with hedonistic, egalitarian, communitarian and anarchistic values. In the course of this discussion, he demonstrates the complexities of the religious consciousness, which contains not only the conservative, repressive, and ideological elements usually emphasized by the Left, but also a critical and utopian dimension with vast revolutionary potential.

Bookchin continues to recognize the Polis to be superior in many ways to other historical models, in so far as its democratic aspects can be extricated from its basis in class domination. What he admires most is its success in nurturing a highly individualized social self by cultivating a balance between values like civic duty, developed personality, and freedom. A responsible self and an active citizenry were consciously created by design" through the system of assemblies, councils, courts, and other institutions in which direct democracy, rotation of offices, and other participatory processes prevailed.

Bookchin argues that our task today is to recreate such a social self and active citizenry, on a universalistic rather than a class basis. He contends that liberatory politics must be based on the "unmediated control over public life" that can only issue from direct action and direct democracy. Direct action is not seen as a *tactic* that can be judged on purely instrumentalist criteria. Rather it is a process of training for "selfhood, self-assertiveness, and sensibility for direct democracy" (p. 132). Direct action does not imply romanticist idealization of flamboyant deeds. Instead, it signifies a deep and enduring commitment to the immediate creation of modes of thought, feeling, and action which are alternatives to those conditioned by the system of domination. Daily life, says Bookchin, must be accepted as "a calling," in which liberatory institutions founded on cooperation, mutual aid, and personalism are created and chosen over those based on bureaucratic and market values. The hope for a total transformation of society must be maintained. Yet, even when there is no immediate prospect of rapid dissolution of hierarchical institutions it is necessary to "defined society's molecular base" in whatever way possible, whether through the creation of non-dominating personal relations, the development of communal and cooperative institutions, or by active resistance to the domination of humanity and nature. Without such direct action there will be no "body politic" in the sense of a community of selves capable of managing society, and such terms as democracy and revolution will only be hollow slogans.

Bookchin is one of the few radical social theorists today who continues to offer a hopeful vision of fundamental social transformation, while remaining critical of the problematic of revolution as it has been presented in the past. While he continues to use the term, his conception of social change is qualitatively different from the standard revolutionary ideologies, which succumb to varying degrees of mechanism, instrumentalism, and reification. Given Bookchin's conception of the ecological society, the true project of humanity must be the *regeneration* of the organic fabric of both society and nature — as mind, desire, and imagination are liberated from the legacy of domination.

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The Ecology of Freedom is an eloquent, erudite, and highly ambitious work. Because of its bold aspirations, it often leaves gaps. Its monistic metaphysics requires a more sophisticated confrontation of the intricacies of the mind-body problem. The theory of the formation of the self demands a deeper analysis of the processes of psychological development. Ecological ethics must deal more forthrightly with the issue of the fact-value dichotomy and how to avoid it. The nature of liberatory practice must be given a great deal more specificity. But no single book can take on all these problems, and an important function of this one is to give further research in these areas a sense of direction and of social purpose.

If radical social theory is to have today any of the vitality that it possessed in the past, Bookchin's attempt to ground it in a comprehensive view of reality, and to relate it authentically to such movements as ecology, community organization, and feminism will be an enormous contribution. Whatever one's perspective, one is likely to find in it much material for worthwhile reflection on the human condition. For many who are disillusioned with the reigning traditions of materialism, idealism, and dualism, and who find in ecological, organicist, and process thought some intimations of an escape from the limitations of Western humanism and scientism, the work will be of major significance. In any case, it deserves a thoughtful reading.

John Clark

Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: An Essay in Moral Theory* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).

Throughout his career, MacIntyre has argued "against the self-images of the age," understood as Marxism, psychoanalysis, Christianity, positivist social science, and ahistorical moral philosophy. In his recent book, *After Virtue*, MacIntryre's iconoclasm has found new targets, such as "emotivism" and its "social content" of "bureaucratic individualism." For MacIntyre, these complementary forms of moral discourse and social life represent the moral bankruptcy of the West today. They inhibit civility and prevent practical agreement on a conception of justice, making this a time of ethical disarray, an age that is "after virtue." But unlike MacIntyre's previous works, *After Virtue* aspires to be more than criticism. It combines a critique of the present with an interpretation of the Western moral heritage into a new image for our age: if we tap the "classical tradition of the virtues," especially the intellectual and moral resources of Aristotle, St. Benedict, Adam Ferguson, and Trotsky, we will be able to construct "new forms of community" that will sustain us during "the coming ages of barbarism and darkness."

Despite this startling prophecy, girding MacIntyre's critical remarks are familiar complaints about liberalism, a term that comfortably embraces "emotivism" and "bureaucratic individualism." The originality of *After Virtue* lies elsewhere, namely, in MacIntyre's historical foundation for ethical renewal. Yet, his interpretation of the history of "classical morality" and the tradition of the virtues presents a distorted picture of the past. It isolates the Western moral tradition from its political tradition and historical dynamic so as to produce a rationalized, depoliticized, and fundamentally conservative approach to the history of ethics and to our present moral and political

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predicament. His Aristotle comes without the *polis*, his St. Augustine without a Christian society, his Adam Ferguson without republicanism, his Trotsky without communism, and his virtue without politics.

The substance of MacIntyre's critique of modernity originates in the charge that today's "language of morality" is in a "state of grave disorder." In the very beginning of *After Virtue*, MacIntyre attempts to elicit the reader's assent to this disturbing diagnosis by appealing to the metaphor of an imaginary world in which the natural sciences have suffered a catastrophe. The theoretical rubric for the knowledge and practice of natural science has been lost and all that remains are fragments: the bits of scientific knowledge that still extist no longer seem to fit together; the tools that have not been destroyed cannot be put to any productive use; the accepted canons of experimentation and verification, by which scientists understood themselves as a part of a common enterprise, have been forgotten. For MacIntyre, morality today functions as if it has already suffered the effects of such a catastrophe. The theoretical and social context in which morality made sense and had power has disappeared. Only fragments of a lost tradition have survived.

The telltale sign of the current moral disarray is the sense that there is "no rational way of securing moral agreement in our culture." Arguments for the rights of the fetus clash with those for the rights of the mother. Rawlsian claims about the need for greater equality in the distribution of quantifiable resources battle Nozickian claims to property entitlements. The arguments are incommensurable. Why? Because, for MacIntyre, the moral systems underlying these claims have rejected the ethical importance of the virtues. The possession and practice of virtue bears no integral relation to the achievement of common goods for the individual or society. Such individualistic moral claims justified in the impersonal, ahistorical language of ethical rules and principles are empty in that there is no "rational" way of adjudicating diverse moral claims that flow from the conflicts of everyday life. In other words, the nature of rationality in moral discourse becomes instrumental rather than substantive, with the result that the moral *telos* of persons splinters, becoming the fulfillment of private desires instead of the realization of a common good.

This philosophical situation has social corollaries. "Modern politics," MacIntyre asserts, is "civil war carried on by other means." Ultimately, for MacIntyre, moral and political arguments today reduce to a battle of wills, desires, and preferences, the outcome of which is determined by force or necessity rather than reason. Indeed, these "emotivist" roots of current moral discourse make any pretense to rationality in moral argument a mockery of morality itself. This era of hollowed-out morality may be depicted as a time when the *use* of moral language completely belies its apparent *meaning*, that is, its evocation of objective, authoritative standards for moral practice.

Such impossible conditions for substantive moral agreement, MacIntyre believes, are not permanent features of Western society. They are uniquely modern phenomena and indicate moral decline, the disappearance of social and philosophical contents that once brought coherence and objectivity to the domain of moral reasoning. MacIntyre builds his theory of moral decline on the assumed existence of an objective entity called morality, the truth of which persists throughout human space and time, as well as the belief that at an early state in the history of any given culture, its moral beliefs exhibit a certain coherence, consistency, and objectivity. Indeed, the scientific content of the opening fantasy in *After Virtue* reveals the pillars of MacIntyre's argument to come. Like a forgotten law of gravity in MacIntyre's imaginary illustration, morality still exists; what prevents our current knowledge and use of it is the state of our concep-

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tual equipment. The difficult but not impossible task before us is the reinvention of the necessary tools for moral practice and the rediscovery of morality's basic tenents.

MacIntyre's theory of morality in history is designed to replace any feintly neo-Marxist theory of historical dialectics while giving a Mannheimian regard to the influence of historical constraints on the form and content of moral ideas at any one time. This non-dialectical relation of history and philosophy reflects MacIntyre's long-standing analytical distinctions between philosophy and society, thought and action, the heuristic aim of which has seemed to be securing an autonomous objectivity for a moral domain that nonetheless corresponds to practical life. MacIntyre's approach resembles that of another conservative moral and political philosopher of the twentieth century, Leo Strauss. Both have criticized scientism in the study of man only to respond by objectifying the humanities. Each attempts to increase the merit and exalt the dignity of his theory of human good by rooting its value in the currency of past golden ages.

The direct appropriation for current use of moral schemes prevalent in long-gone historical eras is questionable. But MacIntyre does not hesitate. Just as he charges that the various forms of emotivist moral justification cannot be "rationally sustained," Mac Intyre claims that his recovery of the classical tradition of the virtues will "rationally vindicate" the form of moral language, theory, and practice that he advocates. It must be kept in mind, therefore, that the historicity of MacIntyre's inquiry is shaped by a conception of virtually transcendental rationality for which he gives no justification or rationale (either in *After Virtue* or in his previous work, although he promises that one is now on the way. While MacIntyre argues that all moral philosophers since the end of the Middle Ages have mistakenly made ahistorical arguments without recognizing the social motivations of their claims, his own view relies on the belief that the substance of his argument miraculously avoids this fatal flaw.

To accomplish the aim of resurrecting what we once had, the greatest progress will come from recognizing what has been lost. MacIntyre envisions *After Virtue* as providing the greatest help towards such recognition. As a result, this nostalgic book assumes the format of an archeological dig and takes its readers toward the fundamentals of morality, previously hidden by the history of human action that has transpired since the end of the Middle Ages. The first third of MacIntyre's book reinterprets the philosophy and "social content" of moral discourse, beginning with the emergence of Protestantism and moving into the twentieth century. The second third describes the history of the classical tradition of the virtues, to which we moderns must now appeal. And the final portion articulates the theoretical context within such such a history can become meaningful and useful to us.

MacIntyre believes that the moral decline of the West — the victory of instrumental over substantive rationality, the evisceration of moral discourse, and the rise of emotivism — began with the attacks of Jensenists and Protestants against the synthesis of Aristotle and Christianity in the moral culture of the Middle Ages (the tail-end of the first stage of morality in the West, its "classical tradition of morality"). This critique stems from the view that human reason cannot supply any "genuine comprehension of man's true end." Reason becomes "powerless to correct our passions." Without a shared belief in a *telos* for human life applicable to individuals and society as a whole, the ability to form objective judgments of truth and falsity about ways to achieve that end atrophies, and the practical function of morality becomes obsolete. Consequently, according to MacIntyre. The individual's personal end, become opaque to criticism from the standpoint of human good.

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Having achieved this "liberation" of the individual from the constraints of a morally patterned social life, MacIntyre's "Western man" enters the second stage in his moral history. This period coincides with the birth of scientific inquiry as a method for discovering truths about nature and of capitalism as the major force controlling economic relations (at least). However, MacIntyre does not suggest that the power of capitalism or the authority of science played a forceful role in determining the "power" of reason in moral theory and practice; each is simply treated as a development that parallels developments in the history of moral ideas. He simply tells us that after the disintegration of the medieval, theistic version of classical morality (otherwise known as the Renaissance and Reformation), the second stage — the project of the Enlightenment — begins.

MacIntyre takes the Enlightenment to be a series of doomed attempts to salvage a system of justification for the self as an autonomous moral agent without sacrificing its newly won independence. For MacInyre, this project failed because it tried to synthesize two contradictory premises. One referred to beliefs about human nature that demoted the moral power and social authority of reason. The other premise entailed the transformation of the rational conditions for moral justification from the "classical" articulation of virtue to the modern assertion of moral rules. A "contradiction" results because it is impossible to harmonize "facts" about such a human nature with "values" of morality that appear as moral rules. An opposition between "is" and "ought," "fact" and "value" had emerged. Though marshalled in my Hume as a logical argument in moral philosophy, the categorical isolation of these terms, for MacIntyre, broke the connection between moral language as an authoritative social force and a practical context of shared social meanings.

The third state continues the process of moral decline by further dissipating the tradition of moral vaules, which the fathers and descendants of the Enlightenment at least had tried unsuccessfully to defend. MacIntyre states that it began in the early twentieth century with the "unmasking" of intuition by G.E. Moore and of motivation by Sigmund Freund. But the most radical representative of these pure forms of emotivism, for MacIntyre, preceded them: Friedrich Nietzsche, who, at the same time, assulted the very honesty and authenticity of using moral language rooted in emotivist principles.

Reinforcing this moral decline and reflecting the tenets of emotivism, according to MacIntyre, are the basic forms of social life in the twentieth century. And for him, twentieth century has its theoretical exponent in Max Weber, its international social form in "bureaucratic individualism," its intellectual ethos in the separation of fact and value for the sake of lawlike, predictive social science, and its personification in social "characters" whom MacIntyre identifies as the aesthete, manager, protester, therapist, and expert. Each of these features of modernity damages the authority of moral discourse. By collapsing the distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative social relations, they disconnect the realm of moral authority from any effective social role. For example, the aesthete's ends in life vary without constraint because of their dependence on his or her unlimited goal of self-expression. This makes choice a stylistic, rather than a morally substantive, affair. Or, to take another character, a "rational" bureaucratic manager employs a kind of expertise that supposedly manipulates means alone, leaving the realm of moral ends unperverted (if untouched). But because of the absence of any socially accepted standards for rational criticism in the selection of ends for bureaucratic success, except in terms of profitability and efficiency, the substantive content of ends becomes as readily manipul-

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able as the means designed to realize them. Finally, MacIntyre claims that the large-scale structure of organized life in modern Western societies, which Weber so well understood, blends power and authority into a hierarchy of rationalized expertise that precludes morality from exerting social power.

Despite the ease with which MacIntyre reduces theorists, theories, and social existence into his own categories, and the familiarity of many of his arguments, his notion of bureaucratic individualism indicates an important feature of modernity, namely, the complementarity of personal expression and bureaucratic authority. The hegemony of bureaucratic structures of corporate and governmental authority creates a social framework in which the mere sovereignty of personal choice becomes the benchmark of moral practice, but only because the basic decisions concerning the organization of society already have been made. In MacIntyre's version of this matrix of bureaucratic power and moral impotence, however, something else is unique that is more troublesome. One might wonder about who is in charge of these powerful structures so supportive of bureaucratic individualism and emotivism, about what political ends are served by endowing "characters" such as the psychological therapist and bureaucratic expert with the aura of authoritative competence while making them assume a posture of moral neutrality. But MacIntyre does not picture this social environment in such a way that one can ascribe political responsibility for this unsavory state of affairs or encourage remedial political action. He does not confront the realities of power in our past or present economic, social, and political life. MacIntyre believes that individuals, classes, or forms of institutional power that exercise de facto moral and political authority are not at fault because actually they are not in control. For MacIntyre, no one is in control. He alleges that this is the reality of the uses of organizational power behind the "masquerade" of social sciences that presume to provide organizational structures and society's authoritative "characters" with meaning, legitimation, and intellectual tools for morally neutral, socially competent control. The only way out of the mess, for MacIntyre, is by recovering the tradition of the virtues that once gave moral coherence to social life. When their authority is restored, a rational and moral social order can reappear.

MacIntyre's account of the classical tradition of the virtues reconstructs three stages in ancient Greece as well as the nature of the virtues in the Middle Ages. His treatment of ancient Greece deserves special scrutiny because his major claims about the virtues in particular and morality in general flow from this analysis.

Homeric society contributes to MacIntyre's tradition of the virtues in three important ways. First, there was a one-to-one correspondence between the exercise of virtue and the performance of a social role. Failing to be virtuous meant failing to live up to the requirements of one's social role. Since clear standards existed among members of this class for evaluating success in the performance of these heavily conscribed actions, evaluating the proper way to exercise virtue could be objectively determined. Secondly, Homer's depiction of the virtues appears in the form of an epic, and story-telling is the means by which the society represented in Homer's poems assumes a unitary form. This is crucial for MacIntyre's purposes, because to him a morally informed human *telos* also assumes the shape of a narrative, with a beginning, middle, and end — whether the particular narrative form is epic poetry, dramatic prose, or philosophical exposition. Thirdly, Homeric, heroic virtue has a particularistic quality. Because of its integral relation to the structure of social life, the exercise of such virtue was not governed by universal rules.

MacIntyre's interpretation of the Homeric tradition, however, is mistaken and self-

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serving. He ignores the class component of Homeric virtue. Homer applied the term virtue (*arete*) only to activities of the aristocratic class; the basic economic functions of society, which they did not perform, did not qualify as expressive of virtue. By this omission, MacInyre can deny that the "objective" expression of heroic virtue automatically involved the enactment of relations of domination between the aristocratic class and the rest of Homeric society. It offers him an argument against Nietzsche, who appealed to Homeric, heroic virtue as the affirmation of *individual* will over and above "inferior" human beings (in order to offer a prototype for the life of an Übermensch who scorned the authority of moral objectivity). MacIntyre's use of Homer to illustrate social conditions of moral rationality, authority, and objectivity conceals the fact that the society of heroes portrayed in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* was about to disintegrate. Moreover, there is nothing terribly splendid in Homer's own time. MacIntyre's fond recollection of the society in the Homeric poems completely overlooks the fact that the bard described a war-torn world whose cohesion depended on a rigidly hierarchical social structure.

The next stage in the ancient Greek history of the virtues is classical, democratic Athens, whose moral discourse is represented in *After Virtue* by the beliefs of the sophists, tragedians, and Plato. The challenge for the exercise of virtue in this era no longer consisted in the task of maintaining one's honor as a warrior but of being a good man and a good citizen. This required a distancing of the self from the conventions of social performance without destroying the belief in there being a rational, objective way to lead a virtuous life. But MacIntyre does not dwell on this highly political era of ancient Greek life, for it is Aristotle (the third stage of the virtues in ancient Greece) from whom MacIntyre draws most of his ideas. The Philosopher's teleological but non-consequentialist ethics, for MacIntyre, "summarizes" the classical tradition of the virtues. His work embodies the form of ethical theory that, in the face of Nietzsche, can be rationally and practically vindicated. Like his reading of Homer, however, his interpretation of Aristotle is peculiarly one-side.

Four aspects of Aristotle's thought are particularly significant for MacIntyre. First, he denied the existence of an irreconcilable conflict between reason and desire, and he understood the exercise of practical reason as the manner in which human desires could be actually fulfilled. Secondly, Aristotle linked the virtues of character to the exercise of practical reason, so that ethical action was constitutive of rational action in achieving human happiness, man's *telos*. Thirdly, by portraying the exercise of practical reason in terms of the dilemmas of choice, Aristotle integrated a theory about the potentially tragic dynamic of personal choice into a universal moral system. Fourthly, the central role of the virtues in Aristotle's thought makes them, rather than moral or legal rules, the foundation for morality.

To be sure, MacIntyre believes that a few problems sully Aristotle's thought. These involve Aristotle's connection of ethical teleology to biology, his presumption of the fundamental unity of the virtues, which prevents him from acknowledging the inevitability of tragic conflict in moral choice, the linkage between his portrayal of the virtues and his social attachments to his own class and society, and his failure to recognize how his own beliefs about specific ways of realizing the human *telos* may be part of a changing, growing tradition. Because of MacIntyre's rationalism, however, one can filter this Aristotelian dross without damaging the central truths of his thought. Thus, MacIntyre manages to derive something called Aristotelianism, whose basic structure can incorporate historicity and embrace the new conception of the virtues inaugurated by Judaic theism and Christian ethics, including the doctrines of sin

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and forgiveness, the virtues of charity and humility. This historicized, theological Aristotelianism flourishes in the last stage of MacIntyre's classical tradition of the virtues, namely the medieval Christian, Jewish, and Islamic cultures. They provided the last social contexts in which classical morality thrived before it succumbed to the assault of the incoherent emotivist project of modernity.

Aristotle can become so fungible, so adaptable to these highly diverse social settings because MacIntyre has stripped away the essential, political dimension of ancient Greek ethics. He denies the class dimension of Homeric virtue; he generally ignores the democratic background to the ethical thought of the sophists, the tragedians, Plato, and Aristotle; he hardly mentions Aristotle's beliefs regarding the importance of political deliberation and participation to the life of the good man and the good citizen. MacIntyre's reading of Aristotle is notable for its concentration on the *Nicomachean Ethics* and avoidance of the *Politics*, whose subject matter Aristotle deemed integral to the domain of ethical theory and practice. Indeed, it was by a similar process of depoliticizing Aristotle that Aquinas absorbed his ethical thought into Cahtolicism, since the practical reason and virtue of the Aristotelian good citizen ultimately had to be controlled by the doctrines of the Church.

As the book returns to the modern era, MacIntyre tries to find a new morality for the late twentieth century that is true to the classical tradition of the virtues. He attempts to distill the "essence" of that tradition into a "core concept" of the virtues, one that will regenerate moral theory and practice. The basic justification for this part of MacIntyre's enterprise (which emphasizes the rationalism in his venture as a whole) reduces to the following: since emotivism characterizes the theoretical underpinning of contemporary social life, because it is morally bankrupt, and because the only alternative to it is either the radical, Nietzschian denial of classical and modern morality altogether or a renewed Aristotelianism, MacIntyre asserts that if Aristotle can be rationally vindicated "the whole Nietzschian enterprise" becomes "pointless," thereby opening the way to a new kind of Aritstotelian ethics for our time.

This new moral system depends on a series of definitions that evoke MacIntyre's depoliticized Aristotelianism. First, virtues are practices, that is, systematic activities that possess objective standards for their competent performance —as in the practice of chess, portrait-painting, or prostitution. However, all practices are not virtuous; virtues are those dispositions whose exercise leads to "the achievement of goods internal to practices." Thus, the exercise of the virtues may inhibit the acquisition of external goods, such as those obtained in prostitution: its good, by definition a kind of contractual self-sacrifice, is external rather than internal to the practice. Secondly, for MacIntyre, the practice of a virtue, because of its need for "objective" social recognition, requires not only its affirmation by others but their cooperation as well. Otherwise, the many social projects that necessitate the associated activity of individuals would not be supportive of the virtues. Finally, in order for someone to realize his *telos*, his life must exhibit a kind of unity; thus, the exercise of the virtues must assume a kind of unity — for MacIntyre, a "narrative unity."

The contrast between MacIntyre's scheme and classical Greek ethics could not be clearer. First, the most complete practice of Platonic and Aristotelian virtue resulted in the exercise of political sovereignty. Plato's and Aristotle's ethics had its ultimate practical expression in the virtuous actions of the philosopher-guardian or the good statesman, whereas MacIntyre's revived Aristotelianism shuns the basic politics of modern society as a domain for virtuous practice. He believes that no modern political move-

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ment seeking fundamental institutional change can be moral. (This, says MacIntyre, is the lesson of Trotsky.) In addition, MacIntyre's literary, formal, "narrative" unity is a frail skeleton compared to the unified life for Aristotle's ethical man, which depended on a practical unity in society that was expressed politically in the rule by good citizens of their common life.

What does MacIntyre leave us to do if we should try to live his kind of virtuous life today? How does one achieve a life of ethical unity in today's society, whose moral fragmentation is so well reflected in the contortions of liberal ethics and enforced by the hegemonic structures of corporate and governmental organizations? How does one overcome the genuine modern experience of feeling the impossibility of rationally deliberating and resolving differences between conflicting moral and political claims? The key, for MacIntyre, is rejection —rejection of the economic order, because its "individualism,...acquisitiveness, and...elevation of the values of the market to a central social place" is at variance with the tradition of the virtues; rejection of the modern political order too, because today's governments, which rely for their support not on the moral consensus of their citizens but from "a set of institutional arrangements for imposing bureaucratic unity on a society which lacks a genuine moral consensus," reject the tradition of the virtues and make "the nature of political obligation systematically unclear."

The good life, according to MacIntyre, should consist in small-scale community life —not as a new kind of social organization aimed at replacing modern structures of power, but as a kind of de-Christianized monasticism within the framework of the welfare state. MacIntyre would deny the charge that his resolution to our moral dilemmas is anti-political. He believes that his theory justifies a new "politics of relevance." But in what does it consist? All that he relates in *After Virtue* as practical examples of a cooperative life of virtue involves concentrating our moral energies on preserving the rule of law, building hospitals, running art galleries, and sustaining schools and universities. Having railed against the morality of our time without addressing its economic and political causes, MacIntyre appropriately responds to the crisis of modernity by abandoning the struggle to return virtue to our political life, by allowing society's current, dominant forces to wield the basic levers of power, and by encouraging us to revive the moral nature of our existence at the margins of society. Such a new society not only exists after virtue but after politics as well.

To believe that society as a whole could become better through radical economic, social, and political change is, for MacIntyre, self-delusion. It falsely assumes the existence of moral resources in our tradition that, in their politically actualized form, could be true to the virtues. Unfortunately, MacIntyre does not tell us why he is so confident about the potency and wisdom of the moral resources he seeks to tap — why, that is, he can be so comfortable with the prospect of a new struggle for classical virtue that sanctions the resolution of the fundamental political struggles of our time by the reigning powers that be. Despite the radical pretensions of MacIntyre's critique of the moral incoherence and hypocrisy of modern Western society, his response to it only manages to justify political withdrawal without confronting the powerful institutional structures that legitimate the moral sophistry of our time. Such willingness to preserve established political structures characterizes conservative thought, and MacIntyre's new book is one of its many recent expressions. The major contribution of *After Virtue* ultimately consists in its portrayal of a new ethos of moral conservatism for the disaffected idealists of modernity.

John R. Wallach

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